Republic of the Philippines vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

A private corporation is absolutely prohibited from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain and may only apply for registration if the land had already converted to private property by operation of law at the time of acquisition, with the corporation unable to tack its possession to its predecessor's possession to complete the 30-year prescriptive period.

T.A.N. Properties, Inc. filed an application for original registration of Lot 10705-B, a 56.4007-hectare parcel in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The applicant claimed its predecessors-in-interest, the Dimayuga family, possessed the land openly and continuously since 1942. The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, contesting both the nature of the land and the qualifications of the corporate applicant.

• Application and Notice: On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the initial hearing for the application for registration of Lot 10705-B. Notice was published in the Official Gazette and People’s Journal Taliba, posted on the municipal bulletin board and the land itself, and sent to adjoining owners and government agencies.
• Oppositions: The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an opposition. Ceferino Carandang also appeared but failed to file a written opposition or appear subsequently, leading to an order of general default against the whole world except the Republic.
• Claim of Possession: Respondent presented witnesses claiming Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) possessed the land since 1942. Upon his death, his son Antonio succeeded him. Antonio donated the land to Fortunato in 1960, but later revoked the donation in 1961, adjudicating it to another son, Prospero (Porting). Porting sold the land to respondent on 8 August 1997.
• Evidence of Alienability: Respondent submitted a CENRO certification stating the land falls within the alienable and disposable zone per Land Classification Map No. 582 certified on 31 December 1925, and a memorandum from the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, stating the same.
• Discrepancy in Classification Dates: While the CENRO certification and LC Map No. 582 indicated the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan stated the date as 31 December 1985. Respondent argued the blue print merely proved location and metes and bounds, not classification.

• Insufficiency of Evidence of Possession: Petitioner argued that the testimonies of respondent's witnesses were general conclusions of law rather than factual evidence, and that additional witnesses were required to corroborate the claim of possession since 1945.
• Failure to Prove Alienability: Petitioner maintained that respondent failed to overcome the presumption that the land belongs to the public domain, as the DENR certifications were issued by unauthorized officers and lacked probative value.
• Corporate Disqualification: Petitioner asserted that respondent, as a private corporation, is disqualified from applying for registration of land of the public domain under the 1987 Constitution.

• Sufficiency of Witness Testimony: Respondent countered that the witness Evangelista's knowledge stemmed from being a neighbor in a small community, and that no law requires corroboration of a single witness's testimony.
• Validity of Certifications: Respondent argued that the CENRO and FMS-DENR certifications were sufficient to prove the land's alienable status, and that the blue print plan merely proved location and metes and bounds, not classification.

• Alienability of the Land: Whether respondent sufficiently proved that the land is alienable and disposable.
• Possession Since June 1945: Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier.
• Corporate Qualification: Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act despite being a private corporation.

• Alienability of the Land: The land was not proven alienable and disposable. The CENRO certification was issued for an area exceeding 50 hectares, which is beyond the CENRO's authority and falls under the PENRO's jurisdiction pursuant to DENR DAO Nos. 20 and 38. The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, had no authority to issue land classification certificates. Furthermore, the certifications were hearsay; they were identified only by a private individual (Torres) and not by the issuing officers, and they did not fall under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as entries made in the performance of a duty. The discrepancy between the 1925 and 1985 classification dates also remained unexplained.
• Possession Since June 1945: Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession was not established. Evangelista's testimony was contradictory—he did not know the relationship between the predecessors and incorrectly identified the successor, contradicting the trial court's own findings. Torres's testimony on possession was hearsay. Tax declarations starting only in 1955 created a presumption that possession began in that year, not before 1945.
• Corporate Qualification: Respondent is disqualified from acquiring alienable public land. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The exception in Director of Lands v. IAC does not apply because the land had not yet converted to private property by operation of law when respondent acquired it in 1997. A corporation cannot tack its possession to its predecessor's to complete the 30-year period. Moreover, the application covered 56.4007 hectares, far exceeding the 12-hectare limit for individuals under RA 9176, rendering the excess application void ab initio.

• Presumption of State Ownership — All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The burden to overturn this presumption by incontrovertible evidence rests with the applicant.
• Proof of Alienability — To prove land is alienable and disposable, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian, not merely certifications from officers lacking authority. Certifications from the CENRO for areas over 50 hectares, or from the FMS-DENR, have no probative value.
• Constitutional Prohibition on Corporate Acquisition of Public Land — Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations are absolutely prohibited from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain; they may only hold such lands by lease. A corporation may only apply for registration if the land had already become private property by operation of law (ipso jure) at the time of acquisition.
• Tacking of Possession by Corporations — The length of possession of land by a corporation cannot be tacked onto its predecessor's possession to complete the statutory 30-year acquisitive prescriptive period because corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain.

• "The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease."
• "Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure."
• "What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed."

• Director of Lands v. IAC, 230 Phil. 590 (1986) — Distinguished. The Court explained that in Director of Lands, the land had already converted to private property at the time the corporation acquired it, which is not the case here.
• Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002) — Followed. Cited to trace the constitutional history and affirm the absolute prohibition against private corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain under the 1987 Constitution.
• Natividad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88233, 4 October 1991 — Followed. Cited to support the ruling that land must already be private property when acquired by the corporation for the registration to be valid.

• Section 3, Article XII, 1987 Constitution — Declares that private corporations or associations may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not exceeding 25 years renewable for another 25 years, and not exceeding 1000 hectares. Citizens may acquire not more than 12 hectares. Applied to disqualify the corporate respondent from acquiring the public land.
• Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by RA 9176 — Governs applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. Applied to note that applications are limited to 12 hectares, rendering the respondent's application for 56.4007 hectares void ab initio for the excess area.
• Section 19 & 23, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Defines public documents and their evidentiary value. Applied to rule that the CENRO and FMS-DENR certifications were not entries in public records made in the performance of duty, and thus were not prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
• DENR Administrative Order No. 20 (1988) and DAO No. 38 (1990) — Delineate DENR functions. Applied to establish that CENROs can only certify areas below 50 hectares and that the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority to issue land classification certificates.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice), Renato C. Corona, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.