Rhema International Livelihood Foundation, Inc. vs. Hibix, Inc.

Prior physical possession of a property, however brief the period, is sufficient to maintain an action for forcible entry, and a party deprived of possession must resort to judicial proceedings rather than retake the property through force or intimidation, even with the aid of law enforcement agencies acting without a court order.

Rhema International Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (Rhema) and Hibix, Inc. (Hibix) are corporate entities claiming ownership and possession over the same parcel of land in Parañaque City. Rhema traces its claim to a donation from Marylou Bhalwart, asserting ownership over a large tract covered by TCT No. 8037, Plan PSD-25211, Decree No. 160 of March 19, 1905, and OCT No. 128. Hibix traces its claim through a chain of conveyances: Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation acquired the property from Executive Realty and Development Corporation on September 25, 1990, constructed a building thereon in 1992, and sold the property with improvements to Hibix on November 3, 1999, after which TCT No. 143048 was issued in Hibix's name. The dispute centers on which party had prior physical possession and whether the manner of dispossession constitutes forcible entry under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Hibix, Inc. acquired the subject property on November 3, 1999, when Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation sold the land together with its improvements to Hibix. Philippine Fuji had itself purchased the parcel from Executive Realty and Development Corporation on September 25, 1990, and a new title, TCT No. 46374, was issued in its name. Philippine Fuji constructed a building on the property in 1992 and occupied it upon completion in 1994. After the sale to Hibix, TCT No. 143048 was issued and registered in Hibix's name, and Hibix remained in possession of the property.

On June 25, 2008, a certain Romeo Prado, introducing himself as a special sheriff, arrived at the property accompanied by four policemen, six security guards, a certain Julian Go who claimed to be the owner, and two armed security guards. Prado informed Hibix's security guards that they were implementing a special writ of execution purportedly issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 111, with respect to LRC Civil Case No. 3957-P. Hibix subsequently discovered that as early as June 25, 2002, the Court of Appeals had already enjoined the enforcement of the order on which the writ was based, rendering the writ bogus. Through force, violence, and intimidation, Prado's group took over possession of the property. Hibix thereafter lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation regarding the unlawful and forcible takeover.

On August 29, 2008, Hibix, together with the NBI, took possession of the property. According to Rhema, Hibix was accompanied by armed men claiming to be members of the special action unit of the NBI, and they forcibly evicted Rhema's personnel. Rhema claimed ownership of the property by virtue of a donation from Marylou Bhalwart, asserting that it covered 71,409,413 square meters under TCT No. 8037, Plan PSD-25211, Decree No. 160 of March 19, 1905, and OCT No. 128, and that it had previously enjoyed juridical and physical possession of the property for years. On September 4, 2008, Rhema filed a complaint for forcible entry against Hibix and its Board of Directors.

The Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 78, rendered its Decision on July 20, 2009, finding Hibix to have forcibly entered the property, ordering Hibix to vacate and to pay Rhema ₱200,000.00 per month as rent from August 29, 2008 until possession was turned over. On appeal, the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 274, found that the property in question covered an area of about 6,357 square meters, including improvements, and affirmed the MeTC's finding that Rhema had prior physical possession of the property for a brief period—from June 25, 2008 to August 29, 2008. The RTC held that since Hibix was in peaceful possession prior to June 25, 2008, when Rhema took over through force, Hibix should have filed a complaint for forcible entry against Rhema instead of using force with the NBI to recover possession. The RTC, however, deleted the award of rentals, finding that Rhema was unable to substantiate its claim for actual damages. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower courts and dismissed the forcible entry case, ratiocinating that Rhema had failed to establish prior physical possession because it had abandoned the property when the NBI conducted its investigation, and that the arrest of Rhema's officers by the NBI was not the deprivation of possession contemplated by law in a forcible entry case.

• Elements of Forcible Entry: Petitioner maintained that the elements of forcible entry were present, asserting that it had prior physical possession of the property and was unlawfully deprived thereof by Hibix through force, intimidation, and strategy when Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any court order, retook possession on August 29, 2008.
• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioner argued that it had prior physical possession of the property from June 25, 2008 to August 29, 2008, a period sufficient to sustain an action for forcible entry regardless of its brevity.

• Procedural Defect: Respondent moved to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the requirements under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Absence of Prior Physical Possession: Respondent implicitly relied on the CA's reasoning that Rhema had abandoned the property at the time the NBI conducted its investigation and verified Hibix's complaint, and that Hibix's retaking of possession was not the deprivation contemplated by law in a forcible entry case.

