Reyes vs. Reyes

The registered owner of land in whose favor and in whose name the land is inscribed in the certificate of title has a preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate certificate of title over one whose name does not appear thereon and has yet to establish his right thereto, notwithstanding the pendency of litigation involving the property.

Three brothers—Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H. Reyes—were the registered co-owners of several parcels of land in the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161 (Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902, and 15912) and Original Certificate of Title No. 8066 (Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration dated May 31, 1940. Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes claimed to have acquired Francisco H. Reyes's undivided one-third share in the disputed lots by way of an unrecorded absolute sale.

Three brothers—Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H. Reyes—were the registered owners of several parcels of land in the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre. These included Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902, and 15912, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, and Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. The titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration dated May 31, 1940.

On July 17, 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed in the cadastral cases a motion for the issuance of writs of possession over all lots covered by both certificates of title. Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion. He admitted possession only of the lots under OCT No. 22161 and denied possessing those under OCT No. 8066, but claimed entitlement to possession of all disputed lots, asserting that he had acquired by way of an unrecorded absolute sale from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third share, interest, and participation in the disputed lots.

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance issued on December 20, 1962, a writ of possession covering Lots Nos. 15891 and 15896. Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the writ was amended on January 7, 1963, to include all other lots covered by both titles. Respondent did not appeal from this amended order.

Thereafter, on January 15, 1963, petitioners, as plaintiffs, commenced an ordinary civil action (docketed as Civil Case No. 3659) before the same court against respondent, seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots or their value, plus moral damages. Respondent answered and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots, reiterating his claim of co-ownership based on his purchase of Francisco H. Reyes's one-third share. Pending trial of Civil Case No. 3659, petitioners filed on February 25, 1963, in the cadastral cases, a motion to compel respondent to surrender and deliver the owners' duplicates of OCT Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed the motion.

The trial court denied petitioners' motion on the ground that the parcels of land covered by both titles were subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, which had not yet been decided on the merits. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting the present direct appeal on pure question of law.

• Subject Matter of Civil Case No. 3659: Petitioners contended that the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 was not the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or value and moral damages, and therefore the lots were not in litigation in that civil case.
• Res Judicata and Estoppel: Petitioners argued that since respondent had already raised the issue of ownership and possession of the lots in his opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession, and despite this opposition the court granted the writ without any appeal being taken, respondent was barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case under the principle of res judicata.
• Authority to Represent Heirs: In their reply brief, petitioners refuted respondent's argument regarding non-impleading of Francisco's heirs by showing they had previously obtained special authority from the heirs of their deceased brother to represent them in the proceedings below.

• Lots in Litigation: Respondent maintained that, having pleaded a counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in Civil Case No. 3659, the trial court correctly held that these lots were subjects of litigation in that case.
• Limited Validity of Writ of Possession: Respondent argued that petitioners had not impleaded their brother Francisco H. Reyes or his heirs as parties in the motion for issuance of writ of possession, and because these heirs had not intervened in that incident, the writ was valid only with respect to petitioners' undivided two-thirds share. He concluded he was not barred from raising the issue of ownership and possession of Francisco's one-third share, which he allegedly purchased.

• Right to Possession of Owner's Duplicate: Whether petitioners or respondent has a better right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title.

• Right to Possession of Owner's Duplicate: Petitioners. The registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title has a preferential right to possession of the owner's duplicate over one whose name does not appear thereon and has yet to establish his right thereto, even if the property is subject of pending litigation.

• Right to Possession of Owner's Duplicate: While the Court agreed with the trial court that the disputed lots were subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659—since respondent had presented a counterclaim for partition—this circumstance did not justify withholding the owner's duplicates from the registered owners. Citing Director of Lands vs. Abacahin (72 Phil. 326), the Court held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name the land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to possession of the owner's duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right thereto. Since respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share through his counterclaim for partition, his rights were amply protected. Furthermore, he could avail of the provision on notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to record the fact that the lots covered by the titles were being litigated, thereby protecting any transferee of the titles. The Court found no justifiable reason for respondent to retain custody of the owners' duplicates. The Court deemed it unnecessary to pass on the merits of petitioners' second contention regarding res judicata and estoppel.

• Preferential Right of Registered Owner to Owner's Duplicate — The registered owner of land in whose favor and in whose name the land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate certificate of title over one whose name does not appear on the certificate and has yet to establish his right to possession thereof. This preferential right is not defeated by the pendency of litigation involving the property, provided the claimant's rights are adequately protected by an independent action and the availability of lis pendens notice under Section 24, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court applied this doctrine by ordering respondent to surrender the owner's duplicates to petitioners, the registered owners, notwithstanding respondent's pending counterclaim for partition in Civil Case No. 3659.

• "the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto." — This passage states the controlling rule of the case, articulating the ratio decidendi that the registered owner's right to the owner's duplicate prevails over a mere claimant's, even during pending litigation.

• "we again see no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of titles." — This sentence concludes the Court's reasoning, tying together the adequacy of respondent's independent counterclaim and the availability of lis pendens as sufficient protection without need to withhold the owner's duplicates.

• Director of Lands vs. Abacahin, 72 Phil. 326 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court cited this case for the rule that the registered owner has a preferential right to possession of the owner's duplicate over someone whose name does not appear on the certificate, quoting extensively from the decision (in the original Spanish) to support its ruling.

• Section 24, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court (Notice of Lis Pendens) — The Court noted that respondent could avail of this provision to record the fact that the lots covered by the titles were being litigated in Civil Case No. 3659, thereby protecting his rights without need to retain the owner's duplicates.
• Article 41, Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), as amended — Cited within the quoted passage from Director of Lands vs. Abacahin, providing that the owner's duplicate must be issued by the Registrar in the name of the person in whose favor the land was decreed and must be delivered to the registered owner.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concurred. Regala, J., took no part.