Republic of the Philippines vs. Crisanto S. Raneses

An applicant for original registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 bears the burden of proving by incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable and disposable public domain; a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s annotation on a conversion or subdivision plan and an LLDA Inter-Office Memorandum are insufficient for that purpose.

Respondent Crisanto S. Raneses claims ownership of two parcels in Barangay Napindan, Taguig City, through his parents and an extrajudicial settlement among his mother and sisters. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is the petitioner. The governing statutory framework is the Regalian doctrine under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, together with Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which permit registration only of alienable and disposable public land upon proof of possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

On March 26, 2007, Crisanto S. Raneses filed an Application for Original Registration of Land Title, docketed as LRC No. N-11573-TG, over Lot No. 3085-A, Csd-00-001621, and Lot No. 3085-B, Csd-00-001621, both in Barangay Napindan, Taguig City, Metro Manila, with a total area of 22,600 square meters. He claimed ownership through his parents, Pedro Raneses and Nina Raneses (also referred to as Catalina Raneses), and through an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of Waiver executed on April 24, 1997 by his mother and sisters Annabelle R. San Juan and Belinda R. Bayas, who partitioned and adjudicated the properties among themselves and waived their rights, interests, and participation in favor of respondent.

At the initial hearing on September 24, 2007, respondent marked documents to establish compliance with jurisdictional requirements. No opposition having been filed, the RTC issued an Order of General Default against all persons except the Republic and granted respondent’s Motion to Present Evidence Ex-Parte. On October 1, 2007, respondent testified that although the earliest tax declaration on record over the properties was issued only in 1980, his parents had been in continuous possession and occupation as early as June 1945. His father Pedro, a farmer, cultivated the properties by planting palay and other crops; because the land was near the lake, Pedro used a portable irrigation system to draw water from Laguna de Bay and a mechanized harvester. Pedro declared the properties for real estate tax purposes, as shown by several tax declarations in his name. When Pedro died on November 15, 1982, cultivation of the properties stopped. Respondent later had the properties declared for real estate tax purposes under his own name and testified that no other persons or entities occupied them.

Catalina Raneses corroborated respondent’s testimony. She testified that she and Pedro had possessed the properties since the Japanese occupation, that Pedro cultivated them for palay production, and that after Pedro’s death in 1982 the properties were no longer used for palay but were at times leased out for watermelon production. She confirmed that in 1997 she, her daughters, and respondent executed the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, waiving their rights and interests over the properties in favor of respondent for a consideration.

To establish that the properties were alienable and disposable, respondent presented a Conversion Subdivision Plan prepared by private Geodetic Engineer Andrew DG. Montallana. The plan stated that the properties were surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority No. LMS-SA-007607-310 dated August 29, 2006 issued by the CENRO, South Sector, and that they were “inside alienable and disposable land area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968.” Respondent also presented an Inter-Office Memorandum dated March 26, 2007 prepared and signed by the Engineering and Construction Division of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, composed of Engineer Ramon D. Magalonga, Jr., Fredisvindo A. Latoza, and Renato Q. Medenilla, and addressed to the Division Chief-III of the ECD. The memorandum stated that after an actual field verification, the team found the properties “presently above (back filling) the reglementary 12.5-meter elevation.”

The RTC granted the application on October 11, 2007, declaring respondent owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3085-A, with an area of 15,240 square meters, and Lot No. 3085-B, with an area of 7,360 square meters, and ordering the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree after finality. On October 25, 2007, the LLDA filed an Opposition alleging that the properties are below the 12.50-meter elevation, form part of the bed of Laguna Lake, and are therefore inalienable, indisposable, and incapable of registration. The LLDA attached an ECD Memorandum dated September 24, 2007 prepared and signed by Engineer Magalonga and concurred in by Division Chief-III Engineer Donato C. Rivera, Jr., which stated that upon projection of the properties on the LLDA’s topographic map, they were below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters. The LLDA also posited that, absent a declaration by the Director of Lands, the properties remain inalienable and indisposable. Respondent filed a Comment and Motion arguing that the Inter-Office Memorandum should be given more credence because it was based on actual field inspection, while the ECD Memorandum was based on a mere table survey, and that the ECD Memorandum should not be considered because it was not formally offered in evidence. The RTC dismissed the LLDA’s Opposition on November 27, 2007, attaching no probative value to its basis because it was filed fourteen days after the application was granted. The CA later upheld the RTC, giving more credence to the Inter-Office Memorandum and finding that respondent had adequately proven the properties form part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.

• Failure to Prove Alienability: Petitioner, through the OSG, averred that respondent, having the burden to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable, failed by relying simply on the Conversion Subdivision Plan and the Inter-Office Memorandum of the LLDA.
• Positive Act of Government: Invoking Republic vs. Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act or statute.
• Credence to ECD Memorandum: Petitioner posited that the ECD Memorandum, being a later issuance, should be given more credence than the Inter-Office Memorandum.
• Public Land Below 12.50 Meters: Petitioner argued that the subject properties are considered part of public land, being below the 12.50-meter elevation as certified by the LLDA.

