Republic v. Bayao

A motion for reconsideration is dispensed with as a prerequisite to a Rule 65 petition where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, and the judiciary cannot enjoin the transfer of a regional office mandated by executive order because such transfer is an executive function whose wisdom is beyond judicial inquiry.

Petitioner is the Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU XII), a government office mandated to implement the laws, policies, and programs of the Department of Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials and employees of the same office. On March 30, 2004, Executive Order No. 304 was issued designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region, directing all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in the region to transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City. The dispute arose from the employees' opposition to the implementation of this executive order.

On March 30, 2004, Executive Order No. 304 was issued designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region, mandating that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in the region transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City. Pursuant to this directive, the Department of Agriculture Undersecretary for Operations, Edmund J. Sana, issued a Memorandum on April 1, 2005 directing OIC and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M. Alid to immediately effect the transfer of the administrative, finance, and operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to Koronadal City, with interim arrangements at the ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm. The action plan was to be submitted by April 6, 2005, with execution to commence by April 16, 2005.

Respondents, who are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII, opposed the implementation through a Memorandum dated April 22, 2005 addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap. They alleged that former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had made a pronouncement during a visit to Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 would remain in Cotabato City, and that only three departments—DTI, DOT, and DOLE—were not covered by the suspension of E.O. No. 304. They had earlier appealed on March 7, 2005 that the implementation be held in abeyance, citing the huge costs of physical transfer, the plight of employees who had settled in Cotabato City, the availability of a building in Cotabato City that could accommodate the entire staff, the absence of a building in Koronadal City where rent was expensive, the estimated ₱7,200,000.00 in dislocation pay and other expenses that could be avoided, and the sub-standard foundation of the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan.

On May 17, 2005, OIC Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the regional office to the ATI Building in Tantangan, Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried out on May 21, 2005. This prompted respondents to file a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC, Branch 14 of Cotabato City on May 18, 2005. By Order dated October 9, 2006, the trial court granted respondents' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65, but the CA dismissed the petition on March 21, 2007 for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order, and denied reconsideration on August 16, 2007.

• Procedural Exception: Petitioner argued that the case falls under the exceptions to the requirement of filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior to a Rule 65 petition, specifically because the questions to be raised had already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, and there was urgent necessity for resolution.
• Rule 45 as Proper Remedy: Petitioner contended that if the assailed CA Resolutions are not elevated via Rule 45, they would attain finality and the trial court Order would become unassailable.
• Separation of Powers: Petitioner maintained that the trial court Order enjoining the transfer is contrary to the ruling in DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, which upheld the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary on the wisdom of transfer of regional offices.
• Executive Prerogative: Petitioner argued that the trial court interfered with the wisdom of the executive in the management of its affairs and disregarded basic rules on amendment and revocation of administrative issuances and the propriety of injunction as a remedy.

• Improper Remedy: Respondents countered that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions, as the CA Resolution dismissing the Rule 65 petition for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule 45 and is not an adjudication on the merits.
• Fatal Omission: Respondents argued that petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration is fatal, as it is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule 65, and none of the recognized exceptions are present.
• Scope of Review: Respondents contended that the disputed CA Resolutions dwell solely on the indispensability of filing a Motion for Reconsideration, thus the other grounds in the present Petition need not be addressed.

• Propriety of Rule 45: Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed CA Resolutions.
• Motion for Reconsideration Exception: Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
• Scope of Review: Whether petitioner can raise other issues not addressed in the assailed CA Resolutions.
• Separation of Powers: Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA Regional Office to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers between the executive department and the judiciary as to the wisdom behind the transfer.

• Propriety of Rule 45: Yes. A dismissal by the CA of a Rule 65 petition for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45, as the resulting CA resolutions are final resolutions contemplated under Rule 45.
• Motion for Reconsideration Exception: Yes. The case falls under the exception where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
• Scope of Review: Yes. Having overcome the procedural issues, the substantive issues raised by petitioner may be addressed.
• Separation of Powers: Yes. The RTC's preliminary injunction against the executive-ordered transfer violated the separation of powers, as the transfer of a regional center is an executive function whose wisdom is beyond judicial inquiry.

• Propriety of Rule 45: A Petition via Rule 45 is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case, whereas a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. The CA's March 21, 2007 Resolution dismissing the Rule 65 petition and its August 16, 2007 Resolution denying reconsideration are final resolutions contemplated under Rule 45. If not elevated, these resolutions would attain finality and the trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 would also become unassailable.

• Motion for Reconsideration Exception: The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a Petition for Certiorari, its purpose being to grant the lower court an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error. This rule admits well-defined exceptions, including where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court. The Court found that the second exception is present: the various issues raised in the Petition with the CA had already been raised by petitioner through its pleadings with the trial court—specifically in its Motion to Dismiss dated June 27, 2005, Memorandum dated September 1, 2006, and Manifestation and Reply dated September 5, 2006—and the lower court had passed upon them prior to issuing its October 9, 2006 Order. The Court also noted that procedural rules may be relaxed when public interest demands it, given that the case involves the effective administration of the executive department.

• Scope of Review: Since the Petition overcame the procedural issues, the Court proceeded to address the substantive issues raised by petitioner, rejecting respondents' contention that only the procedural question of the Motion for Reconsideration need be resolved.

• Separation of Powers: The power to merge administrative regions and determine the regional center is traditionally lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments, as found in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. In Chiongbian vs. Orbos, the Court held that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center. In DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, the Court ruled that the DENR Secretary could validly order the transfer of regional offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato, and that concerns such as the absence of buildings, the timing of the transfer, the schooling of employees' children, and lack of consultation address the wisdom rather than the legality of the transfer. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of executive acts. The trial court's injunction against the transfer mandated by E.O. No. 304 constituted precisely such an impermissible inquiry. Furthermore, a verbal pronouncement that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been given weight, as executive orders are amended, modified, or revoked only by subsequent ones, not by informal pronouncements.

• Motion for Reconsideration as Condition Sine Qua Non for Certiorari — A Motion for Reconsideration is a prerequisite for filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, its purpose being to grant the lower court an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error through re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances. The rule admits well-defined exceptions: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The Court applied exception (b), finding that petitioner had already raised the same issues before the trial court in its Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum, and Manifestation and Reply.

• Separation of Powers — Non-Inquiry into Wisdom of Executive Acts — Each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of acts of the executive or legislative departments. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the RTC's injunction against the transfer of the DA regional office to Koronadal City was an impermissible judicial encroachment on executive discretion, as the concerns raised by respondents—lack of buildings, inconvenience to employees' families, cost of transfer—addressed the wisdom rather than the legality of the transfer.

• Presidential Power to Reorganize Administrative Regions and Determine Regional Centers — While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided in the Constitution, it is traditionally lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of general supervision over local governments. This power carries with it the power to determine the regional center. The Court relied on this doctrine to affirm that the transfer mandated by E.O. No. 304 was a valid exercise of executive authority.

• "It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments." — This passage, quoted from DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, articulates the core separation-of-powers principle that the judiciary cannot review the wisdom of executive acts, and is the ratio decidendi for the substantive ruling.

• "The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved." — This is the canonical enumeration of exceptions to the motion-for-reconsideration requirement in Rule 65 petitions, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted 'will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action x x x.'" — This passage encapsulates the separation-of-powers doctrine in concise form, reinforcing that the judiciary's role does not extend to directing or restraining coordinate branches' lawful exercises of discretion.

• DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, 456 Phil. 635 (2003) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that the DENR Secretary could validly order the transfer of regional offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato, and that concerns about the absence of buildings, timing, schooling of children, and lack of consultation addressed the wisdom rather than the legality of the transfer. The present case was decided on substantially identical facts and reasoning.
• Chiongbian vs. Orbos, 315 Phil. 251 (1995) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that the President's power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
• Siok Ping Tang vs. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 457 — Followed. The Court cited this case for the exception to the motion-for-reconsideration requirement where questions raised in certiorari proceedings had already been raised and passed upon by the lower court, finding the same exception applicable in the present case.
• Abbas vs. COMELEC, 258-A Phil. 870 (1989) — Cited for the proposition that the power to merge administrative regions, though not expressly provided in the Constitution, is traditionally lodged with the President to facilitate general supervision over local governments.

• Section 4, Article X, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the President shall exercise general supervision over local governments. The Court relied on this provision as the constitutional basis for the President's power to reorganize administrative regions and determine regional centers.
• Section 25, Chapter III, Article I, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides that the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. The Court cited this as statutory basis for the President's supervisory authority.
• Executive Order No. 304 (2004) — Designated Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region and mandated the transfer of all regional offices to Koronadal City. The Court upheld its validity and implementation.
• Article 7, Civil Code — Provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and that administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. The Court applied this provision to hold that a verbal pronouncement suspending E.O. No. 304 should not have been given weight, as executive orders are amended, modified, or revoked only by subsequent ones.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad, and Jose Catral Mendoza concurred with the decision of Leonen, J.