Republic vs. Moldex Realty, Inc.

Withdrawal of an application for land registration pending review renders the case moot and academic, requiring dismissal of the petition and setting aside of the favorable lower court decisions without prejudice to a future application. The withdrawal erased the conflict of legal rights, leaving no practical relief to grant, and did not operate as an abandonment of underlying property claims nor as a means to render the vacated decisions final.

Moldex Realty, Inc. is a domestic corporation that acquired two parcels in Alulod, Indang, Cavite from the heirs of Ana Erce and Pedro Erce. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposes private registration of lands claimed as part of the public domain. Registration of such lands is sought pursuant to Act No. 496 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529, which requires proof of registrable title and of the land's alienable and disposable character.

On January 25, 2000, Luis Erce, Rosa Cinense, and Maria Clara Erce Landicho applied before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite for registration of three parcels in Alulod, Indang, Cavite designated as Lot Nos. 9715-A with 40,565 square meters, 9715-B with 20,000 square meters, and 9715-C with 20,000 square meters, totaling 80,565 square meters. Thereafter, the applicants sold Lot Nos. 9715-B and 9715-C, with a combined area of 40,000 square meters, to Moldex Realty, Inc., evidenced by two separate deeds of sale executed in 1997. Moldex was substituted for the original applicants in the pending application, and Lot No. 9715-A was dropped from the application.

To prove title, Moldex presented Engineer John Arvin Manaloto, its Assistant Manager for Technical Services Department, and Pio Atis, a 77-year-old farmer residing in Alulod since birth. Manaloto testified that Moldex purchased the properties from the heirs of Ana Erce and Pedro Erce, that the technical descriptions and subdivision plan were approved by the Bureau of Lands, and that tax declarations from the Municipal Assessor of Indang and the Provincial Assessor of Trece Martires City showed ownership by Olimpio Erce, Pedro Erce, Ana Erce, Heirs of Ana Erce, and Moldex Realty, Inc. from 1948 to 2001. He further testified that he secured from the Forest Management Sector of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Trece Martires City a certification that the properties were declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on March 15, 1982. Atis, tenant of the properties and owner of an adjoining lot, testified that he knew the owners before Moldex and had personal knowledge that the Erces possessed the properties before the war.

The dispute reached the Supreme Court after the Regional Trial Court decreed registration in Moldex's name on February 19, 2002 and the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto on January 6, 2006. While the Republic's Petition for Review was pending, Moldex filed on March 14, 2012 a Manifestation and Motion stating that despite the favorable decisions, it opted to withdraw its application for registration in its name, rendering the case moot and academic.

• Length and Character of Possession: Petitioner argued that Moldex failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or for at least 30 years, and that its predecessors' possession could not result in adverse possession against the Republic since the properties were classified as alienable and disposable only in 1982.
• Erroneous Reliance on Naguit: Petitioner maintained that in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on Republic vs. Naguit instead of Republic vs. Herbieto.
• Effect of Withdrawal: Petitioner countered that since the trial court and Court of Appeals had already decided in Moldex's favor, the appeal should not merely be dismissed for mootness but the lower decisions should be reversed and set aside in favor of Moldex.

• Time of Alienability: Respondent argued that for purposes of registration, land needs only to have been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration.
• Patrimonial Property: Respondent maintained that unless a public land is clearly being reserved for public or common use, it should be considered patrimonial property.
• Mootness by Withdrawal: Respondent asserted that although it had obtained favorable decisions from the trial court and Court of Appeals, it opted to withdraw its application for registration, hence the case had become moot and academic and the appeal should be considered withdrawn or dismissed.

• Mootness: Whether respondent Moldex Realty, Inc.'s withdrawal of its application for land registration has rendered this case moot and academic.
• Length of Possession: Whether respondent was able to prove the required length of possession for purposes of land registration.
• Applicability of Naguit: Whether Naguit was erroneously applied by the Court of Appeals.

• Mootness: Yes. The withdrawal erased the conflicting interests, leaving no justiciable controversy, and no exception to mootness was present.
• Length of Possession: Not resolved. With the case rendered moot and no exception applicable, there was no more reason to go into the substantive issue of possessory length.
• Applicability of Naguit: Not resolved. The alleged erroneous application of Naguit was likewise left undecided, the controversy having ceased to exist by virtue of the withdrawal.

• Mootness: Judicial power is limited to actual cases and controversies presenting definite, concrete conflicts of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. A case becomes moot when supervening events cause the resolvable conflicting issue to cease to exist, leaving no practical use in deciding it. Respondent's Manifestation expressing intent not to act on its claim to registration ended the controversy, such that a ruling on the right to registration would be a mere advisory opinion, the power of judicial review not reposing a self-starting capacity in courts. None of the recognized bases for retaining jurisdiction — grave constitutional violation, exceptional character, paramount public interest, guidance for bench, bar and public, or capable of repetition yet evading review — was present. The withdrawal was construed only as waiver of the favorable RTC and Court of Appeals decisions, not as waiver of underlying property claims nor as proof that the property belongs to the public domain, and as not rendering those decisions final and executory; dismissal was without prejudice to a new application by interested parties.
• Length of Possession: No substantive determination was made because mootness removed the justiciable controversy. The Republic's contention regarding failure to prove possession since June 12, 1945 or for 30 years, particularly in light of the March 15, 1982 alienable and disposable classification, was thus left undecided.
• Applicability of Naguit: No substantive determination was made for the same reason. The competing reliance on Republic vs. Naguit, that alienability at the time of application suffices, versus Republic vs. Herbieto was not passed upon once the application itself was withdrawn.

• Actual case or controversy — An actual case involves a conflict of legal rights or opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, definite and concrete, touching legal relations of parties with adverse interests and admitting of specific relief. Applied to find that Moldex's withdrawal of its registration application eliminated the adverse interests between the State and the applicant, leaving nothing for judicial resolution.
• Mootness — A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist, leaving no justiciable controversy; courts generally decline jurisdiction or dismiss on that ground and refuse to render advisory opinions deciding issues of no practical use or value. Applied to dismiss the Republic's petition after the applicant no longer asserted any right to registration.
• Exceptions to mootness — Jurisdiction may still be assumed despite mootness when there is (1) grave constitutional violation; (2) exceptional character of the case; (3) paramount public interest; (4) opportunity to guide the bench, bar, and public; or (5) a case capable of repetition yet evading review. Applied to hold that none of these circumstances was present, so substantive registration issues would not be decided.
• Effect of withdrawal of registration application — Withdrawal pending review operates as waiver of the favorable lower court decisions and prevents them from becoming final and executory, but is not a waiver or abandonment of underlying property claims nor proof that the land belongs to the public domain, and does not preclude a new application for registration by interested parties. Applied to set aside the RTC and Court of Appeals decisions without prejudice to refiling.

• "An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is 'definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest'; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief." — States the canonical definition of justiciability used to conclude that the withdrawal eliminated the controversy.
• "A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist." — Articulates the test for mootness applied to the supervening withdrawal of the registration application.
• "This court refuses to render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use or value." — Explains why the substantive questions on possession and applicable precedent were no longer decided.
• "[T]he power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a 'self-starting capacity.'" — Emphasizes that courts cannot affirm or deny a claimed right to registration once the applicant no longer asserts it.

• David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) — Followed as controlling authority on the definition of actual case or controversy, mootness, dismissal on mootness grounds, and the exceptions allowing review despite mootness.
• Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806 (2004) — Cited as authority for when a case becomes moot and for the exceptions of grave constitutional violation, paramount public interest, guidance to bench, bar and public, and capable of repetition yet evading review.
• Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482 (2004) — Cited on mootness and on the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception.
• Lu vs. Lu Ym, 585 Phil. 251 (2008) — Cited for the rule refusing advisory opinions and for exceptions involving grave constitutional violations, exceptional character, and paramount public interest.
• Republic vs. Naguit, 489 Phil. 405 (2005) — The Court of Appeals' relied-upon precedent that alienable and disposable character at the time of application satisfies registration requirements; its correctness was left undecided due to mootness.
• Republic vs. Herbieto, 498 Phil. 227 (2005) — Invoked by petitioner as the allegedly correct precedent over Naguit; its applicability was left undecided due to mootness.
• Alunan vs. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997) — Cited as authority for the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness.

• Section 1, Article VIII, Constitution — Vests judicial power and limits it to settling actual controversies involving legally demandable rights and determining grave abuse of discretion; applied to hold that withdrawal left no actual controversy to decide.
• Act No. 496, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 — The land registration law under which the RTC decreed registration of Lot Nos. 9715-B and 9715-C in Moldex's name; the decrees thereunder were set aside as moot following withdrawal, without prejudice to a new application.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Brion, J., Del Castillo, J., and Mendoza, J., concur.