Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

The filing of an appeal bond within the thirty-day reglementary period is an indispensable prerequisite to the perfection of an appeal, and courts have no discretion to admit an appeal filed out of time absent a legal justification recognized by law, such as fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Neither a mistake of law nor the fact that the delay was only one day constitutes such legal justification.

The case arose from a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, presided by Judge Vicente del Rosario, between Enrique Bautista as plaintiff and Leoncia Reyes, in her own representation and as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Dalmacio Celino, as defendant. The underlying dispute concerned a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. The appeal was governed by the new Rules of Court, which took effect prior to the proceedings, specifically Rule 41 on appeals and Rule 37 on motions for new trial.

In the case before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Judge Vicente del Rosario rendered judgment in favor of the defendant Leoncia Reyes on September 19, 1942, of which the plaintiff Enrique Bautista received notice on October 10, 1942. On October 17, 1942, Bautista filed a pro forma motion for new trial, which was denied by the court on the same date, with notice of the denial received by him on October 22, 1942. Thereafter, Bautista filed a notice of appeal on October 23, 1942, the record on appeal on November 2, 1942, and the appeal bond on November 10, 1942.

Counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal and opposed the approval of the record on appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was not presented within thirty days after the appellant was notified of the decision appealed from. The court, with Judge Claudio Sandoval presiding, denied the motion to dismiss and overruled the opposition to the approval of the record on appeal on the theory that the filing of the pro forma motion for new trial suspended the running of the thirty-day period provided for the perfection of the appeal by section 3 of Rule 41.

Counsel for the appellee reiterated the motion for dismissal in the Court of Appeals, but the First Division of that Court likewise denied the motion upon a different ground, synthesized in its conclusion that "the ends of justice would be better subserved if we allow the present appeal to take its due course, considering that the bond was filed only one day late." The Court of Appeals noted that the appellant "must have been of the honest opinion, although erroneously, that his motion, which was not a motion to set aside, interrupted the period for filing his appeal bond." It also cited the Supreme Court's decision in Bustamante vs. Tirona, wherein the Court stated that it was "not mandatory but, if at all, purely discretionary in the respondent judge to approve or disapprove it in the interest of justice."

• Lack of Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should be prohibited from taking cognizance of the appeal on the ground that, the appeal bond having been presented out of time, said appeal was unlawfully allowed by the trial court.
• Finality of the Trial Court's Decision: Petitioner maintained that the decision of the trial court became final upon the lapse of the thirty-day period provided in section 3 of Rule 41 without the appellant's having filed the required appeal bond, and that consequently the appeal should have been dismissed by the trial court under section 13 of the same rule, or by the Court of Appeals under section 1(a) of Rule 52.

• Suspension of the Appeal Period: Respondent Bautista argued, through the trial court's theory, that the filing of the pro forma motion for new trial suspended the running of the thirty-day period provided for the perfection of the appeal by section 3 of Rule 41.
• Ends of Justice: Respondent argued, through the Court of Appeals' reasoning, that "the ends of justice would be better subserved" by allowing the appeal to take its due course, considering that the bond was filed only one day late, and that the appellant must have been of the honest opinion, although erroneously, that his motion interrupted the period for filing his appeal bond.

• Suspensive Effect of Pro Forma Motion for New Trial: Whether the filing of a pro forma motion for new trial suspends the running of the thirty-day period for perfecting an appeal under the new Rules of Court.
• Discretion to Admit Appeal Filed Out of Time: Whether a court is vested with discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of time in the absence of legal justification.
• Legal Justification for Delay: Whether a mistake of law and a one-day delay in filing the appeal bond constitute legal justifications for noncompliance with or relaxation of the reglementary period.

• Suspensive Effect of Pro Forma Motion for New Trial: No. Under the new Rules of Court, the filing of a pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend the running of the period for perfecting an appeal, as reiterated in Valdez vs. Jugo.
• Discretion to Admit Appeal Filed Out of Time: No. In the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time; the interest of justice cannot be invoked against the rule unless there is lawful justification.
• Legal Justification for Delay: No. Neither a mistake of law — the appellant mistakenly believing that his pro forma motion suspended the time for appeal — nor the fact that the delay in the filing of the appeal bond was only one day, nor both circumstances together, are legal justifications for noncompliance with or relaxation of the rule.

• Suspensive Effect of Pro Forma Motion for New Trial: The Court reiterated its ruling in Valdez vs. Jugo, which held that a motion for new trial upon mistake of fact is no longer an antecedent to an appeal and cannot be filed as a matter of form. Under Rule 37, section 2, a motion for new trial must "point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions." When the motion fails to make the specification thus required, it will be treated as a motion pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings, and as such, it shall be stricken out as offensive to the new rules. The Court of Appeals assumed, rightly, that under the new Rules of Court the filing of a pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

• Discretion to Admit Appeal Filed Out of Time: The Court clarified its earlier intimation in Bustamante vs. Tirona, explaining that when it said that it was "not mandatory but, if at all, purely discretionary in the respondent judge to approve or disapprove it in the interest of justice," it did not mean that a judge is vested with discretion to approve a record on appeal presented out of time without legal justification. The Court explained that in Bustamante, the failure to file the record on appeal was justified by an unavoidable accident — the closure of the clerk of court's office on account of war — but the Court found no justification for the further delay after the court resumed functions. Thus, in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. The interest of justice cannot be invoked against the rule unless there is lawful justification; it is the intervention of such circumstance as the law recognizes as a valid reason for relaxing the rule — fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence — that creates the "interest of justice" in favor of the victim of the circumstance.

