Republic vs. Abaya

In land registration proceedings, the 30-day period to perfect an appeal by the government is counted from the date the Solicitor General—not a deputized provincial or city fiscal—receives a copy of the trial court's decision, where the Solicitor General has made a formal entry of appearance and explicitly stated that only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served upon him will bind the government.

Several applications for registration covering approximately 7,880,418 square meters of land in Bahbah (now Prosperidad), Agusan del Sur, were filed by private respondents in 1977 and 1978. The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development, through the Solicitor General, filed oppositions. In entering his appearance, the Solicitor General filed notices that explicitly designated himself as the government's counsel, authorized the provincial fiscal to appear but under his supervision and control, and stated unequivocally that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party represented."

• Nature: Private respondents filed separate applications for registration of several parcels of land in Bahbah (now Prosperidad), Agusan del Sur, with a total area of approximately 7,880,418 square meters. The applications were docketed as LRC Nos. N-160 to N-170 and some were subsequently amended.

• Opposition by the Government: The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development, through the Solicitor General, filed separate oppositions to the applications. Along with these oppositions, the Solicitor General filed formal notices of appearance addressed to the Clerk of Court, copies of which were furnished to the applicants.

• Terms of the Notice of Appearance: The Solicitor General's notice of appearance contained explicit provisions: (1) the Solicitor General was entering his appearance as counsel for the Government; (2) the Provincial Fiscal was authorized to appear in the case and was to be furnished with notices, orders, resolutions, decisions, and processes; (3) the Solicitor General retained supervision and control over the representation and alone had authority to approve withdrawal, non-appeal, or other actions compromising governmental interests; and (4) critically, "only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party represented."

• Trial Court Decision: After a joint trial of all cases, the trial court rendered a decision on June 6, 1980, adjudicating the lands to the private respondents in the manner indicated in the decision.

• Receipt of Decision: Assistant Provincial Fiscal Conrado R. Fabular, who had been authorized to appear in the case, received a copy of the decision on June 17, 1980. The Solicitor General received his copy later, on July 8, 1980.

• Government's Attempt to Appeal: On July 29, 1980, the government (through the Solicitor General) filed separate notices of appeal from the decision to the Court of Appeals. Simultaneously, motions for a 30-day extension of time to file records on appeal were filed. On September 3, 1980, within the extended period first requested, further motions for extension were filed. The records on appeal were ultimately filed on September 26 and 29, 1980.

• Trial Court's Dismissal of Appeal: On September 19, 1980, respondent Judge Abaya issued an order dismissing the government's appeal as untimely. The trial court reasoned that Fiscal Fabular received notice on June 17, 1980; the 30-day period to appeal expired on July 17, 1980; and the Solicitor General's subsequent receipt on July 8, 1980 and filing of a notice of appeal on July 29, 1980 could not resurrect an already-lost right of appeal.

• Period of Appeal Reckoned from Solicitor General's Receipt: Petitioners argued that the trial court's order should be set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. The government maintained that the 30-day appeal period must be counted from July 8, 1980, the date the Solicitor General received the decision, not from June 17, 1980, when the Assistant Provincial Fiscal received his copy.

• Solicitor General as Sole Counsel of Record: Petitioners contended that under Section 1(e) of P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General is the exclusive counsel for the government in land registration cases and related proceedings. As such, the notice served on the fiscal was not binding on the government, especially given the explicit language in the Solicitor General's notice of appearance reserving that effect exclusively to notices served on him.

• Compliance with Reglementary Periods: Petitioners asserted that counting from the Solicitor General's receipt on July 8, 1980, the notice of appeal filed on July 29, 1980 was within the original 30-day period, and the records on appeal were filed within the duly-requested extensions.

The decision does not contain a separate section detailing the arguments of the respondents. The trial court's reasoning, which effectively served as respondents' position, is reflected in the September 19, 1980 order:

• Notice to One Counsel Binding on All: The trial court reasoned that because the Republic was represented by multiple counsel—the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, the District Land Officer, and the Solicitor General—notice to any one of them was sufficient to bind the party. Since Fiscal Fabular received the decision on June 17, 1980, the 30-day period expired on July 17, 1980, and the subsequent notice of appeal by the Solicitor General did not revive a right that had already been foreclosed.

• Period of Appeal: Whether the 30-day period to appeal an adverse decision in a land registration case should be reckoned from the time of notice to the provincial fiscal or notice to the Solicitor General, where the Solicitor General had entered a formal appearance expressly stating that only notices served upon him would bind the government.

• Period of Appeal: The appeal period must be counted from the date the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision, not from the date of receipt by the provincial fiscal. By express provision of Section 1(e) of P.D. No. 478, the Solicitor General is the counsel of the government in all land registration cases and related proceedings. The Solicitor General's notice of appearance unequivocally stated that while the provincial fiscal was authorized to appear, the Solicitor General retained supervision and control over the representation, and only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served upon him would bind the government. The provincial fiscal was merely a "surrogate" of the Solicitor General whose office, as the law office of the Government, is the entity empowered to represent the Government. The ruling in Republic v. Polo (89 SCRA 33), which presented an identical issue, was controlling: service upon the city fiscal did not operate as service upon the Solicitor General where the latter had made a separate appearance and reserved exclusive authority over binding notices. Here, the notices of appeal were filed within the original reglementary period counted from the Solicitor General's receipt on July 8, 1980, and the records on appeal were filed within the extensions duly requested.

• Service of Decisions on the Government in Land Registration Cases — Where the Solicitor General enters a formal appearance as counsel for the government in land registration proceedings, expressly retains supervision and control over the representation, and stipulates that only notices, orders, resolutions, and decisions served upon him will bind the government, the period to appeal runs from the date the Solicitor General receives the adverse decision. Service upon a provincial or city fiscal who is acting merely as the Solicitor General's "surrogate" does not constitute service upon the government for purposes of commencing the appeal period.

• Solicitor General as Exclusive Counsel under P.D. No. 478 — Under Section 1(e) of Presidential Decree No. 478, the Solicitor General is the exclusive law office of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and is empowered to represent the government in all land registration and related proceedings. A deputized fiscal merely assists under the supervision and control of the Solicitor General and does not become an independent counsel of record whose receipt of notice binds the government.

• "We hold that the thirty-day period should be counted from the date when the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision because the service of the decision upon the city fiscal did not operate as a service upon the Solicitor General." — Reaffirming Republic v. Polo, this passage articulates the controlling ratio decidendi: the fiscal is not a substitute recipient for the Solicitor General when the latter has explicitly reserved exclusive authority over binding notices.

• "In this case, it is obvious that, strictly speaking, the city fiscal did not directly represent the Government. He was merely a surrogate of the Solicitor General whose office, as the law office of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, is the entity that is empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings." — This clarifies the hierarchy of representation and the limited role of the fiscal in government litigation.

• Republic v. Polo, 89 SCRA 33 (1979) — Followed and applied as controlling precedent. The issue was identical: whether the appeal period in a land registration case should be counted from notice to the city fiscal or notice to the Solicitor General. The Court held the latter, where the Solicitor General had entered a separate appearance reserving exclusive authority over binding notices.

• Section 1(e), Presidential Decree No. 478 — This provision defines the powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General, establishing it as the law office of the Government and empowering it to represent the Republic in all land registration and related proceedings. The Court relied on this statutory mandate to affirm that the Solicitor General—and not a deputized fiscal—is the counsel of record whose receipt of decisions controls the running of the appeal period.

Justices Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.