Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Alejandre

An applicant for land registration under Section 14(4) of PD 1529 must still prove by incontrovertible evidence that the subject land is alienable and disposable, because the Regalian doctrine presumption of State ownership applies to all lands not clearly shown to be of private dominion. Acquisition by sale or succession, being derivative modes of ownership, does not itself establish the land's private character or overcome the presumption that it forms part of the inalienable public domain.

Spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and Zenaida Ferrer Alejandre applied for judicial registration of title over Lot 6487, Cad. 536, Ap-CAR-000007, a 256-square-meter parcel situated in Barrio Poblacion, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, under the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the ground that the land formed part of the public domain and that the applicants failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The case required the Court to determine whether an applicant proceeding under Section 14(4) of PD 1529 — those who have acquired ownership of land in any manner provided for by law — is nonetheless bound to establish the alienable and disposable character of the subject land.

On July 18, 1991, Spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and Zenaida Ferrer Alejandre filed an application for registration of title over Lot 6487, Cad. 536, described in plan Ap-CAR-000007, with an area of 256 square meters located in Barrio Poblacion, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, pursuant to PD 1529. They alleged ownership by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990, through which Angustia Lizardo Taleon sold the property to them. Taleon, according to the application, had acquired the land from her mother by inheritance, and the mother in turn inherited it from Don Santiago Alejandre, the grandfather of Dr. Ildefonso Alejandre. The spouses occupied the subject property at the time of the application.

The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance on September 16, 1991. The Land Registration Authority submitted reports noting discrepancies in the plan and technical description, requiring corrections and reverification over the course of several years. On January 30, 1992, the trial court issued an order of general default, allowing the spouses to present their evidence ex parte. The LRA submitted a Supplementary Report on August 20, 1993, stating that the polygon did not close even after corrections, and requested reverification. On April 15, 1998, the LRA submitted its Final Report stating that the corrected technical description no longer showed discrepancies but that the area had increased by six square meters. The trial court thereupon ordered publication of the amended technical description.

On June 1, 2000, the Republic filed its Opposition to the application, asserting that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by PD 1073; that the applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title or tax declarations evidencing bona fide acquisition or possession in the concept of owner since that date; and that the subject property formed part of the public domain and was not subject to private appropriation.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on March 31, 2006, granting the application, finding that the spouses acquired the property through a Deed of Absolute Sale from Angustia Alejandre Taleon, who had inherited it from her mother, who in turn inherited it from Don Santiago Alejandre. On June 12, 2008, the RTC issued an Amended Decision increasing the registrable area from 256 to 262 square meters. The Republic appealed to the CA, which denied the appeal on February 27, 2015, sustaining the RTC on the ground that the respondents fell under Section 14(4) of PD 1529 because they acquired the land by sale, and consequently the requirements of possession since 1945 and alienability had no application. The Republic filed the instant petition directly with the Supreme Court without a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the CA decided the appeal in gross disregard of the law and prevailing jurisprudence.

• Statutory Requirements for Registration: The Republic argued that under Section 24 of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by Section 4 of PD 1073, an applicant for land registration must show both open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
• Presumption of State Ownership: Citing Republic vs. Sayo, Director of Lands vs. IAC, and Director of Lands vs. Aquino, the Republic maintained that in land registration proceedings, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered belongs to the public domain.
• Proof of Alienable and Disposable Status: Citing Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals, the Republic posited that to prove the subject land is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government — such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Land investigators, or a legislative act — declaring the land as already alienable and disposable.

• Burden of Proving Alienable and Disposable Status: Whether an applicant for land registration under Section 14(4) of PD 1529, who claims ownership by virtue of a deed of sale, must nonetheless prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable to overcome the Regalian doctrine presumption of State ownership.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the real property tax declarations, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the technical descriptions submitted by the respondents constitute incontrovertible evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the subject land forms part of the inalienable public domain.

• Burden of Proving Alienable and Disposable Status: Yes. Regardless of the mode of acquisition under Section 14(4) of PD 1529, the applicant must prove by incontrovertible evidence that the subject land is alienable and disposable, because the Regalian doctrine presumption of State ownership applies to all lands not clearly shown to be of private dominion.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The real property tax declarations, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1990, and the technical descriptions of the subject property are insufficient to overcome the presumption that the land is inalienable public domain.

• Burden of Proving Alienable and Disposable Status: The Court traced the constitutional and civil-law framework governing the classification of property. Under Article 419 of the Civil Code, property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 enumerates three kinds of property of public dominion: those intended for public use, those intended for public service, and those intended for the development of national wealth. Property of private ownership includes patrimonial property of the State (Articles 421 and 422), patrimonial property of local government units (Article 424), and property belonging to private persons (Article 425). Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the Regalian doctrine, classifies lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral, and national parks, and mandates that only agricultural lands may be declared alienable and thus susceptible to private ownership. Upon such declaration, the land ceases to possess the characteristics of public dominion — being outside the commerce of man, not acquirable by prescription, and not registrable — and assumes the nature of patrimonial property of the State. The Court held that while Section 14(4) of PD 1529 does not expressly describe the kind of land to which it applies (unlike paragraphs 1, 2, and 3), the land covered by paragraph 4 can be no other than alienable and disposable land of the public domain or private land. This proceeds from the well-entrenched rule that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion or ownership presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified, or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn this presumption by incontrovertible evidence rests with the applicant. The CA erred in holding that the requirement of alienability had no application because the respondents proceeded under Section 14(4) rather than Section 14(1).

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The respondents claimed ownership by virtue of tradition through a contract of sale and by succession through their predecessors-in-interest. Both are derivative modes of acquiring ownership. Yet the respondents failed to prove the nature or classification of the land. The fact that they acquired the property by sale and that their transferor acquired it by succession is not incontrovertible proof that the land is of private dominion or ownership. In the absence of such proof, the Regalian doctrine presumption that the subject land is of public domain must prevail. The real property tax declarations (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits "K" to "K5"), and the technical descriptions (Exhibit "J") were insufficient to overcome the presumption that the land is inalienable public domain. Accordingly, the application for registration should not have been granted.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion or ownership presumptively belong to the State. In land registration proceedings, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by incontrovertible evidence showing that the land has been classified, reclassified, or released as alienable and disposable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondents' deed of sale, tax declarations, and technical descriptions were insufficient to establish the private character of the land.

• Classification of Property Under the Civil Code — Property, in relation to the person to whom it belongs, is either of public dominion (Article 420) or of private ownership (Articles 421, 422, 424, 425). Patrimonial property of the State may be sub-classified into: (1) "by nature or use" under Article 421 — property not of public dominion based on the State's current or intended use; and (2) "by conversion" under Article 422 — property that previously assumed the nature of public dominion but is no longer used or intended for that purpose. Lands, as immovable property under Article 415(1), can be either lands of public dominion or of private ownership. The Court relied on this framework to explain that only upon declaration of alienability does land cease to be property of public dominion and become patrimonial property of the State susceptible to private ownership.

• Derivative Modes of Acquisition Do Not Prove Private Character of Land — Acquisition of land by sale or succession is a derivative mode of acquiring ownership and does not itself constitute incontrovertible proof that the land is of private dominion. The nature or classification of the land must be independently established by the applicant, and the mere existence of a deed of sale or tax declaration does not discharge the burden of overcoming the Regalian doctrine presumption.

• "Thus, it can be gathered from the foregoing that the subject of the land registration application under Section 14 of PD 1529 is either alienable and disposable land of public domain or private land." — This passage articulates the Court's holding that Section 14(4), though it does not expressly describe the kind of land covered, necessarily encompasses only alienable and disposable land of the public domain or private land, thereby requiring proof of the land's classification regardless of the paragraph invoked.

• "Therefore, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant." — This states the controlling allocation of the burden of proof in land registration cases, directly contradicting the CA's view that the alienability requirement does not apply to Section 14(4) applicants.

• "The fact that they acquired the same by sale and their transferor by succession is not incontrovertible proof that it is of private dominion or ownership. In the absence of such incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption arising from the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or dominion must be overcome. Respondents failed to do this." — This is the decisive application of the Regalian doctrine to the facts, establishing that derivative modes of acquisition do not suffice to prove the private character of the land.

• Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008) — Cited for the rule that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion or ownership presumptively belong to the State, and that the onus to overturn this presumption by incontrovertible evidence rests with the applicant. Followed.
• Republic vs. Naguiat, 515 Phil. 560 (2006) — Cited through Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties for the same proposition regarding the presumption of State ownership and the requirement that public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable remain inalienable. Followed.
• Menguito vs. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000) — Cited through Republic vs. Naguiat for the proposition that public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified, or released as alienable agricultural land remain part of the inalienable public domain. Followed.
• Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 156 (2000) — Cited by the Republic for the requirement that proof of alienability must be established by a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, or legislative act. The Court's reasoning is consistent with this citation.
• Republic vs. Sayo, 269 Phil. 74 (1990) — Cited by the Republic for the presumption of State ownership in land registration proceedings. Followed.
• Director of Lands vs. IAC, 292 Phil. 341 (1993) — Cited by the Republic for the burden of the applicant to overcome the presumption of State ownership. Followed.
• Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 270 Phil. 392 (1990) — Cited by the Republic for the same proposition regarding the presumption of State ownership. Followed.
• Alba Vda. De Raz vs. CA, 372 Phil. 710 (1999) — Cited in a footnote for the definition of public agricultural lands as those alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.

• Section 14, PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Enumerates four categories of persons who may apply for registration of title to land. The respondents proceeded under paragraph 4 (those who have acquired ownership of land in any manner provided for by law). The Court held that paragraph 4 nonetheless requires proof that the land is alienable and disposable or of private ownership.
• Section 3, Article XII, 1987 Constitution — Classifies lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral, and national parks, and mandates that only agricultural lands may be declared alienable and thus susceptible to private ownership. The Court relied on this provision as the constitutional basis for the Regalian doctrine.
• Articles 419, 420, 421, 422, 424, and 425, Civil Code — Establish the classification of property into public dominion and private ownership, and further sub-classify property of private ownership into patrimonial property of the State, patrimonial property of LGUs, and property of private persons. The Court used this framework to explain the conversion of land from public dominion to patrimonial property upon declaration of alienability.
• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Section 4 of PD 1073 — Requires open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Republic cited this provision to argue that the applicants failed to meet the statutory requisites for registration.
• Section 24, PD 1529 — Cited by the Republic in support of the requirement that an applicant must prove both possession since 1945 and the alienable and disposable character of the land.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred.