Republic of the Philippines vs. Imperial

Under Article X of the Constitution, the terms of the first three Commissioners on Elections must be deemed to have commenced on a common date, and a successor appointed to fill a vacancy caused by death, resignation, or permanent disability serves only for the unexpired balance of the predecessor’s term, so that the constitutional plan of rotating appointments at regular three-year intervals is preserved.

Domingo Imperial and Rodrigo D. Perez held the offices of Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Commission on Elections. Article X of the Constitution established an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two Members, appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who were to hold office for nine years and could not be reappointed; of the first Members, one was to serve nine years, another six, and the third three. The provision superseded the purely statutory Commission previously created by Commonwealth Act No. 607 and was implemented by Commonwealth Act No. 657, which organized the constitutional Commission on June 21, 1941.

Domingo Imperial and Rodrigo D. Perez were the respondents in a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. According to the Solicitor General, the first Commissioners of Elections were duly appointed and qualified on July 12, 1945, with the following terms: Jose Lopez Vito as Chairman for nine years, expiring July 12, 1954; Francisco Enage as Member for six years, expiring July 12, 1951; and Vicente Vera as Member for three years, expiring July 12, 1948.

Upon the death of Chairman Jose Lopez Vito in May 1947, Member Vicente de Vera was promoted Chairman by appointment dated May 26, 1947. Under the rulings in Nacionalista Party vs. Vera and Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista, De Vera’s term as Chairman would have expired on July 12, 1954, the date when the first Chairman Lopez Vito’s term would have expired. Chairman Vicente de Vera died in August 1951, before the expiration of the maximum nine-year term of the first Chairman on July 12, 1954. On August 11, 1951, Domingo Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed De Vera; his appointment provided that he was to serve “for a term expiring July 12, 1960.”

Rodrigo Perez was appointed Member of the Commission on December 8, 1949, for “a term of nine years expiring on November 24, 1958,” vice Francisco Enage, who was retired in November 1949. The Solicitor General concluded that Imperial’s term legally expired on July 12, 1954, the expiration of the nine-year term for which the first Chairman Lopez Vito was appointed, and that Perez’s term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the six-year term for which Commissioner Enage was appointed. The Solicitor General therefore concluded that the respondents had ceased to have any legal or valid title to their positions and that the positions should be declared vacant.

Respondents filed separate answers praying for dismissal. Imperial alleged that Jose Lopez Vito was first appointed Chairman on May 12, 1941, for a nine-year term expiring May 12, 1950; that when Lopez Vito was again appointed Chairman on July 12, 1945, his nine-year term under the second appointment should not be reckoned from July 12, 1945, but from the date of his first appointment in 1941, so that the term under the second appointment expired on May 12, 1950; and that because Imperial was appointed after the expiration of Lopez Vito’s full term in 1950, Imperial should serve a full nine-year term ending only on August 10, 1960. Imperial stressed the unconstitutionality of Lopez Vito’s second appointment to serve up to July 12, 1954, upon the ground that under the Constitution Lopez Vito could neither be appointed for more than nine years nor be allowed to succeed himself.

Perez alleged that since Chairman Lopez Vito was first appointed under the Constitution on May 13, 1941, the terms of all Commissioners should be reckoned from that date to maintain the three-year difference between the expiration dates of their terms as provided by the Constitution. He contended that the term of Member Francisco Enage, his predecessor, should be considered to have started on May 13, 1941, and since Enage was appointed only for six years, his term expired on May 12, 1947; and that since Perez was appointed on December 8, 1949, after Enage’s six-year term had already expired, Perez should serve a full nine-year term from May 12, 1947, expiring on May 12, 1956. Perez argued that if the Solicitor General’s computation were followed—counting Enage’s term from July 12, 1945, ending July 12, 1951—there would be only a difference of fourteen months between the expiration of Lopez Vito’s term on May 12, 1950 and Enage’s term, contrary to and violative of the Constitution’s prescribed three-year difference between the expiration of the terms of the Members of the Commission.

• Term of Chairman Imperial: Petitioner maintained that because Chairman Vicente de Vera’s term as successor to Jose Lopez Vito was legally limited to the latter’s unexpired nine-year term expiring July 12, 1954, respondent Domingo Imperial’s appointment as Chairman on August 11, 1951, notwithstanding its stated expiration of July 12, 1960, legally expired on July 12, 1954.
• Term of Member Perez: Petitioner argued that respondent Rodrigo Perez, appointed on December 8, 1949, to succeed Commissioner Francisco Enage, could serve only the unexpired six-year term of Enage, which expired on July 12, 1951, notwithstanding his appointment’s stated term of nine years expiring November 24, 1958.
• Vacancy of Offices: Petitioner concluded that respondents had ceased to have legal or valid title to the positions of Chairman and Member, respectively, and that their positions should be declared vacant.

• Imperial — Reckoning from First Appointment: Respondent Imperial argued that Jose Lopez Vito was first appointed Chairman on May 12, 1941, for a nine-year term expiring May 12, 1950; that Lopez Vito’s second appointment on July 12, 1945, should not restart the nine-year term but should be reckoned from the 1941 appointment, expiring May 12, 1950; and that because Imperial was appointed after the expiration of Lopez Vito’s full term in 1950, Imperial should serve a full nine-year term ending August 10, 1960.
• Imperial — Unconstitutionality of Lopez Vito’s Second Appointment: Imperial stressed that Lopez Vito’s second appointment to serve until July 12, 1954 was unconstitutional because under the Constitution Lopez Vito could neither be appointed for more than nine years nor succeed himself.
• Perez — Common Starting Date: Respondent Perez alleged that since Chairman Lopez Vito was first appointed under the Constitution on May 13, 1941, the terms of all Commissioners should be reckoned from that date to maintain the three-year difference between expiration dates; Enage’s six-year term should be considered to have started May 13, 1941 and expired May 12, 1947; because Perez was appointed on December 8, 1949, after Enage’s term expired, Perez should serve a full nine-year term from May 12, 1947, expiring May 12, 1956.
• Perez — Three-Year Interval: Perez argued that the Solicitor General’s computation would make Enage’s term expire on July 12, 1951, close to Lopez Vito’s May 12, 1950 expiration, leaving only fourteen months between their terms, contrary to the Constitution’s prescribed three-year difference.

• Common Starting Date of First Commissioners’ Terms: Whether the terms of the first three Commissioners on Elections under Article X of the Constitution must be deemed to have commenced on a common date, notwithstanding variations in their dates of appointment and qualification.
• Filling Vacancies and Unexpired Terms: Whether a successor appointed to fill a vacancy in the Commission on Elections caused by death, resignation, or permanent disability before the expiration of the incumbent’s term serves only for the unexpired balance of that term, rather than for a full nine-year term.
• Terms of Respondents Imperial and Perez: Whether the legal terms of respondents Domingo Imperial and Rodrigo Perez had expired, such that their continuance in office as Chairman and Member of the Commission on Elections was unlawful and their positions should be declared vacant.

• Common Starting Date of First Commissioners’ Terms: Yes. The terms of the first three Commissioners must be deemed to have started at the same moment, irrespective of variations in their dates of appointment and qualification, to preserve the constitutional rotation plan; the Court preferred June 21, 1941, the organization of the constitutional Commission under Commonwealth Act No. 657.
• Filling Vacancies and Unexpired Terms: Yes. A successor appointed to fill a vacancy caused by death, resignation, or permanent disability before expiration of the term serves only for the unexpired balance of the predecessor’s term, because Article X’s rotation plan requires one vacancy every three years and no President may appoint more than one Commissioner.
• Terms of Respondents Imperial and Perez: No. The legal terms of respondents Perez and Imperial had not expired: Perez’s term began June 21, 1947 and expired June 20, 1956, while Imperial’s term began June 21, 1950 and expired June 20, 1959.

• Common Starting Date of First Commissioners’ Terms: Article X, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that the Commission on Elections shall be composed of a Chairman and two Members appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for nine years and may not be reappointed; of the first Members, one shall hold office for nine years, another for six years, and the third for three years. This provision, read with the nine-year term without reappointment, evidences a deliberate plan for a regular rotation or cycle in the Commission’s membership, with subsequent members appointable only once every three years. Prior pronouncements in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista and Nacionalista Party vs. Vera stated that the periods were intended to have one position vacant every three years, so that no President can appoint more than one Commissioner, thereby preserving the independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body. The rotation plan requires two indispensable conditions: first, that the terms of the first three Commissioners start on a common date; and second, that any vacancy due to death, resignation, or disability before the expiration of the term be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. Without these conditions, the regularity of the intervals between appointments would be destroyed and the purpose of the rotation would be frustrated. The terms of the first three Commissioners were therefore held to have started at the same moment, irrespective of variations in their dates of appointment and qualification, so that the expiration of the first terms of nine, six, and three years would lead to the regular recurrence of three-year intervals. It was immaterial whether the terms started from the approval of the constitutional amendment on December 2, 1940, the reorganization of the Commission under Commonwealth Act No. 657 on June 21, 1941, or the appointment of the first Chairman on May 13, 1941; the Court preferred June 21, 1941, because Commonwealth Act No. 657 implemented and completed the organization of the Commission that under the Constitution “shall be” established. Appointment to a constitutional office is both a right and a duty that should not be shirked or delayed, and the appointing power cannot be allowed to retard compliance with its constitutional duty when delay would impede or frustrate the plain intent of the fundamental law. In case of a belated appointment, the interval between the common start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
• Filling Vacancies and Unexpired Terms: The general rule is that a public officer’s death or other permanent disability creates a vacancy in the office, so that the successor is entitled to hold for a full term. That rule, however, is recognized to suffer an exception where the clear intention is to have vacancies and appointments at regular intervals. The Court cited 43 American Jurisprudence, section 159, page 18, for the rule that the resignation or removal of an officer during his term and the appointment of a successor do not divide the term or create a new and distinct one, and that the successor is filling out his predecessor’s term; the term of one appointed to fill a vacancy in a board of several officers is held to be for the unexpired term of his predecessor only where the clear intent of the creating power is that the entire board should not go out of office at once, but that different groups should retire at regularly recurring intervals. State ex rel. Rylands vs. Pinkerman was cited to illustrate that where a board’s charter creates staggered terms, allowing successors of members who resigned to serve full new terms would frustrate the carefully devised scheme of alternating succession. Simpson vs. Willard was cited for the rule that when the Constitution fixes the duration of a term and provides for its being filled at a fixed time occurring periodically, a casual vacancy must be filled for the unexpired term, with the incumbent holding only until the regular time for filling the office. Baker vs. Kirk was cited for the rule that the term of one appointed to fill a vacancy in one of three memberships of a board is deemed to be for the unexpired term, absent express provision, where the statute fixes the first terms at unequal lengths to prevent an entire change of membership at any one time. Other cases to the same effect were collated in State Ex. Rel. Fish vs. Howell. The Court reasoned that the orderly rotation and renovation of Commissioners would be wrecked unless, in case of early vacancy, a successor is allowed to serve only for the unexpired portion of each regular term, and that this rule is so evidently fundamental and indispensable to the working of the plan that it became unnecessary to state it in Article X in so many words. The fact that such appointments would make appointees serve for less than nine years does not argue against reading the limitation into the Constitution, because the nine-year term cannot be lifted out of context and independently of the provision limiting the first Commissioners’ terms to nine, six, and three years; the unexpired portion is still part and parcel of the preceding term, so that filling the vacancy shortens only the tenure of the successor, not the term of office. The possibility that the appointing power might create vacancies does not justify setting at naught the clear intention to have members appointed at regular three-year intervals. Nor does the possibility that one may be appointed for a much shorter term reduce the Commissioner’s independence, because the majority of the Commission would not be affected save in exceptional cases, and the independence of the majority is the independence of the whole Commission.
• Terms of Respondents Imperial and Perez: Applying the foregoing principles, the terms of the first appointees under the Constitution were computed as follows: Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, nine-year term from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1950; Francisco Enage, Member, six-year term from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1947; the first three-year term from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944 was not filled. Since the first three-year term had already expired, the appointment of Vicente de Vera on July 12, 1945 was deemed for the full term of nine years, from June 21, 1944 to June 20, 1953. The first vacancy occurred by expiration of the initial six-year term of Commissioner Enage; although he served as de facto Commissioner until 1949, his successor, respondent Rodrigo Perez, was named for a full nine-year term, which under the principles laid down should be held to have started on June 21, 1947, to expire on June 20, 1956. The second vacancy happened upon the death of Chairman Jose Lopez Vito on May 7, 1947, more than two years before the expiration of his full term. To succeed him as Chairman, Commissioner Vicente de Vera was appointed; such appointment, if at all valid, could legally be only for the unexpired period of Lopez Vito’s term, up to June 20, 1950. To fill the vacancy created by Vera’s assumption of the Chairmanship, Commissioner Leopoldo Rovira was appointed on May 22, 1947; under the principles laid down, Rovira could only fill out the balance of Vera’s term until June 20, 1953, and could not be reappointed thereafter. Vera’s tenure as Chairman expired on June 20, 1950, the end of Lopez Vito’s original term. A vacancy therefore occurred on that date that Vera could no longer fill, since his reappointment was expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent Commissioner Domingo Imperial, whose term of nine years must be deemed to have begun on June 21, 1950, to expire on June 20, 1959. The vacancy created by the legal expiration of Rovira’s term on June 20, 1953 appears unfilled up to the present; the time elapsed must be counted against his successor, whose legal term is for nine years, from June 21, 1953 to June 20, 1962. It appearing that the legal terms of respondents Perez and Imperial had not yet expired, whether the original terms started from the operation of the constitutional amendments or the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 657, the petition for quo warranto was dismissed without costs.

• Rotation Plan in the Commission on Elections — Article X, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, by fixing the first Commissioners’ terms at nine, six, and three years and subsequent terms at nine years without reappointment, establishes a deliberate plan for a regular rotation or cycle in the Commission’s membership, with one position becoming vacant every three years. The Court applied this to hold that no President may appoint more than one Commissioner in a four-year administration, thereby preserving the independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body.
• Common Commencement of Staggered Terms — Where a constitution creates a board with staggered terms to ensure rotation, the terms of the first members must be deemed to have commenced on a common date, irrespective of variations in their dates of appointment and qualification. The Court preferred June 21, 1941, the date the constitutional Commission was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 657, and held that any interval between the common start and a belated appointee’s actual qualification must be counted against the appointee.
• Unexpired-Term Rule for Vacancies in Rotation Boards — As an exception to the general rule that a successor to a public office serves a full term, where the clear intent is to have appointments at regular intervals, a successor appointed to fill a vacancy caused by death, resignation, or permanent disability serves only for the unexpired balance of the predecessor’s term. The Court found this rule indispensable to the constitutional rotation plan even though Article X did not expressly state it, because otherwise the regular three-year intervals would be destroyed.
• Independence of the Commission as a Body — A Commissioner may serve for less than the full nine-year term when filling an unexpired term without impairing the independence of the Commission, because the majority of the Commission is not affected and the independence of the majority is the independence of the whole Commission.

• "The provision that of the first three commissioners appointed, 'one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6 years, and the third for 3 years,' when taken together with the prescribed term of office for 9 years, without reappointment, evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the commission, by having subsequent members appointable only once every three years." — This passage states the core rationale for the rotation plan, deriving from Article X the intent to create one vacancy every three years.
• "Now, the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three commissioners should start on a common date; and (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the two conditions necessary to preserve the constitutional rotation of Commissioners.
• "It seems the term of office of one elected or appointed to fill a vacancy in a board of several officers will be held to be for the unexpired term of his predecessor only, where the clear intent of the creating power is that the entire board should not go out of office at once, but that different groups should retire at regularly recurring intervals." — Quoted from 43 American Jurisprudence, this passage supplies the exception to the general full-term rule for successors and supports the unexpired-term doctrine.
• "And it appearing, from the foregoing, that the legal terms of office of the respondents Perez and Imperial have not as yet expired, whether the original terms started from the operation of the Constitutional amendments or the enactment of C. A. 657, the petition for quo warranto is hereby dismissed without costs." — This is the dispositive holding, resting on the computation that the respondents’ legal terms had not yet expired.

• Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 47 Off. Gaz., 2375 (85 Phil., 126) — Cited as a prior pronouncement on the three-year rotation plan; the Court noted that previous decisions were not considered decisive because of divergent opinions at the time, but relied on the statement that the periods were intended to create one vacancy every three years.
• Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356 (85 Phil., 101) — Cited with Vera for the same proposition that the staggered terms were intended to allow one appointment every three years and preserve the Commission’s independence and impartiality.
• State ex rel. Rylands vs. Pinkerman, 63 Conn. 176, 28 Atl. 110, 22 LRA 643 — Relied on to illustrate that where a board’s charter creates staggered terms, successors of members who resign or leave during their terms should not be appointed for full new terms, because that would frustrate the carefully devised scheme of alternating succession.
• Parmater vs. State, 102 Ind. 90, 93 — Cited in connection with the Bridgeport board example to support the same principle of staggered succession.
• Simpson vs. Willard, 14 S. C. 191 — Cited for the rule that when the Constitution fixes the duration of a term and provides for filling the office at fixed periodic times, a casual vacancy must be filled only for the unexpired term, with the incumbent holding until the regular time for filling the office.
• Baker vs. Kirk, 33 Ind. 517 — Cited for the rule that the term of one appointed to fill a vacancy in one of three memberships of a board is deemed to be for the unexpired term, absent express provision, where the statute fixes the first terms at unequal lengths to prevent an entire change of membership at one time.
• State Ex. Rel. Fish vs. Howell, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.), 345 — Cited as collating other cases to the same effect on filling vacancies in staggered boards for the unexpired term.

• Article X, Section 1, paragraph 1, Constitution — Quoted in full by the Court. It establishes an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two Members appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments; they hold office for nine years and may not be reappointed; of the first Members, one holds for nine years, another for six, and the third for three; and they may be removed only by impeachment. The Court used this provision to derive the rotation plan and the unexpired-term rule.
• Article X, Section 3, Constitution — Cited as one of the safeguards of individual Commissioners’ impartiality and independence, specifically the disability to practice any profession and the prohibition of conflicting interests. The Court referenced it to explain why shortened tenure of one Commissioner does not undermine the Commission’s independence.
• Commonwealth Act No. 607 — Identified as the statute that previously created and organized the purely statutory Commission on Elections, which Article X superseded.
• Commonwealth Act No. 657 — Identified as the statute that implemented and completed the organization of the constitutional Commission on Elections on June 21, 1941; the Court preferred this date as the common commencement of the first Commissioners’ terms.

Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.