Reynes vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

A public prosecutor commits grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when he dismisses a complaint for illegal exactions under Article 213(2) of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the complainant failed to present the enabling ordinance, where the complainant's theory is precisely that no such ordinance exists, and when he accepts at face value the "donation" labels on official receipts issued by the very officer alleged to have made the unlawful demand. Article 213(2) reaches a public officer's demand for payment even in situations where no payment is ever permitted at all, whether by explicit legal prohibition or by the law's mere silence, since in such cases the demand for any sum is itself a legal breach.

Carlos L. Reynes managed the Blue Reef Beach Resort Cottages and Hotel in Barangay Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, a private resort lying within the territorial jurisdiction of the Barangay. Lucresia M. Amores was the punong barangay, and Maribel Hontiveros was a member of the Sangguniang Barangay. Under the Local Government Code, a barangay may impose and collect reasonable fees and charges for services rendered; the punong barangay is charged with enforcing laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment and with ensuring the delivery of basic services, which include services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection; and the barangay treasurer is tasked with collecting and issuing official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to the barangay treasury. A July 18, 2007 Memorandum issued by the Office of the Lapu-Lapu City Administrator governed barangay garbage collection, stipulating that while barangay authorities are responsible for garbage collection in their respective jurisdictions, barangay garbage trucks and collectors shall not encroach or enter private properties such as subdivisions, resorts, and residences, that they shall collect only from garbage stations or dumps along barangay roads, and that unsegregated garbage shall not be collected.

Carlos L. Reynes managed the Blue Reef Beach Resort Cottages and Hotel in Barangay Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu. The Barangay, headed by Punong Barangay Lucresia M. Amores, had been collecting P1,000.00 monthly from the resort as a garbage collection fee, even as the City of Lapu-Lapu was already collecting its own garbage fees and the resort had paid P67,752.34 in business taxes and licenses for 2011, an amount inclusive of a P1,764.38 garbage collection fee. The resort segregated its garbage and deposited it on Tongo Road, outside its premises, where it was collected twice a week.

Amores later ordered the fee increased to P2,000.00 monthly while reducing the frequency of collection to once a week. Reynes questioned the increase, pointing out that no ordinance, statute, or regulation authorized it. Amores gave no explanation; instead, on July 27, 2011, she ordered the cessation of the collection of the resort's garbage.

On August 8, 2011, Reynes wrote to Amores questioning her authority to levy garbage collection fees, considering that the same fees were already being paid to the City of Lapu-Lapu alongside business taxes and fees for licenses, and considering that no public hearing had ever been conducted. Copies of the letter were furnished to the offices of the City Mayor, Vice Mayor, City Attorney, and City Secretary, each of which stamped an acknowledgment of receipt. Amores still offered no explanation and, in a meeting, merely told Reynes' wife, Dr. Sonia Beth Reynes, that the collection of P2,000.00 was "final and unalterable." Left with no alternative lest the resort's garbage be left uncollected, Reynes relented and paid P2,000.00 monthly. Evidencing his subsequent payments, he adduced official receipts acknowledging: (a) P3,000.00 on January 31, 2011 as "garbage collection fee for the month (sic) of Jan to March 2011"; (b) P4,000.00 on August 16, 2011 as "donation - garbage"; (c) P4,000.00 on September 28, 2011 as "donation for garbage collection Oct [and] Nov"; (d) P4,000.00 on December 14, 2011 as "donation to [the Barangay]," backed by a petty cash voucher for "Garbage collection fee for the month[s] of Dec 2011 Jan 2012"; (e) P6,000.00 on March 19, 2012 as "donation for garbage collection Feb, March, April 2012"; (f) P4,000.00 on May 22, 2012 as "donation for garbage collection May [and] June 2012"; (g) P4,000.00 on November 26, 2012 as "donation for garbage collection," backed by a petty cash voucher for "garbage collection month of November to December 2012"; (h) P4,000.00 on January 14, 2013 as "donation for garbage collection," backed by a petty cash voucher for "Payment/Donation for Garbage Collection. Jan.-Feb. 2013"; and (i) P8,000.00 on April 12, 2013 as "donation for garbage collection," backed by a petty cash voucher for "garbage collection March to June 2013."

Such was the state of affairs when, on June 3, 2014, the Barangay stopped collecting the resort's garbage. Reynes recounted that Fredo Amores, the Barangay's garbage truck driver, informed both the resort's supervisor and checker that Barangay Captain Amores had ordered the cessation of garbage collection, allegedly upon Kagawad Hontiveros' instigation, as the latter was offended by an incident two days prior. Referring to an Incident Report prepared by the resort's staff, Reynes recalled that on June 1, 2014, Kagawad Hontiveros, along with some companions, tried to enter the resort but was not immediately allowed to enter and was instead asked to present an identification card per the resort's standard procedure. On June 6, 2014, Dr. Reynes sought an audience with Barangay Captain Amores to settle the matter. In a meeting held on June 11, 2014, Amores maintained that her decision to stop collecting the resort's garbage was final, justifying it by saying that the resort's garbage was "bulky" and that her decision was merely in keeping with the July 18, 2007 Memorandum issued by the Lapu-Lapu City Administrator.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, Amores and Hontiveros maintained that the Barangay was not in a position to collect the resort's garbage in view of the July 18, 2007 Memorandum, which stipulated that while barangay authorities are responsible for garbage collection in their respective jurisdictions, barangay garbage trucks and collectors shall not encroach or enter private properties such as subdivisions, resorts, and residences, that garbage trucks and collectors shall only collect garbage from garbage stations or dumps along barangay roads, and that unsegregated garbage shall not be collected. They claimed that the resort neither segregated its garbage nor used a garbage depositary situated along a public road, and that Reynes, beseeching the Barangay's accommodation, had offered to pay P2,000.00 monthly to defray the costs of garbage collection. They faulted the resort for failing, unlike other resorts, to obtain the services of private concessionaires, and justified the cessation of collection on the resort's continuing inability to segregate and process its own garbage.

In his Reply, Reynes refuted these claims, explaining the resort's waste processing system and facilities: a waste storage area with two compartments, one for biodegradable waste and another for non-biodegradable waste, both secured by locks; two composting units for used oil and other biodegradable wastes; and compliance with the prescribed plastic bag color coding scheme for segregating waste. Even ahead of Amores' allegation in the Joint Counter-Affidavit, he had already attached to his original Complaint pictures of the resort's waste processing facilities. As he emphasized, private respondents merely attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72326 in the name of Beth Sonia Go Reynes married to Carlos Reynes as proof that his garbage was deposited on a private road, but never explained where on the face of the title it is stated that the road where the resort's garbage is deposited forms part of its property. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) nonetheless dismissed the complaint, reasoning that complainant failed to present the Ordinance on garbage fees, that there was thus a lack of evidence that Amores demanded payment of sums different from or larger than that authorized by law, and that the payments appeared to be donations as reflected in the official receipts issued.

• Absence of an Enabling Ordinance: Petitioner maintained that his position was precisely that there was no ordinance or any other regulation that enabled the levying of garbage collection fees, so that requiring him to produce such an ordinance was a farcically futile exercise that could only end in his inability to present one.
• Scope of Article 213(2): Petitioner argued that Article 213(2)'s injunction against the payment of sums "different from or larger than those authorized by law" admits of situations where no payment is ever permitted, whether through an explicitly stated legal prohibition or through the law's mere silence, such that a public officer's demand for any sum is itself a punishable breach.
• The "Donation" Receipts as Artifice: Petitioner contended that because his entire case centered on the unlawfulness of the collections, the person receiving and acknowledging receipt could not be expected to voluntarily admit it in writing, and that the reference to "donations" could point to an attempt to legitimize inordinate collections.
• Amores' Liability Despite Not Being Barangay Treasurer: Petitioner asserted that Amores could have used her office as an artifice for demanding the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law, and that she could not evade liability by pointing to subalterns as the persons who actually effected the assailed collections.
• Hontiveros' Participation: Petitioner alleged that Kagawad Hontiveros induced Barangay Captain Amores to order the cessation of the collection of the resort's garbage, and insisted that both private respondents must stand trial for illegal exactions.

• No Authority to Collect from Private Properties: Respondent Amores and Hontiveros maintained that the Barangay was not in a position to collect the resort's garbage in view of the July 18, 2007 Memorandum issued by the Office of the City Administrator, which barred barangay garbage trucks and collectors from encroaching or entering private properties such as subdivisions, resorts, and residences and limited collection to garbage stations or dumps along barangay roads.
• Resort's Non-Compliance with Segregation and Depositary Rules: Respondents claimed that the resort neither segregated its garbage nor used a garbage depositary situated along a public road, and that unsegregated garbage shall not be collected under the same Memorandum.
• Voluntary Contributions, Not Compulsory Charges: Respondents asserted that the sums delivered by Reynes did not correspond to compulsory charges but to voluntary contributions, alleging that Reynes, beseeching the Barangay's accommodation, had offered to pay P2,000.00 monthly to defray the costs of garbage collection.
• Failure to Engage a Private Concessionaire: Respondents faulted the resort for failing, unlike other resorts, to obtain the services of private concessionaires, and justified the cessation of collection on the resort's continuing inability to segregate and process its own garbage.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion as to Amores: Whether public respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), acting through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Michael M. Mernado, Jr., committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable cause to file criminal charges against private respondent Lucresia M. Amores for illegal exactions under Article 213(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as to Hontiveros: Whether public respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), acting through the same officer, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable cause to file criminal charges against private respondent Maribel Hontiveros for the same offense.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion as to Amores: Yes. The dismissal was tainted with grave abuse of discretion because it demanded that petitioner produce an enabling ordinance that his own theory denied existed and because it took at face value the "donation" labels on the official receipts, thereby arbitrarily disregarding the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as to Hontiveros: No. No probable cause exists to indict Hontiveros for illegal exactions, it not appearing that she acted in concert with Amores in demanding and facilitating inordinate collections or that she herself collected or received the amounts delivered, without prejudice to the administrative aspect of the complaint for gross misconduct against her.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion as to Amores: Probable cause for the filing of a criminal information rests on likelihood rather than certainty and relies on common sense rather than clear and convincing evidence; it is enough that the facts engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Determining probable cause is an executive function that generally lies beyond judicial scrutiny by reason of the separation of powers, but a resolution tainted with grave abuse of discretion — a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law — is correctible by certiorari as a constitutionally enshrined check. A determination of probable cause must be made in reference to the elements of the crime charged, and Article 213(2) of the Revised Penal Code requires, first, that the offender be a public officer entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts, and second, that the officer engage in any of three specified acts or omissions, the first of which is "[d]emanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law." As punong barangay, Amores was the chief executive of the Barangay, charged with enforcing laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment and with ensuring the delivery of basic services under Section 17 of the Local Government Code, which include solid waste collection; her engagement with solid waste management was official, direct, and unequivocal, and her functions were broad enough to encompass facilitating the levying of charges for services rendered. That the barangay treasurer is tasked under Section 395(e) of the Local Government Code with collecting and issuing official receipts did not negate her possible culpability, for a local chief executive cannot evade liability by feigning incidental, ancillary, or tangential involvement and pointing to subalterns as the persons who actually effected the assailed collections; Ongsuco vs. Malones had already recognized the barangay treasurer as a local chief executive's mere alter ego, and Young vs. Mapayo had recognized the potential liability for illegal exactions of a public officer whose functions do not explicitly include the collection of fees and charges. The Ombudsman's reasoning was grievous error: it began from the singular premise that petitioner failed to present the Ordinance on garbage fees and concluded from this that there was a lack of evidence of an unlawful demand, when petitioner's position was precisely that no ordinance or regulation enabled the levying of such fees, so that demanding that he produce one sent him on a fool's errand. Article 213(2)'s injunction admits of situations where no payment is ever permitted or no collection of any object is ever allowed, arising either through an explicitly stated legal prohibition or through a law's mere silence; when the law enables no form whatsoever of payment or collection, a public officer's demand for payment of any sum, or insistence on collecting any object, is a legal breach and a punishable violation of Article 213(2). The Ombudsman's further justification — that the amounts delivered must have been donations because the official receipts said so — was equally erroneous, since one could not expect the person receiving and acknowledging receipt to voluntarily admit unlawfulness in writing, and the reference to "donations" could actually be helpful to petitioner as pointing to an attempt to legitimize inordinate collections; while statements in documents are generally taken as regular, the official receipts had to be appreciated in view of the many nuances of the case, and the Ombudsman cursorily concluded that donations were made, taking at face value the same receipts that may very well have been the offender's own artifice. Amores herself admitted Reynes' intermittent delivery of sums in multiples of P2,000.00, an admission that conceded both the delivery of the money and that the delivery and the Barangay's concomitant receipt were not on account of an enabling ordinance or regulation, leaving only her supposed demand and his supposed voluntary offer in contention; it was more reasonable to conclude that petitioner made deliveries to comply with her demands. Her position hinged on the truth of her premise that the resort could not segregate and process its garbage and used a depositary confined inside its premises, yet she offered nothing but bare allegations, which petitioner refuted in his Reply by laying out the intricacies of the resort's waste processing system and facilities, and which he had already anticipated by attaching pictures of those facilities to his original Complaint; the Transfer Certificate of Title she attached failed to show on its face that the road where the garbage was deposited formed part of the resort's property. The circumstances surrounding petitioner's August 8, 2011 letter were likewise revealing: the letter stated the bases of his objection — that no law, ordinance, or regulation authorized the levy, that no public hearing was ever conducted, and that the city government was already collecting garbage fees — and copies were furnished to, and acknowledged by, the offices of the City Mayor, Vice Mayor, City Attorney, and City Secretary, pointedly imputing unlawful conduct to Amores. Although the Revised Rules on Evidence did not govern the proceedings before the Ombudsman except by analogy or in a suppletory character, and although the provision on admission by silence refers to an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing of another rather than to written correspondence, the basic wisdom underlying that provision was readily appreciable: the grave imputations demanded a denial, a refutation, or some manner of response, yet the record was bereft of proof of any such response, and Amores did not even allege one; she did not refer to the July 18, 2007 Memorandum until three years after the letter, and only when another confrontation arose following the resort's conflict with Hontiveros. The Court emphasized that this was not an adjudication on the merits after a full-blown trial and made no definitive finding on guilt or innocence; the parties remained free to expound on their claims and adduce evidence, and Amores might very well have an explanation for her silence or actual proof that she responded. Even so, the allegations and proof available weighed more heavily in petitioner's favor, constraining the Court to maintain a well-founded belief that the crime of illegal exactions had been committed and that Amores was probably guilty of it and should be held for trial.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as to Hontiveros: By petitioner's own allegations, Hontiveros' involvement arose only after the June 1, 2014 incident, when the resort was supposed to have allowed her entry only after presenting an identification card. The charge that she induced Amores to order the cessation of the collection of the resort's garbage, if true, was by no means righteous conduct that the Court condoned; however, insofar as the charge of illegal exactions was concerned, it did not appear that Hontiveros herself acted in concert with Amores in demanding and facilitating inordinate collections, nor that she, by herself or through someone acting on her instruction, collected or received the amounts delivered by petitioner. The Affidavit-Complaint filed before the Ombudsman was not exclusively a criminal complaint but was at the same time an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, a charge that embraces the imputations against Hontiveros that she abused her position and influence to induce the cessation of garbage collection services to the resort. Because the records available lacked any averment on how the Ombudsman disposed of the administrative aspect of the complaint, and because the records did not indicate a claim or explanation of how the Ombudsman may have erred in handling that aspect, the Court was in no position to make conclusions on it. The affirmation of the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Hontiveros was therefore without prejudice to the proper disposition of the administrative aspect of the complaint against her.

• Probable Cause for the Filing of a Criminal Information — Probable cause consists of such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief, and does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged, resting on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects, and not on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, nor on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, nor on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge, relying instead on common sense. Applied here, the Court weighed the evidence adduced before the Ombudsman and found a well-founded belief that illegal exactions had been committed and that Amores was probably guilty.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion as the Exception to Non-Interference in Prosecutorial Determinations — The determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information is essentially an executive function that generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, the rationale resting on the separation of powers. The exception is when the determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, in which case it becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the exception hinging on the limiting principle of checks and balances. Grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error and properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration; while defying precise definition, it generally refers to a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the Ombudsman's demand for a vacuous burden amounted to an evasion of his positive and legally-ordained duty to appraise cases within the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause.
• Probable Cause Must Be Determined in Reference to the Elements of the Crime Charged — Every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense; any inquiry into whether probable cause exists to prosecute must therefore begin with the text of the penal provision. The Court applied this by enumerating the elements of illegal exactions under Article 213(2) of the Revised Penal Code before assessing the evidence.
• Elements of Illegal Exactions under Article 213(2), Revised Penal Code — Liability ensues when two elements are demonstrated: first, that the offender is a public officer entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts; and second, that the officer engages in any of three specified acts or omissions — (a) demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law; (b) failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected officially; or (c) collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law. The Court found the first element satisfied as to Amores by reason of her office as punong barangay and the second element sufficiently shown by the evidence of her demand.
• Article 213(2) Reaches Demands Where No Payment Is Authorized at All — The injunction against the payment of sums "different from or larger than those authorized by law" and against receiving objects of a nature "different from that provided by law" admits of situations when no payment is ever permitted, or no collection of any object is ever allowed. These situations may arise through an explicitly stated legal prohibition or through a law's mere silence; in the latter case, the law plainly declines to name any authorized manner of payment or collection and, by its reticence, signals that there is no permissible payment or collection. When the law enables no form whatsoever of payment or collection, a public officer's demand for payment of any sum, or insistence on collecting any object, is a legal breach and a punishable violation of Article 213(2).
• Liability of the Punong Barangay Notwithstanding the Barangay Treasurer's Collecting Functions — A public officer whose functions do not explicitly include the collection of fees and charges may nonetheless be liable for illegal exactions, and a local chief executive cannot evade liability by feigning incidental, ancillary, or tangential involvement and pointing to subalterns as the persons who actually effected the assailed collections. The barangay treasurer, in such a situation, acts as the local chief executive's mere alter ego. The Court applied this in holding that Amores' possible culpability was not negated by Section 395(e) of the Local Government Code, which tasks the barangay treasurer with collecting and issuing official receipts.
• Admission by Silence Applied by Analogy in Ombudsman Proceedings — Under Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court, an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing, when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. The Rules of Court do not govern proceedings before the Ombudsman except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient, and the provision on admission by silence refers to an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing of another rather than to written correspondence; nonetheless, the basic wisdom underlying the provision is obvious and commonsensical, and its application, if not the actual rule, was readily appreciable where grave imputations communicated to the respondent and to the highest city officials demanded a denial, refutation, or some manner of response that never came.
• Official Receipts and the "Donation" Label — While statements in documents are generally to be taken as regular, a prosecutor must appreciate official receipts in view of the nuances of the case and may not cursorily conclude that donations were made by taking at face value the same receipts that may very well have been the offender's own artifice. Since one could not expect the person receiving and acknowledging receipt to voluntarily admit unlawfulness in writing, an artificial designation or facade for the payments may have been devised, and the reference to "donations" could point to an attempt to legitimize inordinate collections.

• "Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty." — This is the canonical formulation of the probable cause standard for the filing of a criminal information, quoted from Reyes vs. Pearlbank Securities, Inc. and made the starting point of the Court's analysis of the Ombudsman's duty.
• "Atty. Mernado failed to realize that Article 213(2)'s injunction against the 'payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law' and against 'receiving . . . objects of a nature different from that provided by law' admits of situations when no payment is ever permitted, or no collection of any object is ever allowed. These situations may arise through an explicitly stated legal prohibition, or through a law's mere silence." — This passage supplies the ratio decidendi on the scope of Article 213(2), rejecting the premise that the complainant had to produce an enabling ordinance before an unlawful demand could be shown.
• "When the law enables no form whatsoever of payment or collection, a public officer's demand for payment of any sum, or insistence on collecting any object, is a legal breach. It is a punishable violation of Article 213(2)." — This is the operative holding that made the Ombudsman's dismissal untenable and that defines the outer reach of the offense of illegal exactions.
• "While statements in documents are generally to be taken as regular, Atty. Mernado needed to appreciate the official receipts in view of the many nuances of this case. He cursorily concluded that donations were made, taking at face value the same receipts that may very well have been the offender's own artifice." — This passage articulates the standard for evaluating the evidentiary weight of official receipts at the probable cause stage and explains why the "donation" labels could not, by themselves, defeat the complaint.
• "Private respondent Amores cannot evade liability by feigning incidental, ancillary, or tangential involvement, and pointing to subalterns as the persons who actually effected the assailed collections." — This states the principle that a local chief executive may be held liable for illegal exactions notwithstanding the barangay treasurer's statutory collecting functions.

• Reyes vs. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 582 Phil. 505 (2008) — Controlling precedent on the definition of probable cause for the purpose of filing a criminal information; quoted at length and made the standard against which the Ombudsman's resolution was measured.
• Lim vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, 795 Phil. 226 (2016) — Controlling precedent on the general rule of non-interference in the prosecutor's probable cause determination and on the grave abuse of discretion exception; also the source of the definition of grave abuse of discretion as a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
• Aguilar vs. Department of Justice, 717 Phil. 789 (2013) — Followed for the rule that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor's resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause, and for the principle that probable cause must be determined in reference to the elements of the crime charged.
• People vs. Pineda, 127 Phil. 950 (1967) — Cited to illustrate that the question of instituting a criminal charge is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal, whose views should normally prevail in a clash of views with a judge who did not investigate; the Court sustained the prosecutor and issued a writ of certiorari against the judge's orders.
• Chua vs. Padillo, 550 Phil. 241 (2007) — Cited as an instance where, upon an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion in refusing to prosecute specific persons for specific offenses, a writ of certiorari was issued to set aside the prosecutor's initial determination.
• Marasigan vs. Fuentes, 776 Phil. 574 (2016) — Cited as a further instance of judicial correction, where it was grave abuse of discretion for the Department of Justice Secretary to conclude that one respondent may only be prosecuted for a lesser crime while his co-respondents may not be prosecuted at all; the earlier resolution ordering the filing of informations was reinstated.
• Ongsuco vs. Malones, 619 Phil. 492 (2009) — Cited for the principle that a barangay treasurer may act as the mere alter ego of a local chief executive who insists on inordinate collections.
• Young vs. Mapayo, 388 Phil. 78 (2000) — Cited for the principle that a public officer whose functions do not explicitly include the collection of fees and charges may nonetheless be liable for illegal exactions, the Court there stating that the charge of demanding and receiving P10,000.00 for the solemnization of a marriage, if proven, would constitute illegal exaction.
• Gonzalez vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 562 Phil. 841 (2007) — Cited for the rule that public prosecutors are vested with a wide range of discretion as to whether, what, and whom to charge.
• Uy vs. People, 586 Phil. 473 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the prosecuting attorney cannot be compelled to file a particular criminal information, and that not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case.
• Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 298 Phil. 421 (1993) — Cited in Chua vs. Padillo as authority for the exceptional circumstances in which criminal prosecution may be blocked.

• Article 213(2), Revised Penal Code — Defines frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses, imposing the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, upon any public officer entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts who demands, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law; fails voluntarily to issue a receipt as provided by law for any sum collected officially; or collects or receives, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law. The Court parsed this provision into its two elements and held that it reaches demands for payment even where no payment is authorized at all, whether by explicit prohibition or by the law's mere silence.
• Section 389, Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) — Defines the punong barangay as the chief executive of the barangay government and enumerates the powers, duties, and functions of the office, including enforcing all laws and ordinances applicable within the barangay, maintaining public order, enforcing laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment, ensuring the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17, and promoting the general welfare of the barangay. The Court relied on this provision to establish that Amores' engagement with solid waste management was official, direct, and unequivocal, and that her functions were broad enough to encompass facilitating the levying of charges for services rendered.
• Section 17(b)(1)(iii), Local Government Code — Lists among the basic services and facilities of a barangay those related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection. The Court cited this to show that solid waste collection fell within the basic services Amores was bound to ensure.
• Section 153, Local Government Code — Provides for revenue-raising powers common to all local government units, under which barangays can impose and collect reasonable fees and charges for services rendered. The Court cited this in support of the breadth of Amores' functions relative to the levying of charges.
• Section 395(e), Local Government Code — Tasks the barangay treasurer with collecting and issuing official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to the barangay treasury. The Court rejected the use of this provision to negate Amores' possible culpability, holding that it was improper to negate her liability by the veneer of detachment simply because she held a position different from, or superior to, that of the barangay treasurer.
• Section 48, Republic Act No. 9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000) — Enumerates sixteen prohibited acts. The Ombudsman dismissed the charge under this provision on the ground that the allegations did not fall under any of the enumerated acts; petitioner no longer made averments concerning liability under this section in his Petition, and the dismissal on this ground was not disturbed.
• Rule 130, Section 32, Rules of Court — Defines admission by silence: an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. The Court applied the underlying wisdom of this provision by analogy to Amores' failure to respond to petitioner's August 8, 2011 letter.
• Rule 1, Sections 2 to 4, Rules of Court — Provide that the Rules shall apply in all courts except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court, govern the procedure in civil and criminal actions and special proceedings, and shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization, and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The Court cited these provisions to clarify that the Rules on Evidence did not govern the proceedings before the Ombudsman except by analogy.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the special civil action of certiorari, the remedy petitioner invoked to set aside the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang, JJ., concur. Justice Carandang was designated an additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.