Reyes vs. Atienza

The Ombudsman's finding of no probable cause for violations of Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act will be sustained where the evidence does not sufficiently establish deliberate intent, manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and the appointing authority acted in presumptive good faith based on prior unchallenged appointments to the same position.

Reyes held a permanent appointment as Assistant City Assessor of the City of Manila effective August 3, 1989, after having been designated Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Assessor in 1987. Atienza was the Mayor of Manila, and Sison was the Secretary to the City Mayor. The dispute concerns the appointment of Hernando B. Garcia as Assistant City Assessor on July 1, 1998, and the criminal complaint Reyes filed before the Ombudsman under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Civil Service Commission's rules on appointments and the GSIS retirement regime provide the regulatory backdrop for determining whether Reyes had vacated the post.

Reyes was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Assessor on January 16, 1987, by then acting Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. Upon Mayor Lopez's recommendation, Reyes was appointed on a permanent status as Assistant City Assessor effective August 3, 1989, by then Acting Secretary of Finance Victor C. Macalincag. He remained in office upon the assumption of then Manila Mayor Alfredo C. Lim in 1992.

In a letter dated October 1, 1993, Reyes requested Mayor Lim for a transfer to Quezon City Hall. He stated that if he could not transfer until December 31, 1993, he would eventually apply for retirement effective January 1, 1994. He also requested approval of sick leave for August and September 1993, and that request was approved. Since then, Reyes never actually reassumed the functions of Assistant City Assessor. By his own admission, he was prevented from reporting back to work due to the pendency of three complaints filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman, and an administrative complaint was also pending with the Office of the City Legal Officer. The complaints against Reyes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman were all dismissed by March 1994.

In a letter dated April 8, 1994, addressed to Carlos C. Antonio, City Assessor of Manila, Reyes requested clearances needed for his retirement and stated that in October 1993, upon his request, Mayor Lim approved his retirement effective January 1, 1994, including his clearances, but that the Legal Department of Manila filed a case which was dismissed by the Ombudsman. Mayor Lim made two subsequent appointments to the post of Assistant City Assessor. Angel R. Purisima was appointed on July 26, 1995, and his appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission on September 18, 1995. Purisima resigned on October 31, 1996, and Mayor Lim appointed Senen D. Tomada on March 26, 1998. The CSC disapproved Tomada's appointment for violation of the Commission on Elections ban on appointments during the election period. The CSC disapproval was made only on July 27, 1998, or 26 days after the appointment of Garcia to the same post by the newly elected Mayor Atienza.

Reyes's application for retirement could not be cleared due to the pending administrative complaint filed with the Office of the City Legal Officer. In April 1994, Reyes filed a demurrer to the evidence in the administrative proceeding. Despite repeated urgings, the demurrer remained unresolved by October 1995, causing Reyes to file a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that the demurrer be acted upon. In that petition, Reyes alleged under oath that he "retired from the service as City Assessor of Manila" and could not get his retirement pay because he could not submit a clearance from the office of the public respondent. The petition for mandamus was dismissed in an Order dated October 29, 1996. The administrative complaint against Reyes was dismissed only on August 28, 1998, in a decision penned by Mayor Atienza. Reyes alleged that he was never furnished a copy of the decision and that he learned of the dismissal only on May 5, 1999; his requests for a certified copy from Manila City Hall were ignored.

On March 20, 2000, Reyes filed a criminal complaint against Mayor Atienza and Sison before the Ombudsman. In the complaint, Reyes characterized as illegal the appointment of Garcia as Assistant City Assessor on July 1, 1998, noting that he was then and still actually occupying the position on the premise that his retirement was never approved or cleared due to the pending administrative case. Reyes also alleged that the appointment smacked of nepotism, as Garcia was the brother-in-law of Sison. Reyes had also filed charges against Atienza and Sison before the CSC, although there was no indication as to the nature of the complaint or its status. The Ombudsman found the evidence insufficient to establish deliberate action under Section 3(a) or undue injury under Section 3(e), noting that Mayor Lim's two prior appointments refuted Reyes's claim that he had not vacated the post. The Court of Appeals found Reyes had been separated from the position as of July 26, 1995, when Purisima was appointed, and that Garcia's appointment was approved by the CSC on August 31, 1998 and was not shown to have been recalled or set aside.

• No Vacancy and Illegal Appointment: Petitioner maintained that the appointment of Hernando B. Garcia as Assistant City Assessor on July 1, 1998 was illegal because there was no vacancy; he remained the incumbent Assistant City Assessor by virtue of his permanent appointment on August 3, 1989.
• Section 3(a) Violation: Petitioner argued that the appointment despite the absence of a vacancy, and respondents' alleged failure to act on his follow-ups and requests for a copy of the decision exonerating him, established a violation of Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Section 5(a) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
• Section 3(e) Violation: Petitioner claimed the elements of Section 3(e) were established; he asserted he did not know of Purisima's 1995 appointment, that Purisima resigned because he knew his appointment was irregular and illegal, and that Garcia was appointed 26 days before the CSC disapproved Tomada's appointment.
• Nepotism: Petitioner alleged that Garcia's appointment smacked of nepotism because Garcia was the brother-in-law of Sison, the Secretary to Mayor Atienza.

• Vacancy of the Position: Respondents argued that the post of Assistant City Assessor was vacant at the time of Garcia's appointment because Mayor Lim had made two prior appointments to the same position after Reyes's presumed retirement; the CSC approval of Purisima's appointment indicated that the position was vacant and the appointment valid.
• Reyes's Separation from Service: Respondents relied on Reyes's October 1, 1993 letter and claimed that Mayor Lim approved Reyes's retirement effective January 1, 1994, so Reyes had retired from the service.

• Probable Cause under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Whether the Ombudsman was correct in concluding that there was no probable cause to charge respondents with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to assail the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution.

• Probable Cause under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: No. The Ombudsman's finding of no probable cause was sustained; the evidence did not sufficiently establish deliberate intent under Section 3(a) or manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence under Section 3(e), and respondents acted in presumptive good faith.
• Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari: No. A petition for review under Rule 45 was the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, making the Rule 65 petition patently erroneous; nevertheless, the Court resolved the merits.

• Probable Cause under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: The Court began from the general rule that it does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause, as the Ombudsman is not a trier of facts and its factual determination is respected. The Ombudsman characterized Reyes's claims as mostly inferential and unsubstantiated, including the imputations of malice in impeding his retirement clearances, refusal to release the exonerating decision, nepotism, and violation of CSC rules on Garcia's re-employment. Even assuming truth, these were not substantiated enough to establish probable cause. The Court identified the central question as whether Garcia was appointed with knowledge that the appointment was illegal because there was no vacancy. Although there was no definitive proof of when Reyes vacated the post, the Court noted that resignation by a public officer requires acceptance; without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office, and the Omnibus Rules require written notice and written acceptance submitted to the CSC. If Reyes retired, the GSIS Law provides compulsory retirement at 65 or optional retirement over 60 with more than 15 years of service, generally without approval by the appointing authority, but Civil Service rules require notice of the retirement date to the Commission. The record did not show that Reyes resigned or that any resignation was accepted, and respondents' reliance on the October 1, 1993 letter was insufficient because it merely mentioned retirement as a possibility and sought approval only of sick leave, which was what Mayor Lim approved. No countervailing documents of resignation or retirement were presented. Nevertheless, Reyes's own prior statements, some under oath, that he had retired or was separated from service starting 1994 undercut his claim of continued incumbency. The Court emphasized that the central issue was not the viability of Reyes's incumbency claim but probable cause for criminal culpability. No malice or criminal intent could be attributed to respondents because Mayor Lim had made two prior appointments to the same post; the first was approved by the CSC, and the second was disapproved only because of the COMELEC ban, not because Reyes had not been validly separated. The CSC approval of Purisima's appointment gave rise to a presumption that the position was vacant and the appointment valid, though not conclusive; because no one challenged those appointments on the grounds now alleged, Mayor Atienza had every right to assume in good faith that Reyes no longer held the post. Section 3(a) requires deliberate intent to violate rules or commit an offense in connection with official duties; Section 3(e) requires manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court defined manifest partiality as a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side; evident bad faith as manifest deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage; and gross inexcusable negligence as want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act where there is a duty, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with conscious indifference to consequences. The evidence did not meet these high standards, and respondents' conduct was guided by presumptive good faith from the two previous unchallenged appointments. Thus, no probable cause existed.
• Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari: The Court noted that resort to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 was patently erroneous because the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 was clearly available to Reyes. On this score alone, the petition was dismissible. Nonetheless, the Court resolved the petition on the merits, with due regard to the precedental value a full-length decision would provide.

• Non-interference with the Ombudsman's probable cause determination — The Court generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause, as it is not a trier of facts and respects the Ombudsman's factual determination. The exception is grave abuse of discretion, such as when the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration. In this case, no grave abuse was found; the Ombudsman considered the facts and found the evidence insufficient.
• Resignation of a public officer requires acceptance — Resignation of a public officer is not operative and effective without acceptance; without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions require the voluntary written notice of resignation and the written acceptance by the appointing authority to be submitted to the CSC. The record lacked proof of resignation or acceptance.
• Retirement under the GSIS Law — Compulsory retirement at age 65; optional retirement for employees over 60 with more than 15 years of government service. Generally, retirement does not require approval by the appointing authority, although it may be precluded under other circumstances, and Civil Service rules require notice of the date of retirement to the Commission. The record did not establish that Reyes validly retired or was entitled to retire.
• Elements and standards of Sections 3(a) and 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act — Section 3(a) requires deliberate intent to violate rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or to commit an offense in connection with official duties. Section 3(e) requires causing undue injury to any party or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Manifest partiality is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side; evident bad faith is a manifest deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage; gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act where there is a duty, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with conscious indifference to consequences. The evidence did not meet these standards.
• Presumptive good faith of an appointing authority — Where prior appointments to the same position were made and not challenged, and one was approved by the CSC, the appointing authority may assume in good faith that the prior occupant had vacated the post. The CSC approval of Purisima's appointment gave rise to a presumption that the position was vacant and the appointment valid, though not conclusive; because the prior appointments were unchallenged on the grounds later alleged, Mayor Atienza had every right to assume in good faith that Reyes no longer held the post.

• "As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause." — States the general standard of judicial review over the Ombudsman's probable cause findings, which frames the Court's deferential approach in this case.
• "Assuming that Reyes had resigned his position, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office." — Articulates the resignation doctrine applied to the uncertainty over whether Reyes had vacated his post.
• "Clearly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is quite high, and in this case, insufficiently quantified by the evidence presented by Reyes. Moreover, the conduct of respondents in this case hardly meets these standards, guided as it was, in presumptive good faith by the two previous unchallenged appointments made by Mayor Lim to the same post." — States the ratio for finding no probable cause under Republic Act No. 3019.
• "There are troubling circumstances that attend the facts of this case, and nothing in this decision should preclude Reyes from pursuing through the proper legal avenues, whatever rights and claims he may have under law, emanating from his permanent appointment as Assistant City Assessor of Manila and his possible separation from the service. Nonetheless, what the Court is called upon to adjudge is probable cause for criminal culpability of respondents, and under the circumstances, we cannot find such probable cause." — Summarizes the Court's limited adjudicatory role and final conclusion on probable cause.

• Cabrera vs. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 157419-20, 13 December 2004, 446 SCRA 207 — Cited for the general rule of non-interference with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause and the exception for grave abuse of discretion, such as failure to consider essential facts.
• Sistoza vs. Desierto, 487 Phil. 117 (2002) — Cited with Cabrera vs. Marcelo for the non-interference principle and its exception.
• Venus vs. Desierto, 358 Phil. 675, 694 (1998) — Cited for the principle that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's probable cause determination.
• Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, 14 May 1990, 185 SCRA 346 — Cited for the definitions of manifest partiality and evident bad faith.
• Mendiola vs. People, G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85 — Cited for evident bad faith; the Court noted that disagreement with an official's acts or reasons does not warrant a finding of evident bad faith unless the acts are obviously and palpably sham justifications for arbitrary and capricious acts.
• Fernando vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96182-3, 19 August 1992, 212 SCRA 680 — Cited for the definition of gross inexcusable negligence.

• Section 3(a), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines corrupt practice of persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations or an offense in connection with official duties, or allowing oneself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced. The Court held the evidence insufficient to establish the required deliberate intent.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Defines corrupt practice of causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court held the requisites were not sufficiently established.
• Section 5(a), Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees — Invoked by Reyes as violated by respondents' acts, omissions, and nonfeasance. The Court did not find probable cause under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and did not sustain this claim.
• Section 13, Republic Act No. 8921 (1997) — Provides for compulsory retirement at age 65; if the employee has less than 15 years of service, he may be allowed to continue under civil service rules. Cited in the Court's discussion of retirement.
• Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 8291 — Provides for optional retirement for employees over 60 years of age with more than 15 years of government service. Cited in the Court's discussion of retirement.
• Section 12, Republic Act No. 3019 — Precludes a public officer from retirement pending investigation or prosecution, criminal or administrative, for any offense under the Act or the Revised Penal Code on bribery. Cited as an example of circumstances that may preclude retirement.
• Rule XII, Section 1, Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions — Requires that, in case of resignation, the voluntary written notice of resignation by the employee and the acceptance of resignation in writing by the appointing authority be submitted to the CSC. The Court noted the record lacked proof of compliance.
• Section 261(g), Omnibus Election Code — Prohibits appointments during the election period. Cited in connection with the CSC disapproval of Tomada's appointment; the Court noted the disapproval was due to this ban, not because Reyes had not been validly separated.
• Rule 43, Rules of Civil Procedure — The mode by which Reyes assailed the Ombudsman's rulings before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for a petition for review; the Court noted it was available to Reyes instead of Rule 65.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The special civil action for certiorari under which Reyes filed the present petition; the Court held resort to it was patently erroneous because Rule 45 was available.

Reynato S. Puno (Chairman), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Minita V. Chico-Nazario concurred. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text.