Reyes vs. Gonzalez

The writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC is limited to violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty, and security arising from extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; it does not extend to the right to travel. Where a criminal case is pending, a separate petition for the writ cannot be filed, and any relief available under the writ—including the lifting of a hold departure order—must be sought by motion in that criminal case.

On November 30, 2007, petitioner, a Catholic priest, was among those arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. He was brought to Camp Crame for inquest proceedings. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors found probable cause for rebellion against him and others, and an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. A day before the Information was filed, the Secretary of Justice, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government, issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45, placing petitioner’s name on the Bureau of Immigration’s hold departure list in the interest of national security and public safety. On December 13, 2007, the trial court dismissed the rebellion charge against petitioner and several others for lack of probable cause, ruling that mere presence at the scene and expression of political sentiments did not constitute conspiracy with the soldiers who staged the siege. Despite the dismissal, the hold departure order was not lifted. Petitioner’s counsel formally requested its lifting, but the Secretary of Justice declined to act, citing a representation issue. Petitioner later experienced being held and interrogated by immigration officers at Ninoy Aquino International Airport because his name remained on the hold departure list.

• Arrest and Filing of Rebellion Charges: On November 30, 2007, petitioner was among approximately fifty individuals arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege and brought to Camp Crame. That evening, a DOJ Panel of Prosecutors conducted inquest proceedings for rebellion and inciting to rebellion. On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others, the panel filed an Information for rebellion (I.S. No. 2007-1045) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City.
• Issuance of HDO No. 45: On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued Hold Departure Order No. 45, directing the Commissioner of Immigration to include petitioner and 49 others in the Bureau’s hold departure list, citing national security and public safety.
• Dismissal of the Rebellion Case: Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release Upon Recognizance. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the rebellion charge against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court found that the evidence failed to show that the civilian accused conspired with the soldiers; mere presence at the scene and the expression of electoral and political reform sentiments were insufficient without concrete proof of prior knowledge of the soldiers’ intent to commit rebellion.
• Continued Enforcement of the HDO and Travel Restraint: On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel wrote Secretary Gonzalez requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal. The Secretary replied that he could not act until a representation conflict between two lawyers claiming to represent petitioner was resolved. On December 19, 2007, immigration officers held petitioner at Ninoy Aquino International Airport; only the timely intervention of counsel enabled him to board his flight to Hong Kong. Petitioner returned on December 26, 2007, but he was detained and interrogated each time he presented himself for international flights because his name remained on the hold departure list. The DOJ subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order; the RTC denied it on January 31, 2008, for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time, but the criminal case was not entirely terminated.
• Amparo Petition and CA Proceedings: On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for the writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals. He alleged that the continued inclusion of his name in the hold departure list constituted an illegal restraint on his right to travel, that the Secretary of Justice had no power to issue HDOs, and that the dismissal of the rebellion case removed any legal basis for the order. Respondents’ Return, filed on January 24, 2008, cited the Secretary’s administrative mandate under the Administrative Code and DOJ circulars, argued that the motion for reconsideration made the lifting premature, invoked failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and asserted that the constitutionality of the circulars could not be collaterally attacked in an amparo proceeding. During the hearing on January 25, 2008, petitioner’s counsel stated that petitioner was in Hong Kong, that he was stopped at the airport every time he traveled, and that no motion to lift the HDO was filed before the RTC or the DOJ because doing so would effectively recognize the Secretary’s asserted power. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on February 4, 2008, ruling that the writ of amparo was not the proper remedy and that relief was available by motion in the criminal case.

• Coverage of the Writ of Amparo: Petitioner argued that the writ of amparo protects the entire range of constitutionally guaranteed liberties, including the right to travel as a component of liberty, and is not confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
• Invalidity of the HDO and Lack of Statutory Basis: Petitioner maintained that the DOJ Secretary had no statutory authority to issue hold departure orders. DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998, was an administrative issuance that did not have the force of law and could not serve as legal foundation for HDO No. 45. With the dismissal of the rebellion case, the HDO became utterly without basis.
• Continuing Actual Restraint and Exigency: Petitioner contended that the maintenance of his name on the hold departure list constituted a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel, irrespective of whether he succeeded in traveling on certain occasions. The immediate resort to the writ was justified by the ongoing violation and the exigency of the situation.
• Non-Exhaustion and Constitutional Challenge: Petitioner claimed that filing a motion to lift the HDO before the DOJ or the trial court would have been tantamount to recognizing the very power whose existence he challenged as unconstitutional. The constitutionality of the circulars, according to petitioner, could be raised directly in the amparo proceeding.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: Respondents maintained that HDO No. 45 was validly issued pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998, and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007, which were in turn grounded on the Secretary’s mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as head of the principal law agency of the government, encompassing the investigation of crimes, prosecution of offenders, and provision of immigration regulatory services.
• Prematurity and Pending Motion: Respondents argued that lifting the HDO was premature because the DOJ had timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s order dismissing the rebellion charge, and the criminal case had not yet attained finality.
• Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Respondents pointed out that petitioner never filed a motion to lift the HDO before the DOJ, thereby failing to exhaust available administrative remedies.
• Impropriety of the Amparo Vehicle: Respondents asserted that an amparo proceeding was not the proper forum for a collateral attack on the constitutionality of DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18; such a challenge required a direct action.

