Rillon vs. Rillon

A civil action for recognition and support of a child conceived through alleged rape, and for damages, may be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment without awaiting a criminal prosecution for rape or a judgment of conviction, because Articles 30 and 283 of the Civil Code modified or repealed Rule 107 pro tanto.

The case was a civil suit by a minor, represented by his mother as guardian ad litem, against the man alleged to be his father. It sought recognition as a natural child, support, and damages under the Civil Code of the Philippines. The statutory backdrop was the shift from the old Spanish Civil Code and Rule 107, which tied civil liability for rape to the criminal case, to Civil Code Articles 30 and 283, which allowed a separate civil action.

Gilbert Rillon, a minor, brought this civil action through his mother and guardian ad litem Marcelina Rillon against Filemon Rillon. In the complaint, Gilbert alleged that on or about September 10, 1953, in San Fernando, La Union, Filemon used force and intimidation to have carnal knowledge of Marcelina against her will, and that Gilbert was conceived as a result. It was alleged that Marcelina and Filemon were both single and legally capable of marrying without impediment at the time of conception and remained so.

Gilbert was born on or about April 12, 1954 in San Fernando, La Union, after 180 days from the alleged carnal knowledge and within 300 days. The complaint alleged that the minor needed food for subsistence and lived with his mother, who had no means to support him; Marcelina had asked Filemon to recognize Gilbert as his natural child and provide support, but Filemon refused.

The complaint further alleged that Filemon’s illegal act caused Marcelina mental anguish, physical and mental inconvenience, degradation, and shame, for which she claimed P5,000 moral damages and support of P200; that she was a student at the Normal School in Manila and needed only three months to complete her studies when the incident occurred, for which she claimed P30,000 actual damages; and that she incurred P200 for delivery and birth. Plaintiffs prayed that Filemon be ordered to recognize Gilbert as his natural child, declare him entitled to the rights of a natural child, pay P20.00 a month for maintenance and support, and pay P30,000 actual damages, P5,000 moral damages, and P200 delivery and birth expenses.

In his answer, Filemon denied the material allegations and, by special defense, alleged that Gilbert was the son of Marcelina by another man with whom she had carnal knowledge long before September 10, 1952; that her failure to finish her studies was due to her amorous relations with her boyfriend, her failure to pay tuition fees, and her poor and unsatisfactory scholastic record. He counterclaimed P40,000 moral damages, alleging that the complaint was false, fictitious, and malicious and made in evident and willful bad faith.

After plaintiffs filed a reply to the counterclaim, Filemon moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was premature because there was no final judgment in a criminal case for rape against him and that no cause of action had accrued. The trial court, Judge Juan O. Reyes presiding, dismissed the case without prejudice so that a decision could first be had on the prejudicial question of whether Filemon committed the crime alleged in the complaint. Plaintiffs failed to obtain reconsideration and appealed to the SC.

• Prematurity / Prejudicial Question: Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was premature because there was no final judgment in a criminal case for rape against him and that no cause of action had accrued.

• Prejudicial Question / Civil Action for Recognition and Support: Whether a civil action for recognition and support and for moral damages, based on allegations of facts constituting rape, can proceed without the institution of a criminal action for rape and a judgment convicting the defendant.

• Prejudicial Question / Civil Action for Recognition and Support: Yes. Articles 30 and 283 of the Civil Code allow the offended woman and the child to institute and prosecute the civil action for damages, recognition, and support without awaiting a criminal rape action or conviction; Rule 107 was repealed or modified pro tanto.

• Prejudicial Question / Civil Action for Recognition and Support: Under the old regime, Article 135 of the Civil Code of Spain provided that in cases of rape or seduction the Penal Code provisions on acknowledgment of the issue would be observed. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code imposed on persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction the duties to indemnify the offended woman, acknowledge the offspring unless the law prevented it, and support the offspring. Section 107 of General Orders No. 58 preserved the injured person’s right to take part in the prosecution and recover damages, with the court authorized upon conviction to enter judgment for damages. Article 114 of the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure of 1882 provided that once a criminal proceeding was instituted for a crime, no civil action arising from the same act could be prosecuted and any such civil action had to be suspended until final sentence in the criminal proceeding. The SC in Almeida vs. Abaroa and U.S. vs. Heery applied this regime: the civil liability of the accused had to be determined in the criminal action unless the injured party waived it or reserved the right to institute it separately, and an acquittal barred a civil action based on the alleged criminal act. Rule 107 of the Rules of Court recast these rules, including the rule that after a criminal action was commenced no civil action arising from the same offense could be prosecuted and that the civil action had to be suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding. The Civil Code of the Philippines, enacted on August 30, 1950, changed the regime. Article 283 obliges the father to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, or seduction when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception, and it does not make the civil liability of the offender in a rape case determinable only in a criminal action. Article 30 provides that when a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove the act complained of; this implies the right of the offended party to bring a separate civil action for the criminal act without instituting criminal proceedings. These new provisions are inconsistent with Rule 107, so Rule 107 must give way and is considered repealed or modified pro tanto. Therefore, the offended woman in the rape and the child born out of the crime may institute a civil action for damages and for recognition and support without a previous criminal action and judgment in a criminal case for rape against the offender. The trial court’s order dismissing the case provisionally to await the criminal action was set aside and the case remanded.

• Civil liability from rape may be enforced in a separate civil action — The offended woman and the child conceived through rape may bring a civil action for damages, recognition, and support without first instituting a criminal rape case or obtaining a conviction. The SC applied this because Civil Code Articles 30 and 283 allow the civil action to proceed independently, and Rule 107’s suspension rule was no longer controlling.
• Pro tanto repeal or modification of Rule 107 by the Civil Code — When the Rules of Court conflict with later substantive law, the Rules give way. The SC held that Rule 107’s requirement that a civil action arising from the same offense await the criminal case was inconsistent with Civil Code Articles 30 and 283 and was therefore repealed or modified pro tanto.
• Recognition of a natural child in rape cases — Under Article 283(1) of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, or seduction when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception. The SC used this provision to allow the recognition action to proceed even without a criminal conviction.
• Preponderance of evidence in a separate civil action — Under Article 30 of the Civil Code, when a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove the act complained of. This supported the SC’s conclusion that the civil action need not await a criminal judgment.

• “said provisions are no longer in force because a civil action may now be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment without awaiting the institution and termination of a criminal action, as expressly declared in Articles 30 and 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.” — The SC states the core effect of the Civil Code on the old rule requiring the civil action to await the criminal case.
• “These new provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court and the latter must give way thereto.” — The SC explains why Rule 107 cannot prevail over the Civil Code.
• “the offended woman in the rape and the child born out of the crime may institute a civil action for damages and for recognition and support without a previous action and judgment in a criminal case for rape against the offender.” — The SC states the direct operative ruling.
• “This last article implies the right of an offended party to bring a separate civil action for the criminal act without instituting the criminal proceedings for the prosecution of the offense.” — The SC interprets Article 30 as authorizing a separate civil action.

• Almeida, et al. vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178 — Old-rule precedent cited by the SC; it held that instituting a criminal action carries the civil action unless waived or reserved, and that acquittal in the criminal action bars a civil action based on the alleged criminal act. The SC used it to describe the regime displaced by the Civil Code.
• U. S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil. 600 — Old-rule precedent cited by the SC; it held that the civil liability of the accused must be determined in the criminal action unless the injured party waives it or reserves the right to a separate action. The SC used it to contrast the old procedure with the Civil Code.
• Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep. 344 — Cited by the SC for the old procedure under General Orders No. 58, section 107, under which the court could enter judgment for damages upon conviction of the accused. The SC used it to describe the prior regime.

• Article 135, Civil Code of Spain — Provided that the father is obliged to acknowledge the natural child in specified cases and that in cases of rape or seduction the Penal Code provisions on acknowledgment of the issue shall be observed. The SC cited it as the old regime that tied the civil liability to the criminal law.
• Article 345, Revised Penal Code — Imposed on persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction the duties to indemnify the offended woman, acknowledge the offspring unless the law prevents it, and support the offspring. The SC cited it as part of the old regime.
• Section 107, General Orders No. 58 — Allowed the injured person to take part in the prosecution and recover damages, with the court authorized upon conviction to enter judgment for damages. The SC cited it as part of the old procedure.
• Article 114, Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain of 1882 — Provided that when a criminal proceeding is instituted for a crime, no civil action arising from the same act can be prosecuted and any such civil action must be suspended until final sentence in the criminal proceeding. The SC cited it as the old rule that Rule 107 recast.
• Section 1, Rule 107, Rules of Court — Provided that a criminal action impliedly institutes the civil action for civil liability unless waived or reserved; that after a criminal action is commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the civil action must be suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding. The SC held it inconsistent with the Civil Code and repealed or modified pro tanto.
• Article 283, Civil Code of the Philippines — Obliges the father to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, or seduction when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception, among other cases. The SC applied it to allow the recognition action to proceed without a criminal conviction.
• Article 30, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that when a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove the act complained of. The SC applied it to imply the right to bring a separate civil action without criminal proceedings.