Republic of the Philippines vs. Nestor Galang

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code requires proof of a mental — not physical — illness that existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and that is grave enough to render a spouse truly incapable, as distinguished from merely unwilling, neglectful, or remiss, of discharging the essential marital obligations; the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff, and the totality of evidence must establish the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the condition.

Nestor Galang and Juvy Salazar contracted marriage on March 9, 1994 in Pampanga and resided in the house of Nestor's father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation earning ₱8,500.00 monthly, while Juvy stayed at home as a housewife; the union produced one child, Christopher. The case is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, which renders void a marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. The State's interest in the preservation of marriage is institutionalized in the proceedings through the participation of the prosecuting attorney and the Office of the Solicitor General, the latter discharging the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi.

Nestor Galang and Juvy Salazar were married on March 9, 1994 in Pampanga and took up residence in the house of Nestor's father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor earned ₱8,500.00 monthly as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, while Juvy remained at home as a housewife. The couple had one child, Christopher.

On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler, having stolen his ATM card and his parents' money and having repeatedly solicited money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to Nestor, Juvy suffered from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child," an incapacity he described as "extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable."

The RTC directed the city prosecutor to investigate whether collusion existed between the parties, and on October 18, 1999, Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested that he found no evidence of collusion. The RTC then set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999, and Nestor presented testimonial and documentary evidence. He testified that he prepared their breakfast himself because Juvy did not want to wake up early; that Juvy often left their child in the care of neighbors; that Christopher nearly got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there; that Juvy squandered the ₱15,000.00 he had entrusted to her; that she stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his father's pension; that he caught her playing "mahjong" and "kuwaho" three times; and that she borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.

Nestor also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on Nestor himself. She stated that she wrote Juvy a letter requesting an interview, but the latter did not respond. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist described Nestor as resembling an emotionally matured individual who was well-adjusted but manifested very low frustration tolerance, suppressed feelings and emotions, and emotional tensions caused by his wife's behavior. She characterized Juvy's incapacity as manifested by her being irresponsible and lazy, her involvement in gambling, her being an "estafador," her neglect of her husband and child, her immature and rigid behavior, and her lack of initiative to change, concluding that there were "just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible." The report listed the incidents that led to the couple's separation, including that Juvy took their son and left the conjugal home, and opined that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son."

The RTC nullified the marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001, crediting the testimonies of Nestor and the psychologist and finding present the requisites of gravity, antecedence, and incurability. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto on November 25, 2004, holding that Juvy's indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations, and that the psychologist had characterized her condition as permanent, incurable, and existing at the time of the marriage. The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on May 9, 2005. On the record, the acts attributed to Juvy all occurred during the marriage, the gambling and solicitation having begun only about two years after the wedding and after Nestor allowed her to handle his salary and manage their finances, and the evidence showed that she had attempted to augment the family's income during the early years of the marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and working as a manicurist.

• Insufficiency of the Totality of Evidence: Petitioner claimed that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy's psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations.
• Failure to Prove the Requisites: Petitioner argued that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvy's condition.

