Republic of the Philippines vs. Feliciano

A suit for recovery of ownership and possession filed directly against the Republic of the Philippines is barred by the doctrine of State immunity from suit absent a showing that the State consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted; a presidential proclamation reserving land "subject to private rights" does not constitute such consent.

Respondent Pablo Feliciano claimed ownership of a parcel of land consisting of four lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares situated in Barrio Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. He purchased the property from Victor Gardiola, who in turn had acquired it from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado, whose title was evidenced by an informacion posesoria. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes a tract of land in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). The land claimed by Feliciano fell within the reservation, prompting him to seek exclusion of his property therefrom. NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, had begun subdividing and distributing land to settlers within the reservation.

On January 22, 1970, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares situated in Barrio Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954. Gardiola had purportedly acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado, whose title was evidenced by an informacion posesoria. Upon purchase, Feliciano claimed to have taken actual possession, introduced improvements, and caused the land to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.

On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of NARRA, a tract of land in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur. Thereafter, NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, began subdividing and distributing land to settlers within the reservation. Feliciano contended that his property, while located within the reservation, was his private property and should be excluded therefrom. He prayed that he be declared the rightful owner, that his title based on the informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared valid and subsisting, and that the defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.

The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer raising affirmative defenses of lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription. On August 29, 1970, Judge Rafael S. Sison rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be Feliciano's private property as covered by a possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-in-interest, and declaring it excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation. Lots 2, 3, and 4 were declared reverted to the public domain. Eighty-six settlers, together with the barrio council of Pag-asay, moved to intervene and to set aside the decision, alleging possession of the land for more than twenty years under claim of ownership.

The case was reopened, but the intervenors failed to appear on the date set for presentation of their evidence. Judge Sison denied their motion for postponement and rendered a decision on August 31, 1971 reiterating his earlier ruling. Intervenors moved for reconsideration, and Feliciano moved for execution. Judge Miguel Navarro denied the motion for execution and reopened the case to allow intervenors to present evidence. Feliciano's petition for certiorari to the Intermediate Appellate Court was denied, and the Supreme Court denied his petition in G.R. No. 36163 on May 3, 1973, remanding the case for further proceedings.

On August 31, 1970, intervenors had filed a motion to dismiss principally on the ground that the Republic cannot be sued without its consent. On August 21, 1980, Judge Esteban Lising issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground of non-suability of the State. The Solicitor General opposed Feliciano's motion for reconsideration, maintaining that dismissal was proper and further arguing that the existence and authenticity of the purported informacion posesoria had not been demonstrated, that it was not evidence of title, and that at any rate its efficacy had been lost by prescription and laches. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, Feliciano elevated the matter to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which on April 30, 1985 reversed Judge Lising's order and remanded the case. The Republic then filed the present petition for review.

• Non-Suability of the State: The Republic argued that the complaint was a suit directly against the State, which is not permitted absent a showing that the State consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. No such consent was shown, and the complaint itself failed to allege the existence of such consent, constituting a fatal defect.
• Invalidity of the Informacion Posesoria: The Solicitor General maintained that the existence and authenticity of the purported informacion posesoria had not been demonstrated, that it was not evidence of title, and that at any rate its efficacy had been lost by prescription and laches. The document was a "reconstituted" possessory information without proof that the original was lost, and it called for an area of only 100 hectares while the claim extended to over 700 hectares.
• Sua Sponte Invocation: The Republic contended that the defense of immunity from suit may be invoked by courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings, rendering the failure to assert it earlier non-fatal.

• Implied Consent from Proclamation: Feliciano contended that the State's consent to be sued could be read from Proclamation No. 90 itself, which established the reservation "subject to private rights, if any there be," arguing that this language constituted a waiver of immunity.
• Not a Suit Against the State: Relying on the Begosa case, Feliciano argued that the action was not a suit against the State because he did not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or funds; the land in question was private property belonging to him, not property owned by the State.
• Late Assertion of Immunity: Feliciano asserted that the Republic's failure to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo rendered the defense unavailable.

• State Immunity from Suit: Whether the complaint filed by Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines for recovery of ownership and possession of land is barred by the doctrine of non-suability of the State.
• Consent by Proclamation: Whether the phrase "subject to private rights, if any there be" in Proclamation No. 90 constitutes the State's consent to be sued.
• Nature of the Action: Whether the action is not a suit against the State on the ground that it seeks recovery of private land and does not divest the Government of any property.
• Sua Sponte Invocation: Whether the defense of State immunity may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings, notwithstanding failure to assert it earlier.
• Evidentiary Value of Informacion Posesoria: Whether the informacion posesoria relied upon by Feliciano is sufficient to establish ownership or possession.

• State Immunity from Suit: Yes. The complaint is a suit against the State and is barred absent a showing of consent to be sued, which was neither alleged nor demonstrated.
• Consent by Proclamation: No. The language of Proclamation No. 90 excluding existing private rights cannot be construed as a waiver of State immunity; a presidential proclamation is not a legislative act, and waiver of immunity must emanate from statutory authority.
• Nature of the Action: No. The character of the land remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate ownership and possession; the argument that the Government is not being divested of any property is sophistical.
• Sua Sponte Invocation: Yes. The defense of immunity from suit may be invoked by courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
• Evidentiary Value of Informacion Posesoria: No. The informacion posesoria was of dubious authenticity, having been "reconstituted" without proof of loss of the original, and it called for an area of only 100 hectares while the claim extended to over 700 hectares; it remained at best prima facie evidence of possession and had not been converted into a record of ownership.

• State Immunity from Suit: The complaint by its caption, allegations, and prayer was clearly a suit against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844. A suit for recovery of property is an action in personam, directed against a specific party, and any judgment binds only such party. Under settled jurisprudence, a suit against the State is not permitted except upon a showing that the State consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. No such showing was made, and the complaint itself failed to allege the existence of such consent—a fatal defect warranting dismissal.

• Consent by Proclamation: The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act; the consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, and waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

• Nature of the Action: The argument that the action is not a suit against the State because it involves private land and does not divest the Government of any property involves sophistry. The character of the land sought to be recovered remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. The plaintiff seeks to establish ownership based on an informacion posesoria of dubious value by suing the Republic in an action in personam.

• Sua Sponte Invocation: It is settled that the defense of State immunity from suit "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings." The failure of the Republic to assert the defense when the case was tried before the court a quo is therefore not fatal.

• Evidentiary Value of Informacion Posesoria: The inscription of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law merely furnishes prima facie evidence that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right. It could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to 10) upon fulfillment of the requisites in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, but there was no showing that the informacion posesoria had been so converted. Respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act, an action in rem, but failed to do so. The document was "reconstituted" from a duplicate presented by Feliciano himself without proof that the original was lost, and reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. The possessory information called for an area of only 100 hectares, whereas the claim extended to 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701.9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting possessory information documents and other purportedly old Spanish titles as proof of ownership.

• Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit — The State cannot be sued without its consent, either express or implied through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. The defense may be invoked by courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, must be construed in strictissimi juris and can only be made by an act of the legislative body; a presidential proclamation is not a legislative act and cannot constitute such consent. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the complaint because it was a suit directly against the Republic of the Philippines with no showing of consent to be sued.

• Evidentiary Value of Informacion Posesoria — An informacion posesoria inscribed under the Spanish Mortgage Law is at best prima facie evidence of possession at the time the proceeding was held, not evidence of ownership. It could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to 10) upon fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. Reconstitution of such a document is valid only in case of loss of the original. The Court found the informacion posesoria in this case dubious because it was "reconstituted" without proof of loss of the original and covered only 100 hectares while the claim extended to over 700 hectares.

• "Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris." — This passage articulates the canonical standard for construing waiver of State immunity, establishing that such waiver must be express or implied through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted, and cannot be drawn from a presidential proclamation.

• "There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property." — This passage refutes the argument that an action involving land claimed to be private is not a suit against the State, clarifying that the very purpose of the suit is to compel the State to litigate ownership.

• "Courts should be wary in accepting 'possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands." — This passage sets a cautionary standard for the evidentiary treatment of informacion posesoria and old Spanish titles in land disputes, emphasizing the need for scrutiny of their authenticity and sufficiency.

• Ang Lam vs. Rosenosa, 86 Phil. 447 — Cited for the proposition that a suit for recovery of property is an action in personam, not in rem, binding only the parties thereto.
• Providence Washington Insurance Co. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 598 — Cited for the rule that a suit against the State is not permitted except upon a showing that the State consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
• Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic of the Philippines, 20 SCRA 627 — Cited for the principle that failure to allege the existence of State consent to be sued is a fatal defect warranting dismissal.
• Insurance Company of North America vs. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 27 SCRA 780 — Cited for the settled rule that the defense of State immunity from suit may be invoked by courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
• Mobil Philippines Exploration, nn. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120 — Cited jointly with Insurance Company of North America vs. Warner, 21 SCRA 766, for the doctrine that waiver of State immunity must be construed in strictissimi juris.
• Begosa vs. Philippine Veterans Administration, 32 SCRA 466 — The decision relied upon by the respondent appellate court; the Court distinguished and rejected its application, finding sophistry in the argument that the action was not a suit against the State.
• Alfonso vs. Commanding General, 7 Phil. 600 — Cited for the description of the nature and purpose of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law.
• Bishop of Segovia vs. Mun. of Bantay, 28 Phil. 347 — Cited for the rule that inscription of an informacion posesoria furnishes at best prima facie evidence of possession at the time the proceeding was held.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 865 — Cited for the rule that reconstitution of a document can be validly made only in case of loss of the original.
• Government of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374 — Cited for the proposition that a possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares, casting doubt on claims extending far beyond that area.

• Republic Act No. 3844 — Created the Land Authority, the governmental agency representing the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in the complaint. The Court noted that the complaint was directed against the Republic through this agency.
• Proclamation No. 90 (Nov. 1, 1954) — Issued by President Ramon Magsaysay, reserving for settlement purposes under NARRA administration a tract of land in Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur. The Court held that the phrase "subject to private rights, if any there be" in the Proclamation did not constitute consent to be sued, as a presidential proclamation is not a legislative act.
• Spanish Mortgage Law, Article 393 — Prescribed the requisites for conversion of an informacion posesoria into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to 10). The Court found no showing that the informacion posesoria had been so converted.
• Public Land Act — Provides the mechanism for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, an action in rem, which the Court noted respondent could have availed of but failed to pursue.

Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera, J., was on leave.