Republic vs. Estate of Santos

An application for original registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 requires proof of alienable and disposable status through a CENRO or PENRO Certification and a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, and proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; under Section 14(2), acquisitive prescription of public domain land cannot begin to run absent an express government manifestation that the property has been converted to patrimonial status under Article 422 of the Civil Code.

The respondent estate of Virginia Santos, represented by its administrator Pacifico Santos, sought original registration of title over a 3,942-square-meter parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10839-C, a subdivision of Lot No. 10839 under the Taguig Cadastral Mapping, located at P. Burgos St., Sta. Ana, Taguig City. Virginia Santos was the sole child and heir of Alejandro Santos, who was alleged to have owned the subject land during his lifetime. The application was filed under Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, which governs original registration of title to land. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the ground that the land remained part of the public domain and that the possession and ownership requirements had not been satisfied.

On October 9, 2006, the Estate of Virginia Santos, through its administrator Pacifico Santos, filed an application for land registration over Lot No. 10839-C, a 3,942-square-meter parcel situated at P. Burgos St., Sta. Ana, Taguig City, with an assessed value of ₱82,400.00. The subject land was a subdivision of Lot No. 10839 described under Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000352 of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping. The application was supported by Letters of Administration appointing Pacifico as administrator of Virginia's estate, a subdivision plan annotated to show that the survey was within L.C. Map No. 2623 classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968, a technical description, a certification in lieu of a surveyor's certificate issued by the DENR, Tax Declaration No. FL-013-01057, and an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate by Sole Heir executed by Virginia on March 27, 1975, after the death of her father Alejandro Santos. The respondent estate alleged that Virginia, through her predecessor-in-interest Alejandro, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession of the property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its opposition on April 30, 2007, contending that neither the applicant nor Virginia's predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law, that the tax declarations did not constitute competent evidence of bona fide acquisition, that any claim based on a Spanish title was no longer available, and that the subject land formed part of the public domain. The Land Registration Authority submitted a report stating that the subject property did not overlap with any previously decreed properties but could not verify whether it was already covered by a land patent.

At trial, respondent estate presented Romualdo B. Flores, who testified that he had been tilling the land since 1970, that his father Sixto Cuevas Flores had tilled the land for Alejandro even before the Japanese occupation in 1941, and that he knew this because he was already nine years old at that time. Several tax declarations covering Lot No. 10839 were also offered, the earliest being T.D. No. 6532 issued on August 19, 1949. The MeTC initially denied the application on August 31, 2011, finding the evidence of possession and ownership insufficient and the proof of alienable and disposable character inadequate, but granted a motion for reconsideration on February 24, 2012, allowing the presentation of further evidence. Respondent estate then presented Felino Flores, who testified through a judicial affidavit that he had been tilling the land since 1979, that his father Romualdo tilled it from 1969, and that his grandfather Sixto had tilled it before the Second World War, based on family history.

On April 5, 2013, the MeTC reversed itself and granted the application, finding the tax declarations and the DENR certification on the survey plan sufficient to establish both ownership and the alienable and disposable character of the land. An Amended Order was issued the same day correcting the area in the dispositive portion. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal on May 22, 2015, affirming the MeTC's Amended Order. The CA relied on the ruling in Sta. Ana Victoria vs. Republic, noting that the cadastral survey was the same as in that case, and found that the respondent estate had proven open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, accepting the 1949 tax declaration as proof thereof. The Republic then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

• Over-reliance on Sta. Ana Victoria: The Republic argued that the CA gravely erred in taking judicial notice of the cadastral survey submitted in Sta. Ana Victoria to prove the alienable and disposable character of the subject land, when the CA had no constructive knowledge of the location of the subject land or the technical boundaries of L.C. Map No. 2623, and the identity of the land was still under dispute.
• Failure to prove possession since June 12, 1945: The Republic asserted that respondent estate failed to establish open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the earliest tax declaration being for 1949, short of the required period.
• Insufficiency of testimonial evidence: The Republic insisted that respondent estate's witnesses gave vague and unsubstantiated statements on the supposed ownership of Virginia and Alejandro, without showing specific acts of dominion over the property.

• Judicial notice of Sta. Ana Victoria: Respondent estate countered that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, including their factual findings, formed part of the legal system that all courts were bound to follow, and since the subject land emanated from the same cadastral survey declared alienable and disposable in Sta. Ana Victoria, the subject property must likewise be declared as such.
• Presumption of accuracy of certifications: Respondent estate advanced that the contents of the certification at the dorsal portion of the survey plan and the technical description of the property enjoyed the presumption of accuracy.
• Sufficiency of evidence of possession: Respondent estate averred that its witnesses testified on the identity of the property, the crops planted, and three generations of tenancy, supplemented by tax declarations showing possession by Virginia and her predecessor-in-interest for more than fifty years.

• Alienable and Disposable Character of the Land: Whether the respondent estate sufficiently proved that the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as required under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
• Judicial Notice of Sta. Ana Victoria: Whether the CA erred in taking judicial notice of the cadastral survey submitted in Sta. Ana Victoria to establish the alienable and disposable character of the subject land.
• Possession and Occupation since June 12, 1945: Whether the respondent estate proved open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
• Registration under Section 14(2): Whether the subject land could be registered under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

• Alienable and Disposable Character of the Land: No. The annotation on the subdivision plan and the certification from the DENR's Forest Management Services fell short of the required evidentiary standard, which demands a CENRO or PENRO Certification and a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
• Judicial Notice of Sta. Ana Victoria: No. The CA erred in taking judicial notice of the identity and location of the subject land based on Sta. Ana Victoria, as it had no constructive knowledge of the location of the subject land or the technical boundaries of L.C. Map No. 2623, and the identity of the land was still under dispute.
• Possession and Occupation since June 12, 1945: No. The earliest tax declaration dated only to 1949, and the witnesses' testimonies on cultivation were bereft of specificity and partly hearsay, failing to establish the exclusivity and notoriety required by law.
• Registration under Section 14(2): No. No evidence was presented showing an express government manifestation that the subject land had been converted to patrimonial status under Article 422 of the Civil Code, and without such conversion, the prescriptive period for acquisition could not begin to run.

• Alienable and Disposable Character of the Land: Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the first requisite is that the property sought to be registered forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The present rule requires that the application be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary. Respondent estate relied solely on the annotation on the subdivision plan of Lot No. 10839 and a certification from the FMS-DENR, both stating that the land was within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623. These pieces of evidence did not satisfy the required standard, as held in Republic vs. De Guzman Vda. de Joson and Republic vs. Sese.

• Judicial Notice of Sta. Ana Victoria: In Spouses Latip vs. Chua, the Court ruled that a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which it has no constructive knowledge. The CA, in concluding that the subject land was within L.C. Map No. 2623, assumed and took judicial notice of its location without any constructive knowledge of the technical boundaries of that map. Moreover, the identity and location of the subject land were still under dispute, the Republic having consistently raised the issue of doubtful identity even during trial. The CA's declaration of alienable and disposable status based merely on Sta. Ana Victoria was therefore erroneous.

• Possession and Occupation since June 12, 1945: The second and third requisites of Section 14(1) require open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest tax declaration submitted was T.D. No. 6532 issued in 1949, short of the required date. Romualdo's testimony that his father Sixto tilled the land before the Japanese occupation in 1942 was bereft of specificity as to the nature of cultivation and the volume of crops planted and harvested, rendering it mere casual cultivation insufficient to establish exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession, as held in Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Aranda vs. Republic of the Philippines. Felino's testimony was likewise insufficient, as he was born only in 1962 and could not have personal knowledge of possession on or before June 12, 1945; his statements about his grandfather's cultivation were based on family stories and were thus hearsay.

• Registration under Section 14(2): Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to persons who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under existing laws, which, as explained in Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, refers to the Civil Code. While Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that patrimonial property of the State is susceptible to prescription, a mere declaration of alienability and disposability is insufficient. There must be an express government manifestation that the property is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth under Article 422, converting it from public dominion to patrimonial property. No such evidence was presented. The classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable did not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, rendering it insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

• Evidentiary Requirements for Proving Alienable and Disposable Status — To prove that land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable, the application must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian of the official records. An annotation on a survey plan or a certification from the DENR's Forest Management Services does not satisfy this standard.

• Judicial Notice Limited to Facts Within Constructive Knowledge — A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge. Judicial notice of a cadastral survey in a different case cannot cure an applicant's failure to prove the identity and location of the subject land, especially when such matters are disputed.

• Specific Acts of Dominion Required for Land Registration — Applicants for land registration under Section 14(1) cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over the land of such nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. Unsubstantiated claims of cultivation, bereft of specifics as to the nature and volume of crops, constitute mere casual cultivation insufficient to establish exclusive and notorious possession.

• Conversion to Patrimonial Status as Requisite for Prescription of Public Domain Land — Under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, acquisitive prescription of public domain land requires not merely a declaration of alienability and disposability but an express government manifestation that the property is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period begin to run.

• "Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property." — This passage, quoted from Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., articulates the evidentiary standard for proving possession in land registration cases and was central to the Court's finding that the witnesses' testimonies were insufficient.

• "There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run." — This passage, drawn from Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, defines the controlling doctrine on when prescription of public domain land begins to run and was applied to deny registration under Section 14(2).

• "The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription." — This statement crystallizes the distinction between alienable-disposable public domain land and patrimonial property, explaining why the respondent's evidence was insufficient for prescription under Section 14(2).

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez, 726 Phil. 212 (2014) — Cited for the proposition that applicants for original registration must establish compliance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
• Naguit vs. Republic, 489 Phil. 405 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the first requisite of Section 14(1) requires that the property be alienable and disposable at the time of filing the application.
• Republic vs. De Guzman Vda. de Joson, G.R. No. 163767, March 10, 2014, 718 SCRA 228 — Controlling precedent establishing the current evidentiary requirement of a CENRO/PENRO Certification and a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary-approved original classification to prove alienable and disposable status.
• Republic vs. Sese, G.R. No. 185092, June 4, 2014, 724 SCRA 592 — Followed, holding that a certification from the FMS-DENR and annotations on survey plans fall short of the required evidentiary standard.
• Spouses Latip vs. Chua, 619 Phil. 155 (2009) — Cited for the doctrine that a court cannot take judicial notice of facts dependent on matters outside its constructive knowledge.
• Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 727 Phil. 608 (2014) — Controlling precedent on the requirement of specific acts of dominion to prove possession; the Court applied its reasoning to find the witnesses' testimonies on cultivation insufficient.
• Aranda vs. Republic of the Philippines, 671 Phil. 651 (2011) — Followed for the rule that mere casual cultivation does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of owner.
• Republic vs. Candy Maker, Inc., 525 Phil. 358 (2006) — Followed, emphasizing the importance of showing specific acts of dominion and the incredibility of claims of cultivation by very young children.
• Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, 605 Phil. 244 (2009) — Controlling precedent on Section 14(2), establishing that alienable and disposable status alone is insufficient for prescription; an express government manifestation of conversion to patrimonial status is required.
• Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria vs. Republic, 666 Phil. 519 (2011) — The case upon which the CA relied; the Supreme Court found the CA's reliance erroneous because the identity and location of the subject land relative to the cadastral survey in that case were disputed and not subject to judicial notice.

• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier may apply for registration of title. The Court found that respondent estate failed to satisfy all three requisites: alienable and disposable character, possession and occupation, and the June 12, 1945 cut-off date.
• Section 14(2), Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Provides that those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under existing laws may apply for registration. The Court held that this provision refers to the Civil Code's rules on prescription, which require conversion of public domain land to patrimonial status before the prescriptive period can begin to run.
• Article 1113, Civil Code — Provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. Applied to show that the subject land, remaining property of the public dominion, was insusceptible to prescription.
• Article 420(2), Civil Code — Defines property of the public dominion, including lands of the public domain. Applied to establish that classification as alienable and disposable does not change the land's status as property of the public dominion.
• Article 422, Civil Code — Provides that property of the public dominion, when no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Applied to require an express government manifestation of conversion before prescription can run.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concurred.