• Contrary Position: Respondent took the exact opposite view of the petitioner's submission, maintaining that the evidence sufficed to warrant the declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36: Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent's marriage to Juvy on the ground that, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36: No. No sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of the respondent's evidence being insufficient to establish the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Juvy's alleged condition.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36: Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, and that the defect must refer to no less than a mental — not physical — incapacity causing a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants, confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina laid down more definitive guidelines incorporating the Santos requirements; Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos clarified that expert opinion is not absolutely necessary if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its requisites can be duly established; and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provided that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but expert opinion need not be alleged. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te suggested the relaxation of the Molina guidelines, but Benjamin G. Ting vs. Carmen M. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. Suazo vs. Angelito Suazo laid to rest any question regarding Molina's continued applicability, clarifying that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina and merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity. Measured against these guidelines, the totality of the respondent's evidence — his testimony, the psychologist's report, and her testimony — was insufficient.
• Respondent's Testimony: The testimony showed only that Juvy refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast, left their child to the care of neighbors, squandered a portion of the ₱15,000.00 entrusted to her, stole the respondent's ATM card and attempted to withdraw from his account, falsified his signature to encash a check, fabricated stories to borrow money from relatives, and indulged in gambling. These acts do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity the law requires, since psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Under Republic of the Philippines vs. Norma Cuison-Melgar, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she be shown incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness, and proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor — an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage — must be shown, with a cause linked to the manifestations of the incapacity. The testimony failed to show that Juvy's condition was a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in an incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition; the acts attributed to her showed only indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Ricardo B. Toring vs. Teresita M. Toring emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity. The falsification of the respondent's signature, the theft of the ATM card, and the squandering of the ₱15,000.00, while reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially as the evidence showed these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts; neither the penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money nor the solicitation of money from relatives on the pretext of a sick child warranted a conclusion of mental malady at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The respondent himself admitted that the gambling and swindling occurred only two years after the marriage and after he let Juvy handle his salary and manage their finances, and the evidence showed that she had tried to augment the family's income by putting up a sari-sari store and working as a manicurist.
• Psychologist's Report: The report hardly helped the respondent's cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated at the material time required by Article 36. The psychologist admitted that she derived her conclusions exclusively from information given by the respondent, whose description of Juvy would expectedly contain a considerable degree of bias; a psychological evaluation based on such a one-sided description alone can hardly be considered credible or sufficient. While Marcos holds that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined as a condition precedent, and that independent proof may support a conclusion of psychological incapacity independently of a psychologist's examination and report, no such independent evidence was ever gathered or adduced in this case; evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of the marriage would have made a lot of difference. Apart from the lack of factual basis, the report merely stressed Juvy's negative traits — laziness, immaturity, irresponsibility, involvement in swindling and gambling, and lack of initiative to change — and declared that psychological findings tended to confirm personality and behavioral disorders that appeared incorrigible, ending with an opinion, unaccompanied by any stated psychological basis, that there was sufficient reason to believe she was psychologically incapacitated. The report was grossly inadequate: the psychologist did not identify the types of psychological tests administered on the respondent or the root cause of Juvy's condition; the acts alleged all occurred during the marriage, with no showing that any mental disorder existed at its inception; the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of the condition, specifically why and to what extent the disorder was serious and how it incapacitated her from complying with her marital duties, and did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found; and it failed to establish incurability, the pronouncements that Juvy lacked initiative to change and that her incapacity appeared incorrigible being insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated or that the cure would be beyond her means.
• Psychologist's Testimony: The court testimony fared no better, as the psychologist merely reiterated what she had written in her report — that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible, played mahjong and kuhawo for money, stole money from the respondent, deceived people to borrow cash, and neglected her child — without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. These allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage, and the testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy's early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. The psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy's psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and likewise failed to prove gravity and incurability; from the premise that Juvy was hesitant to change despite the respondent's efforts, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared incurable or incorrigible and would be very hard to cure. Such unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with the gravity or incurability Article 36 requires, because to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing, while to refuse or be reluctant to change is another; psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
• Constitutional Policy and Burden of Proof: The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity lies with the plaintiff, and unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the indissolubility of the marital tie must be upheld.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36, Family Code — A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage is void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The defect must refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants concomitantly assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, and must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
• The _Santos Requisites_ — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The Court applied these requisites and found none of them established by the respondent's evidence.
• The _Molina Guidelines_ — The definitive guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36 require, among others, that the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff with doubts resolved in favor of the marriage; that the root cause of the incapacity be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; that the incapacity be proven to exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage; that it be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; that the illness be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; that the non-complied marital obligations be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code, stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision; that interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church be given great respect though not controlling; and that the trial court order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State, with the Solicitor General issuing a certification quoted in the decision and discharging the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi. These guidelines remain applicable, Ngo Te having merely suggested their relaxation.
• Expert Opinion Not Indispensable — Under Marcos, it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. The Court recognized this rule but held that no independent evidence was gathered in this case to supply what the one-sided psychological report lacked.
• Relaxation of _Molina Is Not Abandonment_ — Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; it merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity, as clarified in Ting and Suazo.
• Difficulty, Refusal, or Neglect Distinguished from Incapacity — Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness, and proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor — an adverse integral element in the personality structure — must be shown, with a cause linked to the manifestations of the incapacity. Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
• One-Sided Psychological Evaluation — A psychological evaluation derived exclusively from information supplied by the petitioning spouse, whose description of the other spouse would expectedly contain a considerable degree of bias, can hardly be considered credible or sufficient; independent evidence from sources who intimately knew the spouse before and after the marriage is necessary where the subject is not examined.
• Refusal to Change Distinguished from Incurability — To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. A report's pronouncements that a spouse "lacks the initiative to change" and that the condition "appears incorrigible" are insufficient to prove that the mental condition could not be treated or that the cure would be beyond the spouse's means.
• Indissolubility of Marriage and Burden of Proof — The Constitution protects and strengthens the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family; marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and unless the evidence clearly reveals a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marital tie must be upheld.

• "We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a 'difficulty,' 'refusal' or 'neglect' in the performance of some marital obligations." — This passage states the threshold the respondent's evidence failed to cross, and is the formulation routinely cited for the proposition that ordinary marital shortcoming is not psychological incapacity.
• "In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown." — This defines the canonical content of the incapacity required by Article 36 and explains why the acts attributed to Juvy, being mere isolated incidents, did not qualify.
• "To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another." — This is the Court's ratio for rejecting the psychologist's conclusion of incurability, which rested only on Juvy's supposed lack of initiative to change.
• "Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties." — This states the constitutional and policy premise underlying the rule that the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff and that doubts are resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage.

• Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20 — Controlling precedent establishing the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, and confining psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198 — Controlling precedent laying down the definitive guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, which the Court applied and reaffirmed as still in force.
• Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755 — Followed for the rule that expert opinion is not absolutely necessary if the totality of evidence establishes the incapacity and its requisites; distinguished on the ground that no independent evidence was adduced in this case.
• Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193 — Cited and construed as having merely suggested a relaxation of the Molina guidelines rather than abandoning them.
• Benjamin G. Ting vs. Carmen M. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694 — Followed, together with Suazo, in holding that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina.
• Jocelyn M. Suazo vs. Angelito Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154 — Followed for the clarification that Ngo Te stands for a more flexible approach in psychological incapacity cases.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Norma Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177 — Followed for the rule that proof of a spouse's failure to meet marital responsibility is insufficient absent a showing of incapacity arising from psychological illness.
• Ricardo B. Toring vs. Teresita M. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389 — Followed for the rule that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
• Bier vs. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123 — Cited for the requirement of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the personality structure.
• Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157 — Cited for the formulation that psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
• Paz vs. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 195 — Cited for the rule that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.
• Agraviador vs. Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010 — Cited in connection with the flexible approach to psychological incapacity petitions.
• So vs. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319 — Cited as the source of the text of Article 36 of the Family Code quoted in the decision.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. This was the sole ground invoked, and the Court held the evidence insufficient to satisfy it.
• Articles 68 to 71, Family Code — Define the essential marital obligations of husband and wife, which under the Molina guidelines must be the obligations shown to have been unfulfilled, and which must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.
• Articles 220, 221 and 225, Family Code — Define the essential obligations of parents and their children, likewise incorporated into the Molina guidelines as among the marital obligations whose non-compliance must be pleaded, proved, and recited in the decision.
• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), effective March 15, 2003 — Provides that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but that expert opinion need not be alleged.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle under which the petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional basis for the certification that the conclusions of the Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson)
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Roberto A. Abad (designated additional member vice Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, per Special Order No. 997, dated June 6, 2011)
• Martin S. Villarama, Jr.