Republic of the Philippines vs. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Incorporated

A petition for certiorari is properly dismissed outright where the petitioner fails to attach copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition, including the memorandum and transcripts of hearings, as required by Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and a preliminary prohibitory injunction may issue to restrain the immediate implementation of a POEA suspension order pending appeal before the DOLE where the licensee has a clear and convincing right to operate and would suffer irreparable damage.

The Republic, represented by the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), is the government agency tasked with regulating private recruitment agencies under the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Incorporated is a licensed recruitment agency authorized to recruit and process documents for Filipinos seeking overseas employment. The dispute concerns the regulatory consequences of POEA orders suspending Principalia’s license and documentary processing, and the authority of the courts to enjoin their immediate implementation while administrative appeals remain pending.

Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Incorporated was a licensed recruitment agency engaged in the placement and employment of Filipinos abroad. On July 16, 2003, Ruth Yasmin Concha filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, docketed as POEA Case No. RV 03-07-1497. Concha alleged that in August 2002, she applied with Principalia for placement and employment as caregiver or physical therapist in the USA or Canada; that she paid P20,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 fee required by Principalia, which was not properly receipted; and that Principalia failed to deploy her for employment abroad. In its March 15, 2004 Order, the POEA Adjudication Office found Principalia liable for violations of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, particularly for collecting a fee from the applicant before employment was obtained, for non-issuance of an official receipt, and for misrepresenting that it was able to secure employment for Concha. Principalia’s license was ordered suspended for 12 months or, in lieu thereof, Principalia was ordered to pay a fine of P120,000.00 and to refund Concha’s placement fee of P20,000.00.

On October 14, 2003, Rafael E. Baldoza filed a second complaint, docketed as POEA Case No. RV 03-07-1453. Baldoza alleged that Principalia assured him of employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine operator with a monthly salary of $450.00; that after paying P20,000.00 as placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar on May 31, 2003; that upon arrival at the jobsite, he was made to work as welder, a job for which he had no skills; that he insisted he was hired as machine operator, but the alternative position offered to him was that of helper, which he refused; and that he was repatriated on July 5, 2003. On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a compromise agreement with quitclaim and release whereby Principalia agreed to redeploy Baldoza for employment abroad. Principalia failed to deploy Baldoza as agreed, and in an Order dated April 29, 2004, the POEA suspended Principalia’s documentary processing. Principalia moved for reconsideration, which the POEA granted on June 25, 2004. The POEA lifted its order suspending documentary processing after noting that Principalia exerted efforts to obtain overseas employment for Baldoza within the stipulated period but that, due to Baldoza’s lack of qualification, his application was declined by its foreign principal.

Meanwhile, on June 14, 2004, before the promulgation of the POEA order lifting the suspension, Principalia filed a complaint against Rosalinda D. Baldoz in her capacity as Administrator of POEA and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his capacity as POEA Conciliator before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. The complaint sought annulment of the order for suspension of documentation processing with damages, and applied for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Principalia claimed that the suspension of its documentary processing would ruin its reputation and goodwill and would cause the loss of its applicants, employers, and principals; thus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a writ of mandatory injunction had to be issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to it.

On June 14, 2004, Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante of the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, granted a 72-hour restraining order enjoining Administrator Baldoz and Atty. Abara from imposing the suspension orders before the matter could be heard in full. On June 17, 2004, Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali of the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, granted a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo ante, enjoining the defendants, other officers of the POEA, their subordinates, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting for and in their behalf from implementing the Orders of Suspension under VC No. LRD 03-100-95 and POEA Case No. RV-03-07-1497. The hearing on preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction was set for June 22, 2004. After the hearing, Administrator Baldoz and Atty. Abara submitted their Memorandum.

In an Order dated July 2, 2004, the trial court held that the issue on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction had become moot because POEA had already released the renewal of Principalia’s license. On the issue against the implementation of the order of suspension, however, the trial court found the need to issue the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction prayed for by Principalia. It stressed that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 was still pending appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment; that the said Order did not categorically state that the suspension of Principalia’s license was immediately executory; that Principalia would suffer tremendous loss and even closure of its business, and its reputation would be tarnished, making it difficult, if not impossible, to regain its existing clientele if the immediate implementation of the suspension continued; and that POEA would not suffer any damage if the immediate implementation of the suspension was enjoined. The trial court granted the application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction upon posting of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, enjoining and restraining the defendants, other officers of the POEA, their subordinates, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting for and in their behalf from immediately implementing the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 under POEA Case No. RV-03-07-1497.

• Technical Dismissal / Substantial Compliance: Petitioner argued that Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires only that the petition be accompanied by certified true copies of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof and other documents relevant and pertinent thereto; that it attached all the documents pertinent to the petition filed with the Court of Appeals; and that the attached documents substantially informed the Court of Appeals that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
• Clear and Convincing Right: Petitioner maintained that the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in granting Principalia’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of a clear and convincing right to the relief demanded.
• Irreparable Damage: Petitioner asserted that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the application despite the absence of proof of irreparable damage as required under the Rules of Court.
• Injunction Against Accomplished Act: Petitioner argued that the injunctive writ issued by the Regional Trial Court does not lie to enjoin an accomplished act.
• Presumption of Regularity: Petitioner contended that the issuance of an injunctive writ by the Regional Trial Court was tantamount to the reversal of the presumption of regularity of an official act.
• Immediate Executory Suspension: Petitioner argued that the basis for immediate implementation of the suspension order was Section 5, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, because the penalty imposed carried the maximum penalty of twelve months suspension of license.

• Clear Right and Irreparable Damage: Respondent claimed that the suspension of its documentary processing would ruin its reputation and goodwill and would cause the loss of its applicants, employers, and principals; thus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a writ of mandatory injunction had to be issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to it.
• Evidence of Right and Damage: Respondent presented evidence to prove that it had a license, that the said license was renewed, that the two suspension orders subject of the case existed, and that it would suffer irreparable damages.

• Technical Dismissal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari based on purely technical grounds for failure to attach copies of all relevant pleadings and transcripts of the hearings.
• Clear and Convincing Right: Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction despite the alleged absence of a clear and convincing right to the relief demanded.
• Irreparable Damage: Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ despite the alleged absence of proof of irreparable damage as required under the Rules of Court.
• Presumption of Regularity: Whether the issuance of the injunctive writ by the Regional Trial Court was tantamount to a reversal of the presumption of regularity of an official act.

• Technical Dismissal: No. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari because POEA failed to attach the Memorandum and the transcripts of the June 22 and June 29, 2004 hearings, as required by Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
• Clear and Convincing Right: No grave abuse of discretion. Until the appeal before the DOLE is resolved with finality, Principalia has a clear and convincing right to operate as a recruitment agency; POEA’s suspension before final adjudication was premature.
• Irreparable Damage: No grave abuse of discretion. Irreparable damage was duly proven because suspension of the license is not easily quantifiable and would tarnish Principalia’s reputation and cause loss of clientele.
• Presumption of Regularity: No. The presumption of regular performance of duty does not apply where the official’s duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion; the trial court did not correct a ministerial duty of POEA.

• Technical Dismissal: Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto; failure to comply with any of the foregoing requirements is sufficient ground for dismissal. Section 1, Rule 65 similarly requires that the petition be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. POEA failed to attach its Memorandum filed in the trial court and the transcripts of the hearings conducted on June 22, 2004 and June 29, 2004. In its motion for reconsideration, POEA attached only the TSN dated June 30, 2004, and still failed to attach the Memorandum, which the Court of Appeals deemed essential in determining the propriety of the trial court’s issuance of the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. Although the allowance of a petition on the ground of substantial compliance with the Rules is not a novel occurrence, strict application of the Rules was proper because POEA did not demonstrate willingness to comply with the requirements and to submit the necessary documents needed by the Court of Appeals for a proper perspective of the case. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition outright.
• Clear and Convincing Right: The trial court did not decree that POEA, as the granting authority of Principalia’s license to recruit, was not allowed to determine Principalia’s compliance with the conditions for the grant. POEA can determine whether the licensee has complied with the requirements. In this instance, however, the trial court observed that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 was pending appeal with the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. Until such time that the appeal is resolved with finality by the DOLE, Principalia has a clear and convincing right to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA’s action of suspending Principalia’s license before final adjudication by the DOLE would be premature and would amount to a violation of the latter’s right to recruit and deploy workers. Moreover, POEA would have no authority to exercise its regulatory functions over Principalia because the matter had already been brought to the jurisdiction of the DOLE.
• Irreparable Damage: Irreparable damage was duly proven by Principalia. Suspension of its license is not easily quantifiable nor is it susceptible to simple mathematical computation. The trial court found that, in the meantime that the appeal had not been resolved, Principalia’s clients and principals would have to look for other agencies here and abroad to supply their needs for employees and workers; that the end result would be tremendous loss and even closure of its business; and that Principalia’s reputation would be tarnished and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for it to regain its existing clientele if the immediate implementation of the suspension of its license continued. If the injunctive writ was not granted, Principalia would have been labeled as an untrustworthy recruitment agency before there could be any final adjudication of its case by the DOLE. It would have lost both its employer-clients and its prospective Filipino applicants. Loss of the former due to a tarnished reputation is not quantifiable.
• Presumption of Regularity: The presumption of regular performance of duty by the POEA under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court finds no application in the case at bar, as it applies only where a duty is imposed on an official to act in a certain way, and assumes that the law tells him what his duties are. The presumption that an officer will discharge his duties according to law does not apply where his duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion. The issue threshed out before the trial court was whether the order of suspension should be implemented pending appeal. It did not correct a ministerial duty of the POEA. As such, the presumption on the regularity of performance of duty does not apply.

• Dismissal for Non-Compliance with Rule 46 and Rule 65 — A petition for certiorari must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof and copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. Failure to comply is a sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ outright dismissal because POEA failed to attach its trial court Memorandum and the transcripts of the June 22 and June 29, 2004 hearings; attaching only a later TSN on reconsideration did not cure the defect.
• Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction — A writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction may issue where the applicant has a clear and convincing right to the relief demanded and would suffer irreparable damage. The Court found both requisites satisfied: Principalia had a clear right to operate while its appeal was pending before the DOLE, and suspension of its license would cause irreparable damage to its reputation and clientele.
• Irreparable Damage — Irreparable damage is injury not easily quantifiable or susceptible to simple mathematical computation. The Court held that the suspension of a recruitment agency’s license, before final adjudication, would tarnish its reputation and cause loss of employer-clients and applicants, which is not quantifiable.
• Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts — The presumption under Section 3(m), Rule 131 applies only where a duty is imposed on an official to act in a certain way and the law specifies his duties. It does not apply where the official’s duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion. The Court held it inapplicable because the trial court did not correct a ministerial duty of POEA.

• "The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition." — This provision, quoted from Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, supplied the basis for the Court of Appeals’ outright dismissal of POEA’s certiorari petition.
• "Thus, until such time that the appeal is resolved with finality by the DOLE, Principalia has a clear and convincing right to operate as a recruitment agency." — This states the ratio for finding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the injunctive writ on the ground of clear and convincing right.
• "Suspension of its license is not easily quantifiable nor is it susceptible to simple mathematical computation, as alleged by POEA." — This defines the Court’s treatment of irreparable damage and explains why the suspension of Principalia’s license warranted injunctive relief.
• "Therefore the presumption that an officer will discharge his duties according to law does not apply where his duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion." — This states the Court’s reason for rejecting POEA’s reliance on the presumption of regularity of official acts.

• Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 520, 532 (2003) — Cited to note that the allowance of a petition on the ground of substantial compliance with the Rules is not a novel occurrence in Philippine jurisdiction; the Court nevertheless applied the Rules strictly because POEA did not demonstrate willingness to comply.
• Security Bank Corporation vs. Indiana Aerospace University, G.R. No. 146197, June 27, 2005, 461 SCRA 260, 268 — Cited in support of the strict application of the Rules and the conclusion that the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for dismissing the petition for non-compliance.

• Section 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Requires the petition to contain full names and addresses, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background, the grounds relied upon, material dates, and to be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, material portions of the record, and other relevant documents. Failure to comply is sufficient ground for dismissal. Applied to uphold the Court of Appeals’ dismissal.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Requires a petition for certiorari to be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. Applied to require the missing Memorandum and transcripts of hearings.
• Section 5, Rule V, Part VI, 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations — Provides that the decision of the Administration shall be stayed during the pendency of the appeal, except where the penalty imposed carried the maximum penalty of twelve months suspension or cancellation of license, in which case the decision shall be immediately executory despite the pendency of the appeal. The trial court found the March 15, 2004 suspension order did not categorically state it was immediately executory; the Supreme Court upheld the injunction against immediate implementation.
• Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The Court held it inapplicable because it applies only where a duty is imposed on an official to act in a certain way and the law specifies his duties; it does not apply where the official’s duties are not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion.

Artemio V. Panganiban (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.