Republic vs. Malabanan

An appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising mixed questions of fact and law is properly taken to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal under Rule 41, and the Court of Appeals commits reversible error when it dismisses such an appeal under Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the appeal raises only questions of law.

The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title against respondents Angelo B. Malabanan and Pablo B. Malabanan, who were registered owners of a 405,000-square-meter parcel of land in Talisay, Batangas, covered by TCT No. T-24268, and against Greenthumb Realty and Development Corporation, which held derivative titles. The land was originally registered on April 29, 1936 under OCT No. 0-17421 pursuant to Decree No. 589383 issued in L.R.C. Record No. 50573. The Republic claimed that an investigation by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources revealed that the land was within the unclassified public forest of Batangas per L.C. CM No. 10, prompting the filing of the reversion complaint on March 30, 1998, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1055 and later re-docketed as Civil Case No. C-192.

Respondents Angelo B. Malabanan and Pablo B. Malabanan were registered owners of a 405,000-square-meter parcel of land situated in Talisay, Batangas, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24268 of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas. The parcel of land was originally registered on April 29, 1936 in the Register of Deeds of Batangas under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-17421 pursuant to Decree No. 589383 issued in L.R.C. Record No. 50573. OCT No. 0-17421 was cancelled and replaced with TCT No. T-9076, from which the respondents' title, TCT No. T-24268, was derived. The parcel of land was later subdivided into smaller lots, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-24268; the derivative titles are now either in the names of the Malabanans or respondent Greenthumb Realty and Development Corporation.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines claimed that an investigation conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (Region IV) revealed that the land covered by TCT No. T-24268 was within the unclassified public forest of Batangas per L.C. CM No. 10. This prompted the filing of a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title against respondents on March 30, 1998, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1055 and raffled off to Branch 83 of the RTC of Batangas, later re-docketed as Civil Case No. C-192.

On May 5, 1998, the Malabanans filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; the complaint violated Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure since petitioner did not attach a copy of Decree No. 589383; and that a similar complaint for reversion involving the same parcels of land and parties had already been dismissed by the same court. In an Order dated December 11, 1998, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that a similar complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. T-784, was dismissed on December 7, 1992 for lack of jurisdiction; that nullification of OCT No. 0-17421 and all its derivative titles would involve nullification of the judgment of the Land Registration Court, making Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 applicable and vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over actions for annulment of judgments of the RTC; and that the court took judicial notice of several prior cases concerning ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land that were elevated to the CA and the Supreme Court, which upheld the ownership of the properties by the Malabanans.

On January 5, 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of dismissal. On January 18, 1999, the Malabanans moved to deny due course and dismiss the appeal, arguing that petitioner adopted an improper mode of appeal because the issue of jurisdiction is a question of law that should be raised before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. On June 29, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying due course and dismissing petitioner's appeal. However, on certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54721, the CA reversed that order on February 29, 2000, ruling that the determination of whether an appeal may be dismissed on the ground that the issue involved is purely a question of law is exclusively lodged within the discretion of the CA, and directed the trial court to give due course to the appeal and transmit the original records to the CA.

In its Appeal Brief before the CA, petitioner raised a lone assignment of error: that the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. A perusal of the arguments in the brief revealed that petitioner not only raised the jurisdictional issue but likewise questioned the portion of the dismissal order where it was held that several cases involving the subject land had already been filed and that the CA and the Supreme Court had upheld respondents' ownership. Petitioner argued that the question of whether the right of the Malabanans had in fact been upheld is factual in nature and necessarily requires presentation of evidence. On July 20, 2005, however, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal, holding that the issue of jurisdiction, being a pure question of law, is cognizable only by the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari, and dismissed the appeal under Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Mixed Questions of Fact and Law: Petitioner argued that the issue surrounding the validity of the order dismissing the complaint does not only involve a question of law but also involves a question of fact, pertaining to the portion of the trial court's assailed order which stated that the Malabanans' ownership had been upheld by the CA and the Supreme Court; the question of whether such right had in fact been upheld is factual in nature.
• Trial Court Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that the trial court has jurisdiction over the complaint and should not have dismissed the complaint in the first place.

• No Factual Issues: Respondents countered that there are no factual issues involved because they are deemed to have hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint when they filed a motion to dismiss.

• Propriety of the Appeal Mode: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing petitioner's appeal for being the wrong mode to assail the trial court's order.

• Propriety of the Appeal Mode: No. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal. Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Propriety of the Appeal Mode: The Supreme Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, citing Murillo vs. Consul: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; the second mode is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; the third mode is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

The Court, citing Leoncio vs. De Vera, differentiated a question of law from a question of fact: a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

Applying these principles, the Court found that petitioner's appeal did not only involve a question of law. Aside from the trial court's ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other basis for the trial court's ruling, which referred to previously decided cases allegedly upholding with finality the ownership of the Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued by petitioner, the question of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is factual in nature as it requires the presentation of evidence. Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants; the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence — if it can, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. The Court applied this doctrine to find that the Republic's appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law because it questioned the factual finding that the Malabanans' ownership had been upheld in prior cases, which requires presentation of evidence.

• Three Modes of Appeal from RTC Decisions — The Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; (2) petition for review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; and (3) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law. The Court applied this framework to hold that the Republic properly invoked the CA's appellate jurisdiction through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

• "A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact." — This passage articulates the canonical distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, which is the controlling doctrine in determining the proper mode of appeal.

• "Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact." — This passage establishes the operative test for distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact, which the Court applied to find that the Republic's appeal raised mixed questions.

• "Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, holding that the CA erred in dismissing the appeal because the presence of factual questions made ordinary appeal to the CA the proper mode.

• Murillo vs. Consul, Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK-9748 dated March 1, 1990, as cited in Macababbad, Jr. vs. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009, 576 SCRA 70, 83 — Controlling precedent clarifying the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, which the Court applied to determine the proper mode of appeal in this case.
• Leoncio vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 176842, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA 180 — Followed for the differentiation between a question of law and a question of fact, providing the test applied by the Court to determine that the Republic's appeal raised mixed questions.
• Binay vs. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 255-256 — Cited in Leoncio for the proposition that the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
• Velayo-Fong vs. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 320, 329-330 — Cited in Leoncio for the same proposition regarding the test for questions of law versus questions of fact.
• Abedes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 174373, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 268, 285-286 — Cited in support of the three modes of appeal from RTC decisions.
• Suarez vs. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 124512, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 74, 80 — Cited in support of the three modes of appeal from RTC decisions.

• Section 2, Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. The Court held that this provision was inapplicable because the Republic's appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, not only questions of law.
• Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs appeal from the Regional Trial Courts; the Court held that this was the proper mode of appeal for the Republic because the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law from an RTC decision in the exercise of original jurisdiction.
• Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petition for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; cited in the Court's clarification of the three modes of appeal.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court; cited in the Court's clarification that this mode is available only on questions of law.
• Section 7, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires that when an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached as an exhibit; cited by the Malabanans in their Motion to Dismiss for petitioner's failure to attach a copy of Decree No. 589383.
• Section 9(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Court; cited by the RTC in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the Certification portion of the decision regarding the consultation requirement before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson, Third Division)
• Arturo D. Brion
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno