Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosita Sadca, et al.

A member of an indigenous cultural community may apply for confirmation of imperfect title or a free patent over land of the public domain, whether disposable or not, provided the land is suitable for agriculture and the applicant, by himself or through predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years; such a claim is an exception to the Regalian doctrine. The free patent issued to Acay was upheld because the Republic failed to prove extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

Sadca Acay, a member of the Kankana-ey Tribe, was the original free-patent applicant over the Barrio Abatan parcel; his daughter Rosita Sadca and the respondent spouses are his successors-in-interest and subsequent buyers. The dispute concerns the interaction between the Regalian doctrine, which places public-domain lands under State ownership, and statutory exceptions for members of indigenous cultural communities under Section 48(c) of The Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872, and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, which recognize ancestral lands and native title.

Sadca Acay, a member of the Kankana-ey Tribe, submitted Free Patent Application No. (1-2) 1296 with the Director of Lands over a 28,099-square-meter parcel of land in Barrio Abatan, Mankayan, Benguet. On August 29, 1975, the Director of Lands issued Free Patent No. (1-2) 120 in Acay's favor, and soon after, Original Certificate of Title No. P-788 was issued in Acay's name.

On May 26, 1986, Acay died intestate and left behind several lots. His heirs extrajudicially settled the properties among themselves and agreed to allocate the Barrio Abatan lot to Rosita Sadca, Acay's daughter. On June 24, 1987, Original Certificate of Title No. P-788 was cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22747 issued in Rosita's name.

On April 30, 1990, Rosita subdivided the lot into 13 parcels and sold them to Spouses Marcenio Lesino and Elizabeth Baguinay, Spouses Benito Bentadan and Helen Dimas, and Spouses Romeo Fontanilla and Felomina Dagas. The corresponding certificates of title were issued to the lot buyers.

On August 26, 2002, the Republic filed a Complaint for cancellation of the free patent and original certificate of title and for reversion of the Barrio Abatan lot. It alleged that the lot awarded to Acay was located inside the Mount Data National Park and National Forest, hence it was not alienable, and that Acay made falsehoods and misrepresentations in his free patent application. The Republic also asserted that the lot was within a road right of way, was not fit for agricultural purposes, and was not within the coverage of The Public Land Act.

The parties presented conflicting evidence on Acay's possession and cultivation. The Republic claimed that another person occupied and cultivated the lot, while respondents presented two tax declarations dated April 5, 1955 and July 17, 1968 in Acay's name. Respondents' witness, Engr. Cristino Motes, testified that when he was younger, he worked alongside Acay and other workers to create terraces and riprap on the lot. The Regional Trial Court gave more weight to respondents' evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed its factual findings.

• Questions of Fact Under Rule 45: Petitioner insisted that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Acay's free patent award since the evidence clearly shows that Acay never continuously occupied or cultivated the lot awarded to him.
• Fraud and Misrepresentation: Petitioner argued that Acay made misrepresentations in his application for free patent which should lead to the cancellation of the award and certificate of title issued to him.
• Inalienability and Agricultural Suitability: Petitioner pointed out that the lot awarded to Acay was not only inalienable but was within a road right of way, hence it was not fit for agricultural purposes and was not within the coverage of The Public Land Act, as erroneously concluded by the Court of Appeals.
• Failure to Meet Possession Requirement: Petitioner maintained that it presented clear and convincing evidence that Acay did not meet the additional requirement of possession.

• Public Land Act Coverage for ICCs: Respondents asserted that registration of inalienable land by members of indigenous cultural communities was allowed under The Public Land Act.
• Compliance with Possession Period: Respondents claimed that Acay, a member of the Kankana-ey Tribe, complied with the required period of possession for the issuance of a free patent in his name.
• Failure to Prove Misrepresentation: Respondents maintained that petitioner failed to substantiate its assertion that Acay misrepresented material facts in his application because his application was never presented into evidence.
• Insufficiency of Petitioner's Evidence: Respondents asserted that the bulk of petitioner's evidence only claimed that the lot awarded to Acay was inalienable since it is located within Mount Data.
• Presumption of Regularity: Respondents posited that petitioner did not succeed in overcoming the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the Office of the Bureau of Lands and the Director of Lands when they approved Acay's application for free patent.
• Equal Protection: Respondents criticized petitioner's selective filing of a complaint for reversion against them, but not on other awardees of lots within Mount Data, claiming that this violated their right to equal protection.

• Rule 45 — Questions of Fact: Whether the case falls within the exceptions to a Rule 45 petition which would allow the Court to entertain questions of fact.
• Validity of Free Patent: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the free patent awarded to Acay.

• Rule 45 — Questions of Fact: No. A Rule 45 petition may raise only questions of law; factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding, and petitioner failed to invoke any established exception. Review is also discretionary under Rule 45, Section 6.
• Validity of Free Patent: No. The free patent was validly upheld. Section 48(c) of The Public Land Act permits members of indigenous cultural communities to apply for confirmation of title over public-domain land, whether disposable or not, if suitable for agriculture and possessed for at least 30 years; the Republic failed to prove extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

• Rule 45 — Questions of Fact: A petition for review under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law; the Court is not a trier of facts and is not obligated to re-examine evidence. Findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court. Although exceptions exist, petitioner failed to refer to any established exception that would compel the Court to rule on factual evidence. The questioned factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, review under Rule 45, Section 6 is discretionary; the onus is on petitioner to present a compelling reason or show special and important reasons, such as policy-determining or transcendental cases. Absent those, the appeal is dismissed on the basis of sound judicial discretion.

• Validity of Free Patent: The Court upheld the Court of Appeals' finding that the Republic failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation. Petitioner's premise—that Acay must have committed fraud because the land was inalienable for being part of Mount Data National Park—did not establish fraud; no evidence supported it, and petitioner did not even present Acay's actual application form. Under Taar vs. Lawan, only extrinsic fraud may be raised to review or reopen a decree of registration, and the determination of fraud is a factual matter beyond a Rule 45 petition. The Republic failed to prove extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence. On possession, the Regional Trial Court weighed conflicting evidence and gave more weight to respondents' evidence, including tax declarations in Acay's name and testimony that Acay worked on terraces and riprap; the Court of Appeals affirmed, making the findings binding and conclusive. The Court also recognized that Section 48(c) of The Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872, allows members of national cultural minorities to apply for confirmation of imperfect title over lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not, so long as the land is suitable for agriculture and the applicant has possessed and occupied it for at least 30 years. Acay, a Kankana-ey, had been granted a free patent and certificate of title, and the DENR and Director of Lands enjoyed the presumption of regularity; absent contrary evidence, Acay was presumed to have satisfied all legal requirements. The Court further explained that forest land is generally part of the public domain and cannot be registered under the Torrens system, but an exception exists for forest or mineral land statutorily reclassified and considered ancestral land openly and continuously occupied by an ICC member. This exception traces to Cariño vs. Insular Government and Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, and is reinforced by Presidential Decree No. 410 and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which recognize native title and ancestral lands. The 1987 Constitution and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act reflect a policy of recognizing and protecting ICC rights, culture, and beliefs, requiring full recognition and protection of indigenous resource management strategies, common property, and land tenure systems.

• Section 48(c) of The Public Land Act (Manahan Amendment) — Members of national cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title over lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, if they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years. The provision is one statutory way to recognize ancestral land ownership. In this case, Acay, a Kankana-ey, was issued a free patent; the Republic failed to prove fraud or that he lacked the required possession, so the free patent and subsequent titles were upheld.

• Ancestral Lands and Native Title as Exception to the Regalian Doctrine — Forest or mineral land is generally part of the public domain and cannot be registered under the Torrens system. However, an exception exists where forest or mineral land has been statutorily reclassified and considered ancestral land, openly and continuously occupied by a member of an indigenous cultural community. Native title refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, which are presumed never to have been public lands since before the Spanish Conquest. The Court applied this exception through Section 48(c), Cariño vs. Insular Government, Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, Presidential Decree No. 410, and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.

• Extrinsic Fraud as Ground to Review or Reopen a Decree of Registration — Only extrinsic fraud may be raised to review or reopen a decree of registration. Extrinsic fraud is fraud employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the applicant's name. The determination of the existence or nonexistence of fraud is a factual matter beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition. The Republic failed to prove extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence and did not present Acay's application form.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Issuance of a Free Patent — A free patent issued by the DENR and the consequent certificate of title carry the presumption that the grantee satisfied all legal requirements and that the DENR regularly performed its duties. The presumption stands absent evidence to the contrary. The Republic failed to rebut it; the fact that the land was within Mount Data National Park did not automatically establish fraud.

• Rule 45 Limits and Discretionary Review — A petition for review under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law; findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Exceptions exist but must be invoked. Review is discretionary under Rule 45, Section 6 and will be granted only for special and important reasons. Petitioner failed to invoke any exception or show a compelling reason, so the factual findings were left undisturbed.

• Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Indigenization of Property Laws — Philippine law treats land as a thing that can be owned under Civil Code Articles 427 and 428, while indigenous cultural communities generally have a communal view of land, treating ownership as a tribal right to use the land or territorial control, tied to work and trusteeship for future generations. The 1987 Constitution and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act recognize and protect ICC rights to ancestral lands and culture. The Court emphasized that recognition of ICC rights must carry respect for their culture and beliefs, requiring full recognition and protection of indigenous resource management strategies, common property, and land tenure systems.

• "Members of indigenous cultural communities [1] may apply for confirmation of their title to land in the public domain under Section 48(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or The Public Land Act, so long as the applicant is able to prove continuous possession in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years. Section 48(c) of The Public Land Act is one statutory way through which ancestral land ownership may be recognized." — This opening passage states the core ruling and identifies Section 48(c) as a statutory route for recognizing ancestral land ownership.
• "Clearly the above provision allows a member of a national cultural minority, like Acay, to apply for confirmation of imperfect title over lands of the public domain whether they are disposable or not, so long as the land applied for is suitable to agriculture and the applicant can show possession and occupation for at least 30 years." — This passage, quoted from the Court of Appeals and adopted in the decision, construes Section 48(c) and supplies the requisites applied to Acay.
• "Only extrinsic fraud may be raised as a ground to 'review or reopen a decree of registration.' Extrinsic fraud has a specific meaning under the law. It refers to that type of fraud that 'is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.'" — This passage, drawn from Taar vs. Lawan, defines the only fraud ground available and explains why the Republic's fraud claim failed.
• "It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land." — This passage from Cariño vs. Insular Government states the native-title presumption that qualifies the Regalian doctrine.

• Taar vs. Lawan, 820 Phil. 26 (2017) — Controlling precedent for the rule that only extrinsic fraud may be raised to review or reopen a decree of registration and that the existence of fraud is a factual matter beyond a Rule 45 petition; applied to reject the Republic's fraud claim.
• Cariño vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909) — Landmark decision on native title; held that land held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory goes is presumed never to have been public land, providing the doctrinal basis for the ancestral-land exception to the Regalian doctrine.
• Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 (1946) — Reiterated the qualification to the Regalian doctrine; land possessed by occupants and their predecessors since time immemorial, or even before the Spanish Conquest, was never part of the public domain.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Paran, 278 Phil. 1 (1991) — Explained that Section 48(c) of The Public Land Act distinguishes applications by members of national cultural minorities from those by other qualified persons; ICC members may apply for public lands whether disposable or not, including forest or mineral land, if suitable for agriculture.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Cosalan, 284 Phil. 575 (1992) — Upheld the exception to the Regalian doctrine, stressing that the primary right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated land in good faith prior to government classification must be recognized and not prejudiced by after-events.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Cosalan, 835 Phil. 649 (2018) — Reiterated the exclusive right of members of indigenous cultural communities under Section 48(c) as an exception to the Regalian doctrine and recognized ancestral lands as covered by native title.
• Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019 — Noted that the 1987 Constitution reoriented the State toward enabling indigenous peoples to maintain their identity, departing from earlier policies of integration and assimilation.
• Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 354 (1999) — Distinguished ordinary from extraordinary acquisitive prescription; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary, requiring only possession in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.
• Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 214 Phil. 606 (1984) — Held that forest land is part of the public domain and cannot be the subject of registration under the Torrens system, subject to the ancestral-land exception recognized in this case.
• Pascual vs. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) — Cited for the rule that a Rule 45 petition may raise only questions of law and that the Court may entertain questions of fact only in exceptional circumstances.
• Duran vs. Court of Appeals, 522 Phil. 399 (2006) — Cited for the binding nature of the trial court's factual findings, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, given the trial court's firsthand opportunity to observe witness demeanor.

• Section 48(c), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 3872 — Allows members of national cultural minorities who, by themselves or through predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years, to be entitled to the rights in Section 48(b). Applied to uphold Acay's free patent.
• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 — Provides for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles of citizens occupying agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least 30 years. Section 48(c) extends this right to members of national cultural minorities.
• Section 44, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872 — Entitles a natural-born citizen not owning more than 24 hectares to a free patent for agricultural public land continuously occupied and cultivated since July 4, 1926 or prior; its second paragraph grants the same right to members of national cultural minorities who continuously occupied and cultivated land, whether disposable or not, since July 4, 1955. Applied to Acay's free patent.
• Section 120, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 3872 — Governs conveyances and encumbrances by non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities, requiring validity where the person can read and understand the instrument, and approval by the Chairman of the Commission on National Integration in specified illiterate or language cases. Cited in the statutory amendment context.
• Section 47, Republic Act No. 6940 — Extended to December 31, 2000 the period for persons specified in The Public Land Act to take advantage of its benefits, subject to area limits. Cited to show the continuing applicability of The Public Land Act provisions.
• Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8, Presidential Decree No. 410 — Declared ancestral lands occupied and cultivated by members of national cultural communities as alienable and disposable; defined ancestral lands; authorized Land Occupancy Certificates; directed subdivision into farm lots not exceeding five hectares; prohibited sale within 10 years; and required applications within 10 years. Cited as statutory recognition of ancestral lands.
• Sections 3(b), 3(1), 4, 5, and 12, Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) — Define ancestral lands, native title, and the indigenous concept of ownership; Section 12 gives individual members of cultural communities the option to secure title under Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Land Registration Act 496 upon continuous possession in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for at least 30 years, uncontested by members of the same ICC/IP. Applied to reinforce the recognition of ancestral land rights.
• Article XII, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Embodies the Regalian doctrine: all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The Court recognized native title and ancestral lands as an exception.
• Article II, Section 22; Article VI, Section 5(2); Article XII, Section 5; Article XIII, Section 6; Article XIV, Section 17; Article XVI, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, culture, traditions, and institutions, and provide for their representation and consultation. Cited as the constitutional basis for the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and the protective policy toward ICCs.
• Rule 45, Sections 1 and 6, Rules of Court — Section 1 limits a petition for review to questions of law; Section 6 makes review discretionary and available only for special and important reasons. Applied to deny the Republic's petition and decline factual review.
• Articles 427, 428, 1106, 1117, and 1118, Civil Code — Define ownership, acquisitive prescription, and its ordinary and extraordinary forms. The Court cited them to contrast the legal concept of ownership with the indigenous communal view and to explain that extraordinary prescription requires only possession in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.

Carandang, Zalameda, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur. Dimaampao, J., was designated as additional Member vice J. Rosario per Raffle dated November 24, 2021.