Republic of the Philippines vs. Cecilia Grace L. Roasa

Possession of land under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain may be included in computing the period of possession required for original registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 and Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, provided that the land is already classified as alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.

The case involves an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land denominated as Lot 2 of the consolidation/subdivision plan, Ccs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lots 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, consisting of 1.5 hectares. The respondent acquired the property by purchase in 1994 and claimed that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since the 1930s. The central legal question concerns the proper interpretation of the possession requirement under Philippine land registration laws, specifically whether possession before the government's declaration of alienability can be credited toward the statutory period.

• Original Filing: Application for registration of title filed on December 15, 2000 with the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-930.
• Lower Court Decision: On December 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the application, holding that the respondent failed to comply with the required 30-year adverse possession since the land was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982.
• Appeal: Respondent filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85515.
• CA Decision: On December 13, 2006, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, granting the application for confirmation of imperfect title and directing the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City to issue title in the name of the applicant.
• SC Action: The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, assailing the CA Decision.

The instant petition arose from an application for registration of title over a parcel of land filed by Cecilia Grace L. Roasa, represented by her attorneys-in-fact Bernardo M. Nicolas, Jr. and Alvin B. Acayen. The application was filed on December 15, 2000 with the RTC of Tagaytay City. The subject lot was denominated as Lot 2 of the consolidation/subdivision plan, Ccs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lots 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, consisting of 1.5 hectares.

In her application, Roasa alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject lot, having acquired the same by purchase as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994. She claimed that the property is agricultural land planted with corn, palay, bananas, coconut, and coffee by her predecessors-in-interest, and that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since the 1930s. They had also declared the land for taxation purposes. The application stated the names and addresses of the adjoining owners.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application, contending that the muniments of title, such as tax declarations and tax payment receipts, did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land nor of the alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by Roasa and her predecessors-in-interest as owners for the period required by law. The OSG also argued that the subject lot is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation.

Thereafter, Roasa presented three witnesses to prove her allegations and filed her formal offer of evidence. The Republic did not present any evidence to support its opposition. On June 21, 2004, the RTC admitted all the exhibits of Roasa and considered the case submitted for decision. On December 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the application, holding that the evidence showed the subject land was declared as not part of the forest land of the government before March 15, 1982, which was short of more or less seven years of the required adverse possession of thirty years. Aggrieved, Roasa filed an appeal with the CA.

On December 13, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision and granting the application for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA held that the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 only applies to the requirement of possession and does not have any bearing as to when the land became alienable and disposable. The CA reasoned that when the property was classified as alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982, this did not affect the second requirement of possession, so that despite the fact that the property became alienable and disposable only in 1982, the possession requirement since June 12, 1945 stands. Since the possession was since 1930, which is before June 12, 1945, the requirement of possession had been met. Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole ground that the CA gravely erred in reversing the trial court's Decision denying respondent's application for registration of title due to her failure to comply with the required 30-year adverse possession since the subject land was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on March 15, 1982 per CENRO Certification, and the application was filed only on December 12, 2000.

• The CA gravely erred in reversing the trial court's Decision denying respondent's application for registration of title.
• Respondent failed to comply with the required 30-year adverse possession since the subject land was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on March 15, 1982 per CENRO Certification.
• The application was filed only on December 12, 2000, which is less than 30 years from the date of declaration of alienability.
• Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject land was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year period of possession.
• The possession of the subject lot by respondent and her predecessors-in-interest before the establishment of alienability of the said land cannot be credited as part of the required period of possession because the same cannot be considered adverse.

• The subject property, regardless of the date, was already made alienable and disposable agricultural land.
• The cut-off date of possession of June 12, 1945 only applies to the requirement of possession and does not have any bearing as to when the land became alienable and disposable.
• When the property was classified as alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982, this does not have any bearing with the second requirement of possession.
• Despite the fact that the property became alienable and disposable only in 1982, the possession requirement since June 12, 1945 stands.
• Since the possession was since 1930, which is before June 12, 1945, the requirement of possession has been met.
• Reliance on Republic vs. Naguit which clarified that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree should be interpreted to include possession before the declaration of the land's alienability as long as at the time of the application for registration, the land has already been declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing the trial court's Decision denying respondent's application for registration of title due to her alleged failure to comply with the required 30-year adverse possession since the subject land was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982.
  • Whether the period of possession prior to the date when the subject land was classified as alienable and disposable should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession for purposes of original registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 and Section 48(b) of C.A. 141.

• Procedural: N/A

• Substantive: The SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA Decision. The SC held that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 and Section 48(b) of C.A. 141 is that which was adopted in Republic vs. Naguit and reiterated in Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, namely, that possession of land under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain may be included in computing the period of possession required for original registration of title, provided that the land is already classified as alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.

The SC traced the evolution of its rulings on this issue, noting that in Naguit, the Court clarified that Section 14(1) should be interpreted to include possession before the declaration of the land's alienability as long as at the time of the application for registration, the land has already been declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands. The SC emphasized the absurdity that would result in interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring that the alienability of public land should have already been established by June 12, 1945, as this would render the provision virtually inoperative and preclude the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable.

However, in the later case of Republic vs. Herbieto, the Court ruled that the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable cannot be included in the computation of the period of possession. This conflict was resolved in Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, where the Court declared that Naguit and not Herbieto should be followed, and that Herbieto has no precedential value with respect to Section 14(1). The Court explained that the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto.

The SC further explained that adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, but it has more to do with a person's belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.

Applying these principles to the case, the SC found that there was no dispute that the subject lot had been declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982, which was more than eighteen years before respondent's application for registration filed on December 15, 2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses established that the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been in adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945. Thus, respondent's right to the original registration of title over the subject property was dependent on the existence of (a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration and (b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Both requisites were present in this case.

• Naguit Doctrine on Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 — Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree should be interpreted to include possession before the declaration of the land's alienability as long as at the time of the application for registration, the land has already been declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands. The law merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.

• Requisites for Original Registration of Title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 and Section 48(b) of C.A. 141 — An applicant for original registration of title based on a claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of the following:

  • Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, of land;
  • The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land of public domain;
  • The possession or occupation was under a bona fide claim of ownership;

  • Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.

  • Possession in the Concept of an Owner — Adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, but it has more to do with a person's belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.

  • Doctrine of Stare Decisis and Abandonment of Herbieto — The SC expressly abandoned the ruling in Republic vs. Herbieto and declared that it has no precedential value with respect to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. The Court settled any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word on Section 14(1) in favor of Naguit.

• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, may file an application for registration of title to land. The SC interpreted this provision to mean that possession prior to the declaration of alienability may be included in computing the period of possession, provided the land is already alienable and disposable at the time of application.

• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure, may apply for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title. The SC applied this provision consistently with Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

None.