Primary Holding
Only a decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections en banc, rendered after a motion for reconsideration of a division decision, may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and an appeal from a trial court in a municipal election contest must be perfected by payment of the appeal fee within five days from promulgation.
Background
Aquiles U. Reyes and Adolfo G. Comia were rival candidates for member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. Under Art. IX, C, §§2-3 of the Constitution, the COMELEC decides election cases in division, with motions for reconsideration decided en banc, and its decisions on municipal election contests are otherwise final and executory. Under Art. IX, A, §7, only decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
History
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Municipal Board of Canvassers, May 13, 1992 — proclaimed petitioner as eighth winning candidate with 7,205 votes without resolving private respondent's motion to exclude certain returns.
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RTC Br. 39, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, June 23, 1992 — denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and annulled petitioner's proclamation, declaring private respondent the eighth winning councilor.
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Court of Appeals, August 26, 1992 — dismissed petitioner's petition for mandamus and prohibition because of his pending appeal before the COMELEC, citing Supreme Court Circular 28-91; reconsideration denied and decision became final on December 10, 1992.
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COMELEC First Division, January 22, 1993 — dismissed petitioner's appeal (EAC No. 9-92) for failure to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.
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Supreme Court, May 5, 1995 — resolved the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the RTC decision, COMELEC dismissal, and continued recognition of private respondent.
Facts
Petitioner Aquiles U. Reyes and private respondent Adolfo G. Comia were candidates for member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, Comia moved for exclusion of certain election returns on the ground of serious irregularity in counting votes cast for "Reyes" only in favor of petitioner, considering that another candidate, Epitacio Reyes, bore the same surname. Without resolving that petition, the Board proclaimed petitioner on the same day as the eighth winning candidate with 7,205 votes, and petitioner took his oath of office on May 25, 1992.
On June 1, 1992, Comia filed an election protest before the trial court, alleging a vital mistake by the Board of Canvassers in mathematical computation. He alleged that C.E. Form No. 20-A reflected only 858 votes for him when, after review and correction, he was entitled to 915 votes; that the Board and the Election Registrar, in the presence of Municipal Trial Court Judge Tomas C. Leynes, manifested that the discrepancy was an honest mistake in computation and addition; and that his corrected total was 7,233 votes, or 28 votes more than petitioner's 7,205 votes for the eighth position. On June 4, 1992, petitioner moved to dismiss the protest as filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period from proclamation, but the trial court denied the motion on June 15, 1992. The Board filed an answer admitting it had mistakenly credited private respondent with only 858 votes instead of 915 votes in the Statement of Votes.
On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered decision annulling petitioner's proclamation and declaring Comia the eighth winning councilor, a copy of which was served on petitioner on June 26, 1992. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and, in addition, a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him and prohibit recognition of Comia. Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan met in inaugural session on July 3, 1992, recognized Comia as its eighth member and allowed him to assume office, informing petitioner thereof on July 13, 1992. Petitioner paid the P1,020.00 appeal fee only on August 6, 1992, forty days after receipt of the trial court decision. He later invoked a joint-affidavit of the Board members dated October 12, 1993 claiming that, through honest mistake due to fatigue, his 40 votes in Precinct No. 37 and 31 votes in Precinct No. 41-A had been transcribed in favor of candidate Jeremias Nacorda, who actually garnered only 9 and 8 votes therein per the Election Returns.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Jurisdiction of Trial Court: Petitioner argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by assuming jurisdiction over the election protest despite its having been filed more than ten days after his proclamation.
- Dismissal of Appeal: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC's First Division committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing his appeal for late payment of the appeal fee, claiming he acted on advice to wait until the records were received from the RTC and docketed before paying, and relying on COMELEC Resolution No. 1456 that the fee was payable only upon filing the appeal brief.
- Pure Question of Law: Petitioner maintained that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc could be dispensed with because only a question of law was raised.
- Re-canvass: Petitioner prayed that a re-canvass be conducted in all electoral precincts of Naujan in view of the October 12, 1993 joint-affidavit of the Municipal Board of Canvassers concerning mis-transcribed votes in Precincts No. 37 and 41-A.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Need for En Banc Decision: The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC, contended that the present petition, filed without a prior motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the Constitution because only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issues
- Reviewability and Reconsideration: Whether a petition for certiorari may be brought to the Supreme Court from a COMELEC division decision without first filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
- Perfection of Appeal: Whether the COMELEC First Division properly dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the period to perfect the appeal.
- Trial Court Jurisdiction and Estoppel: Whether the trial court's decision may still be assailed for alleged lack of jurisdiction where the protest was claimed to have been filed beyond ten days from proclamation, considering petitioner's subsequent appeal and recourse to the Court of Appeals.
Ruling
- Reviewability and Reconsideration: No. Only decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC en banc, after a motion for reconsideration of a division decision, may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Art. IX, A, §7.
- Perfection of Appeal: Yes. Dismissal was proper because the appeal fee was paid forty days after receipt of the trial court decision instead of within the five-day period to file the notice of appeal, a ground for dismissal under Rule 22, §9.
- Trial Court Jurisdiction and Estoppel: No. Petitioner is estopped from assailing trial court jurisdiction after appealing to the COMELEC and filing mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, and his re-canvass plea fails with the dismissal of the COMELEC appeal.
Ruling Rationale
- Reviewability and Reconsideration: Under Art. IX, A, §7, decisions, orders, and rulings brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari mean the special civil action under Rule 65, §1, which requires a prior motion for reconsideration. Art. IX, C, §§2-3 mandate that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration decided en banc. The questions tendered were not pure questions of law so as to excuse reconsideration, since they required interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts. Absent an en banc decision, the present action was fatally defective.
- Perfection of Appeal: Rule 22, §9 of the COMELEC Rules expressly allows dismissal for failure to pay the appeal fee, and §2(b) of Resolution No. 2108-A requires payment within the period to perfect the appeal, understood as the period to file the notice of appeal. Rule 22, §3 gives the aggrieved party five days after promulgation to file the notice of appeal. Resolution No. 2108-A, promulgated July 14, 1989, superseded Resolution No. 1456 relied upon by petitioner. Having received the decision on June 26, 1992 but paying P1,020.00 only on August 6, 1992, petitioner lapsed forty days. No evidence supported the alleged erroneous advice to defer payment, nor was the advising person identified or an offer to pay within the period shown.
- Trial Court Jurisdiction and Estoppel: Having elected to appeal the trial court decision to the COMELEC on that very jurisdictional ground and to separately seek mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, petitioner could not file the present petition merely because those recourses failed. The Court of Appeals had already dismissed the mandamus-prohibition suit due to the pending COMELEC appeal under Circular 28-91, with finality on December 10, 1992. The October 12, 1993 joint-affidavit issue, raised in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief in EAC No. 9-92, afforded no basis for relief once that appeal was dismissed.
Doctrines
- COMELEC en banc review as prerequisite to certiorari — All election cases must be heard and decided by the COMELEC in division, while motions for reconsideration must be decided en banc; only the resulting en banc decision, order, or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Art. IX, A, §7, which contemplates a Rule 65 petition requiring a prior motion for reconsideration.
- Perfection of appeal in municipal election contests — Under COMELEC Rules Rule 22, §§3 and 9 and Resolution No. 2108-A §2(b), the notice of appeal must be filed within five days after promulgation of the trial court's decision and the appeal fee paid within the same period to perfect the appeal; failure to pay timely is a ground for dismissal, and Resolution No. 2108-A superseded Resolution No. 1456.
- Estoppel against belated jurisdictional attack after electing remedies — A party who appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC and separately sued in the Court of Appeals on the same controversy is estopped from relitigating the trial court's jurisdiction through a new certiorari petition after losing in those fora.
Key Excerpts
- "It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, 'may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.'" — States the controlling rule on reviewability, limiting Supreme Court certiorari to en banc COMELEC rulings after division adjudication and reconsideration.
- "In accordance with §2(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2108-A, the appeal fee must be paid within the period to perfect the appeal." — Anchors the dismissal ruling, linking the fee deadline to the five-day notice-of-appeal period.
- "Having decided on this course of action, he should not be allowed to file the present petition just because he lost in those cases." — Expresses the estoppel rationale barring petitioner's renewed attack on the trial court's jurisdiction.
Precedents Cited
- Galido vs. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78 (1991) — Cited as authority that Art. IX, A, §7 certiorari means the special civil action under Rule 65, §1.
- Rivera vs. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 178 (1991) — Cited for the same proposition on the nature of certiorari review of COMELEC rulings.
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 308 (1992) — Cited comparatively to support that only COMELEC en banc rulings are brought to the Supreme Court.
- Ong, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 806 (1992) — Cited comparatively on the same en banc review requirement.
Provisions
- Art. IX, A, §7, Constitution — Provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each Constitutional Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within thirty days from receipt; applied to require a COMELEC en banc ruling and prior motion for reconsideration.
- Art. IX, C, §2, Constitution — Grants COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over regional, provincial, and city contests and appellate jurisdiction over municipal contests decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, with municipal and barangay contest rulings final, executory, and not appealable; applied to frame the appellate pathway.
- Art. IX, C, §3, Constitution — Allows COMELEC to sit en banc or in two divisions but requires election cases to be heard and decided in division and motions for reconsideration decided en banc; applied to bar direct review of a division dismissal.
- Rule 22, §§3 and 9, COMELEC Rules of Procedure; §2(b), COMELEC Resolution No. 2108-A — Require notice of appeal within five days after promulgation, payment of appeal fees within the period to perfect the appeal, and authorize dismissal for nonpayment; applied to sustain dismissal where payment came forty days later.
- COMELEC Resolution No. 1456, §6 — Former rule invoked by petitioner to defer fee payment until filing of the appeal brief; held superseded by Resolution No. 2108-A.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Francisco, J., is on leave.