Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The government, through the National Centennial Commission (NCC), sought to construct the Tejeros Convention Center on a 3,497 sq. m. property in Cavite owned by respondent Fe Manuel, which the National Historical Institute had declared a historical landmark. Manuel's property was mortgaged to Metrobank and had been extrajudicially foreclosed. The NCC filed a complaint for expropriation against Manuel and Metrobank; Manuel interposed no objection subject to payment of just compensation.

• The Expropriation Project: The NCC initiated the Tejeros Convention Project on Fe Manuel's property, declared a historical landmark by the NHI. Manuel's mortgagor, Metrobank, extrajudicially foreclosed the property on November 20, 1997.
• The Complaint: The Republic, through the NCC, filed a complaint for expropriation against Manuel and Metrobank on December 4, 1997. Manuel did not object provided just compensation was paid.
• The Trial Court's Dismissal: The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action on May 27, 1998. The trial court found no prior presidential determination of the necessity of eminent domain and no written authority for the Solicitor General, as required by the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held the NCC lacked authority under Executive Order No. 128 to acquire property or recommend condemnation, and noted the NCC's impending dissolution raised valid concerns regarding the payment of just compensation.
• The Procedural Dispute: Petitioner received the RTC dismissal order on June 3, 1998, and filed a motion for reconsideration on June 17, 1998 (14 days later). The RTC denied the motion on October 6, 1998, received by petitioner on October 12, 1998. On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed a certiorari petition in the CA. The CA applied the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 effective September 1, 1998, which reckoned the 60-day period from notice of the assailed order, deducting the 14 days elapsed before the MR was filed. The CA concluded only 46 days remained from October 12, 1998, rendering the December 11, 1998 filing 14 days late.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Rules: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in applying the September 1, 1998 amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 retroactively, as doing so resulted in injustice. Petitioner invoked Section 6, Rule 1, urging liberal construction of the rules.
• Solar Team Doctrine: Petitioner maintained that the circumstances warranted the same liberality applied in Solar Team Entertainment vs. Ricafort, where strict compliance with a new procedural rule was deferred.
• Subsequent Amendment (A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC): Petitioner asserted that the September 1, 2000 amendment reverted the reckoning of the 60-day period to receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, which should govern the case.

• Timeliness of Petition: Respondent Metrobank argued the certiorari petition was correctly dismissed as out of time. Upon receipt of the denial of the MR on October 12, 1998, the amended Section 4, Rule 65 (effective Sept 1, 1998) was already in force, reckoning the period from the assailed order. Only 46 days remained, making the December 11 filing 14 days late. Respondent Fe Manuel adopted petitioner's arguments.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Whether the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: The petition was filed on time. While the CA correctly applied the prevailing rule at the time of filing, A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC subsequently reverted the reckoning period to receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Procedural laws do not create or remove vested rights and may be given retroactive effect to pending and undetermined actions. Applying A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC retroactively, the petition filed on December 11, 1998, was exactly on the 60th day from receipt of the denial of the MR on October 12, 1998.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Procedural or remedial laws do not create new or remove vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. They do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

• "The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."

• Solar Team Entertainment vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA [1998] — Cited by petitioner to argue for liberality in applying new procedural rules; distinguished/not followed as the Court relied instead on the retroactive application of the subsequent amendment A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.
• Systems Factors Corporation vs. NLRC, 346 SCRA 149 [2000] — Cited as controlling precedent for the retroactive application of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC and the principle that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to pending cases.
• Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil 208 [1953]; Gregorio vs. CA, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]; Tinio vs. Mina, 26 SCRA 512 [1968]; Billones vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 674 [1965] — Cited as foundational authority for the principle that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law.

• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended by Bar Matter No. 803, effective Sept 1, 1998) — Provided that the 60-day period for filing certiorari shall be reckoned from notice of the assailed judgment, order, or resolution, and if an MR is filed, the remaining period (not less than 5 days) shall be reckoned from notice of denial. Applied strictly by the CA to dismiss the petition.
• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, effective Sept 1, 2000) — Reverted to the original rule, providing that the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration or new trial. Applied retroactively by the Supreme Court to find the petition timely.
• Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Invoked by petitioner to urge liberal construction of the rules to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of actions.
• Section 12, Chapter 4, Book III, 1987 Administrative Code — Cited by the RTC as basis for dismissing the expropriation complaint for lack of presidential authority.
• Executive Order No. 128 — Cited by the RTC to support its finding that the NCC had no power to acquire real estate or recommend condemnation.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales