Republic vs. Mendoza

Where the owner voluntarily agrees to the government's taking of property for public use, ejectment cannot lie against the government; the owner's exclusive remedy is an action for just compensation.

Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) occupied a 1,149-square-meter lot in Lipa City, Batangas, for its school site beginning in 1957. The property remained registered under the respondents' title, although a 1962 consolidation and subdivision plan designated the specific lot for the City Government of Lipa, and the city tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name. In 1998, the respondents demanded that PPS vacate the premises, precipitating an unlawful detainer action when the school refused.

• School Occupation: Since 1957, Paninsingin Primary School (PPS), a public school operated by the Republic through the Department of Education, occupied a 1,149-square-meter portion of Lots 1923 and 1925 in Lipa City.
• Property Title and Subdivision: The property was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410 in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza. In 1962, the Mendozas consolidated and subdivided the larger lots into four lots, designating Lot 4 (1,149 sqm) in favor of the City Government of Lipa. No new title was issued to the City Government for Lot 4, and the original title was only partially cancelled.
• Tax Declarations: The City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and the permanent improvements built by PPS in its name.
• Demand to Vacate: On November 6, 1998, the Mendozas demanded that PPS vacate the property, claiming they merely tolerated the occupation and never relinquished their rights. PPS refused, asserting the Mendozas had relinquished their right to the school lot as evidenced by the subdivision plan.

• Laches: Petitioner maintained that the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot due to their decades-long inaction.
• Relinquishment of Ownership: Petitioner argued that sufficient evidence demonstrated the Mendozas had relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa for use as a school, as shown by the subdivision plan.
• Tax Declarations: Petitioner asserted that the property had long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes, bolstering the claim of government ownership.

• Indefeasibility of Title: Respondent countered that, as the registered owners holding an indefeasible title, the Mendozas possessed a better right of possession over the property.
• Lack of Transfer Document: Respondent argued that PPS could not produce any documentary evidence proving the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor.
• Tolerated Possession: Respondent maintained that the Republic's possession through PPS was merely tolerated and could not ripen into ownership, rendering the Mendozas' right to eject any occupant imprescriptible.

• Ejectment vs. Just Compensation: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the eviction of the Republic from property used as a public school site, notwithstanding the respondents' registered title and the absence of formal expropriation proceedings.

• Ejectment vs. Just Compensation: The Court of Appeals erred in ordering eviction. While the respondents' title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the evidence demonstrates their intention to cede the property to the government permanently, as shown by the subdivision plan and tax declarations in the city's name. Voluntary agreement to the taking of property for public use waives the requirement of formal expropriation proceedings. Prolonged failure by the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings constitutes a waiver of the right to regain possession. Consequently, the respondents' remedy is an action for payment of just compensation, not ejectment. The Municipal Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to evict the Republic or adjudicate just compensation; the proper venue is an ordinary civil action for such compensation.

• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title — A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the government, and registered title is imprescriptible; it cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Applied here to affirm the respondents' continuing ownership, notwithstanding the government's decades-long occupation and tax declarations.
• Waiver of Formal Expropriation — Where the owner voluntarily agrees to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he waives the right to the institution of formal expropriation proceedings. Prolonged failure to question the lack of such proceedings further constitutes a waiver of the right to recover possession.
• Remedy for De Facto Taking — When property is taken for public use without formal expropriation, the owner's exclusive remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. Just compensation is determined based on the value of the property at the time of taking.

• "A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice."
• "[W]here the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property."
• "[T]he failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession."

• Eusebio v. Luis, G.R. No. 162474 — Followed. Established that the prolonged failure of an owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings constitutes a waiver of the right to regain possession.
• Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 494 (2005) — Followed. Affirmed the RTC's power to award just compensation even in the absence of proper expropriation proceedings, allowing determination in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession or value.
• Republic v. Catarroja, G.R. No. 171774 — Distinguished. Tax declarations may stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title; here, the respondents' title prevails over the city's tax declarations.
• Arbias v. Republic, G.R. No. 173808 — Applied. Tax declarations have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership when a certificate of title exists.

• Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 31 — Declares that a decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the government. Cited to affirm the indefeasibility of the respondents' title.
• Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 47 — States that title once registered is imprescriptible and cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Applied to recognize the respondents' continuing ownership despite the government's long-term occupation.

Carpio, Villarama Jr., Perez, Mendoza