Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, etc.

Jurisdiction to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted, and once jurisdiction is acquired, it remains with the court until the case is finally determined; a subsequent statute removing jurisdiction will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached unless express prohibitory words are used.

The case involves a criminal complaint for direct assault upon a person in authority filed by respondent Eulalia Banayat, a head teacher, against petitioner Porfirio Rilloraza. The complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, for an offense allegedly committed in Naguilian, La Union. The jurisdictional question arose from the interplay of two amendatory statutes to the Judiciary Act of 1948: Republic Act 2613, which took effect on August 1, 1959, and Republic Act 3828, which took effect on June 22, 1963, four days after the criminal complaint was lodged. The offense charged, direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, carries a penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos.

On June 18, 1963, respondent Eulalia Banayat, a head teacher, filed a criminal complaint in the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, charging petitioner Porfirio Rilloraza with the crime of direct assault upon a person in authority, allegedly committed in Naguilian, La Union. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4987 of the Justice of the Peace Court of San Fernando, La Union, entitled "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Dr. Porfirio Rilloraza, accused."

On February 7, 1964, petitioner moved to quash the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. Hearing on the merits then commenced in the municipal court's exercise of original jurisdiction, and three prosecution witnesses were able to testify, with a stenographic record of their testimony taken. On June 3, 1964, petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of La Union on certiorari and prohibition, docketed as Civil Case No. 1961, entitled "Porfirio Rilloraza, petitioner, vs. Judge Pedro Arciaga, in his capacity as Judge, Municipal Court, San Fernando, La Union, and Eulalia Banayat, respondents."

On October 8, 1964, the Court of First Instance of La Union issued an order declaring the proceedings conducted by the respondent municipal judge null and void, directing him to desist from continuing with the hearing of the case, and ordering the transmission of the record to the Municipal Court of Naguilian, La Union, for the necessary preliminary investigation. The lower court reasoned that Republic Act 3828, which took effect on June 22, 1963 — four days after the criminal complaint was lodged — limited the jurisdiction of municipal courts in provincial capitals to crimes committed within their respective jurisdictions, and that when a justice of the peace court goes beyond the limits of the jurisdiction it possesses at the time of trial, its actuation may be questioned. The lower court also relied on Section 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Hence, the present appeal.

• Jurisdiction at Time of Filing: Petitioner argued that the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, lacked jurisdiction over the case because Republic Act 3828, which took effect on June 22, 1963, limited municipal court jurisdiction to offenses committed within their respective jurisdictions, and the offense was allegedly committed in Naguilian, La Union.
• Retroactive Application: Petitioner argued that Republic Act 3828 is penal in nature and should be given retroactive effect as it is favorable to the accused, since under the new law he would be afforded all opportunity for a preliminary investigation in Naguilian.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondent's arguments in detail.

• Governing Statute: Whether the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, is governed by Republic Act 2613 or Republic Act 3828.
• Effect of Subsequent Statute on Jurisdiction: Whether the passage of Republic Act 3828 on June 22, 1963, four days after the criminal complaint was filed, operated to divest the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, of jurisdiction over the case.
• Retroactivity of Republic Act 3828: Whether Republic Act 3828 is penal in nature and should be given retroactive effect as it is favorable to the accused.

• Governing Statute: Republic Act 2613 governs. Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. Since prosecution was started on June 18, 1963, when Republic Act 2613 was in force, this law controls.
• Effect of Subsequent Statute on Jurisdiction: No. Once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined therein. A subsequent statute removing jurisdiction will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached, absent express prohibitory words.
• Retroactivity of Republic Act 3828: No. Republic Act 3828 is not a penal statute; it merely delineates the jurisdiction of courts and does not define crimes or provide penalties therefor. It cannot have retroactive effectivity.

• Governing Statute: The Court reproduced the penultimate paragraph of Section 37(c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended by Republic Act 2613, which took effect on August 1, 1959, providing that justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and judges of municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both. The same provision was subsequently amended by Republic Act 3828, which took effect on June 22, 1963, limiting jurisdiction to offenses committed within the respective jurisdictions of municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts. The Court applied the long-respected rule that jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted, citing People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715, 717; People vs. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739, 744; Ferrer vs. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172, 175; Paringit vs. Masakayan, L-16578, July 31, 1961; and People vs. Adolfo, L-24191, March 21, 1965. The charge of direct assault upon a person in authority is encompassed in Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, with a penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos. Therefore, the Justice of the Peace Court of San Fernando, the capital of La Union, had jurisdiction to try the case.

• Effect of Subsequent Statute on Jurisdiction: The Court rejected the lower court's impression that the passage of Republic Act 3828 operated to divest the Municipal Court of San Fernando of jurisdiction. The Court held that once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined therein, and a subsequent statute removing jurisdiction will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached, citing People vs. Pegarum, supra, at p. 717, citing 16 C.J., sec. 246, p. 181. The Court observed, as early as 1913 in Government vs. Gale, 24 Phil. 95, 100, that "[i]t is a subversion of the judicial power to take a cause from a court having jurisdiction before its final decision is given." The Court also cited Iburan vs. Labes, 87 Phil. 234, 238, declaring that "[w]here a court originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction, jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired by any legislative enactment unless express prohibitory words are used, and jurisdiction duly acquired under an existing statute is not taken away by a subsequent statute prescribing a different method of commencing an action." The Court noted that no prohibitory words are employed in Republic Act 3828.

