Republic vs. Miller

An alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family Code, which prohibited aliens from adopting, may continue with the petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code, because the right to adopt had vested at the time of filing. The court's jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, and once attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.

The respondents, Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, are American citizens married to each other, residing in Angeles City, where Claude was assigned to Clark Air Base. They sought to adopt a Filipino minor, Michael Magno Madayag, whose natural parents consented to the adoption due to poverty. The statutory backdrop involves two conflicting laws: the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603), which allowed aliens to adopt, and the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), effective August 3, 1988, which disqualified aliens from adopting. The petition was filed on July 29, 1988, before the Family Code took effect, raising the question of which law governs the adoption.

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American citizens, filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. Claude, 38 years old, was a member of the United States Air Force assigned at Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985; Jumrus was 40 years old. They had been married on June 21, 1982, were childless, and did not expect to have children due to the wife's medical condition. The family had resided at Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985.

The minor, born on July 14, 1987, in San Fernando, La Union, was the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. He had been in the respondents' custody since the first week of August 1987. The natural parents, who had no visible means of livelihood, executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption, motivated by poverty and concern for their son's future. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, through its regional office in San Fernando, Pampanga, recommended approval of the petition, finding the respondents morally, emotionally, and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would serve the minor's best interest.

At the hearing on September 9, 1988, with an assistant city fiscal representing the Solicitor General, the respondents adduced evidence supporting the petition. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision granting the adoption, declaring the minor freed from all obligations of obedience and support with respect to his natural parents, and changing his surname from "Madayag" to "Miller." The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court because the appeal raised only questions of law.

• Applicability of the Family Code: The Republic argued that the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, prohibits aliens from adopting a Filipino child, and that this prohibition should govern the adoption despite the petition having been filed before the Family Code took effect.

• Vested Right to Adopt: The respondents argued that they had acquired a vested right to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time the petition was filed, and that this right could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code disqualifying aliens from adopting.

• Vested Right to Adopt: Whether the respondents, as aliens, may adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, given that the petition for adoption was filed before the Family Code took effect.

• Vested Right to Adopt: Yes. The respondents' right to adopt had vested under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time the petition was filed, and the Family Code's prohibition on alien adoption cannot impair that vested right.

• Vested Right to Adopt: The Court applied the doctrine of vested rights, citing Republic vs. Court of Appeals (205 SCRA 356). A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity, and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder; it expresses the concept of a present fixed interest that should be protected against arbitrary State action. The Court reasoned that because the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance under the law in force at the time it was filed, the court acquired jurisdiction and retained it until the case was fully disposed. Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, and once attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. Consequently, the Family Code, which took effect after the filing, could not retroactively disqualify the respondents. The Court further noted that adoption statutes are humane and salutary, designed to provide homes for needy children and to give childless couples the joy of parenthood, and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote these objectives.

• Vested Rights Doctrine — A right becomes vested when its existence, effectivity, and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder; it is a present fixed interest that should be protected against arbitrary State action. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondents' right to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code had vested upon the filing of the petition, and the subsequent Family Code prohibition could not impair that right.
• Jurisdiction Attaches at Commencement — The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, and once it attaches, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that the trial court's jurisdiction over the adoption petition, filed before the Family Code took effect, remained unaffected by the new law.
• Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes — Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child as paramount; every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote the noble objectives of providing homes for needy children and enabling childless couples to experience parenthood. The Court invoked this principle to support the affirmation of the adoption.

• "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." — This passage defines the vested rights doctrine that formed the basis of the Court's ruling, and is the canonical formulation cited in the decision.
• "As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance." — This passage articulates the principle that jurisdiction is fixed at the time of filing and cannot be defeated by later legislative changes, directly supporting the Court's conclusion.
• "Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code." — This is the operative holding of the case, stating the rule that governs the application of the Family Code to pending adoption petitions.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 356 — Controlling precedent; the Court cited this case for the proposition that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code at the time of filing acquired a vested right that could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
• Ayog vs. Cusi, 118 SCRA 492 — Cited for the definition of a vested right as a present fixed interest protected against arbitrary State action.
• Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565 — Cited in support of the principle that jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent events.
• Bobanovic vs. Montes, 142 SCRA 485 — Cited for the proposition that adoption statutes are humane and salutary and should be liberally construed to promote the welfare of the child and the objectives of adoption.

• Article 184, Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) — The provision disqualifying aliens from adopting a Filipino child. The Court held that this provision could not apply to the respondents because their right to adopt had vested before the Family Code took effect.
• Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) — The law in force at the time the petition was filed, which allowed aliens to adopt. The Court applied this law to the respondents' petition, as their right had vested under it.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Nares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.