Reynolds vs. United States

A party's religious belief cannot be accepted as a justification for committing an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. While the government cannot regulate religious opinions, it can regulate actions, even if motivated by religion, when those actions are deemed socially harmful (like polygamy).

In the mid-19th century, the Mormon Church openly practiced polygamy in Utah Territory. In response, Congress passed the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act (1862), codified as Revised Statutes § 5352, making bigamy in U.S. territories a federal crime. The U.S. government sought to enforce this law against Mormon practitioners.

• Filed in the District Court for the Third Judicial District of Utah Territory.
• Defendant pleaded in abatement (challenging grand jury composition) and not guilty.
• District Court overruled the plea, found defendant guilty, and sentenced him to imprisonment and a fine.
• The Supreme Court of the Territory affirmed the judgment.
• Defendant (Plaintiff in Error) appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court via writ of error.

• George Reynolds, a Mormon, married Mary Ann Tuddenham.
• While Mary Ann was living, Reynolds married Amelia Jane Schofield in a ceremony performed by church authority Daniel H. Wells.
• Reynolds was indicted for bigamy under R.S. § 5352.
• At trial, Reynolds admitted the marriages but argued he acted pursuant to a religious duty enjoined by his church and believed to be of divine origin.
• The trial court refused to instruct the jury that this religious belief was a valid defense.

• Grand Jury: The indictment was invalid because the grand jury had only 15 members, contrary to R.S. § 808 requiring 16-23 for federal courts. Utah territorial law allowed 15.
• Jury Selection: Challenges for cause against jurors who had formed opinions about guilt/innocence were improperly overruled. Challenges by the prosecution against jurors living in polygamy were improperly sustained.
• Evidence: Testimony from Amelia Jane Schofield given at a prior trial was improperly admitted because she was absent, violating the Confrontation Clause.
• Constitutionality/Defense: R.S. § 5352 was unconstitutional as applied to him because it infringed on his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. His religious belief that polygamy was a duty should be a complete defense.

• Grand Jury: R.S. § 808 applies only to U.S. Circuit and District Courts, not territorial courts. Utah's territorial law governing its own courts was valid.
• Jury Selection: The jurors challenged by Reynolds did not hold disqualifying opinions. Challenges against polygamist jurors were proper, as they could not be impartial.
• Evidence: A sufficient foundation was laid showing Reynolds procured Amelia Jane Schofield's absence, making her prior testimony admissible.
• Constitutionality/Defense: Congress has power to legislate for territories. Polygamy is an offense against society, not merely a religious practice. The First Amendment protects belief, not actions that violate social duties or good order.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the indictment found by a 15-member grand jury under territorial law was valid.
  • Whether challenges to jurors with preconceived opinions were improperly overruled.
  • Whether challenges to jurors living in polygamy were improperly sustained.
  • Whether admitting the prior testimony of an absent witness violated the Confrontation Clause.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether R.S. § 5352 is constitutional.
  • Whether religious belief that polygamy is a duty is a valid defense to a charge of bigamy.
  • Whether the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the consequences of polygamy were improper.

• Procedural:
  • Grand Jury: Valid. R.S. § 808 applies only to U.S. Circuit and District Courts. Territorial district courts are not federal courts of the U.S., so Utah's law allowing 15 grand jurors governed. (Clinton v. Englebrecht followed).
  • Juror Challenges (Reynolds): No error. The jurors' opinions were not so fixed and decisive as to raise a manifest presumption of partiality. The trial court's finding on this mixed question of law and fact should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
  • Juror Challenges (Prosecution): No error. Even if the challenges were formally for cause instead of favor, the jurors were clearly incompetent due to living in polygamy, and their exclusion was proper. A judgment won't be reversed for sustaining a good challenge under the wrong name.
  • Prior Testimony: No error. Sufficient evidence showed Reynolds procured the witness's absence (telling the marshal "you will have to find out" where she was and "she does not appear in this case"). The burden shifted to Reynolds to disprove procurement; he failed to do so. The Confrontation Clause does not protect a defendant from the consequences of his own wrongful acts.
• Substantive:
  • Constitutionality of § 5352: Valid. Congress has broad power under Art. IV, Sec. 3 to make rules for territories. Polygamy has long been an offense against society. The law regulates actions, not religious opinions.
  • Religious Defense: Invalid. The First Amendment prohibits laws regulating religious opinion, but not laws regulating actions that violate social duties or undermine good order. Allowing religious belief to excuse criminal conduct would make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law and permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Criminal intent is presumed from the knowing commission of the act.
  • Jury Instructions: No error. The comments on the consequences of polygamy were not an improper appeal to passion or prejudice but a relevant reminder of the crime's nature and the jury's duty.

• Belief/Action Distinction (Free Exercise Clause): The First Amendment absolutely protects religious beliefs and opinions. However, it does not protect religious conduct or actions that violate valid social regulations or criminal laws. Congress is deprived of power over mere opinion but free to reach actions violating social duties or subversive of good order. (Applied to reject the religious defense).
• Presumption of Criminal Intent: When a person knowingly commits an act that constitutes a crime, the law presumes they intended the necessary consequences of that act. Ignorance of the law is not a defense. (Applied to counter the argument that lack of evil intent due to religious belief negated mens rea).
• Procurement of Witness Absence & Confrontation Clause: The constitutional right to confront witnesses does not apply if the defendant wrongfully procures the witness's absence. The burden shifts to the defendant to disprove procurement once the prosecution makes a prima facie showing. (Applied to admit prior testimony).

• "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."
• "To permit [religious belief as a defense] would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances."
• "The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution... Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."
• "A criminal intent is generally an element of crime, but every man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does."

• Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 434 (1872): Followed. Established that territorial courts are not U.S. Courts, and their procedure is governed by territorial laws, not necessarily federal procedural statutes like R.S. § 808 regarding grand juries.
• Lord Morley's Case, 6 State Trials 770 (1666): Cited. Early English authority supporting the rule that testimony of a witness absent due to the defendant's procurement may be admitted.
• Regina v. Scaife, 17 Ad. & El. N. S. 242 (1851): Cited. Supported the rule that if a defendant contrives to keep a witness away, the witness's deposition may be read.
• Burr's Trial (1 Burr's Trial 416): Cited. Referenced for Chief Justice Marshall's statement on the standard for juror impartiality regarding pre-formed opinions ("light impressions" vs. "strong and deep impressions").

• U.S. Constitution, Amendment I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." (Central issue: scope of protection for religious practice).
• U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him..." (Issue: admissibility of absent witness's prior testimony).
• Revised Statutes § 5352 (Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act): "Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another...in a Territory...is guilty of bigamy..." (The substantive criminal statute under which Reynolds was convicted).
• Revised Statutes § 808: Prescribed the number of grand jurors (16-23) for U.S. Circuit and District Courts. (Issue: whether it applied to Utah territorial courts).
• Utah Compiled Laws (1876), p. 357, § 4: Provided for grand juries of 15 in Utah territorial courts. (Held to govern the grand jury in this case).

• N/A

• Justice Field (Concurring in part, Dissenting in part): Concurred with the majority on all points except the admission of Amelia Jane Schofield's prior testimony. He believed a sufficient foundation for its admission had not been laid, arguing the authorities cited by the Chief Justice actually established the reverse.