Republic vs. Santos

A dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion and does not belong to the riparian owner, because the drying up of a river does not constitute accretion, which requires the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil through the effects of the current.

Respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B, a 1,045-square-meter property in Parañaque City, later amending the application to include Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. as co-applicant. Respondents claimed the property was formed through accretion to their adjoining lot and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous, and adverse possession for more than 30 years. The City of Parañaque opposed the application, contending the property was within the legal easement, needed for flood control, and was actually a dried-up river bed rather than an accretion.

• Application for Registration: On March 7, 1997, Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B, alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years. On May 21, 1998, the application was amended to include Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. as co-applicant and co-owner, alleging the property was formed through accretion and possessed for over 30 years.
• Opposition: The City of Parañaque opposed the application, stating the property was needed for flood control, was within the 20-meter legal easement, and was a dried-up river bed rather than an accretion.
• Evidence of the Property's Origin: Respondents' own evidence and testimony, particularly from Arcadio, Jr., established that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard. Arcadio, Jr.'s Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 for the adjoining lot also bounded it on the southwest by a "Dried River Bed," corresponding to the location of Lot 4998-B.
• Claim of Possession: Respondents claimed possession for over 30 years but admitted declaring the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paying realty taxes only from 1999.
• Proof of Alienability: To prove the land was alienable and disposable, respondents relied on a notation on the survey plan stating the survey was inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968.

• Accretion Claim Contradicted by Evidence: Petitioner argued that respondents' claim of accretion under Article 457 is contradicted by their own evidence showing the property was a dried-up river bed, not formed by the gradual filling up of soil through the river's current.
• Inapplicability of Article 461: Assuming the land was a dried-up river bed, registration cannot be justified under Article 461, which applies only to river beds abandoned through a natural change in the course of waters, not where the river simply dries up.
• Failure to Prove Alienability: Respondents failed to formally offer in evidence an official certification that the subject property is alienable and disposable; a surveyor's notation is insufficient.
• Lack of Proof of Possession: The finding of continuous, open, public, and adverse possession for more than 30 years is unsupported by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.

• Formation by Accretion Inferred: Respondents argued that because Lot 4998-B did not exist when the original title of the adjoining lot was issued in 1920 and came about thereafter between the lot and the river, the unavoidable conclusion is that soil and sediments were deposited by the current, forming the property.
• Alienability Proven by Survey Notation: Respondents insisted the property was classified as alienable and disposable, citing the notation on the survey plan indicating it was inside a map classified as such by the Bureau of Forest Development.

• Accretion: Whether Article 457 of the Civil Code on accretion is applicable to a dried-up river bed.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether respondents can claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 despite the property being a dried-up river bed and lacking proper proof of alienability.

• Accretion: Article 457 was erroneously applied by the lower courts. Accretion requires the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil through the effects of the current of the water. The drying up of a river involves the recession of the water level and does not equate to accretion. Because the property was a dried-up river bed, it belongs to the State as property of public dominion under Article 502 of the Civil Code, not to the riparian owner.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Acquisitive prescription was not applicable. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation or acquisitive prescription. A dried-up river bed remains property of public dominion unless declared alienable and disposable by the government. Respondents' proof of alienability—a surveyor's notation on a survey plan—does not constitute a positive government act reclassifying the land. Furthermore, respondents' claim of 30-year possession was belied by their admission of declaring the property for taxation only in 1997, and payment of realty taxes is not conclusive proof of ownership or possession.

• Accretion — Defined as the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil through the effects of the current of the water on land adjacent to river banks. The requisites are: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. The drying up of a river is not accretion.
• Regalian Doctrine — All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
• Proof of Alienability — To prove that land is alienable and disposable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. A mere surveyor's notation on a survey plan does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land.

• "By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person."
• "Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain."
• "A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."

• Celestial v. Cachopero, G.R. No. 142595, October 15, 2003 — Followed. Held that a dried-up creek bed remains property of public dominion and is not susceptible to private appropriation or acquisitive prescription absent a government declaration of alienability.
• Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and G.R. No. 173775, October 8, 2008 — Followed. Stated that to overcome the presumption of State ownership, incontrovertible evidence of a positive government act declaring land alienable must be presented.
• Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000 — Followed. Held that a surveyor's notation on a survey plan indicating the land is alienable and disposable does not constitute a positive government act validly changing land classification.
• Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008 — Followed. Held that CENRO/PENRO certifications must be supported by proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land, and that the land falls within the approved area.

• Article 457, Civil Code — Provides that owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers own the accretion they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Applied: Held inapplicable because the property was a dried-up river bed, not an accretion.
• Article 461, Civil Code — Declares that river beds abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course. Applied: Distinguished; applies only when a river changes course, not when it simply dries up.
• Article 502, Civil Code — Declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion. Applied: Held to mean that dried-up river beds continue to belong to the State as property of public dominion.
• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Allows those in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain since June 12, 1945, to apply for registration. Applied: Respondents failed to qualify because the land was not shown to be alienable and disposable, and possession thereof cannot ripen into ownership.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., Reyes