Republic vs. Abarca

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and the burden of overcoming this presumption by incontrovertible evidence — including proof of a positive government act declaring the land alienable and disposable — rests on the person claiming ownership, not on the Republic seeking to recover possession of untitled public land.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)-Region II, asserted ownership over a 21,646-square-meter parcel of land in Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela, denominated as Lot 1, TS 1028, which had been occupied and used as a school site by the Alibagu Elementary School (AES) since the 1960s. The lot was surveyed on October 28, 1965 under Cadastral No. 403 and approved on March 3, 1986, but remained untitled and was not covered by any Presidential Proclamation. Severo Abarca and his children occupied a portion of the property, having entered initially as a lessee of a one-hectare portion of the school site in 1983.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Director of DECS-Region II, claimed ownership over a parcel of land situated in Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela, covering 21,646 square meters and denominated as Lot 1, TS 1028. Since the 1960s, the Alibagu Elementary School (AES) had been occupying and using the property as a school site. The lot was surveyed on October 28, 1965 under Cadastral No. 403, with the survey approved on March 3, 1986, for the purpose of allocating the property as a school site for AES. The land remained untitled and was not covered by any Presidential Proclamation, as attested by Manuel Caurel, Land Management Officer III of the DENR.

In January 1983, Severo Abarca was allowed by the Principal of AES and the President of the school's Parents-Teachers Association to lease a one-hectare portion of the property for a period of ten years starting January 8, 1983, in consideration of P200.00 per year to be used for the improvement of the school. After the expiration of the ten-year lease period, and despite several demands, Severo and his children — Nilo, Perseus, Juvy Malana, and Agnes Balmaceda — refused to vacate and continued to occupy the leased portion, having erected their respective houses thereon.

The respondents denied the Republic's claim of ownership and possession. They admitted that Severo had leased a portion of the school site in January 1983 for ten years, but asserted that the same had already been returned to AES in 1993. They contended that the portion they occupied was outside the school site and that they had been in possession thereof since 1970. Court-appointed Commissioners Cesar S. Ponce and Pedro Santa Cruz, Jr. both conducted relocation surveys on Lot 1, TS 1028 and found that the area occupied by the respondents was within the school site.

The respondents likewise admitted that they had applied for the issuance of a sales patent over a portion of Lot 1, TS 1028. They failed, however, to present tax declarations in their name or any other evidence to substantiate their claim of possession since 1970.

• Regalian Doctrine and State Ownership: Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the State pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, it being untitled public land not covered by any Presidential Proclamation.
• Admission by Application: Petitioner contended that respondents themselves admitted they do not own the subject property by applying for a sales patent over a portion of Lot 1, TS 1028, thereby acknowledging that the same belongs to the Government.
• Identity of the Property: Petitioner maintained that it sufficiently identified the property it sought to recover — the parcel upon which respondents built their houses, forming part of the one-hectare land previously leased from AES — as proven by the testimonies of its witnesses and the survey reports of the court-appointed Geodetic Engineers.
• Location Within School Site: Petitioner asserted that the land occupied by the respondents is part of Lot 1, TS 1028, which is reserved as a school site for public education purposes.

• Absence of Presidential Proclamation: Respondents countered that there is no proclamation reserving Lot 1, TS 1028 for use as a school site, relying on the CA's interpretation of Republic vs. Estonilo.
• Failure to Identify Leased Area: Respondents argued that petitioner could not identify the actual area and boundaries of the lot leased to them.
• Alienable and Disposable Character: Respondents pointed out that Manuel Caurel, a DENR officer, testified that the subject property is alienable and disposable.
• Burden of Proof: Respondents maintained that petitioner bears the burden of proving its ownership of the subject property.

• Better Right of Possession: Whether petitioner has a better right of possession over the subject property.

• Better Right of Possession: Yes. The Republic has a better right of possession, the respondents having failed to overcome the presumption of State ownership over untitled public land under the Regalian doctrine.

• Better Right of Possession: Land may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Under the Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and all lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. The burden of proof in overcoming this presumption rests on the person claiming ownership, who must establish by incontrovertible evidence a positive act of the government — such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, or legislative act — declaring the land alienable and disposable. In this case, the respondents did not deny the State's ownership of the subject property; they admitted leasing a one-hectare portion of the school site. The court-appointed Commissioners declared that the land upon which respondents built their houses is located within Lot 1, TS 1028. If their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession since 1970, the lease from AES in 1983 would be inexplicable. Moreover, respondents failed to adduce any evidence — not even tax declarations — to support their claim of possession since 1970. Their application for a sales patent over a portion of Lot 1, TS 1028 constituted an acknowledgment that the land belongs to the Government. The CA's reliance on Republic vs. Estonilo was misplaced: that case concerned whether a petition for reservation or a court judgment was necessary to make Proclamation 265 effective, and the Court ruled that only a positive act of the President was needed to segregate land for public purpose. Nowhere in Estonilo did the Court declare that a proclamation is required to prove the Republic's ownership of public land. Accordingly, the presumption of State ownership stands unrebutted, and the Republic possesses a better right to the subject property.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person remain part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Lot 1, TS 1028, being untitled and not clearly under private ownership, belongs to the State, and the respondents' possession — however long — cannot ripen into ownership.
• Burden of Proof in Overcoming Presumption of State Ownership — The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person claiming ownership, who must prove by incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable or disposable. A positive act of the government declaring the land alienable and disposable is required — such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act. The Court found that the respondents failed to discharge this burden, having presented no evidence of any positive government act reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable.

• "Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State." — This passage states the foundational principle underlying the Court's ruling, articulating the presumption of State ownership that the respondents failed to overcome.
• "The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable." — This formulation, quoted from Valiao vs. Republic, defines the allocation of the burden of proof in public land cases and was the analytical pivot for reversing the CA's disposition.
• "Nowhere in the said decision did the Court declare that a proclamation is required to prove the Republic's ownership of a public land." — This passage distinguishes Republic vs. Estonilo and corrects the CA's misreading, clarifying that a presidential proclamation is not a prerequisite for the Republic to assert ownership over untitled public land.

• Valiao vs. Republic, 677 Phil. 318 (2011) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the canonical formulation of the Regalian doctrine and the burden of proof required to overcome the presumption of State ownership over lands of the public domain.
• Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap, 589 Phil. 156 (2008) — Followed. Cited for the rule that a positive act of the government is required to declare land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
• Republic vs. Estonilo, 512 Phil. 644 (2005) — Distinguished. The CA had relied on this case to require a Presidential Proclamation for the reservation of land for public purpose. The Supreme Court clarified that Estonilo merely held that a positive act of the President suffices to segregate land for public purpose under the Public Land Act, and did not declare that a proclamation is required to prove the Republic's ownership of public land.
• Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 761 (2000) — Followed. Cited for the principle that tax receipts and tax declarations are mere indicia of a claim of ownership, not incontrovertible evidence — reinforcing the respondents' failure to prove their possession since 1970.

• Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution — Embodies the Regalian doctrine, providing that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Applied as the constitutional basis for presuming State ownership over the untitled Lot 1, TS 1028.
• Articles 419, 420, and 421, Civil Code — Classify land as either of public dominion or of private ownership and define the categories of property of public dominion. Applied to characterize Lot 1, TS 1028 as land of public dominion belonging to the State.
• Section 8, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Limits alienable or disposable lands to those which have been officially delimited and classified. Cited in Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap for the requirement of a positive government act to declare land alienable and disposable.

Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred.