Republic of the Philippines vs. Pablo Feliciano

A complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of land against the Republic of the Philippines is a suit against the State and cannot prosper absent a showing of the State’s consent to be sued, which must be expressly or impliedly granted through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted; the complaint must allege such consent.

Respondent Pablo Feliciano claimed a parcel of land in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, consisting of four lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, as private property acquired from Victor Gardiola, whose predecessor-in-interest’s title was evidenced by an informacion posesoria. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, administered settlement and distribution of lands within the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 under the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration and its successor, the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844. The land claimed by Feliciano was located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90.

Pablo Feliciano claimed a parcel of land consisting of four lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. He alleged that he bought the property from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954. Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado, whose title was evidenced by an informacion posesoria. Upon his purchase, Feliciano took actual possession, introduced various improvements, and caused the property to be surveyed in July 1952; the survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.

On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90, reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur. NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, thereafter began subdividing and distributing the land to settlers. Feliciano maintained that the property he claimed, although located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was his private property and should be excluded from the reservation. He prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the 1,364.4177 hectares, that his title based on the informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal, valid, and subsisting, and that all awards to settlers be cancelled and nullified.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, answered, raising lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription as affirmative defenses. On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, declared Lot No. 1, with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of Feliciano, being covered by a possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-in-interest, and excluded it from the NARRA settlement reservation; the court declared Lots 2, 3, and 4 reverted to the public domain. Eighty-six settlers, together with the barrio council of Pag-asay, moved to intervene and set aside the decision, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than twenty years under claim of ownership.

The trial court reconsidered its decision on January 25, 1971, reopened the case, and directed the intervenors to file their pleadings and present evidence, while allowing Feliciano and the Republic to present additional evidence. When the intervenors failed to appear on August 30, 1971, the trial court denied their motion for postponement and allowed Feliciano to offer his evidence en ausencia; on August 31, 1971, Judge Sison reiterated his August 29, 1970 decision. The intervenors moved for reconsideration, but before that motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, through Judge Miguel Navarro, denied the motion for execution and set aside the order denying the intervenors’ motion for postponement, reopening the case to allow them to present evidence.

After further proceedings, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on August 21, 1980. In the course of the litigation, the Solicitor General maintained that the dismissal was proper on non-suability of the State and that the existence or authenticity of the purported possessory information title of Feliciano’s predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated; that the document was not evidence of title; and that, if it were, its efficacy had been lost by prescription and laches. The records also disclosed that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a reconstituted possessory information, reconstituted from the duplicate presented to the Register of Deeds by Dr. Pablo Feliciano without proof that the duplicate was authentic or that the original had been lost. The possessory information called for an area of only 100 hectares, whereas Feliciano claimed 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701.9064 hectares; settlers had also been occupying and cultivating the land since before the outbreak of the war.

• Non-Suability of the State: Petitioner maintained that the complaint is a suit against the State, which cannot be sued without its consent, and that no consent was shown or alleged.
• Waiver Not Inferred from Proclamation: Petitioner argued that Proclamation No. 90’s reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be” did not waive immunity; waiver must come from statutory authority and be strictly construed.
• Nature of Action: Petitioner argued that the action is in personam against the Republic, not an action in rem, and that the Begosa ruling does not apply because the land’s character remains to be established.
• Informacion Posesoria: Petitioner maintained that the possessory information’s existence or authenticity was not demonstrated, that it was not evidence of title, and that its efficacy had been lost by prescription and laches; it was merely reconstituted from a duplicate without proof of authenticity or loss of the original, and covered only 100 hectares while the claim was larger.
• Procedural Immunity: Petitioner argued that failure to assert immunity at trial is not fatal because courts may invoke it sua sponte at any stage.

• Consent from Proclamation: Respondent contended that the State’s consent could be read from Proclamation No. 90’s reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be.”
• Not a Suit Against State under Begosa: Respondent argued that the action is not a suit against the State because he does not seek to divest the Government of any lands or funds; the land is private property, not owned by the State.
• Waiver by Failure to Plead: Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to assert immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo.

• Non-Suability of the State: Whether the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of land against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, is a suit against the State barred by non-suability absent consent.
• Consent/Waiver: Whether the State’s consent to be sued may be inferred from Proclamation No. 90’s reservation “subject to private rights, if any there be.”
• Nature of Action and Begosa: Whether the action is not a suit against the State under Begosa because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of lands or funds.
• Procedural Invocation: Whether the defense of immunity from suit may be invoked by the courts sua sponte even if not timely asserted by the State.
• Informacion Posesoria: Whether the informacion posesoria relied upon by respondent established ownership or title sufficient to recover the land.
• Dismissal: Whether the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to allege consent.

• Non-Suability of the State: Yes. The complaint is a suit against the State, which cannot be sued without consent; no consent was shown or alleged, and dismissal was proper.
• Consent/Waiver: No. Proclamation No. 90’s “subject to private rights” clause does not waive immunity; waiver must emanate from statutory authority and is strictly construed.
• Nature of Action and Begosa: No. The action is in personam against the Republic to establish ownership and possession; the land’s character remains to be established, so Begosa does not remove immunity.
• Procedural Invocation: Yes. Immunity from suit may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage; failure to assert it earlier is not fatal.
• Informacion Posesoria: No. The possessory information remained at best prima facie evidence of possession; it was not converted into a record of ownership, and its authenticity and value were doubtful.
• Dismissal: Yes. The complaint should have been dismissed; failure to allege consent is a fatal defect.

• Non-Suability of the State: The State cannot be sued except upon a showing that it has consented to be sued, either expressly or impliedly through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. The complaint’s caption, allegations, and prayer were directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844. A suit for recovery of property is not an action in rem but an action in personam, directed against a specific party, and any judgment binds only that party. No showing of consent was made, and the complaint itself failed to allege consent; this was a fatal defect, and on this basis alone the complaint should have been dismissed.
• Consent/Waiver: The consent of the State cannot be read from Proclamation No. 90. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by the Proclamation cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act; the consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, and waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
• Nature of Action and Begosa: Respondent’s submission, sustained by the appellate court, that the action is not a suit against the State under Begosa because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any lands or funds, involved some sophistry. The character of the land sought to be recovered still remained to be established, and the plaintiff’s action was directed against the State precisely to compel it to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. The plaintiff sought to establish that he was the owner of the land based on an informacion posesoria of dubious value by suing the Republic in an action in personam.
• Procedural Invocation: The failure of petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo was not fatal. Such defense may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
• Informacion Posesoria: The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law was a means to record a claimant’s actual possession of land, established through an ex parte proceeding. Such inscription merely furnished, at best, prima facie evidence that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right. The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of twenty years, later reduced to ten, upon fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. There was no showing that respondent’s informacion posesoria had been converted into a record of ownership. Respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem, but failed to do so. Settlers had been occupying and cultivating the land since before the outbreak of the war, casting doubt on respondent’s claim of possession. The informacion posesoria was also a reconstituted possessory information, reconstituted from a duplicate presented by Dr. Pablo Feliciano without proof that the duplicate was authentic or that the original was lost; reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. The possessory information called for an area of only 100 hectares, whereas respondent claimed 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701.9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting possessory information documents and other purportedly old Spanish titles as proof of alleged ownership of lands.
• Dismissal: Because the complaint failed to allege the State’s consent to be sued, it should have been dismissed. The appellate court’s reversal of the trial court’s dismissal order was therefore set aside.

• State Immunity from Suit (Non-Suability of the State) — The State cannot be sued without its consent, except upon a showing that it has consented to be sued, either expressly or impliedly through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. Waiver of immunity is a derogation of sovereignty, is not inferred lightly, must be construed in strictissimi juris, and must emanate from statutory authority. In this case, the suit against the Republic for recovery of ownership and possession of land was a suit against the State; no consent was shown or alleged, and dismissal was proper.
• Action in Personam versus Action in Rem — A suit for recovery of property is not an action in rem but an action in personam. It is directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint against the Republic was in personam and therefore directly implicated State immunity.
• Informacion Posesoria — An inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law recorded a claimant’s actual possession of land through an ex parte proceeding. It furnished, at best, prima facie evidence that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession under a claim of right. It could ripen into a record of ownership after twenty years, later reduced to ten, upon compliance with Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. Here, no conversion into a record of ownership was shown, and the document was attended by doubts as to authenticity and area.
• Sua Sponte Invocation of Immunity — The defense of immunity from suit may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. The State’s failure to assert it earlier did not bar its invocation.
• Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title — Under the Public Land Act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title is an action in rem. Respondent could have applied for it but failed to do so.
• Reconstitution of Title — Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. The reconstituted possessory information in this case was made from a duplicate without proof that the duplicate was authentic or that the original was lost, raising grave doubts as to its authenticity and validity.

• "The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property." — This passage states the core holding that the action was a suit against the State and that non-suability barred the complaint.
• "A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties." — This defines the nature of the action and explains why the suit directly implicated the Republic’s immunity.
• "Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris." — This states the controlling rule on waiver of State immunity, which the Court applied against reading consent into Proclamation No. 90.
• "Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in his application." — This defines the evidentiary value of an informacion posesoria, which the Court held did not establish ownership.

• Ang Lam vs. Rosellosa, 86 Phil. 447 — Cited for the rule that a suit for recovery of property is an action in personam, not in rem.
• Providence Washington Insurance Co. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 598, 601 — Cited for the rule that the State cannot be sued without consent except upon a showing of express or implied consent through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
• Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic of the Philippines, 20 SCRA 627 — Cited for the proposition that failure of the complaint to allege consent is a fatal defect.
• Insurance Company of North America vs. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 27 SCRA 780 — Cited for the rule that immunity from suit may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
• Mobil Philippines Exploration, nn. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120; Insurance Company of North America vs. Warner, 21 SCRA 765 — Cited for the rule that waiver of immunity is not inferred lightly and must be construed in strictissimi juris.
• Begosa vs. Philippine Veterans Administration, 32 SCRA 466 — Cited by respondent and the appellate court but rejected as inapplicable; the action remained a suit against the State because it sought to compel the Republic to litigate ownership and possession.
• Alfonso vs. Commanding General, 7 Phil. 600, 615 — Cited for the nature of an informacion posesoria as an ex parte proceeding recording actual possession.
• Bishop of Segovia vs. Mun. of Bantay, 28 Phil. 347, 351 — Cited for the rule that a possessory information is at best prima facie evidence of possession under a claim of right.
• Querol and Flores vs. Querol, 48 Phil. 90, 98-99 — Cited for the rule that a possessory information may ripen into a record of ownership after twenty years, later reduced to ten, upon compliance with Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 865 — Cited for the rule that reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original.
• Government of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374, 379 — Cited for the fact that a possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares.

• Proclamation No. 90 (November 1, 1954) — Issued by President Ramon Magsaysay, it reserved for settlement purposes under NARRA a tract in Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur. The Court held it did not waive State immunity; the clause “subject to private rights, if any there be” merely excluded existing private rights and was not a legislative consent to suit.
• Republic Act No. 3844 — Created the Land Authority, the governmental agency through which the Republic was represented; the complaint against it was a suit against the State.
• Spanish Mortgage Law — Provided for inscription of an informacion posesoria to record a claimant’s actual possession through an ex parte proceeding; such inscription was at best prima facie evidence of possession under a claim of right.
• Article 393, Spanish Mortgage Law — Prescribed the requisites for a possessory information to ripen into a record of ownership after twenty years, later reduced to ten; no showing of compliance was made.
• Public Land Act — Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is an action in rem; Feliciano could have applied under it but failed to do so.

Justices Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, and Sarmiento concurred. Justice Melencio-Herrera was on leave.