• Coverage of the Writ of Amparo: Whether the right to travel is protected by the writ of amparo under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, such that a hold departure order constitutes a violation of or threat to life, liberty, or security cognizable through the writ.
• Availability of Alternative Remedy under Section 22: Whether petitioner’s failure to file a motion to lift the HDO in the pending criminal case before the RTC, as mandated by Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, precluded the petition.
• Justiciability of the Constitutional Question: Whether the constitutionality of DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18, which authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue hold departure orders, could be resolved in a petition for the writ of amparo absent an actual controversy and given the availability of another remedy.

• Coverage of the Writ of Amparo: The right to travel is not within the protective scope of the writ of amparo. The Amparo Rule, as definitively interpreted in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. While the right to liberty broadly includes freedom of movement, the writ was conceived as an extraordinary response to the specific problem of politically motivated killings and disappearances. Petitioner’s restriction on travel, though an inconvenience, did not constitute the kind of severe deprivation of life, liberty, or security for which the writ was designed. The HDO was issued in connection with a criminal case and remained subject to the trial court’s control; thus, the restraint was not unlawful in the sense required by the Rule. Moreover, the right to travel is not absolute and may be restricted to safeguard the system of justice, as affirmed in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his right was impaired to a degree constituting a serious violation for which no other legal recourse existed.

• Availability of Alternative Remedy under Section 22: The petition was properly dismissed because a separate amparo action was barred by Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. That section provides that when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed, and the reliefs available under the writ shall be pursued by motion in the criminal case. Here, Criminal Case No. 07-3126 remained pending before the RTC; the trial court retained residual jurisdiction to entertain incidents even after the dismissal of the charge as to petitioner, as the case was still active with respect to other accused and motions. Petitioner’s co-accused had successfully filed motions to lift the HDO in the same criminal case, demonstrating the availability of the remedy. Petitioner’s deliberate choice not to invoke that remedy—on the theory that doing so would recognize the DOJ Secretary’s power—did not excuse non-compliance with the Rule. The Court of Appeals correctly applied Crespo v. Mogul in holding that once a case is filed in court, any disposition or incident rests in the court’s sound discretion, and the writ of amparo cannot be used to bypass that procedural avenue.

• Justiciability of the Constitutional Question: The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18. No actual controversy requiring such a determination existed, as petitioner’s fear that the DOJ might deny a motion to lift the HDO was merely speculative. The remedy of filing a motion before the RTC remained available and had not been attempted. Absent a concrete case or controversy and given the existence of an unexhausted remedy, the constitutional challenge could not be entertained in the amparo proceeding.

• Limited Coverage of the Writ of Amparo — The writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC is an extraordinary remedy whose coverage, in its present form, is confined to violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty, and security arising from extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings; “enforced disappearances” involve arrest, detention, or abduction by government agents or organized groups acting with government acquiescence, coupled with refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person. The writ was not designed to protect purely property or commercial interests, nor does it extend to amorphous or uncertain grounds, such as a claim based on the right to travel unconnected to the targeted evils. (Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, Tapuz v. Del Rosario, Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association applied.)

• Section 22 of the Amparo Rule and Residual Jurisdiction — When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ of amparo may be filed; all reliefs available under the writ must be sought by motion in that criminal case. The trial court retains control over the criminal action to the exclusion of a separate amparo proceeding. This rule applies even where the charge against the accused has been dismissed, as long as the criminal case remains pending in the court (e.g., with respect to other accused or unresolved incidents). The residual power of the court to entertain incidents encompasses the lifting of a hold departure order. (Crespo v. Mogul on court control over pending cases affirmed.)

• Requirement of Actual Controversy and Availability of Remedy — A petition for the writ of amparo requires a clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty, or security is immediately in danger or threatened in a continuing manner. A speculative apprehension that an administrative agency might deny a motion does not present an actual controversy. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of an administrative issuance when an effective and unexhausted judicial remedy exists.

• “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of ‘extralegal killings’ and ‘enforced disappearances,’ its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.” — Reiterating the controlling definition from Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the Court foreclosed the argument that the writ extends to the right to travel.

• “The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).” — The Court of Appeals’ succinct but decisive basis for dismissal, which the Supreme Court quoted with approval.

• “The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.” — Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, underscoring that the extraordinary character of the writ demands strict adherence to its limited scope.

• Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1 — Controlling precedent that crystallized the limited coverage of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; extensively quoted for the definitions and underlying principles.

• Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768 — Applied for the basic principle that the writ of amparo requires justifying allegations of fact demonstrating a prima facie violation or threat to life, liberty, or security; also used to explain that the writ will not be issued where there is an ongoing judicial proceeding addressing the same dispute.

• Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association I–XIII, Inc., G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 208 — Cited to reinforce that the Court will not expend its resources on matters outside the coverage of the writ.

• Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462 — Followed for the rule that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court, not the prosecutor.

• Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 115132-34, August 9, 1995, 247 SCRA 127 — Cited for the proposition that the right to travel is subject to constraints imposed by the necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.

• Section 1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) — Defines the petition as a remedy for violations or threats to the rights to life, liberty, and security by unlawful acts or omissions; explicitly states that the writ “shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” Applied to hold that a restriction on travel does not fall within its coverage.

• Section 22, Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) — Provides that when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed, and the reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. Applied to bar the amparo petition because the criminal case remained pending and the remedy of moving to lift the HDO was available in that proceeding.

• Section 5, Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) — Enumerates the required justifying allegations in a petition, emphasizing the need for factual specificity; used to underscore the writ’s extraordinary nature.

• Article III, Sections 1 and 2, 1987 Constitution — Guarantee of the rights to life, liberty, and security, and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; referenced in the discussion of the scope of the right to security of person.

• Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 — Administrative issuances prescribing rules on hold departure orders and watchlist orders; their constitutionality was challenged but not ruled upon.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.