Republic vs. Court of Appeals

An adopted child may petition the court for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court notwithstanding Article 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to bear the surname of the adopter; the statutory mandate fixing the surname is not an exception to or a bar against the remedy of judicial change of name, and a sincere desire to erase signs of former alienage that hamper one's social and business life, without prejudice to the State or any person, constitutes a proper and reasonable cause for granting such petition.

Private respondent Maximo Wong was born Maximo Alcala, Jr., the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. At the age of two and a half, he and his sister Margaret were adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos, pursuant to a court order in Special Case No. 593 issued on September 9, 1967 by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The adoptive parents, childless after fifteen years of marriage, reared the children as their own. Hoong Wong has since died; Concepcion Ty Wong, a high school teacher, survived him and consented to the petition for change of name. Private respondent is a Muslim Filipino residing in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community in Cotabato City, where he operates a furniture business. The substantive law governing surnames at the time included Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code, particularly Article 365 mandating that an adopted child bear the surname of the adopter, and Article 376 requiring judicial authority for any change of name, as procedurally implemented by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, superseded relevant provisions of the Civil Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code on adoption, providing in Article 189 that the adopted shall have the right to use the surname of the adopters.

Private respondent Maximo Wong was born Maximo Alcala, Jr., the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was two and a half years old, he and his nine-year-old sister Margaret Alcala were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato in Special Case No. 593 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong was an insurance agent and Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher; they had remained childless after fifteen years of marriage and decided to adopt the children, showering them with parental love and rearing them as their own.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, private respondent — by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City — filed a petition to change his name back to Maximo Alcala, Jr. He averred that his use of the surname "Wong" embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as it suggested Chinese ancestry when in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community in Cotabato City. He stated that he wanted to erase any implication of alien nationality, that he was being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname which hampered his business and social life, and that his adoptive mother did not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

At the hearing, private respondent testified that after adoption he used the surname "Wong" in school, but observed that it embarrassed him among his friends; when with Chinese friends he could not speak Chinese, and in the Muslim community where he lived no one believed he was Muslim. He had a small furniture business but few customers because they did not believe he was Muslim. His adoptive mother, Concepcion Ty Wong, corroborated his testimony, stating that when he used the surname "Wong," some of his relatives, cousins, and friends seemed to shy away from him and despise him in school, which was why she agreed to the change of name. She executed an affidavit of consent on May 27, 1985, in which she declared that she voluntarily and freely gave consent to the change of surname without affecting the legal adoption granted on September 9, 1967, which made him one of her legal and compulsory heirs.

The Republic, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition before both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, contending that the allegations of ridicule were unsubstantiated, that reverting to the old name constituted ingratitude to the adoptive parents, and that the change would violate Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code. The trial court granted the petition on July 2, 1986, finding the jurisdictional requirements fully complied with, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in full. The Republic then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

• Unsubstantiated Allegations: The Solicitor General contended that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and could not justify the petition for change of name.
• Ingratitude to Adoptive Parents: Petitioner argued that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father was crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his surviving adoptive mother, despite her consent.
• Violation of Civil Code Provisions: Petitioner posited that the reversion to the old name violated Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which require an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, giving the impression that he had severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.
• Bad Precedent: Petitioner maintained that sustaining the change of name would run counter to the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic that one should not be allowed to use a surname which he is not permitted to employ under the law, and would set a bad example to other persons who might seek a change of surname on lame excuses.

• Compliance with Law: Private respondent argued that he did as the law required — upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter — but being already emancipated, he could now decide what was best for himself.
• Ridicule and Embarrassment: Private respondent contended that the Chinese name he carried caused him undue ridicule and embarrassment and affected his business and social life, which he realized only upon reaching adulthood.
• Adoptive Mother's Consent: Private respondent averred that his adoptive mother, being aware of his predicament, gave her consent to the petition, albeit making clear that the same would in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn statement.
• No Prejudice to State or Adoptive Mother: Private respondent argued that if his adoptive mother did not take offense or feel resentment about his desire to change his name, there could be no possible prejudice to her, much less to the State.
• Rule 103 Available to All Persons: Private respondent maintained that Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has as its primordial purpose to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest, and that the trial court's factual findings and appreciation of testimonies should not be disturbed.

• Sufficiency of Grounds: Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name — embarrassment, ridicule, and prejudice to social and business life due to carrying a Chinese surname in a Muslim community — are valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.
• Applicability of Rule 103 to Adopted Children: Whether Article 365 of the Civil Code, mandating that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, bars an adopted child from availing of the remedy of judicial change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

• Sufficiency of Grounds: Yes. The reasons adduced — embarrassment, ridicule, and prejudice to social and business life — constitute a proper and reasonable cause for change of name, falling within established jurisprudential exceptions, particularly where a surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the change was for a fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public interest.
• Applicability of Rule 103 to Adopted Children: No, Article 365 does not bar resort to Rule 103. The statutory mandate fixing the surname of an adopted child is not an exception to the remedy of judicial change of name; Rule 103 uses the generic term "persons" and is available to all natural persons regardless of status, including adopted children.

• Sufficiency of Grounds: The Court found that private respondent's testimony before the lower court bore out the existence of a valid cause for the change of name. He testified that the surname "Wong" embarrassed him among friends and relatives, that he could not speak Chinese when with Chinese friends, that he lived in a Muslim community where no one believed he was Muslim, and that his furniture business suffered because customers did not believe he was Muslim. This testimony was materially corroborated by his adoptive mother, who observed that relatives and friends shied away from him when he used the surname "Wong." The Court upheld the appellate court's observation that the purpose of the law in allowing change of name is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest, and that in the absence of prejudice to the State or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage which hamper social and business life is a proper and reasonable cause. The evidence need only be satisfactory to the court, not the best evidence available. The Court enumerated recognized valid grounds for change of name, including when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing of fraudulent purpose or prejudice to public interest. The Court also noted that the trial court was in a better position to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses, and could take judicial notice of existing factors in the community where private respondent lived.

