Republic of the Philippines vs. Leonor A. Macabagdal

A notarized Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, even if unregistered with the Register of Deeds, retains evidentiary value to prove that one is an heir for purposes of substitution of parties in a pending case, although it may not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of property. The Court is not a trier of facts, and questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before it.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), initiated expropriation proceedings to acquire a parcel of land in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City for the C-5 Northern Link Road Project. The complaint initially impleaded an unidentified owner named in the title as "John Doe YY" because diligent efforts to search for the owner were exerted but the title and registered owner were not properly identified. The expropriation was necessary for the implementation of a public infrastructure project, which is the statutory context for the exercise of eminent domain.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH, filed a Complaint dated January 23, 2008 before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, seeking to expropriate a parcel of land in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City for the C-5 Northern Link Road Project. The complaint initially impleaded an unidentified owner named in the title as "John Doe YY," as the title and registered owner were not properly identified despite diligent efforts to search for the owner. After the trial court directed publication of the complaint in a newspaper of general circulation, the Republic filed a Motion for issuance of a writ of possession, which the trial court granted but held in abeyance until the Republic deposited a check representing the 100% zonal value of the property. Upon compliance, the RTC issued the writ of possession per Order dated March 10, 2009.

On October 13, 2008, Atty. Conrado E. Panlaque appeared before the RTC, praying that one Elena A. Macabagdal be substituted as party defendant, alleging that she was the real party in interest as the registered owner of the subject property, and submitted a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125922 registered in Elena's name. The Republic then filed a Motion to set the case for hearing to enable Elena to substantiate her claim, but on the day of the supposed hearing, neither Elena nor her counsel appeared. Instead, on February 3, 2010, Atty. Ricardo C. Pilares, Jr. filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Party, Admission of Answer and Hearing, averring that Elena had already died on May 14, 1997 as shown in her death certificate, and praying that her sole heir, Leonor A. Macabagdal, represented by Eulogia Macabagdal-Pascual by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, be substituted in Elena's place. The Omnibus Motion informed the RTC that respondent Leonor was the sole heir of her sister Elena, who died single intestate without a husband and children.

On April 16, 2010, Atty. Pilares presented Eulogia Macabagdal-Pascual and Nenita Pascual Ramota as witnesses and marked in evidence a copy of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and other pertinent documents as Exhibits "1" to "13-A" in support of respondent Leonor's claim as registered owner and proof of her ownership. After the completion of the testimonies, Atty. Hermenegildo Dumlao II, counsel for the Republic, orally manifested that the Republic's position on the motion for substitution would depend on the certification to be issued by Project Director Patrick B. Gatan. In a Manifestation dated April 26, 2010, the Republic informed the RTC that the property subject of expropriation is the same as that described in the technical description of TCT No. T-125922, registered in the name of Elena.

In its Order dated July 9, 2010, the RTC, finding that Elena A. Macabagdal really owned the property, named her as party defendant, and due to her death, ordered her substitution by respondent Leonor as her sole heir. The Republic filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing that the substitution was improper because the extrajudicial deed of partition was neither registered in the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela City nor published in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion in its Order dated March 16, 2011, ruling that Section 1, Rule 74 is not one of the requirements for substitution of parties under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and noting that the death certificate showed Elena was single at death without a will, making her surviving sister Leonor her only heir.

The Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, raising the sole issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondent Leonor to substitute Elena despite the former's alleged failure to prove her lawful right over the property. The CA denied the petition, finding no abuse of discretion, and noted that contrary to the Republic's assertion, the deed of extrajudicial settlement and the notice thereof were in fact published. The CA further explained that even if the deed were unregistered and unpublished, the immediate effect is that the instrument will not bind heirs, creditors, or other persons who have no notice thereof, but there is no mention that the instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir. The Republic's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, prompting the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Question of Law: The Republic argued that the instant Petition concerns "pure questions of law," specifically whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in allowing respondent Leonor to substitute Elena despite the former's failure to prove a lawful right over the subject property.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: The Republic contended that the only evidence submitted to prove that respondent Leonor is the sole heir was the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, which was unregistered with the Register of Deeds and unpublished in a newspaper of general circulation, and therefore does not bind the Republic, and respondent Leonor may not rightfully claim payment for the expropriation of the property.

• Non-Compliance with Rule 74: The Republic maintained that the substitution of respondent Leonor was invalid because the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estates of the late Lapaz A. Macabagdal and Elena A. Macabagdal dated July 21, 2008 ignored Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

• Limited Admission: The Republic countered that what it admitted was only the fact that the property subject of expropriation is the same registered under TCT No. T-125922, not that respondent Leonor was the sole heir.

• Propriety of Substitution: Respondent Leonor argued that the RTC did not abuse its discretion and that the substitution was proper, maintaining that there were sufficient pertinent documents and papers to support her claim.

• Acquiescence and Estoppel: Respondent Leonor insisted that the Republic acquiesced to her as the real party-in-interest when it actively participated in the determination of her personality as the sole heir, and thus the Republic is precluded from questioning her as an heir to Elena Macabagdal.

• Cognizability of the Issue: Whether the issue raised by the Republic—whether respondent Leonor sufficiently proved her status as sole heir of Elena—is a question of fact not cognizable in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondent Leonor's substitution as party defendant in the expropriation case.

• Cognizability of the Issue: No. The Republic raised a purely factual issue—whether respondent Leonor sufficiently established her standing as an heir of Elena—which invites recalibration of the evidence on record and is not cognizable by the Court in a Rule 45 appeal. A catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Court.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondent Leonor to substitute Elena, as respondent Leonor provided ample proof of her interest over the subject property, including testimonial and documentary evidence, and the notarized Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement enjoys the presumption of regularity and truthfulness of its contents.

• Cognizability of the Issue: A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The Republic invited the Court to recalibrate the RTC and CA's assessment of the evidence on record as regards respondent Leonor's standing as an heir of Elena. The Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court found no cogent reason to reverse the CA's holding. First, the Republic's assertion that the only evidence of respondent Leonor was the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was not meritorious, as respondent Leonor presented two witnesses—Eulogia Macabagdal-Pascual and Nenita Pascual Ramota—as well as other pertinent documentary evidence, including the Death Certificate of Elena. Second, the Republic's counsel orally manifested in open court that the Republic's position on the motion for substitution depended solely on the certification issued by DPWH's Project Director Patrick B. Gatan regarding whether the subject property refers to the one covered by TCT No. T-125922, revealing that the Republic had no issue as regards respondent Leonor's status as heir. Third, in the Manifestation dated April 26, 2010, the Republic confirmed that the subject property is the same one covered by TCT No. T-125922, and the status of respondent Leonor as the sole surviving sister of Elena and the propriety of her substitution were never questioned. Fourth, even assuming the unregistered Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the only evidence, non-registration does not strip away the document's evidentiary value with respect to respondent Leonor's status and interest over the subject property. The RTC appreciated the deed in relation to respondent Leonor's claim that she is the only surviving sister of Elena and that the latter had no other heirs, not that the property was adjudicated solely to her. While the Republic is correct that under Section 1, Rule 74 an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement does not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of property, there is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that the instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir due to non-registration. Finally, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was duly notarized, and a notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and the truthfulness of its contents, being a public document and evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution. The burden of disproving what is borne in the deed fell on the Republic, but it failed to meet this burden, providing no evidence nor even making any allegation that respondent Leonor is not the sole surviving heir and sister of Elena.

• Question of Fact vs. Question of Law — A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Republic's challenge to respondent Leonor's status as sole heir was a factual question not cognizable in a Rule 45 appeal.

• Non-Cognizability of Factual Issues in Rule 45 Appeals — Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration, as the Court is not a trier of facts and does not examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the Republic's petition.

• Evidentiary Value of Notarized Documents — A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and the truthfulness of its contents, and being a public document, is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the notarized Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, which states that Elena has no other heirs and that respondent Leonor is her only surviving sister, shifted the burden of disproving its contents to the Republic, which failed to meet that burden.

• Effect of Non-Registration of Extrajudicial Settlement — Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement does not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of property, but there is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that the instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir due to non-registration. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the Republic's argument that the unregistered deed could not establish respondent Leonor's heirship.

• "A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation." — This passage defines the standard for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law, which was the basis for the Court's holding that the Republic's petition raised a non-cognizable factual issue.

• "A catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration." — This passage states the controlling rule on the limited scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under Rule 45, which was dispositive of the petition.

• "A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and the truthfulness of its contents." — This passage articulates the evidentiary presumption accorded to notarized documents, which the Court applied to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement to uphold respondent Leonor's standing as sole heir.

• "While petitioner Republic is correct insofar as saying that under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement does not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of property, the CA is also correct in its holding that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that 'the instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir' due to the sheer fact that it was not registered before the Register of Deeds." — This passage reconciles the non-binding effect of an unregistered extrajudicial settlement on third persons with its continued evidentiary value to prove heirship, which was central to the Court's ruling.

• Caiña vs. People, 288 Phil. 177 (1992) — Cited as the source of the definition of a question of fact, distinguishing it from a question of law for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.

• Bautista vs. Puyat Vinyl Products, Inc., 416 Phil. 305 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court, citing earlier jurisprudence including Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. vs. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc. and Navarro vs. Commission on Elections.

• Republic of the Phils. vs. Sandiganbayan, 426 Phil. 104 (2002) — Cited for the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.

• Spouses Reyes, et al. vs. Heirs of Benjamin Malance, 793 Phil. 861 (2016) — Cited for the doctrine that a notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and the truthfulness of its contents.

• Section 1, Rule 74, Rules of Court — Provides that an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement does not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of property. The Court applied this provision to acknowledge the Republic's argument but held that it does not strip the document of evidentiary value to prove heirship.

• Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Governs the substitution of parties upon the death of a party. The RTC applied this provision in allowing respondent Leonor to substitute Elena, and the Court affirmed this application.

• Section 23, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that a notarized document, being a public document, is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution. The Court cited this provision to support the evidentiary weight given to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, which are limited to questions of law. The Court applied this rule to dismiss the Republic's petition as raising a purely factual issue.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The Republic's petition before the CA was filed under this rule, raising the issue of grave abuse of discretion.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), J. Reyes Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concurred in the decision.