Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

A corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of title to lands that have already become private property through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period prescribed by law, the constitutional prohibition against private corporations acquiring alienable public lands being inapplicable once the land has ceased to be part of the public domain by operation of law.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, a corporation sole represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, sought judicial confirmation of title to four parcels of land in Candelaria, Quezon, acquired through purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the ground that the applicant lacked title in fee simple. The dispute centered on whether Article XIV, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution—which prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease—barred a corporation sole from registering title, given that the application was filed in 1979, after the Constitution's effectivity on January 17, 1973.

On February 2, 1979, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four parcels of land before the Court of First Instance of Quezon. Three of the parcels—Lots 1, 2, and 3 of plan PSU-65686, with areas of 18,977, 6,910, and 16,221 square meters respectively—are situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcel, described in plan PSU-112592 with an area of 3,221 square meters, is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. The applicant claimed title through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928.

The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, and copies of the notice of initial hearing were served on the proper government officials. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcels being applied for. At the initial hearing on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal appeared to interpose objection, and an Order of General Default was issued against the whole world except the two directors. Thereafter, the Fiscal manifested on July 22, 1980 that the State would not adduce evidence and would submit the case for decision.

With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, the evidence showed that these lots were surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on November 3, 1928, and the survey plan was approved on October 20, 1929. Lot 1 was acquired through Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado on October 20, 1928. A portion of Lot 2 was likewise acquired by purchase through Rev. Father Esquenet from the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May 22, 1969, while the remaining portion of Lot 2 and all of Lot 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even prior to the 1928 survey. Burial records of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria showed that as early as November 1918, Lot 3 had already been utilized as the church's cemetery. These three lots presently constitute the Roman Catholic Church cemetery in Candelaria and are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church as "cemetery site."

The fourth parcel under plan PSU-112592 was formerly owned by the spouses Paulo G. Macasaet and Gabriela V. de Macasaet, who donated it to the Roman Catholic Church through Rev. Father Esquenet on February 26, 1941. The lot was surveyed for the church on August 16, 1940 as a church site, and the survey plan was approved on January 15, 1941. A chapel had been erected on the lot; the old chapel was demolished and a new one now stands on the same site.

The Court of First Instance concluded that the applicant had adequately shown title based on acquisitive prescription, noting that possession by the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest covered more than 52 years with respect to Lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to Lot 3, and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel—all open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner. The court ordered registration of the four parcels in the name of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, Inc. The Republic moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the constitutional prohibition under Article XIV, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution, which was denied by the lower court. The Republic then elevated the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision on May 13, 1986, and denied reconsideration on June 19, 1986.

• Constitutional Disqualification: Petitioner contended that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, being a corporation sole, was disqualified from owning and registering title to the parcels of land under Article XIV, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution, which prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.
• Timing of Application: Petitioner argued that because the application for registration was filed only on February 2, 1979—long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973—the application and confirmation of title was ineffectual, as private corporations had already been declared ineligible to acquire alienable public lands.
• Inapplicability of Section 48(b) to Juridical Entities: Petitioner maintained that being a juridical entity, private respondent could not avail of the benefits of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which petitioner argued applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons.
• Prior Registration and Identity of Lands: Petitioner asserted that the lands applied for were the subject of a previous registration case where a decree of registration had already been issued, and that respondent corporation failed to establish the identity of the lands applied for.

• Corporation Sole's Right to Hold Property: Private respondent espoused the view that a corporation sole should not be treated as an ordinary private corporation for purposes of the constitutional prohibition, and that it was vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate under Section 113 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68.

• Qualification of Corporation Sole: Whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole, is qualified to apply for confirmation of title to the four parcels of land subject of the case.
• Applicability of Constitutional Prohibition: Whether a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private corporation for purposes of applying Article XIV, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution, which prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain.

• Qualification of Corporation Sole: Yes. The corporation sole was qualified to apply for confirmation of title because the subject lands had already become private property by operation of law through possession satisfying the statutory period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, rendering the constitutional prohibition inapplicable.
• Applicability of Constitutional Prohibition: No. The constitutional prohibition does not apply because the lands had ceased to be part of the public domain before the application was filed; moreover, a corporation sole is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate under Section 113 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, and need not be treated as an ordinary private corporation.

• Qualification of Corporation Sole: The Court applied the doctrine established in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509 [1986]), which requires a determination of the character of the lands at the time the registration proceedings were instituted. If the lands were still part of the public domain at that time, the application must fail; if they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by private corporations does not apply. The Court traced the line of cases from Cariño (1909) through Susi (1925) to Herico (1980), which developed the doctrine that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates a legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act provides that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title." As a conclusive presumption, no proof is admissible to overcome it; confirmation proceedings are merely a formality limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and duration. The Court found that the four lots had been possessed openly, continuously, and adversely for periods exceeding the statutory minimum—over 52 years for Lots 1 and 2, about 62 years for Lot 3, and over 39 years for the fourth parcel—well before the application was filed in 1979. The lands were therefore already private property at the time of the application, and the constitutional prohibition did not apply.

• Applicability of Constitutional Prohibition: The Court clarified that it was not holding that a corporation sole should be treated like an ordinary private corporation. Citing Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission (L-8451, December 20, 1957, 102 Phil. 596), the Court described a corporation sole as a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy, consisting of one person and his successors, incorporated by law to give them legal capacities and advantages, particularly perpetuity. Section 113 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 expressly provides that any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes. By the nature of its incorporation, a corporation sole is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate, and need not be treated as an ordinary private corporation because, whether or not so treated, the constitutional provision would nevertheless be inapplicable given that the lands were already private.

• Regalian Doctrine and Conversion of Public Land to Private Property — Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates a legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. This doctrine was developed through a line of cases beginning with Cariño vs. Insular Government (1909), through Susi vs. Razon (1925), down to Herico vs. Dar (1980), and reaffirmed in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1986). The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the subject lands had already become private property before the registration application was filed, making the constitutional prohibition on private corporations acquiring public lands inapplicable.
• Conclusive Presumption of Government Grant — Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, a possessor who has met the requisite period of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title." No proof is admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption; confirmation proceedings are thus limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and duration, and registration does not confer title but merely recognizes a title already vested by operation of law.
• Nature of Corporation Sole — A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy, consisting of one person and his successors, incorporated by law to give them legal capacities and advantages, particularly perpetuity. Under Section 113 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, a corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes. It is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate by the nature of its incorporation and need not be treated as an ordinary private corporation.

• "If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporation or association obviously does not apply." — This passage states the controlling rule from Director of Lands vs. IAC that determines the applicability of the constitutional prohibition based on the character of the land at the time of the registration proceedings.
• "open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine on automatic conversion of public land to private property through prescription, tracing the lineage from Cariño through Susi to Herico.
• "No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested." — This passage defines the nature and scope of land registration proceedings under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, emphasizing that registration is confirmatory and not constitutive of title.
• "A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy." — This passage, drawn from Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, defines the essential nature of a corporation sole and distinguishes it from ordinary private corporations.

• Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 (1986) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the rule that the character of the land at the time of the registration proceedings must be determined; if already private, the constitutional prohibition does not apply. This case reversed the earlier ruling in Manila Electric Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome and adopted the dissent of then Justice Teehankee.
• Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., 141 SCRA 21 (1986) — Followed as res judicata on the issue of public land acquisition by private corporations, declaring the earlier Meralco ruling reversed.
• Cariño vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909) — Foundational precedent establishing the doctrine that possession of public land for the prescribed period converts it to private property by operation of law.
• Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 (1925) — Cited as part of the line of cases affirming the doctrine of automatic conversion through prescription.
• Herico vs. Dar, 95 SCRA 43 (1980) — Cited as reaffirming the doctrine of automatic conversion of public land to private property through possession.
• Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596 (1957) — Cited for the definition and nature of a corporation sole as a special form of corporation associated with the clergy, distinct from ordinary private corporations.
• Manila Electric Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 789 (1982) — Distinguished and effectively overturned by Director of Lands vs. IAC, which reversed the ruling imposing the constitutional ban on public land acquisition by private corporations.

• Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution — Provides that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the subject lands had already become private property by operation of law before the application was filed.
• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Provides that those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all conditions essential to a Government grant and entitled to a certificate of title. The Court applied this provision to hold that the subject lands had already vested as private property.
• Section 113, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corporation Code) — Provides that any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes. The Court cited this provision to confirm that a corporation sole is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.