Resuena vs. Court of Appeals

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment against a third-party occupant without necessity of prior partition; the action is deemed instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. An occupant by the owner’s mere tolerance is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand and is not a possessor in good faith entitled to reimbursement for improvements.

Juanito Borromeo, Sr. was a co-owner of Lot No. 2587 (owning six-eighths; the spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja owning two-eighths) and Lot No. 2592 (co-owned with the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, shares undetermined), both located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu. Borromeo developed portions of the lots into the Borromeo Beach Resort and, wishing to expand, demanded that petitioners vacate the portions they occupied. Petitioners had built houses on the upper portion of Lot No. 2587 (all petitioners except Eutiquia Rosario) and on Lot No. 2592 (Rosario), allegedly with the permission of the other co-owners. Borromeo claimed that all petitioners occupied the property through his own liberality.

• The Co-owned Properties: Juanito Borromeo, Sr. was co-owner of Lot No. 2587 (6/8 share; the late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja held 2/8) and Lot No. 2592 (co-owned with the heirs of Nicolas Maneja in undetermined proportions). Both lots are situated in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu.
• Occupancy by Petitioners: Five petitioners — Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena — resided on the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, claiming they did so with the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. Petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja. Respondent alleged that all petitioners occupied the premises through his own liberality.
• Demand to Vacate: Respondent developed parts of the lots into the Borromeo Beach Resort. Wishing to expand and extend the resort facilities, he demanded that petitioners vacate; they refused.
• Testimony in a Prior Case: In a separate case (Civil Case No. R-14600), Borromeo testified that he and Basilisa Maneja had verbally agreed on the portions each would occupy in Lot No. 2587 — his share toward the seashore, her share toward the upper part — though the lot remained unpartitioned. The MTC relied on this testimony to conclude that no determinate share had been allotted to respondent, barring ejectment.
• Lower Courts’ Factual Findings: Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals proceeded on the MTC’s factual premises, without accepting as established the claims that petitioners were assignees of the Spouses Bascon or that a definitive partition had occurred. The common finding was that petitioners occupied the lots by mere tolerance.

• Estoppel: Petitioners maintained that respondent was estopped from filing ejectment because his testimony in Civil Case No. R-14600 — acknowledging an agreement that the upper portion of Lot No. 2587 would be occupied by Basilisa Maneja — constituted a waiver of that portion.
• Executed Contract / Statute of Frauds: Petitioners argued that the verbal agreement between Borromeo and Basilisa Maneja had been consummated by their occupancy, taking it outside the Statute of Frauds.
• Assignees Under Article 493: Petitioners claimed they were assignees of the Spouses Bascon’s co-ownership share, their occupation being an exercise of rights under Article 493 of the Civil Code.
• Reimbursement for Improvements Under Article 546: Assuming ejectment was proper, petitioners contended they should be reimbursed for the cost of constructing their houses as necessary expenses, asserting they were possessors in good faith under Article 546.

• Right to Eject Under Article 487: Respondent relied on Article 487 of the Civil Code, which permits any co-owner to bring an action in ejectment, the suit being deemed for the benefit of all co-owners.
• Mere Tolerance: Respondent asserted that petitioners occupied the lots through his liberality and that tolerance grants no right to continued possession; it creates only an implied obligation to vacate upon demand.
• Absence of Right to Occupy: Respondent maintained that petitioners had no written contract, lease, or document conferring any real right over the property, and the alleged permission from other co-owners could not defeat his right as co-owner to recover possession from third persons without lawful title.

• Right to Eject Under Article 487: Whether a co-owner may maintain an ejectment suit against third persons occupying a portion of the co-owned property by mere tolerance, absent prior partition.
• Estoppel: Whether respondent’s prior testimony on an informal division of occupancy estopped him from ejecting petitioners.
• Right of Occupancy Flowing from Alleged Verbal Agreement and Assignment: Whether an unproven verbal agreement between co-owners and a subsequent alleged assignment to petitioners conferred on them a defensible right of occupancy against another co-owner.
• Reimbursement Under Article 546: Whether petitioners, as occupants by tolerance, are possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses.

• Right to Eject Under Article 487: Article 487 is a categorical and unqualified authority that any co-owner may bring an action in ejectment. The suit is deemed instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. Because petitioners failed to prove any right or authority to occupy the property, respondent could properly invoke Article 487 to evict them, notwithstanding the absence of partition.
• Estoppel: Petitioners were not entitled to invoke estoppel. The alleged agreement pertained solely to Lot No. 2587 and, even if it existed, was a transaction between respondent and Basilisa Maneja. Estoppel is effective only between the parties and their successors-in-interest; petitioners are strangers to that transaction and cannot take advantage of any estoppel arising from it. The testimony did not establish a definitive partition or any right of petitioners to dwell on the land.
• Right of Occupancy Flowing from Alleged Verbal Agreement and Assignment: Petitioners’ claim lacked any legal basis. Mere tolerance from one co-owner does not vest a right of occupancy. The common ownership remained inchoate and undivided, making any assertion that the Spouses Bascon could transmit determinate portions purely speculative. No public instrument evidenced the creation or transmission of a real right as required by Article 1358, and petitioners could not prove their alleged status as successors-in-interest of the co-owners.
• Reimbursement Under Article 546: Article 546 applies exclusively to a possessor in good faith — one who builds on land believing he is the owner. Occupants by sheer tolerance are not possessors in good faith. As petitioners’ presence on the lots was by mere tolerance, they were not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses of constructing their houses.

• Article 487 Ejectment by Co-owner — Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. The suit is deemed filed for the benefit of all co-owners; a favorable judgment benefits all, while an adverse judgment does not prejudice those not impleaded. The provision abrogated the earlier rule in Palarca v. Baguisi that required all co-owners to join. Here, respondent’s action for ejectment was treated as instituted for the benefit of all co-owners, enabling him to recover possession from third-party occupants without need of prior partition.
• Tolerance Does Not Create a Right to Possess — Persons who occupy the land of another by the owner’s tolerance or permission, without any contract, are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. Summary ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Tolerance “does not bear any legal fruit, and it can easily be supplanted by a sudden change of heart on the part of the owner.”
• Estoppel Is Personal — Estoppel is effective only as between the parties to the transaction or their successors-in-interest. A stranger to a transaction can neither be bound by nor take advantage of an estoppel arising from it. Petitioners were strangers to any informal agreement between Borromeo and Basilisa Maneja and thus could not invoke estoppel.
• Possessor in Good Faith Under Article 546 — Only a possessor who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof (possessor in good faith) is entitled to reimbursement of necessary expenses and retention until reimbursement. Occupants by mere tolerance are not possessors in good faith and have no right to reimbursement.

• “Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that ‘[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment,’ is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot No. 2587.” — This passage distills the ratio decidendi and is frequently cited for the scope of a co-owner’s right to bring an ejectment suit.
• “[P]ersons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.” — This articulates the well-settled doctrine on tolerance as a basis for ejectment.
• “Tolerance in itself does not bear any legal fruit, and it can easily be supplanted by a sudden change of heart on the part of the owner.” — The phrase underscores that tolerance is a mere factual concession and creates no substantive right.
• “Estoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their successors in interest; thus, only the spouses Bascon or their successors in interest may invoke such ‘estoppel.’ A stranger to a transaction is neither bound by, nor in a position to take advantage of, an estoppel arising therefrom.” — This clarifies the personal nature of estoppel.
• “Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.” — The Court definitively excludes tolerance-based occupants from the protections of Article 546.

• Palarca v. Baguisi, 38 Phil. 177 (1918) — The earlier doctrine that required all co-owners to join in an ejectment action; expressly superseded by Article 487 of the Civil Code.
• Sering v. Plazo, G.R. No. L-49731, 29 September 1988, 166 SCRA 84 — Relied upon by the RTC for the proposition that any co-owner may bring an action in ejectment under Article 487, the suit being for the benefit of all co-owners.
• Banco de Oro Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85448, 21 February 1990, 182 SCRA 464 — Cited for the doctrine that occupants by tolerance are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand and that summary ejectment is the proper remedy.
• Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515 (2000) — Established that persons occupying realty by mere tolerance are not possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement under Article 546.

• Article 487, Civil Code — “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” Applied directly to uphold respondent’s capacity to sue and evict petitioners without a partition.
• Article 1358, Civil Code — Requires that acts creating, transmitting, modifying, or extinguishing real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument. The absence of any document evidencing petitioners’ right of occupancy weighed against their claim, as the provision grants the parties power to compel documentation of agreements concerning immovables.
• Article 546, Civil Code — Limits reimbursement of necessary expenses and retention to a possessor in good faith. The Court ruled that petitioners, as occupants by tolerance, did not qualify.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concurred.