• Retroactivity of Republic Act 3828: The Court found no merit in the argument that Republic Act 3828 is penal in nature and should be given retroactive effect as favorable to the accused. The Court noted that the only advantage petitioner could muster is that under the new law he would be afforded all opportunity for a preliminary investigation in Naguilian. The Court observed that the case had gone quite far in the San Fernando court, and except for possible delay, there was no appreciable advantage to petitioner. The Court stated that in a situation where hearing has already started, it would not serve public interest to uproot the action, refile it in another court, discard the testimony already recorded, and start the case anew. The Court held that both laws, as is Republic Act 296 which they amend, merely delineate the jurisdiction of courts; they do not speak of acts or omissions punishable by law, do not define crimes, nor provide penalties therefor. Penal statutes refer to those laws by which punishments are imposed for some violation or transgression of some of their provisions, citing 31 Words and Phrases, Perm. ed., p. 589 and 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third revision, p. 2551. Republic Act 3828 cannot have, as it did not provide for, retroactive effectivity.

• Doctrine of Jurisdiction Determined at the Time of Filing — Jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. In this case, since the criminal complaint was filed on June 18, 1963, when Republic Act 2613 was in force, that law governed the jurisdictional boundaries of the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 3828 four days later.

• Doctrine of Continuity of Jurisdiction — Once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined therein. A subsequent statute removing jurisdiction will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached, unless express prohibitory words are used. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the passage of Republic Act 3828 did not divest the Municipal Court of San Fernando of jurisdiction over the case, as no prohibitory words were employed in the statute.

• Distinction Between Penal and Jurisdictional Statutes — Penal statutes refer to those laws by which punishments are imposed for some violation or transgression of some of their provisions. Statutes that merely delineate the jurisdiction of courts, define no crimes, and provide no penalties are not penal in nature and cannot have retroactive effectivity. Republic Act 3828, like Republic Act 296 which it amended, merely delineates the jurisdiction of courts and therefore cannot be given retroactive application.

• "A rule long respected is that jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted." — This passage states the foundational rule for determining which statute governs a court's jurisdiction in a criminal case, anchoring the Court's analysis of whether Republic Act 2613 or Republic Act 3828 applied.

• "Once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined therein. A subsequent statute removing jurisdiction 'will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached.'" — This passage articulates the doctrine of continuity of jurisdiction, which was the central basis for reversing the lower court's order nullifying the municipal court proceedings.

• "It is a subversion of the judicial power to take a cause from a court having jurisdiction before its final decision is given." — This quotation from Government vs. Gale, 24 Phil. 95, 100, underscores the policy rationale against ousting a court of jurisdiction once it has attached, emphasizing the disruption to judicial proceedings that would result.

• "Penal statutes refer to those laws by which punishments are imposed for some violation or transgression of some of their provisions." — This passage defines what constitutes a penal statute for purposes of retroactive application, supporting the Court's conclusion that Republic Act 3828, being merely jurisdictional in nature, could not be given retroactive effect.

• People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715, 717 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted, and that a subsequent statute removing jurisdiction will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached.
• People vs. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739, 744 — Cited in support of the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.
• Ferrer vs. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172, 175 — Cited in support of the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.
• Paringit vs. Masakayan, L-16578, July 31, 1961 — Cited in support of the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.
• People vs. Adolfo, L-24191, March 21, 1965 — Cited in support of the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.
• Government vs. Gale, 24 Phil. 95, 100 — Quoted for the proposition that "[i]t is a subversion of the judicial power to take a cause from a court having jurisdiction before its final decision is given," supporting the doctrine of continuity of jurisdiction.
• Iburan vs. Labes, 87 Phil. 234, 238 — Cited for the rule that "[w]here a court originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction, jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired by any legislative enactment unless express prohibitory words are used, and jurisdiction duly acquired under an existing statute is not taken away by a subsequent statute prescribing a different method of commencing an action."

• Section 37(c), Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended by Republic Act 2613 — This provision, in force at the time the criminal complaint was filed, vested justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and judges of municipal courts with jurisdiction like that of the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both. The Court applied this provision to determine that the Municipal Court of San Fernando had jurisdiction over the direct assault charge.
• Section 37(c), Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended by Republic Act 3828 — This subsequent amendment, which took effect on June 22, 1963, limited municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts to offenses committed within their respective jurisdictions. The Court held that this statute did not divest the municipal court of jurisdiction already acquired.
• Article 148, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing direct assault upon a person in authority, with a penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos. The Court applied this provision to determine that the offense fell within the jurisdictional threshold of Republic Act 2613.
• Section 44(f), Judiciary Act of 1948 — Referenced by the lower court in support of its conclusion that Republic Act 3828 divested the municipal court of jurisdiction; the Supreme Court implicitly rejected this application.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.