• Forcible Entry: Whether the elements of forcible entry are present in this case.

• Forcible Entry: Yes. The elements of forcible entry—prior physical possession and unlawful deprivation through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth—are both present. Rhema had prior physical possession from June 25 to August 29, 2008, and Hibix unlawfully deprived Rhema of possession by retaking the property through NBI aid without any court order.

• Forcible Entry: Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the basis for forcible entry actions, requiring two elements: (1) prior physical possession of the property, and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. Possession in forcible entry cases means physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession; only prior physical possession, not title, is at issue. An appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required—however short the period, recovery of possession under Rule 70 may be granted so long as prior physical possession is established. In this case, Hibix enjoyed possession of the property until June 25, 2008, when Rhema wrested possession from Hibix. Hibix did not file a case for forcible entry against Rhema. Instead, on August 29, 2008, Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any court order, retook possession of the property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical possession from June 25 to August 29, 2008. The underlying philosophy of ejectment suits, as articulated in Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals and Drilon vs. Guarana, is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder by compelling the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Hibix's resort to the NBI to wrestle possession back from Rhema was tantamount to putting the law into one's own hands—the very evil the special civil action of forcible entry is designed to prevent. As to the award of rent, the Court deferred to the RTC of Parañaque City's finding that Rhema was unable to substantiate its claim for actual damages, the Supreme Court not being a trier of facts.

• Elements of Forcible Entry — The two elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property, and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. Both elements must concur for an action under Rule 70 to prosper. In this case, the Court found both present: Rhema had prior physical possession from June 25 to August 29, 2008, and Hibix unlawfully deprived Rhema of possession by retaking the property with NBI aid and without a court order.

• Possession De Facto in Ejectment Cases — Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. The Court applied this doctrine to emphasize that Rhema's claim of ownership through donation was not the central inquiry; what mattered was who had physical possession and who was deprived of it through force.

• Brevity of Prior Physical Possession — For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required. However short the period, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 may be granted. The Court applied this principle to hold that Rhema's two-month possession (June 25 to August 29, 2008) was sufficient.

• Philosophy of Ejectment Suits — Prohibition Against Self-Help — The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. The Court held that Hibix's resort to the NBI to retake possession, rather than filing a forcible entry case against Rhema, constituted self-help—the very evil the remedy of forcible entry is designed to prevent.

• "Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto; not legal possession. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue." — This passage defines the nature of possession required in ejectment proceedings, distinguishing physical possession from legal ownership, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on Rule 70.

• "For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required. However short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted." — This formulation establishes that the duration of prior physical possession is immaterial, a principle central to the Court's ruling that Rhema's two-month possession sufficed.

• "Undeniably, it was Rhema who first used violence in order to deprive Hibix possession over the property. The remedy, which the latter should have resorted to, is to file a case for forcible entry against Rhema. Instead, Hibix went to the NBI to lodge a complaint and sought their aid to wrestle possession back from Rhema. This is tantamount to putting the law into one's hands, which is the evil sought to be avoided by the special civil action of forcible entry." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the prohibition against self-help in recovering possession, and the requirement that a dispossessed party must resort to judicial process.

• Nenita Quality Foods Corp. vs. Galabo, et al., 702 Phil. 506 (2013) — Cited as the source of the two-element test for forcible entry: (1) prior physical possession and (2) unlawful deprivation through force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. Followed and applied to the facts.

• Rivera-Calingan, et al. vs. Rivera, et al., 709 Phil. 583 (2013) — Cited for the proposition that possession in forcible entry cases means physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession, and that only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. Followed.

• Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557 (2004) — Cited for the underlying philosophy of ejectment suits: to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out of possession to resort to the law alone. Followed and applied to condemn Hibix's resort to self-help.

• Drilon vs. Guarana, 233 Phil. 350 (1987) — Cited for the principle that the purpose of a forcible entry action is to ensure that a party in peaceable possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence, or terror, regardless of the actual condition of title to the property. Followed.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Defines who may institute forcible entry and unlawful detainer proceedings and when: a person deprived of possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court within one year after such unlawful deprivation. The Court applied this provision to hold that Rhema, having been deprived of physical possession by Hibix's forceful retaking with NBI aid, properly instituted the action for forcible entry.

Bersamin, C.J. (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, and Gesmundo, JJ., concurred.