Republic vs. Cantor

A declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code requires the present spouse to prove a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is dead, which belief must be the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to ascertain the absent spouse's whereabouts and whether he or she is still alive or already dead. Mere absence for the statutory period, lack of communication, and uncorroborated inquiries from relatives and friends are insufficient to satisfy this stringent standard.

Respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor and Jerry F. Cantor were married on September 20, 1997, and lived together in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Article 41 of the Family Code permits a spouse to contract a subsequent marriage when the prior spouse has been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is dead, provided a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death is instituted. Article 247 of the same Code provides that the judgment of the court in such summary proceedings shall be immediately final and executory, which affects the remedies available to an aggrieved party.

Respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor and Jerry F. Cantor were married on September 20, 1997, and lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by the respondent's inability to reach "sexual climax" during intimate moments and Jerry's expression of animosity toward the respondent's father. After the quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling, and this was the last time the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated with, nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, more than four years after Jerry's disappearance, the respondent filed a petition before the RTC for her husband's declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead, alleging that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, neighbors, and friends, but to no avail. She also allegedly made it a point to check the patients' directory whenever she went to a hospital, hoping to find Jerry. All these efforts, she claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

The RTC granted the respondent's petition and declared Jerry presumptively dead, concluding that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead since more than four years had passed without her receiving any news about him. The CA affirmed the RTC's order, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, then brought the matter to the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 petition, contending that certiorari lies to challenge the trial court's judgment in summary proceedings for declaration of presumptive death and that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The petitioner contended that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments, or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, notwithstanding that such judgments are immediately final and executory and hence not appealable under Article 247 of the Family Code.
• Lack of Well-Founded Belief: The petitioner posited that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husband's presumptive death, claiming that she failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband and failed to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondent's specific arguments before the Supreme Court.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments, or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
• Existence of Well-Founded Belief: Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Yes. Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in summary proceedings for declaration of presumptive death, since the judgment is immediately final and executory and hence unappealable under Article 247 of the Family Code.
• Existence of Well-Founded Belief: No. The respondent failed to prove that she had a well-founded belief that her husband was dead, as her efforts to locate him were merely passive and uncorroborated, falling short of the stringent standard required by Article 41 of the Family Code and prevailing jurisprudence.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code explicitly provides that the court's judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse, shall be immediately final and executory. With the judgment being final, it is no longer subject to appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable. However, an aggrieved party is not entirely left without a remedy. While no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As held in Republic vs. Tango, even if the judgment is immediately final and executory, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. Thus, the petitioner's resort to certiorari under Rule 65 to question the RTC's order was proper.

• Existence of Well-Founded Belief: Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. The four essential requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are: (1) the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites are present, since he or she substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, requiring a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead. Mere absence of the spouse, lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The present spouse must prove that his or her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse, requiring exertion of active effort, not a mere passive one. In the present case, the respondent's efforts — inquiring from in-laws, neighbors, and friends, and checking hospital patients' directories during unintentional hospital visits — fell short of the stringent standard. She did not actively look for her missing husband, did not report his absence to the police or seek the aid of authorities, did not present as witnesses the relatives, neighbors, or friends from whom she allegedly made inquiries, and there was no corroborative evidence to support her claim of a diligent search. The Court found that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" relying on uncorroborated inquiries, insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. The strict standard approach is consistent with the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage, and the requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death is also for the present spouse's benefit, protecting him or her from criminal prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Well-Founded Belief Under Article 41 of the Family Code — The present spouse must prove that his or her belief that the absent spouse is dead was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse, and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he or she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort, not a mere passive one. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the respondent's uncorroborated inquiries from relatives and friends and unintentional hospital visits were insufficient to establish a well-founded belief.
• Finality of Judgment in Summary Proceedings Under the Family Code — Under Article 247 of the Family Code, the judgment of the court in summary proceedings, including declarations of presumptive death, shall be immediately final and executory, and hence unappealable. However, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the petitioner's resort to certiorari was proper.
• Strict Standard Approach in Declaration of Presumptive Death — The Court has consistently applied a "strict standard" approach in petitions for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code to ensure that such petitions are not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws on marriage. This is consistent with the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage as a basic social institution. The Court applied this doctrine in reversing the declaration of presumptive death.

• "Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as 'well founded belief' that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted." — This passage from Republic v. Nolasco, quoted by the Court, articulates the crucial difference between the stricter standard under Article 41 of the Family Code and the old provision of the Civil Code, and is central to the Court's reasoning.
• "The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse." — This passage from Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.) provides the criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code, which the Court applied in finding the respondent's efforts insufficient.
• "In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one's spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well." — This passage from Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.) emphasizes the need for strict compliance with the degree of due diligence required in locating a missing spouse, and the Court cited it to justify the strict standard approach.

• Republic of the Phils. vs. Bermudez-Lorino, 489 Phil. 761 (2005) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that judgments in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code are immediately final and executory by express provision of Article 247, and that the right to appeal is not granted to any of the parties therein, including the Republic.
• Republic vs. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 560 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that while no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
• Republic vs. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20 — Cited as controlling authority for the stricter standard imposed by Article 41 of the Family Code compared to Article 83 of the Civil Code, and for the enumeration of the four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.), 513 Phil. 391 (2005) — Cited as controlling authority for the criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code, and for the strict standard approach in view of the summary nature of the proceedings.
• Republic vs. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 432 — Cited as a case applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.) and ruling against the present spouse for failure to prove a well-founded belief due to lack of diligent search.
• Delos Santos vs. Rodriguez, et al., 130 Phil. 459 (1968) — Cited as authority for the proposition that the fact that a decision has become final does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court.
• Arroyo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, November 19, 1991, 203 SCRA 750 — Cited for the sentiment that the protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family is of the most fundamental kind, reflecting the State's policy to protect and strengthen the family.
• Manuel vs. People, 512 Phil. 818 (2005) — Cited for the proposition that the requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death is for the present spouse's benefit, protecting him or her from criminal prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Article 41, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void unless the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, and requires the spouse present to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death. The Court applied this provision in determining the essential requisites for the declaration and the stricter standard of "well-founded belief."
• Article 247, Family Code — Provides that the judgment of the court in summary proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. The Court applied this provision in holding that the judgment in a declaration of presumptive death case is unappealable, but certiorari under Rule 65 remains available.
• Article 391, Civil Code — Referred to in Article 41 of the Family Code as providing the circumstances where there is danger of death, in which case an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the declaration of presumptive death. The Court cited this provision in enumerating the essential requisites.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides for the remedy of certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied this rule in holding that the petitioner's resort to certiorari to question the RTC's order was proper.
• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — The provision on bigamy, which the Court noted the judicial declaration of presumptive death protects the present spouse from, as the declaration effectively establishes the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage.
• Article II, Section 12, Constitution — Provides that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. The Court cited this provision as the underlying rationale for the strict standard approach in interpreting and applying Article 41 of the Family Code.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Velasco, Jr., J., wrote a separate concurring opinion.

• _Leonen, J. _ — Wrote a dissenting opinion, which Abad, J., joined. The dissent's specific reasoning is not detailed in the majority opinion text, but it disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the respondent failed to establish a well-founded belief that her husband was dead.