• Legal Justification for Delay: The Court held that neither a mistake of law nor a one-day delay, nor both together, constitute legal justification for noncompliance with or relaxation of the rule. The Court reasoned that if mistake of law were ever excusable, the law would be unenforceable, citing Article 2 of the Civil Code that "ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone from compliance therewith." The Court further reasoned that if transgression of the deadline fixed by the rule for perfecting an appeal may be sanctioned without legal justification, the public policy behind that rule would necessarily have to be abandoned, and litigants would be at a loss to know exactly when they may obtain execution of judgments or consider the case terminated. The Court emphatically stated: "when the law fixes thirty days, we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable." The Court also rejected the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the ends of justice would be better subserved" by allowing the appeal, citing three considerations: (1) the orderly administration of justice would suffer a drawback if the period for perfecting appeals be rendered uncertain; (2) the appealed decision is presumed by law to be just and correct, and therefore the denial of the appeal does not necessarily imply an injustice to the appellant; and (3) the right to appeal is a purely statutory right, and he who wants to exercise it must comply with the statute.

• Indispensable prerequisite to perfection of appeal — The filing of an appeal bond is an indispensable prerequisite to the perfection of an appeal. Under Rule 41, section 3, an appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is filed but not within the period provided, the appeal shall be dismissed. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the appellant's failure to file the appeal bond within the thirty-day period rendered the appeal dismissible.

• Pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend appeal period — Under the new Rules of Court, the filing of a pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. A motion for new trial upon mistake of fact is no longer an antecedent to an appeal and cannot be filed as a matter of form; it must point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law. When the motion fails to make the required specification, it will be treated as a motion pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings, and as such, it shall be stricken out as offensive to the new rules. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the trial court's theory that the pro forma motion suspended the running of the thirty-day period.

• Legal justification for relaxing reglementary periods — Courts have no discretion to admit an appeal filed out of time absent a legal justification recognized by law, such as fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The interest of justice cannot be invoked against the rule unless there is lawful justification; it is the intervention of such circumstance as the law recognizes as a valid reason for relaxing the rule that creates the "interest of justice" in favor of the victim of the circumstance. Neither a mistake of law nor a one-day delay constitutes such legal justification. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in allowing the appeal.

• "The filing of an appeal bond is an indispensable prerequisite to the perfection of an appeal." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case: the appeal bond requirement is not a mere technicality but an essential element for perfecting an appeal, and its absence within the reglementary period is fatal.

• "If mistake of law were ever excusable, the law would be unenforceable. That is why it is expressly provided that 'ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone from compliance therewith.'" — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of mistake of law as a justifying circumstance for noncompliance with procedural rules, grounding the rule in Article 2 of the Civil Code.

• "when the law fixes thirty days, we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable." — This passage is the Court's canonical statement on the strict application of reglementary periods, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence for the proposition that procedural deadlines must be observed strictly.

• "The right to appeal is a purely statutory right, and he who wants to exercise it must comply with the statute." — This passage articulates the principle that the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and its exercise is conditioned upon compliance with the requirements prescribed by law.

• Bustamante vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 48813, 1 Off. Gaz., 875 — Distinguished. The Court clarified its earlier intimation that approval of an appeal filed out of time was "purely discretionary in the respondent judge in the interest of justice," explaining that such discretion exists only where the delay is justified by circumstances recognized by law, such as fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. In Bustamante, the delay was partly justified by the closure of the clerk of court's office on account of war, but no justification was found for the further delay after the court resumed functions.

• Valdez vs. Jugo, G.R. No. 48859, Nov. 28, 1942 — Followed. The Court reiterated the ruling that under the new Rules of Court, the filing of a pro forma motion for new trial does not suspend the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. The Court quoted extensively from Valdez, which explained that a motion for new trial upon mistake of fact is no longer an antecedent to an appeal and must comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 37, section 2.

• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The Court applied this provision to determine the reglementary period for perfecting the appeal.

• Section 5, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that the appeal bond shall be in the amount of P60 unless the court shall fix a different amount, or unless a supersedeas bond is filed. The Court cited this provision to establish the amount of the appeal bond required.

• Section 13, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that where the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is filed but not within the period of time provided, the appeal shall be dismissed. The Court applied this provision to hold that the trial court should have dismissed the appeal.

• Section 1(a), Rule 52, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own motion or on that of the appellee for failure to file the appeal bond within the thirty-day period. The Court applied this provision to hold that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal.

• Section 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Recognizes fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence as circumstances justifying relief from judgments, orders, or other proceedings. The Court applied this provision to define the circumstances that constitute legal justification for relaxing the reglementary period for appeal.

• Section 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Requires a motion for new trial to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions. The Court applied this provision to determine that the appellant's motion was pro forma and did not suspend the appeal period.

• Article 2, Civil Code — Provides that ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone from compliance therewith. The Court applied this provision to reject the appellant's mistake of law as a justifying circumstance for the late filing of the appeal bond.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concurred.