Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

Probate proceedings are as a general rule limited to the extrinsic validity of the will — due execution, compliance with formalities, and testamentary capacity — and do not pass upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of its provisions except where the defect is apparent on the face of the will, practical considerations require it, or the parties agree thereto. Applied here, the declaration that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was the testator's wife and devisee involved intrinsic validity and need not have been nullified in probate absent a patent illegality or competent proof.

Torcuato J. Reyes was the decedent-testator whose estate is the subject of Special Proceedings No. 112. Petitioners Manuel, Mila and Danilo Reyes are his recognized natural children with Estebana Galolo, while Lyn and Marites Agape are his natural children with Celsa Agape. Asuncion "Oning" R. Reyes was the woman described in the will as his wife and instituted as devisee/legatee, and private respondent Julio A. Vivares was the executor designated in the will.

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed a two-page last will and testament signed by him in the presence of three witnesses, Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo and Soledad Gaputan. In paragraph II thereof, he gave and bequeathed to his wife Asuncion "Oning" R. Reyes all his shares in personal properties including jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furniture, fixtures and the building, and all his one-half or 50% shares in real estates owned in common with his brother Jose in Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban and Sagay in Camiguin and in Lunao, Gingoog, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguitan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta and Talisayan in Misamis Oriental. The will designated private respondent Julio A. Vivares as executor and, in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.

Thereafter Reyes died on May 12, 1992. Nine days later, Vivares filed a petition for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, which set the petition for hearing, caused publication in the Mindanao Daily Post once a week for three consecutive weeks, and sent notices to persons named in the petition. According to the prosecution of the opposition, the will was not executed and attested in accordance with legal formalities and Asuncion Reyes Ebarle had exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator. Oppositors Manuel, Mila and Danilo Reyes and Lyn and Marites Agape further averred that Reyes was never married and could never marry Asuncion because she was already married to Lupo Ebarle, then still alive, with no annulment, making open cohabitation violative of public morals and disqualifying her as heir.

The trial court received evidence and, in its April 23, 1993 decision, found the will executed in accordance with prescribed formalities. It nevertheless found, based on testimonies of witnesses, that Asuncion was never married to Reyes and that their relationship was adulterous, treating the testator's admission and corroborating trial testimony as establishing an illicit consideration that rendered the devise intrinsically invalid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained admission to probate but found that oppositors had shown no competent documentary or other evidence that Oning's marriage to the testator was inexistent or void by reason of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, leaving the testator's declaration and the presumption of marriage unrebutted.

• Execution and Undue Influence: Petitioner argued that the last will and testament was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law and that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of execution.
• Prior Existing Marriage: Petitioner maintained that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion because she was already married to Lupo Ebarle, who was still alive and whose marriage was never annulled, so her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals and she could not be a compulsory heir or valid devisee.
• Collateral Consanguinity: Petitioner argued that Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree, as shown by witness Gloria Borromeo's testimony on their kinship, making their purported marriage void ab initio as against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code.
• Sufficiency of Testimonial Proof and Belated Certificate: Petitioner contended that the testimonies of the witnesses and the personal declaration of the testator himself were sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage, and sought to support the claim with a belatedly attached copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.

• Lack of Competent Evidence of Disqualification: Respondent countered that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes, warranting reversal of the trial court's nullification of paragraph II (a) and (b).

• Scope of Probate: Whether probate proceedings are limited to extrinsic validity such that the trial court should not have ruled upon the intrinsic validity of the devise to Asuncion "Oning" Reyes.
• Applicability of Nepomuceno: Whether the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals voiding a devise on the face of the will for admitted concubinage applies to invalidate paragraph II (a) and (b).
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Belated Proof: Whether uncorroborated hearsay testimony sufficed to overcome the testator's declaration and presumption of marriage, and whether a marriage certificate first presented on appeal may be entertained.

• Scope of Probate: Yes. Probate was confined to animus testandi, absence of vices of consent, and compliance with formalities; the institution of Oning as devisee/legatee involved intrinsic validity not required to be passed upon.
• Applicability of Nepomuceno: No. Nepomuceno was distinguished because there the will itself openly admitted prior marriage and concubinage, while Torcuato Reyes merely described Oning as his wife without admitting any illicit relationship.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Belated Proof: No. Hearsay and uncertain testimony on Lupo Ebarle did not rebut the testator's declaration and presumption of marriage, and failure to offer the marriage certificate in probate constituted waiver barring its consideration on appeal.

• Scope of Probate: The rule applied is that probate inquires only into due execution, legal formalities, and testamentary capacity, without determining or prejudging by implication the validity or efficacy of testamentary provisions, intrinsic validity ordinarily coming only after proof and allowance. Exceptions exist where the defect is apparent on the face of the will making probate a useless ceremony, where practical considerations demand it such as preterition or doubtful legality, where parties agree to先 determine intrinsic validity, or under other exceptional circumstances constraining the court to act. Here the proceeding sought only probate of Torcuato Reyes' will, so the issues were animus testandi, vices of consent, and formalities; the declaration that Oning was his wife and the propriety of her institution concerned efficacy of the disposition and did not have to be scrutinized.
• Applicability of Nepomuceno: In Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, the testator expressly declared cohabitation as man and wife with Sofia J. Nepomuceno since 1952 while acknowledging inability to marry her because of a previous marriage, so the very tenor of the will invalidated the legacy as disposition to a concubine and remand would waste time and money. Torcuato Reyes' will contained no such open admission, stating only bequests to his wife Asuncion "Oning" Reyes of personal properties and one-half interests in the enumerated real properties. Because patent illegality was absent, invocation of Nepomuceno to void paragraph II (a) and (b) as contrary to law and morals was erroneous.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Belated Proof: The trial court's nullification rested on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion remained married to another during cohabitation, but the testimonies were hearsay and uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle. Such declarations could not prevail against the testator's competent declaration that Oning was his wife and the presumption of marriage, no competent documentary or other trial evidence having shown inexistence or voidness by pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship. The marriage certificate offered only on appeal could no longer be entertained, failure to present it before the probate court constituting waiver; factual findings of the appellate court, confined to questions of law on review and undisturbed absent contrariety to the record, were therefore sustained, consistent with resolving all doubts in favor of the testator having meant just what was said.

• Probate limited to extrinsic validity; exceptions — As a general rule, probate passes only upon extrinsic validity: due execution, compliance with prescribed formalities, and testamentary capacity, without determining or prejudging intrinsic validity or efficacy, which is ordinarily considered only after the will is proved and allowed. Exceptionally, intrinsic validity may first be determined when the defect is apparent on the face of the will making probate a useless ceremony, when practical considerations demand it such as preterition of heirs or testamentary provisions of doubtful legality, when the parties agree thereto, and otherwise under exceptional circumstances constraining the court to act. The will here was admitted on extrinsic grounds while the devise to the declared wife was sustained against premature intrinsic attack.
• Will as testator speaking after death — A will's provisions have substantially the same force in probate as if the testator stood before the court in full life declaring them by word of mouth, effectuating the law's purpose of permitting persons to speak after death, with all doubts resolved in favor of the testator having meant just what was said. The testator's description of Asuncion "Oning" Reyes as his wife was thus given reverential observance absent competent rebuttal.
• Presumption of marriage and competence of spousal declaration — The declaration of the husband is competent evidence of marriage and, with the presumption of marriage, is not overcome by uncorroborated hearsay or uncertain testimony about a supposed prior spouse. The oppositors' testimonial evidence concerning Lupo Ebarle was therefore insufficient to void the devise.
• Waiver by failure to offer evidence in probate; appellate deference to factual findings — Failure to present available documentary proof before the probate court to support alleged disqualification constitutes waiver precluding its entertainment on appeal or on review, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction being confined to questions of law, factual findings of the Court of Appeals stand unless shown contrary to the record. The belated marriage certificate was consequently disregarded and the appellate findings sustained.

• "Unless legally flawed, a testator’s intention in his last will and testament is its "life and soul" which deserves reverential observance." — Opens the decision by framing the controlling interpretive posture favoring effectuation of testamentary intent.
• "As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated." — States the canonical limitation defining the issues properly litigable in probate and the basis for reversing premature intrinsic nullification.
• "A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. . . . All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he said." — Provides the frequently cited formulation, drawn from Santos vs. Manarang, for honoring the testator's declaration that Oning was his wife.

• Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 — Distinguished as controlling only where the will on its face admits disposition to a concubine; inapplicable where the will merely names the devisee as wife without admitting illicitness.
• Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499 — Cited for the exception allowing intrinsic determination when probate would be a useless ceremony and when parties agree to prior determination of intrinsic validity.
• Balanay vs. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452 — Cited for practical-considerations exception permitting intrinsic review such as preterition or provisions of doubtful legality.
• Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 — Cited both for the general extrinsic-validity limitation and the practical-considerations exception.
• Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 488 — Cited for the general rule confining probate to extrinsic validity.
• Palacios vs. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739 — Cited for the proposition that probate does not determine nor prejudge validity or efficacy of provisions.
• Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209 — Source of the testator-speaking-after-death formulation applied to uphold the testator's declaration.
• Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 98 — Cited for deference to appellate factual findings absent contrariety to the record.

• Article 38 (1), Family Code — Invoked by petitioners to argue that the purported marriage between Torcuato Reyes and Oning Reyes, allegedly collateral relatives to the fourth civil degree, was void ab initio as against public policy; the devise was nevertheless sustained in probate for lack of a patent defect and competent proof, intrinsic efficacy being outside required probate inquiry.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring reasoning of significance appears in the text.