Republic vs. Saromo

Land classified as "unclassified public forest land" is inalienable and non-disposable, and cannot be the valid subject of a free patent application, unless and until an official proclamation releases the land from its forest classification and renders it disposable agricultural land. The classification of land as forest or timber land is a legal status descriptive of its nature, not of its physical appearance, and testimonial evidence on the land's physical features cannot overcome the legal classification.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Land Management Bureau, sought the reversion and cancellation of title over a parcel of land covered by Free Patent No. 17522 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-331 issued to Filemon Saromo. The land was situated along the coastline of Batangas and was covered by Proclamation No. 1801, which declared certain islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist Zones and Marine Reserve under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority. The case implicates the Regalian doctrine, under which all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the constitutional classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.

On September 25, 1980, Geodetic Engineer Francisco C. Guevarra surveyed a parcel of land for Filemon Saromo and prepared Survey Plan No. PSU-4-A-004479. At the bottom left-hand portion of the plan was a NOTE stating: "This survey is formerly a portion of China Sea. This survey is inside unclassified public forest land and is apparently inside the area covered by Proclamation No. 1801 dated November 10, 1978. This survey is within 100.00 meters strip along the shore line. This survey was endorsed by the District Land Officer D.L.O. No. (IV-A-1), Batangas City dated December 11, 1980." The survey plan of the subject lot included the salvage zone.

On September 30, 1980, the survey plan was submitted to Region IV-A for approval. It was endorsed by the District Land Officer of Batangas City on December 11, 1980, and approved the following day by Flor U. Pelayo, Officer-in-Charge. On December 24, 1980, Saromo, then fifty years old, executed an Application for Free Patent covering the subject property, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. IV-A-1 in Batangas City. The application stated that the land was agricultural public land covered by Survey No. PSU-4-A-004479, containing an area of 45,808 square meters, and that Saromo first occupied and cultivated the land by himself in 1944. On the same date, Saromo executed an affidavit stating that he held himself responsible for any liability if the land had already been adjudicated as private property or if any statement he made was found untrue or false.

On January 24, 1981, Saromo executed an affidavit in support of a Notice of Application for Free Patent. On March 4, 1981, Alberto A. Aguilar executed an investigation report stating that on January 14, 1981, he examined the land applied for by Saromo and found that it was inside an agricultural area under proposed Project No. 31 LC Map 225. On May 18, 1981, Jaime Juanillo, District Land Officer, issued an Order approving the application for free patent and ordering the issuance of Patent No. 17522 in Saromo's favor. The Order stated that the land had been classified as alienable and disposable and that investigation revealed the land had been occupied and cultivated by the applicant since July 4, 1926 or prior thereto. On May 26, 1981, Original Certificate of Title No. P-331 was issued in the name of Filemon Saromo by Deputy Register of Deeds Gregorio C. Sembrano.

On October 16, 1981, a certain Luis Mendoza filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands against the Free Patent awarded to Saromo, but the investigation was not terminated because of the investigator's resignation and departure for the United States. On September 6, 1999, the Director of Lands issued Special Order No. 99-99 creating an investigation team headed by Atty. Rogelio C. Mandar to verify the legality of the issuance of Free Patent No. 17522. The investigation team found that the subject lot was not alienable and disposable at the time of issuance, as it was "inside unclassified public forest and covered by Proclamation No. 1801 declaring the whole of Batangas Coastline as tourist zone," and that the issuance of the free patent was highly improper and irregular, making the free patent and the corresponding OCT null and void ab initio.

The Republic filed its Complaint for Reversion/Cancellation of Title on September 19, 2001, alleging that the subject lot is inside unclassified forest land and covered by Proclamation No. 1801, and that since it is part of the shore, it is part of the public dominion and cannot be titled in the name of a private person. Saromo denied the allegations and countered that the subject land is disposable and alienable, being agricultural land suited for cultivation at the time the free patent was issued, and that he is the owner in fee simple by virtue of the lawfully issued OCT and Free Patent.

The Republic presented as witness Engr. Leonito D. Calubayan, a geodetic engineer and Community Environment Resources Officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, who testified that when Plan PSU-4A-004479 was verified and plotted against the land classification map, it fell on Project No. 38-A, Block C, of LC Map No. 3276, certified on June 29, 1987, which is forest land (permanent forest) within the foreshore area of Calatagan, Batangas. He also presented LC Map No. 3342 to prove that as of October 10, 1984, the whole of Calatagan, Batangas was unclassified public forest. Engr. Calubayan further testified that the investigation report of Aguilar mentioned LC Map 225, but that map was for Sibulan, Negros Oriental, and LC Map 718 mentioned in the Survey Authority referred to Taal, Batangas. Saromo himself testified that he purchased the subject land in 1967 at the earliest or 1969 at the latest, and that he was then 44 or 46 years old, contradicting the sworn statement in his Application for Free Patent that he first occupied and cultivated the land in 1944.

• Alienability and Disposability of the Subject Land: The Republic argued that the CA erred on a question of law in upholding that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of issuance of the free patent title to Saromo, and that Proclamation No. 1801 expressly declared the Batangas Coastline as a tourist zone, hence a reserved area incapable of alienation and disposition by private individuals.

• Fraud and Misrepresentation: The Republic argued that the CA erred in not applying Section 91 of the Public Land Act on fraud and misrepresentation and in disregarding the attendant fraud and misrepresentation of Saromo in his free patent application.

• Presumption of Regularity: The Republic argued that the CA erred in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of the officer who issued Saromo's free patent.

• Regalian Doctrine: The Republic argued that the principle of the Regalian doctrine applies in the present case.

• Alienability and Disposability of the Subject Land: Saromo countered that the subject land is disposable and alienable, the same being agricultural land suited for cultivation and plantation of fruit-bearing trees at the time the free patent was issued to him.

• Validity of Title: Saromo claimed that he is the owner of the subject lot in fee simple by virtue of OCT No. P-331 and Free Patent No. 17522, which was lawfully issued to him by the Lands Management Bureau.

• Alienability and Disposability of the Subject Land: Whether the CA erred on a question of law in upholding that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of issuance of the free patent title to Saromo.

• Fraud and Misrepresentation: Whether the CA erred in not applying Section 91 of the Public Land Act on fraud and misrepresentation and in disregarding the attendant fraud and misrepresentation of Saromo in his free patent application.

• Presumption of Regularity: Whether the CA erred in applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of the officer who issued Saromo's free patent.

• Regalian Doctrine: Whether the principle of the Regalian doctrine applies in the present case.

• Alienability and Disposability of the Subject Land: No. The subject land was unclassified public forest land at the time of the issuance of the free patent, as evidenced by the NOTE in the survey plan itself, and the Republic presented credible evidence, including LC Map No. 3276 and LC Map No. 3342, showing that the land remained within unclassified forest land. The subject land was therefore inalienable and non-disposable and could not have been the valid subject of a free patent application.

• Fraud and Misrepresentation: Yes. Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 applies. The discrepancies in the documents relative to Saromo's free patent application, including the false statement that he first occupied the land in 1944 when he actually purchased it in 1967 or 1969, constitute "false statements" on essential conditions for the grant of the free patent, which ipso facto justify the cancellation of the free patent and the corresponding Torrens certificate of title.

• Presumption of Regularity: No. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in the processing and approval of Saromo's free patent was controverted by the evidence presented by the Republic, including the NOTE in the survey plan, the absence of any land classification map negating such NOTE, and the discrepancies in the documents relative to the application.

• Regalian Doctrine: Yes. The Regalian doctrine applies. Since the subject land is unclassified public forest land, it belongs to the State, and the free patent issued over it is null and void. Reversion is warranted under Section 91 of CA 141, and even if Section 91 is ruled out, reversion is warranted based on mistake or error on the part of government officials or agents.

• Alienability and Disposability of the Subject Land: The Court found that the NOTE in the survey plan qualifies as an admission of Saromo under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The NOTE is an admission by Saromo that the subject land is "inside unclassified public forest land," and unless rebutted in a clear and convincing manner, it remains an admission against his interest and binding upon him. The Court held that the testimonies of Engr. Guevara, Aguilar, and Engr. Cabrera on the physical features of the subject land were not clear and convincing proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Citing The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. Yap, the Court explained that forest land of the public domain is a classification descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land looks like. The classification is a legal status, and unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. The Court noted that the official proclamation releasing the land classified as public forest land to form part of disposable agricultural lands is conspicuously missing in the instant case. Citing Heirs of the late Sps. Palanca vs. Republic, the Court observed that in the absence of classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition, and whatever possession applicants may have had, however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership. The Court further found that the Republic presented credible evidence through Engr. Calubayan showing that when Plan PSU-4A-004479 was verified and plotted against the land classification map, it fell on Project No. 38-A, Block C, of LC Map No. 3276, which is forest land (permanent forest) within the foreshore area of Calatagan, Batangas, and that LC Map No. 3342 proved that as of October 10, 1984, the whole of Calatagan was unclassified public forest. The Court concluded that the misapprehension of facts by the lower courts warranted review, and that the subject land, being inalienable and non-disposable, could not have been the valid subject of a free patent application because only agricultural public lands subject to disposition can be the subject of free patents under Section 44 of CA 141.

• Fraud and Misrepresentation: The Court found that there were several discrepancies in the documents relative to Saromo's free patent application. Saromo's sworn Application for Free Patent stated that he first occupied and cultivated the land in 1944, but he testified that he purchased the land in 1967 at the earliest or 1969 at the latest, and that he was then 44 or 46 years old. The Court held that since the year "1944" appears in both his Application for Free Patent and in the investigation report of Aguilar, the error can no longer be categorized as clerical; rather, an intention to mislead or make a false representation is evident. Under Section 91 of CA 141, the statements made in the application are considered essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. The Court held that the discrepancies, taken together, can be considered as "false statements" on the essential conditions for the grant of the free patent, and as such, they ipso facto justify the cancellation of the free patent and the corresponding Torrens certificate of title.

• Presumption of Regularity: The Court held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in the processing and approval of Saromo's free patent has been controverted by the evidence presented by the Republic. The survey plan includes a NOTE that the subject land is within "unclassified public forest land," and the investigator and verifier of the then Bureau of Lands did not present any land classification map that would negate such NOTE. The investigation report of Aguilar mentioned LC Map 225, but that map was for Sibulan, Negros Oriental, and LC Map 718 mentioned in the Survey Authority referred to Taal, Batangas. Even Saromo himself contradicted the investigation report of Aguilar regarding the date of his occupation and cultivation of the land. Given these discrepancies, the processing and approval of the free patent were far from regular, and the validity of the free patent cannot be affirmed based on the mere presumption of regularity.

• Regalian Doctrine: The Court held that reversion of the subject land is warranted under Section 91 of CA 141. Even if Section 91 is ruled out, reversion is warranted based on mistake or error on the part of government officials or agents. Citing Republic vs. Hachero, the Court observed that reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine, and that the Court has allowed resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, including lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land, even when such grant was made through mere oversight. Citing Republic vs. Roxas, the Court emphasized that the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the Bureau of Lands cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain, and that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents. Since the government officials concerned erred or were mistaken in granting a free patent over unclassified public forest land, which could not be registered under the Torrens system and over which the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction, the free patent and the Torrens title issued pursuant to it ought to be cancelled.

• Classification of forest land as a legal status — Forest land of the public domain, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," is a classification descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land looks like. A forested area classified as forest land does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover, and parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that testimonial evidence on the physical layout or condition of the subject land — that it was planted with coconut trees and beach houses had been constructed thereon — was not conclusive on the classification of the subject land as alienable agricultural land.

• Unclassified land requires a positive act for declassification — In the absence of classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. When the property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership. This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in such lands. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the term "unclassified land" is a legal classification and a positive act is required to declassify inalienable public land into disposable agricultural land, and that such official proclamation is conspicuously missing in the instant case.

• Admission against interest — Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The Court applied this doctrine to the NOTE in the survey plan prepared by Engr. Guevara for Saromo, holding that the NOTE qualifies as an admission by Saromo that the subject land is "inside unclassified public forest land," and unless rebutted in a clear and convincing manner, it remains an admission against his interest and binding upon him.

• Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties — The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties may be controverted by evidence showing irregularities in the processing and approval of an application. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the presumption was rebutted by the NOTE in the survey plan, the absence of any land classification map negating such NOTE, and the discrepancies in the documents relative to Saromo's free patent application, including the false statement regarding the date of his occupation of the land.

• State's immunity from estoppel — The statute of limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the State, and the State is immune from estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its officials and agents. The mistake or error of the officials or agents of the Bureau of Lands cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that even if the grant of the free patent was made through mistake or oversight, the title could still be cancelled and the subject land reverted back to the State.

• "Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into 'agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks,' do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes." — This passage, quoted from The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, articulates the controlling doctrine that the classification of land as forest is a legal status, not a description of physical appearance, and is central to the Court's rejection of the testimonial evidence on the land's physical features.

• "The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply." — This passage, quoted from Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, establishes the requirement of an official proclamation for declassification of forest land, which the Court found to be conspicuously missing in the instant case.

• "While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition." — This passage, quoted from Heirs of the late Sps. Palanca v. Republic, supports the Court's holding that unclassified land remains inalienable until a positive act of declassification occurs.

• "the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the [Bureau of Lands] in this regard cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents." — This passage, quoted from Republic v. Roxas, supports the Court's alternative ground for reversion based on mistake or error on the part of government officials, notwithstanding the absence of fraud.

• The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. Yap, 589 Phil. 156 (2008) — Controlling precedent on the doctrine that forest land classification is a legal status descriptive of the land's nature, not its physical appearance. The Court relied on this case to reject the testimonial evidence on the physical features of the subject land.

• Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 211 Phil. 260 (1983) — Followed for the proposition that a forested area classified as forest land does not lose such classification simply because it has been stripped of its forest cover, and that an official proclamation is required to release land classified as forest to form part of disposable agricultural lands.

• Heirs of the late Sps. Palanca vs. Republic, 531 Phil. 602 (2006) — Followed for the rule that unclassified land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition, and that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership while the property remains unclassified.

• Republic vs. Hachero, 785 Phil. 784 (2016) — Followed for the proposition that reversion may be granted for reasons other than fraud, including lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land, even when such grant was made through mere oversight.

• Republic vs. Roxas, 723 Phil. 279 (2013) — Followed for the principle that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents with regard to property of the public domain.

• Republic vs. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296 (2006) — Cited for the general statement that the remedy of reversion can be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title.

• Republic vs. Mangotara, 638 Phil. 353 (2010) — Cited for the recognition that the Court has allowed reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, including violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.

• Section 91, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act) — Provides that statements made in an application for a free patent are essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. The Court applied this provision to cancel Saromo's free patent based on the false statement regarding the date of his occupation of the land.

• Section 44, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act) — Provides that only agricultural public lands subject to disposition can be the subject of free patents. The Court applied this provision to hold that the subject land, being unclassified public forest land, could not have been the valid subject of a free patent application.

• Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The Court applied this provision to treat the NOTE in the survey plan as an admission by Saromo that the subject land is "inside unclassified public forest land."

• Proclamation No. 1801 (November 10, 1978) — Declared certain islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist Zones and Marine Reserve under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority. The Court held that the proclamation was not sufficient to prove that the subject land is inalienable and non-disposable, as there is nothing in the law which provides that the areas covered thereby are necessarily inalienable and non-disposable.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 564 — Provides that the Philippine Tourism Authority has the purpose of promoting the development of integrated resort complexes of selected geographic areas with potential tourism value, known as "tourist zones." The Court cited this provision to show that tourist zones are not necessarily inalienable and non-disposable.

• Sections 59 and 60, Republic Act No. 9593 (Tourism Act of 2009) — Defines "Tourism Enterprise Zones" and provides for their designation by the Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority. The Court cited these provisions to show that there is nothing in the descriptions of tourist zones or TEZs from which it can be deduced that they are inalienable and non-disposable.

• Article XII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution; Article XIV, Section 10, 1973 Constitution; Article XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution — Classify lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The Court cited these provisions in support of the doctrine that forest land classification is a legal status.

Carpio, Acting C.J. (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred.