Republic vs. Caraig

An applicant for original registration of title may prove that the land is alienable and disposable through substantial compliance with the legal requirements, such as CENRO certifications, when the trial court rendered its decision prior to the promulgation of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. on June 26, 2008, and there is no effective opposition from the government. The applicant must also prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, which may be established through credible witness testimonies of specific acts of ownership.

Manuel M. Caraig filed an Application for Original Registration of Title over Lot No. 5525-B, a 40,000-square meter portion of Lot 5525 located in Brgy. San Luis, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The application was filed under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, which allows registration by those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, opposed the application on the grounds that the land is inalienable public domain and that Caraig and his predecessors-in-interest were not in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945.

On September 2, 2002, Manuel M. Caraig, through his attorney-in-fact Nelson N. Guevarra, filed an Application for Original Registration of Title over Lot No. 5525-B, a 40,000-square meter portion of Lot 5525 located at Brgy. San Luis, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Manuel alleged that he bought the property from Reynaldo S. Navarro as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 25, 1989, and that Reynaldo and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, and exclusive possession of the land prior to June 12, 1945 under a bona fide claim of ownership. He attached to his application a Tax Declaration in his name, the Deed of Absolute Sale, a Subdivision Plan approved on July 3, 2002, the Technical Description of the lot, and a Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's Certificate.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Opposition, seeking denial of the application on the grounds that the land is inalienable public domain, that Manuel and his predecessors-in-interest were not in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945, and that the evidence was insufficient. Only the OSG opposed the application, and an Order of General Default was issued against the whole world except the OSG.

During trial, Manuel presented six witnesses. Nelson testified that Lot No. 5525 was previously owned by Evaristo Navarro, as shown by a March 10, 2003 Certification from the Municipal Assessor indicating Evaristo was the first declared owner under Tax Declaration Nos. 20386/20387 issued in 1955. On November 11, 1958, Evaristo and his wife donated the land to their son Reynaldo. Nelson also presented a February 11, 2003 CENRO Certification stating the lot is not covered by any public land application or patent, and a March 21, 2003 Certification declaring the lot within the alienable and disposable zone under "Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925," except for a three-meter strip along the creek for bank protection.

Fermin Angeles, a long-time resident and neighbor, testified that he used to accompany his mother to bring food to his father who tilled land adjacent to Evaristo's, and would see Evaristo supervising farm workers in planting coffee and banana, harvesting, and selling crops. Arcadio Arcillas testified that as early as 1942, when he was 12 years old, residents knew Evaristo was the owner, and he would see Evaristo giving instructions to workers tilling the land. After Manuel acquired the property, he constructed a house and a corner stone, and planted black pepper, lanzones, and coffee. Epifanio Guevarra, Miguel Jaurigue Libot, and Francisco Malleon corroborated the other witnesses' testimonies that Evaristo owned the land, it was inherited by Reynaldo, and a portion was sold to Manuel.

The MTC granted the application, and the OSG appealed to the CA, arguing there was no competent proof of 30 years of possession, that the witness testimonies were hearsay, and that Nelson was incompetent to identify the contents of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of Donation. The CA affirmed, and the OSG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

• Hearsay Evidence: The OSG argued that the MTC erred in giving probative value to hearsay evidence, specifically the testimonies of the witnesses which were allegedly purely hearsay.
• Insufficient Possession: The OSG argued that no competent evidence exists to show that respondent was in possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years to allow registration under his name.
• Insufficient Certification: The OSG argued that the certification that the subject property is alienable and disposable is insufficient absent an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
• Witness Incompetence: The OSG insisted that Nelson was incompetent to identify the contents of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Deed of Donation.

N/A — The decision does not recount Manuel Caraig's specific arguments in response to the OSG's petition, aside from the factual findings of the lower courts which are summarized in the Facts and History sections.

• Alienable and Disposable Land: Whether the CENRO Certificates are sufficient proofs that Lot No. 5525-B is alienable and disposable.
• Possession Since June 12, 1945: Whether Manuel sufficiently proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in continuous, peaceful, notorious, and exclusive possession in the concept of an owner of the subject land.

• Alienable and Disposable Land: Yes. The CENRO Certificates dated February 11, 2003 and March 21, 2003 sufficiently showed that the government executed a positive act of declaration that Lot No. 5525-B is alienable and disposable land of public domain as of December 31, 1925, and the strict requirements of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. are inapplicable because the MTC decided the case before that ruling was promulgated.
• Possession Since June 12, 1945: Yes. Manuel sufficiently proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as established by credible witness testimonies of specific acts of ownership.

• Alienable and Disposable Land: The Court acknowledged the general rule from Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that an applicant must present both a CENRO or PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary. However, the Court applied the exception recognized in Republic vs. Vega, which allows substantial compliance pro hac vice when the trial court rendered its decision prior to June 26, 2008, the date T.A.N. Properties was promulgated. Manuel filed his application on September 2, 2002, and the MTC granted it on February 28, 2007, fifteen months before T.A.N. Properties. The CENRO Certificates, together with the documentary evidence, substantially complied with the legal requirement. The Court also noted that neither the Land Registration Authority nor the DENR opposed the application on the ground of inalienability, and the OSG failed to controvert the government's positive act of declaration, so the certificates enjoy the presumption of regularity.

• Possession Since June 12, 1945: The Court applied the definition of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession from Republic vs. Estate of Santos: possession is open when patent, visible, apparent, and not clandestine; continuous when uninterrupted and unbroken; exclusive when the possessor shows exclusive dominion; and notorious when generally known by the public or people in the neighborhood. The Court found that the witnesses unswervingly declared that Evaristo occupied and possessed Lot No. 5525 in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945. Arcadio, who frequented the land since childhood, categorically testified that Evaristo possessed and owned the land as early as 1942, performing specific acts of ownership such as planting banana and coffee and hiring workers. Fermin's testimony corroborated this, and the possession of Evaristo and Reynaldo was tacked to Manuel's possession by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The Court also held that the fact that the earliest tax declaration on record is 1955 does not negate possession since 1945, as tax declarations are good indicia of possession but belated declaration does not negate the fact of possession, especially where no other persons claim any interest in the land.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands which do not appear to be within private ownership are public domain and hence presumed to belong to the State. A person applying for registration has the burden of proof that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable, and must present incontrovertible evidence that the land has been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State.

• Substantial Compliance (pro hac vice) in Land Registration — As an exception to the strict requirements of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., courts may approve an application for original registration on the ground of substantial compliance showing a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception applies only to applications for registration pending before the trial court prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008, and is inapplicable to all future applications.

• Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Possession — Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The law speaks of possession and occupation separately, and occupation serves to highlight that possession must not be a mere fiction but actual manifestation of acts of dominion.

• Tacking of Possession — The possession and occupation as bona fide owner of predecessors-in-interest can be tacked to the possession of the applicant who acquired the land by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, but only as regards the portion sold and subject of the application for registration.

• Tax Declarations as Indicia of Possession — Tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, but it does not follow that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially where no other persons claim any interest in the land.

• "The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records." — This passage from Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. states the strict general rule for proving that land is alienable and disposable, which the Court distinguished in the instant case.

• "It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings." — This passage from Republic vs. Vega defines the scope of the substantial compliance exception, which the Court applied to Manuel's application because the MTC decided the case before T.A.N. Properties was promulgated.

• "The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property." — This passage from Republic vs. Alconaba defines the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, which the Court applied in finding that Manuel's witnesses established specific acts of ownership.

• Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008) — Controlling precedent establishing the strict requirement that an applicant must present both a CENRO or PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary. The Court distinguished this case because the MTC decided Manuel's application before this ruling was promulgated.

• Republic vs. Vega, 654 Phil. 511 (2011) — Followed as the basis for the substantial compliance exception pro hac vice, allowing approval of applications where the trial court rendered its decision prior to June 26, 2008, and there is a positive act of government and absence of effective opposition.

• Republic vs. Serrano, 627 Phil. 350 (2010) — Followed for the proposition that a DENR Regional Technical Director's certification annotated on the subdivision plan substantially complies with the legal requirement that the land be proved alienable and disposable.

• Republic vs. Estate of Santos, 802 Phil. 801 (2016) — Followed for the definition of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and for the enumeration of the three requirements under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

• Republic vs. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607 (2004) — Followed for the distinction between possession and occupation and the requirement of actual possession as manifestation of acts of dominion.

• Leoncio vs. De Vera, 569 Phil. 512 (2008) — Followed for the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in determining the propriety of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002) — Followed for the proposition that to prove land is alienable, an applicant must establish a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports, or legislative act.

• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, may apply for registration of title. The Court found that Manuel met all three requirements under this provision.

• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by P.D. No. 1073 — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all conditions essential to a government grant. The Court cited this provision in conjunction with Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

• Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Philippine Constitution — Embodies the Regalian Doctrine, providing that all lands which do not appear to be within private ownership are public domain and hence presumed to belong to the State. The Court cited this as the constitutional basis for the applicant's burden of proof.

• Article 422, Civil Code — Cited by the OSG in its argument that the certification of alienability is insufficient absent an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. The Court did not directly address this argument in its ruling.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Prescribes that only questions of law should be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. The Court noted that the OSG raised mixed questions of fact and law, which are not proper subjects of an appeal by certiorari, but still resolved the petition on the merits.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concurred. Baltazar-Padilla, J., was on leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.