• Applicability of Rule 103 to Adopted Children: The Court rejected the Solicitor General's position that sustaining the change of name would violate Article 365 of the Civil Code. The Court reasoned that the law prescribes the surname a person may employ but does not unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname; it only subjects such recourse to the obtention of requisite judicial sanction. "What the law does not prohibit, it permits." If the Solicitor General's argument were followed to its conclusion, no person could ever change his name, rendering Rule 103 inutile. A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions on the use of surnames, and Section 1 of Rule 103 uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. The Court found no legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such remedy by an adopted child. The Court further held that the change of surname is more an incident than the object of adoption proceedings; the purpose of adoption is to effect a new status of relationship between child and adoptive parents, not to permanently fix the surname. The Court also noted that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom — it does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship; what is altered is only the name. The consent of the adoptive mother, who explicitly stated the change would not affect the legal adoption and her son's status as her compulsory heir, dispelled any concern of ingratitude or prejudice to successional rights. The Court rejected the suggestion that private respondent should have his adoption revoked if he wanted to use his natural father's surname, calling it exacting "too clear a toll for making use of an appropriate and valid remedy available under the law."

• Change of Name as a Privilege, Not a Right — A change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in light of the reasons adduced and the consequences likely to follow. It is a privilege granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that private respondent's circumstances — embarrassment, ridicule, and business disadvantage — constituted a proper and reasonable cause.

• Recognized Grounds for Change of Name — The Court enumerated valid grounds: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing of fraudulent purpose or prejudice to public interest. Private respondent's case fell under grounds (e) and (f).

• Change of Surname as Incident, Not Object, of Adoption — The act of adoption fixes a status — that of parent and child. The change of name which frequently accompanies adoption is more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in adoption. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the argument that reverting to the natural surname severs the adoptive relationship.

• Change of Name Does Not Alter Family Relations — A change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship; what is altered is only the name. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that private respondent's successional rights and legal status as an adopted child remained unaffected by the change of surname.

• Rule 103 as Exception to Mandatory Surname Provisions — A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under the law only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. Section 1 of Rule 103 uses the generic term "persons," signifying all natural persons regardless of status. Article 365 is not an exception to, much less a bar against, Rule 103. The Court applied this to hold that adopted children are not discriminated against in availing of the remedy.

• "What the law does not prohibit, it permits." — This passage encapsulates the Court's reasoning that Article 365 of the Civil Code, while mandating the use of the adopter's surname, does not prohibit an adopted child from seeking a judicial change of name; the absence of an express prohibition permits the recourse.

• "While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for allowing an adopted child to revert to a former surname: the surname is incidental to adoption, whose true object is the creation of a parent-child status.

• "A change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name." — This passage defines the limited legal effect of a change of name, frequently cited to distinguish nominal changes from substantive alterations in civil status.

• "If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there will never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment of the law." — This passage rebuts the restrictive interpretation that would render Rule 103 meaningless, affirming the coexistence of mandatory surname provisions with the judicial remedy for change of name.

• Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721 (1967) — Cited for the proposition that the purpose of the law allowing change of name is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest, and that justice dictates allowing a person to improve his social standing absent prejudice to the State or others.
• Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965 — Cited as authority that a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, in good faith and without prejudice to anybody, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name.
• Manuel vs. Republic, 1 SCRA 836 (1961) — Cited by the Solicitor General for the proposition that one should not be allowed to use a surname which he is not permitted to employ under the law; the Court found this argument unfounded in the context of Rule 103.
• Oshita vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 700 (1967) — Cited for the valid ground that when a surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing of fraudulent purpose or prejudice to public interest, change of name is warranted.
• Ang Chay vs. Republic, 34 SCRA 224 (1970) — Cited for the ground that having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien parentage, justifies a change of name.
• Tan vs. Republic, 4 SCRA 1128 (1962) — Cited for the requirement that strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in change of name proceedings as they are proceedings in rem.
• Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82 — Cited by private respondent for the principle that the trial court's factual findings and appreciation of testimonies should not be disturbed absent strong and cogent reasons, as the trial court is in a better position to observe witness demeanor.

• Article 365, Civil Code — Mandates that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. The Court held that this provision is not a bar to an adopted child's petition for change of name under Rule 103, as it fixes the surname only inceptively and is subject to judicial modification.
• Article 376, Civil Code — Provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. The Court noted that the application for change of name involves a special proceeding governed by Rule 103, with the declared objective of preventing fraud and maintaining a record of the change.
• Article 341, Civil Code — Enumerates the effects of adoption, including the entitlement of the adopted person to use the adopter's surname. The Court treated this entitlement as both an obligation and a right, but not an absolute prohibition on seeking a change.
• Article 189, Family Code — Provides that adoption shall have the effect of making the adopted deemed the legitimate child of the adopters, acquiring reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the parent-child relationship, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters. The Court noted this provision superseded the pertinent Civil Code and Child and Youth Welfare Code provisions on adoption.
• Rule 103, Rules of Court — Governs the special proceeding for change of name. The Court held that Section 1's use of the generic term "persons" signifies availability to all natural persons regardless of status, including adopted children, and that Article 365 is not an exception to or bar against Rule 103.
• Article 412, Civil Code; Rule 108, Rules of Court — Discussed by way of distinction: these refer only to correction of clerical errors in the civil register, not to substantial changes of name, which must be effected through Rule 103.
• Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), Article 39(3) — Maintained the same entitlement of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, consistent with the Civil Code and later the Family Code.

Narvasa, C.J., Paras, Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concurred.