Republic vs. Heirs of Eduardo Booc

Reconstitution of a lost or destroyed OCT under RA 26 requires strict compliance with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of Sections 12 and 13, as well as sufficient and competent proof that the certificate of title actually existed and was in force at the time of loss or destruction.

Respondents are the heirs of the Boocs, who were allegedly the registered owners of the subject lots. The Republic, represented by the OSG, challenged the reconstitution. RA 26 governs judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate and requires strict compliance with its mandatory requirements.

Respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the late Eduardo Booc, Mercedes Booc, Aurelia Booc, Pedro Booc, Florentino Booc, and Feliciana Booc, filed on July 9, 1998 a petition for reconstitution of the original certificates of title of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777, located in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, with areas of 2,813 square meters, 5,507 square meters, and 6,973 square meters, respectively. They alleged that sometime in 1930 the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered three January 20, 1930 Decisions declaring the late Eduardo Booc, Mercedes Booc, Aurelia Booc, Pedro Booc, and Florentino Booc as registered owners of the lots; that in 1934 Decree Nos. 531394, 531367, and 531382 were separately issued by the CFI-Cebu directing registration of the lots in the Boocs' names; and that OCTs were thereafter issued to the Boocs. The OCTs were allegedly lost or destroyed during World War II, as evidenced by a Certification dated June 26, 1998 issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, and respondents claimed they exerted diligent efforts to recover the certificates but failed. They further averred that the certificates were still in force when lost or destroyed and that no co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate certificates had been issued. They listed the adjoining owners and stated that Lot No. 4749 was in the material possession of the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority (MEPZA), while the Mactan International Airport Authority (MIAA) possessed Lot Nos. 4765 and 4777.

In support of the petition, respondents presented certified true copies of the January 20, 1930 CFI Decisions; Decree No. 531367 dated June 1, 1934 for Lot No. 4749, Decree No. 531382 dated June 2, 1934 for Lot No. 4765, and Decree No. 531394 dated May 1, 1934 for Lot No. 4777; the June 26, 1998 Register of Deeds certification; certified true copies of the technical descriptions; a June 18, 1998 certification from the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City and certifications from the Branch Clerks of Court of Branches 27, 53, and 54 stating that no application for reconstitution of the subject lots had been filed; and sketch plans. On February 18, 2000, the RTC issued an Amended Order setting the initial hearing, directing the Branch Clerk of Court to publish the Notice of Hearing in three successive issues of the Official Gazette and to post copies at the Capitol Building of Cebu City and at the place where the lots were located, and ordering that copies be furnished to the OSG, the Register of Deeds-Cebu, the Bureau of Lands, and the LRA. An Amended Notice of Hearing was issued the same date. The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City to appear for the State.

At the initial hearing, respondents established the jurisdictional facts. The RTC initially entered an order of general default when no opposition was filed and scheduled the initial presentation of respondents' evidence on August 29, 2000, but the presentation did not push through when the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) filed its opposition. MCIAA asserted that the government, through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), owned the subject lots; that the CAA bought the lots from Julian Cuizon, Modesta Cuizon, and Paulino Cuizon under three Deeds of Absolute Sale dated September 5, 1957, April 4, 1958, and July 16, 1958; that the government had since been in continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse possession and had declared the lots for taxation under Tax Declaration Nos. 00357, 00371, and 00086; and that ownership was transferred to MCIAA pursuant to Republic Act No. 6985. Respondents replied that Julian, Modesta, and Paulino were not legal heirs of the Boocs and could not sell the lots; that MCIAA was a possessor in bad faith for grossly neglecting its duty to determine the actual owners before purchasing; and that because the lots were covered by Torrens certificates of title, the action was imprescriptible. MCIAA rejoined that respondents were not real parties-in-interest because they were not the registered owners and that the petition was prematurely filed because the issue of ownership had to be resolved in an ordinary court action, not before a cadastral court. On February 19, 2003, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's opposition, holding that respondents, as heirs of the Boocs, and MCIAA, as claimant, were both real parties-in-interest in a petition for reconstitution under RA 26, which only determines whether the re-issuance of a title is proper.

During trial, respondents presented Ismael Limalima, the son-in-law of the heirs of Eduardo Booc, as their sole witness; he identified the documentary evidence. On cross-examination, Ismael averred that sometime in 1976 respondents were surprised to find that another person had occupied Eduardo's land, that they then searched for the duplicate copy of the OCT but did not find it, and that, believing it was lost, they went to the municipal hall of Lapu-Lapu City afterwards. In a Report dated April 17, 2009 submitted to the RTC, the LRA stated that the petition sought reconstitution of OCT Nos. N.A., allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777 of the Cadastral Survey of Opon, on the basis of Decree Nos. 531394, 531382, and 531367; that from Book No. 8 of the Record Book of Cadastral Lots, Decree Nos. 531367, 531382, and 531394 were issued to Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777 on June 1, 1934, June 2, 1934, and May 31, 1934, respectively, all of Opon Cadastre, in Cadastral Case No. 20, GLRO Cad. Record No. 1004; that copies of the decrees on file at the Vault Section, Docket Division, LRA, showed they were issued in favor of Eduardo, Mercedes, Aurelio, Pedro, Florentino, and Feliciana, all surnamed Booc; and that the technical descriptions, when plotted in Municipal Index Sheet No. 7323, did not appear to overlap previously plotted or decreed properties in the area.

The RTC found that respondents sufficiently proved that the OCTs of the subject lots were issued in the name of the Boocs and that these were lost or destroyed during the war.

• No Proof of Torrens Registration: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in affirming the RTC because there is no proof that the subject lots were registered under the Torrens System; hence, there are no titles that may be validly reconstituted.
• OCT Numbers Not Identified: Petitioner argued that the numbers of the certificates of title were not indicated in the decrees and CFI-Cebu Decisions, and that these documents cannot sufficiently support a petition for reconstitution; respondents also failed to prove that the certificates existed and were in force when allegedly lost or destroyed.

• Existence of OCTs: Respondents insisted that OCTs were issued over the subject lots, as proved by the Register of Deeds' certification.
• Absence of Title Numbers Not Fatal: Respondents argued that the absence of the certificate of title numbers is not a ground to deny or infirm the petition because Section 13 of RA 26 merely states that the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title shall be stated in the notice "if known."

• Jurisdiction under RA 26: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution despite the alleged defects in the petition and notice under Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26.
• Entitlement to Reconstitution: Whether respondents are entitled to the reconstitution of the OCTs of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777.

• Jurisdiction under RA 26: No. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction because the petition and amended notice failed to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26.
• Entitlement to Reconstitution: No. Even assuming procedural compliance, respondents failed to prove that the OCTs existed and were in force when lost or destroyed; the CFI decisions and decrees showed only the award and direction to register, not the issuance of OCTs.

• Jurisdiction under RA 26: The SC held that RA 26 governs judicial reconstitution and that its requirements are mandatory. The RTC can acquire jurisdiction only if the mandatory requirements and procedures laid down in RA 26 are strictly complied with. There are two sets of procedures: Sections 10 and 9 for sources under Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a); and Sections 12 and 13 for sources under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f). The petition failed Section 12 because, although it stated that MEPZA possessed Lot No. 4749 and MIAA occupied Lot Nos. 4765 and 4777, it did not indicate their present addresses; it did not stipulate whether buildings or improvements not belonging to the Boocs were erected and their nature; and it did not state the encumbrances, namely the deeds of absolute sale executed in 1957 and 1958 in favor of MCIAA. The amended notice also failed Section 13 because it did not indicate the number of the lost or destroyed OCTs, stating only "Original Certificate of Title of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765 and 4777"; it omitted the names of MEPZA and MIAA as occupants and possessors, the area and boundaries of the lots, and the date on which persons with interest must appear and file claims or objections. These defects defeated the in rem purpose of the notice and publication requirements. Noncompliance rendered the RTC proceedings, and the CA proceedings, void for lack of jurisdiction. The SC could pass upon the jurisdictional defect even if the Republic did not raise it as an additional issue because jurisdiction affects the authority of the court. The SC cited Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, Castillo vs. Republic, and Republic vs. Castro.
• Entitlement to Reconstitution: The SC held that even if respondents complied with RA 26, the petition should have been denied because there was insufficient evidence that OCTs in the Boocs' names existed. Under Section 2 of RA 26, reconstitution is based on sources in a specified order. Respondents anchored their petition on Sections 2(d) and 2(f). In Republic vs. Tuastumban, the SC laid down the requirements for an order of reconstitution: (a) the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) the documents presented are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution; (c) the petitioner is the registered owner or had an interest; (d) the certificate was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) the description, area, and boundaries are substantially the same as those in the lost or destroyed certificate. The CFI decisions and Decree Nos. 531367, 531382, and 531394 at best proved that the lots were awarded to the Boocs and were to be registered in their names under the Land Registration Act; they did not prove that OCTs were actually issued. The Register of Deeds certification was not competent because it merely stated that the OCT of Lot Nos. 4749, 4765, and 4777 had been lost or destroyed during the last Global War without stating the title numbers or the names for which they were issued. The LRA Report merely corroborated the award and did not state whether certificates were issued. The failure to present competent evidence of the OCT numbers was a fatal defect. The absence of an affidavit of loss under Section 109 of PD 1529, despite knowledge of the loss as early as 1976, cast doubt on the existence of the certificates. Ismael's testimony was insufficient because he testified only on the authenticity and existence of the documentary evidence and the alleged 1976 loss; he did not say who among the Boocs possessed the certificates, did not attest that he saw the duplicate, and did not detail the search. Respondents also submitted no tax declarations, and payment of realty tax, while not proving ownership, is an exercise of ownership. Finally, respondents were guilty of laches for filing the petition 12 years after discovering the alleged loss. The SC reiterated that reconstitution requires clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued, citing Republic vs. Sanchez.

• Strict compliance with RA 26 jurisdictional requirements — Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 are mandatory and jurisdictional; noncompliance renders the proceedings void. The SC applied this because the petition omitted required allegations on occupants' addresses, improvements, and encumbrances, while the notice omitted the OCT number, occupants, area and boundaries, and hearing date.
• Reconstitution requires proof of existence and force of the lost or destroyed OCT — Reconstitution restores the certificate in its original form and condition, so there must be sufficient and competent proof that the title actually existed and was in force when lost or destroyed. The SC found the CFI decisions and decrees insufficient because they only showed award and direction to register, not issuance.
• Requirements for reconstitution under Republic vs. Tuastumban — The SC enumerated: (a) the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) the documents presented are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution; (c) the petitioner is the registered owner or had an interest; (d) the certificate was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) the description, area, and boundaries are substantially the same as those in the lost or destroyed certificate. Respondents failed to satisfy the proof of existence and force of the OCTs.
• Affidavit of loss under Section 109, PD 1529 — The owner must file a notice of loss under oath with the Register of Deeds upon discovery. The SC treated the absence of an affidavit of loss, despite knowledge of the loss since 1976, as casting doubt on the existence of the certificates.
• Laches — Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or declined to assert it. The SC applied it because respondents filed the reconstitution petition 12 years after discovering the alleged loss.
• Liberal construction not applicable to land registration; jurisdiction cannot be waived — The SC held that defects in RA 26 compliance are not mere technicalities; land registration cases require strict compliance, and lack of jurisdiction renders all proceedings void. The SC could raise jurisdiction even if not pleaded.

• "The trial court can only acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution if the mandatory requirements and procedures laid down in RA 26 have been strictly complied with." — The SC states the jurisdictional threshold for reconstitution petitions.
• "The requirements in Section 12, on the contents of a petition, and Section 13, on the publication of the notice of petition, are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature." — The SC characterizes the specific provisions violated by respondents.
• "Thus, before any reconstitution may be made, there should be sufficient and competent proof that the title sought to be reconstituted had actually existed." — The SC requires proof of the existence of the lost or destroyed title before reconstitution.
• "Reconstitution proceedings under RA 26 has for their purpose the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. Thus, reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner." — The SC stresses the strict evidentiary standard to prevent abuse of reconstitution proceedings.

• Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 Phil. 652 (1982) — Emphasized that the requirements and procedures under RA 26 are mandatory and must be followed before the court can acquire jurisdiction.
• Republic vs. Tuastumban, 604 Phil. 491 (2009) — Laid down the requirements for an order of reconstitution, which respondents failed to satisfy.
• Republic vs. Castro, 594 Phil. 127 (2008) — Cited for the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of Sections 12 and 13 and for the rule that failure to identify the title number defeats the notice requirement.
• Castillo vs. Republic, 667 Phil. 729 (2011) — Held that liberal construction does not apply to land registration and that lack of jurisdiction renders the proceedings void.
• Republic vs. Sanchez, 527 Phil. 571 (2006) — Stressed that reconstitution must be granted only upon clear proof that the title was issued, to prevent exploitation of reconstitution proceedings.
• Republic vs. Susi, 803 Phil. 348 (2017) — Cited for the two sets of procedures and requirements under RA 26 depending on the source of reconstitution.
• Ragua vs. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 7 (2000) — Cited for the definition of laches, which the SC applied to respondents' 12-year delay.
• Republic vs. Catarroja, 626 Phil. 389 (2010) — Cited for the principle that payment of realty tax is an exercise of ownership, although a tax declaration does not prove ownership.

• Sections 12 and 13, Republic Act No. 26 — Section 12 lists the mandatory contents of a petition for reconstitution; Section 13 governs notice, publication, posting, and service. The SC found both violated, so the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 26 — Enumerates the sources for reconstitution in order. Respondents relied on Sections 2(d) and 2(f), but the SC found the evidence insufficient to prove the existence of the OCTs.
• Section 109, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Requires the owner to send notice of loss of the owner's duplicate certificate under oath to the Register of Deeds. The SC noted the absence of an affidavit of loss despite knowledge of the loss since 1976.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — A petition for review on certiorari generally raises only questions of law; the SC applied the recognized exceptions, including when the CA's judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts or overlooked relevant facts.