Reynante vs. Court of Appeals

In forcible entry, prior physical possession—not ownership—is the decisive issue; a party who proves prior possession may recover possession even against the owner until lawfully ejected in accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Moreover, an alluvial accretion to registered land does not automatically become registered land, and the riparian owner's failure to register it for fifty years may subject it to acquisition by prescription by a third person.

Jose Reynante was taken in as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond in Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618. The private respondents are the Carlos heirs who succeeded to the fishpond after Don Cosme Carlos's death. The disputed Lots 1 and 2 lie between the fishpond and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. The controversy implicated Article 457 of the New Civil Code on alluvial accretion and the effect of Torrens registration on unregistered accretion.

More than 50 years before the dispute, Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of the private respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 188.711 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618 of the Land Registry of Bulacan. During the tenancy, Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on Lots 1 and 2, covering 5,096 square meters and 6,011 square meters, respectively. These lots lie between the fishpond covered by TCT No. 25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Reynante harvested and sold the nipa palms without interference or prohibition from anyone, and Don Cosme Carlos never questioned his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own.

After Don Cosme Carlos died, his heirs, the private respondents' predecessors-in-interest, entered into a written agreement denominated "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NG PAGSASAULI NG KARAPATAN" dated November 29, 1984 with Reynante. For and in consideration of P200,000.00, Reynante turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-kasama at tagapamahala." Pursuant to that agreement, he surrendered the fishpond and the two huts located therein to the private respondents. The private respondents thereafter leased the fishpond to Carlos de la Cruz. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut he had constructed on Lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted there.

On February 17, 1988, the private respondents formally demanded that Reynante vacate the said portion, claiming that he had already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt of the demand, Reynante refused and failed to relinquish possession of Lots 1 and 2.

On April 22, 1988, the private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against Reynante, alleging that by means of strategy and stealth he took over the physical, actual, and material possession of Lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.

The Municipal Trial Court found that Reynante had been in prior possession of Lots 1 and 2. Its factual findings were supported by the "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY" executed by Epifanio Lucero, Apolonio D. Morte, and Carling Dumalay, all disinterested parties with no motive to falsify, and by an ocular inspection conducted on December 2, 1988, attended by the parties and their counsel. During that inspection, the court observed that the nipa hut and the subject sasahan appeared to have existed long ago, planted and standing adjacent to the fishpond and the dikes serving as passageway of water from the river to Lots 1 and 2; that a muniment of title was embedded on the ground on the inner side of the pilapil separating the fishpond from the sasa plants, at a height of 20 to 25 feet from water level; and that the controversial premises were beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River, being part of the public domain. Verification by the Forest Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, showed that the disputed lots were not included in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618; the tract of land at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante, falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. Map No. 3122 dated May 8, 1987.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether petitioner or private respondents had prior physical possession of Lots 1 and 2.
• Accretion and Prescription: Whether the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of accretion, and whether petitioner's possession for more than fifty years may be protected against their claim.

• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioner. The evidence established that petitioner had possessed Lots 1 and 2 for more than fifty years; in forcible entry, prior physical possession, not title, determines who may retain possession until lawful ejectment.
• Accretion and Prescription: No, not as against petitioner. Even assuming the lots were alluvial accretion, private respondents' failure to register the accretion for fifty years subjected it to acquisition by prescription by petitioner, whose long possession must be respected absent a better title.

• Prior Physical Possession: An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process; actual title is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover possession even against the owner himself, and if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he owns the property. The Court of Appeals therefore could not legally restore private respondents' possession over Lots 1 and 2 simply because petitioner had clearly proven prior possession. The evidence showed petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots for more than 50 years. It was undisputed that he was caretaker of the fishpond owned by Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years, constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond, and planted nipa palms therein. This was bolstered by the SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY executed by Epifanio Lucero, Apolonio D. Morte, and Carling Dumalay, disinterested parties with no motive to falsify. The trial court's ocular inspection on December 2, 1988 also observed that the nipa hut and sasahan existed long ago, planted and standing adjacent to the fishpond and dikes; that a muniment of title was embedded on the ground on the inner side of the pilapil separating the fishpond from the sasa plants; and that the disputed premises were beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs and along the Liputan River, part of the public domain. Private respondents based their claim of possession simply on the written agreement by which petitioner surrendered his rights over the fishpond. The trial court correctly ruled that the document surrendered the fishpond, not the sasahan or the land on which petitioner constructed his hut. Nothing indicated that the tenant was giving other matters not mentioned in the document. When private respondents leased the fishpond to Carlos de la Cruz, the lease did not mention the hut constructed by petitioner or the nipa palms he planted, suggesting that these were not included in the lease and may not belong to private respondents.

• Accretion and Prescription: The disputed lots were not included in TCT No. 25618, as verified by the Forest Management Bureau, DENR; the tract described in the plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for Jose Reynante falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under Project No. 15 per B.F.L.C. Map No. 3122 dated May 8, 1987. The Court of Appeals ruled that Lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and thus belonged to private respondents under Article 457 of the New Civil Code. Accretion benefits a riparian owner when: (1) the deposit is gradual and imperceptible; (2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river. Granting without conceding that Lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation, and although accretions gradually received by river banks become the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot receiving it is covered by a Torrens title; ownership of land and registration under the Torrens system are distinct. Ownership over accretion is governed by the Civil Code, while imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title but merely confirms and protects the title already possessed, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties; to obtain that protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws through the prescribed judicial procedures. Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit by accretion, their failure to register the accretion for fifty years subjected it to acquisition through prescription by third persons. Petitioner's possession of the subject lots for more than fifty years was undisputed, and unless private respondents could show a better title, that possession had to be respected.

• Forcible entry determines prior physical possession, not title — In an action for forcible entry, the only issue is prior physical possession; actual title is never determined. A party who proves prior possession may recover possession even against the owner himself and may remain until lawfully ejected by a person with a better right in accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. If the plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he owns the property. Applied: petitioner's more than 50-year possession of Lots 1 and 2 entitled him to retain possession; the Court of Appeals erred in restoring private respondents' possession based on their claim of ownership/accretion.

• Requisites of alluvial accretion — Under Article 457 of the New Civil Code, accretion benefits a riparian owner when: (1) the deposit is gradual and imperceptible; (2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river. The Court assumed without conceding that Lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation, but held that even then private respondents' claim did not prevail against petitioner's long possession.

• Accretion to registered land is not automatically registered; prescription may lie — An accretion does not automatically become registered land merely because the lot receiving it is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of land is distinct from registration under the Torrens system. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title but merely confirms and protects the title already possessed, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties; to obtain that protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws. Failure to register an accretion for fifty years subjects it to acquisition through prescription by third persons. Applied: even assuming private respondents acquired the alluvial deposit, their failure to register it for fifty years allowed petitioner's long possession to be respected.

• "An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself." — States the ratio on forcible entry: prior physical possession, not ownership, controls the right to possession.

• "Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription." — States the ratio on accretion and prescription: even a valid accretion claim does not bar prescription by another.

• "An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another." — Defines the distinction between ownership and Torrens registration, a key premise for holding that unregistered accretion may be prescribed.

• "Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons." — Applies the prescription rule to the facts and explains why petitioner's long possession prevailed.

• German Management & Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499 — Cited for the rule that in forcible entry, a party who can prove prior possession can recover possession even against the owner, and that priority in time entitles the possessor to remain until lawfully ejected.
• Lizo vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 469 (1942) — Cited for the rule that if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he owns the property.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 514 — Cited for the requisites of accretion under Article 457 of the New Civil Code.
• Agustin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218 — Cited, together with Republic vs. Court of Appeals, for the requisites of accretion.
• Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 521 — Cited for the rule that accretion does not automatically become registered land merely because the lot receiving it is Torrens-titled; ownership and registration are distinct, and failure to register the accretion may subject it to prescription.

• Article 457, New Civil Code — Provides that to owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The Court assumed without conceding that Lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation; even if so, private respondents' failure to register the accretion for fifty years subjected it to acquisition by prescription.
• Land Registration and Cadastral Act (as cited in the decision) — Registration under the Act does not vest or give title but merely confirms and protects the title already possessed, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties; to obtain that protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws. The decision used this principle to hold that an unregistered accretion may be acquired by prescription.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ.