Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The right to appeal is not part of due process but a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised only in the manner and within the periods prescribed by law; failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is jurisdictional and renders the judgment final and executory, and certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

The Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Bureau of Treasury, sought reimbursement from Traders Royal Bank for amounts paid on four type "B" Treasury Warrants totaling ₱151,645,000.00, which had been deposited by the bank for collection and cleared by the Bureau of Treasury in January 1986. The Republic subsequently discovered that the payees' indorsements on the warrants had been forged and demanded reimbursement, which the bank refused. The dispute centers on whether the Republic, as drawer of the warrants, has a cause of action against the collecting bank for amounts paid on forged indorsements, a question that was never reached on the merits because of procedural defaults.

On two occasions in January 1986, the Office of the President issued four type "B" Treasury Warrants drawn against the Bureau of Treasury in the aggregate amount of ₱151,645,000.00. The warrants were payable to Leonila Sioson and Nancy Concepcion, in the amounts of ₱33,044,000.00, ₱17,800,250.00, ₱39,900,250.00, and ₱40,900,500.00, dated January 6 and January 11, 1986. The treasury warrants were deposited in Traders Royal Bank for collection.

On January 7, 1986, Traders Royal Bank presented the warrants to the Bureau of Treasury for clearing. The warrants were cleared and the bank credited the amounts to the designated payees' accounts. On April 3, 1986, the Republic discovered that the payees' indorsements on the warrants had been forged. It demanded reimbursement from Traders Royal Bank of the amounts paid on the warrants, but the bank refused to pay.

On October 13, 1987, the Republic, through the Bureau of Treasury, filed Civil Case No. 87-42752 for collection against Traders Royal Bank before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Manila. After the Republic rested its case, Traders Royal Bank filed a Demurrer to Evidence on January 12, 1994, contending that the Republic had not alleged that it had to replace the treasury warrants and pay the payees again, and that any cause of action properly pertained to the payees whose indorsements were forged, or against the forgers. The trial court initially denied the demurrer on September 30, 1994, but on motion for reconsideration by the bank, reversed itself and dismissed the Republic's complaint on January 30, 1995.

The Republic received the order of dismissal on February 7, 1995, giving it until February 22, 1995 to file a notice of appeal. On February 20, 1995, two days before the deadline, it filed a motion for reconsideration instead, which interrupted the running of the appeal period. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on May 23, 1995; the Republic received the denial on June 2, 1995, giving it until June 4, 1995 to file its notice of appeal. It filed the notice of appeal on June 16, 1995, twelve days beyond the reglementary period. The dismissal thereby became final, though this was not immediately noticed, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals. When Traders Royal Bank's turn came to file its brief as appellee, it moved to dismiss the Republic's appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The Republic's motion for reconsideration was denied, and it received the denial on June 5, 1997, giving it until June 20, 1997 to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, the Republic filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on August 4, 1997, forty-five days after the reglementary period had lapsed.

• Relaxation of Reglementary Period: Petitioner urged a relaxation of the rules on the period for filing appeals, invoking the judicial policy of allowing late appeals when the interest of justice so requires, as articulated in Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr.
• Substantial Justice over Technicality: Petitioner contended that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice, and that every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of its cause.
• Meritorious Claim: Petitioner argued that it has a meritorious claim against private respondent and stands to lose ₱151,645,000.00 if it cannot appeal from the trial court's order dismissing its complaint.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing its appeal from the RTC order dismissing its complaint.

• Late Filing of Appeal: Respondent Traders Royal Bank moved to dismiss petitioner's appeal before the Court of Appeals on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time, twelve days beyond the reglementary period.
• No Cause of Action Against Bank: In its Demurrer to Evidence, respondent contended that the Republic had not alleged that it had to replace the treasury warrants and pay the payees again, and that any cause of action properly pertained to the payees whose indorsements were forged, or against the forgers.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Certiorari: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy when the petitioner failed to file a timely petition for review under Rule 45.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is jurisdictional and mandatory, and whether the delay in filing the notice of appeal may be excused.
• Relaxation of Rules: Whether exceptional circumstances exist justifying a relaxation of the rules on the period for perfecting appeals.
• Appealability of the Order Denying Reconsideration: Whether the notice of appeal, which referred only to the order denying the motion for reconsideration and not the order of dismissal, was fatally defective.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Certiorari: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal; the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 45, which petitioner failed to file within the reglementary period.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Yes, the requirement is jurisdictional. Failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period renders the trial court's decision final and executory, as the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, not part of due process.
• Relaxation of Rules: No. No exceptional circumstances were shown to justify deviation from the rule on timely filing; petitioner offered no explanation at all for the twelve-day delay in filing its notice of appeal.
• Appealability of the Order Denying Reconsideration: No. An order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory and not appealable; the notice of appeal referred only to that order and not to the order of dismissal, making the appeal fatally defective.

• Propriety of Rule 65 Certiorari: The special civil action of certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner's remedy was to appeal from the Court of Appeals' resolutions via a Rule 45 petition for review. Having failed to do so within the fifteen-day reglementary period that expired on June 20, 1997, it resorted to Rule 65 certiorari forty-five days late. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The question raised—whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion—could have been raised on appeal under Rule 45.

• Timeliness of Appeal: The perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. This rule is founded on the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal twelve days beyond the reglementary period, rendering the RTC's dismissal final. The failure to file a timely notice of appeal is akin to the failure to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period—in both cases, the appeal is not perfected in due time.

• Relaxation of Rules: While the Court has, in highly exceptional instances, allowed relaxation of the rules on reglementary periods for appeal, such relaxation requires exceptional circumstances. In Ramos vs. Bagasao, a four-day delay was excused because counsel of record had died. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a six-day delay was allowed to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice involving hundreds of hectares of land. In Olacao vs. NLRC, a tardy appeal was accepted because the subject matter had already been judicially settled with finality in another case. The present case does not approximate any of these extraordinary circumstances. Petitioner offered no explanation at all for the twelve-day delay. The OSG's oft-repeated excuse of being saddled with a huge caseload has lost its flavor; government service entails hard work and pressure to meet deadlines, and this is not a ground for liberal interpretation of the rules. Anyone seeking exemption has the burden of proving exceptionally meritorious circumstances, which petitioner failed to discharge.

• Appealability of the Order Denying Reconsideration: Petitioner does not dispute that its notice of appeal referred only to the order denying its motion for reconsideration and not the order of dismissal. Rule 37, §9 and Rule 41, §1(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable; the remedy is an appeal from the judgment or final order. Although these provisions took effect on July 1, 1997, after the appeal in question was taken in February 1995, they merely codified existing jurisprudence holding that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory and therefore not appealable. The rules are not new. This failure, combined with the late filing, rendered the trial court's dismissal final and executory.

• Right to Appeal as Statutory Privilege — The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to perfect an appeal renders the trial court's decision final and executory.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal — The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Exceptional Circumstances for Relaxation of Appeal Periods — In highly exceptional instances, the Court may relax the rules on reglementary periods for appeal, but only when exceptional circumstances are shown, such as: (a) death of counsel of record before the deadline, preventing timely filing (Ramos vs. Bagasao); (b) threat of gross miscarriage of justice involving significant public interest (Republic vs. Court of Appeals); or (c) the subject matter having already been judicially settled with finality in another case (Olacao vs. NLRC). The party seeking exemption bears the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious circumstances exist.

• Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Is Interlocutory — An order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable; the proper remedy is an appeal from the judgment or final order. A notice of appeal that refers only to the order denying reconsideration, and not to the order of dismissal itself, is fatally defective.

• Late Filing of Notice of Appeal Equated to Non-Payment of Appeal Fee — The failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period is akin to the failure to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. In both cases, the appeal is not perfected in due time, and the decision appealed from becomes final and executory.

• "The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has lost." — This passage states the fundamental rule that certiorari under Rule 65 is not a remedy available to a party who has failed to perfect an appeal, establishing the mutual exclusivity of the two remedies.

• "Time and again, we have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory." — This is the canonical formulation of the jurisdictional nature of the period for perfecting appeals, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." — This articulates the doctrinal basis for the strict application of reglementary periods for appeal, grounding the jurisdictional requirement in the statutory nature of the right.

• "Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with." — This emphasizes the absolute character of the timeliness requirement, quoted from Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., underscoring that no court may disregard or relax the rule absent truly exceptional circumstances.

• Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423 (1997) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the proposition that certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal and that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive.

• Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 (1994) — Followed and distinguished. Petitioner relied on this case for the policy of relaxing appeal periods in meritorious instances, but the Court found that the case itself requires exceptional circumstances for such relaxation, which were absent here.

• Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395 — Cited as an example of an exceptional circumstance justifying relaxation: a four-day delay excused because counsel of record had died before the deadline.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 — Cited as an example of an exceptional circumstance: a six-day delay allowed to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice involving hundreds of hectares of land titled in the Republic's name.

• Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 577 SCRA 38 — Cited as an example of an exceptional circumstance: a tardy appeal accepted because the subject matter had already been judicially settled with finality in another case.

• Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50 (1996) — Followed. The Court applied this case's rejection of the OSG's excuse of heavy caseload for delayed filings, holding that such excuse is not a ground for liberal interpretation of the rules.

• Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373 (1996) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the principle that the requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, drawing an analogy to the late filing of a notice of appeal.

• Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 597 (1997) — Cited for the proposition that the Court has discretion to treat a Rule 65 petition as filed under Rule 45 if filed within the reglementary period, which was not the case here.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action of certiorari. The Court held that certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Court held that this was the proper remedy for appealing the Court of Appeals' resolutions, which petitioner failed to file within the fifteen-day reglementary period.

• Rule 37, §9, Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable; the remedy is an appeal from the judgment or final order. Applied to hold that petitioner's notice of appeal, which referred only to the order denying its motion for reconsideration, was fatally defective.

• Rule 41, §1(a), Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Applied together with Rule 37, §9, to reinforce that the order denying reconsideration is interlocutory and not appealable.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.