• Non-offer of ECD Memorandum: Respondent countered that no consideration should be accorded to the ECD Memorandum because it was not formally offered in evidence.
• Credence to Inter-Office Memorandum: Respondent asserted that, even if considered, the Inter-Office Memorandum should be given more credence because it resulted from an actual verification inspection while the ECD Memorandum was merely based on a table survey.
• Prior Classification: Relying on the RTC and CA findings, respondent claimed that the subject properties had already been classified as alienable and disposable as provided in the Conversion-Subdivision Plan’s annotation.

• Alienability and Disposability: Whether the subject properties are alienable or disposable land of the public domain.

• Alienability and Disposability: No. The subject properties were not shown to be alienable and disposable land of the public domain; respondent failed to overcome the presumption under the Regalian doctrine by incontrovertible evidence. The CA decision was reversed and the application dismissed.

• Alienability and Disposability: Under Rule 45, review is limited to errors of law unless the factual findings are devoid of support, based on a misapprehension of facts, or glaringly erroneous. The records do not support the RTC and CA findings that the properties are alienable and disposable. Respondent invoked Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, which requires (a) that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicant or predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Regalian doctrine under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution presumes all lands not clearly within private ownership to belong to the State; public land remains inalienable unless reclassification or alienation is proved, not assumed. The applicant bears the burden to overturn the presumption by incontrovertible evidence. Respondent relied only on the Conversion Subdivision Plan annotation and the LLDA Inter-Office Memorandum. Under Republic vs. Dela Paz and Republic vs. Sarmiento, a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s annotation that the survey is inside an alienable and disposable area is insufficient. The applicant must instead present a certificate of land classification status from CENRO or PENRO, prove that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, show that the land is within the approved area per verification through survey by CENRO or PENRO, and present a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary. Respondent’s evidence did not satisfy these requirements. Because alienability was not proved, it was unnecessary to resolve whether the Inter-Office Memorandum deserved more credence than the ECD Memorandum. As in Republic of the Philippines vs. Lydia Capco de Tensuan, where the LRA or DENR opposes on the ground of inalienability, the Court cannot be lenient; since respondent failed to prove alienability, the burden of evidence did not shift to LLDA to prove that the land formed part of the Laguna Lake bed.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain; land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed and must be proved. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent failed to prove the subject properties were alienable and disposable.
• Requisites for Original Registration under Section 14(1), P.D. No. 1529 — A petition for registration may be granted upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court found that respondent failed on the first requisite.
• Incontrovertible Evidence Requirement for Alienability — The applicant must present a certificate of land classification status issued by CENRO or PENRO of the DENR; prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable; show that the land is within the approved area per verification through survey by CENRO or PENRO; and present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. A surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation on a conversion and subdivision plan that the survey is inside an alienable and disposable area is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
• Burden of Proof in Land Registration — The applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable. If the applicant fails to present satisfactory proof of alienability, the burden of evidence does not shift to the oppositor to prove that the land is inalienable.
• Rule 45 Limitation on Factual Review — In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or the findings are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. The Court applied this exception because the records did not support the lower courts’ findings on alienability.

• "The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain for land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved." — This passage states the Court’s foundational rule on the Regalian doctrine and the presumption that public land remains inalienable absent proof of reclassification or alienation.
• "In Republic v. Dela Paz citing Republic v. Sarmiento, this Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that “this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry,” is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain." — This excerpt directly rejects the evidentiary value of the very annotation respondent relied upon to prove alienability.
• "In contrast, this Court has held that the applicant must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable." — This passage enumerates the documentary requirements that an applicant must satisfy to prove alienability and disposability.
• "Since Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed." — This excerpt, quoted from Republic of the Philippines vs. Lydia Capco de Tensuan, explains that the applicant’s failure to prove alienability prevents the burden from shifting to the oppositor.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697, 710-711 (2002) — Cited by petitioner/OSG for the rule that an applicant must establish a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation report, or legislative act, to prove that land is alienable and disposable.
• Republic vs. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610 — Relied upon by the Court for the rule that a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s annotation on a conversion and subdivision plan is insufficient to overcome the presumption that land remains inalienable public domain; also cited for the Rule 45 exception allowing factual review when findings are devoid of support or misapprehended.
• Republic vs. Sarmiento, 547 Phil. 157, 166-167 (2007), citing Menguito vs. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000) — Cited in Republic vs. Dela Paz for the same rule that the surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation is insufficient to prove alienability.
• Republic vs. Naguiat, 515 Phil. 560, 565 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of registration is alienable and disposable.
• Aranda vs. Republic, G.R. No. 172331, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 140, 146-147 — Cited for the rule that all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and that public land remains inalienable unless shown to have been reclassified or alienated.
• Mercado vs. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., G.R. Nos. 141019, 164281 & 185781, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 13, 45 — Cited for the rule that land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed and must be proved.
• Republic vs. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 116, 121-122, citing Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 452-453 (2008) — Cited for the documentary requirements to prove that land is alienable and disposable, including the certificate of land classification status and proof of DENR Secretary approval.
• Republic vs. Jaralve, G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 495, 519 — Cited in relation to the authority of CENRO and PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status under DENR Administrative Order No. 20 and DENR Administrative Order No. 38.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Lydia Capco de Tensuan, G.R. No. 171136, October 23, 2013 — Quoted by the Court for the rule that leniency in evidentiary requirements is not allowed where the LRA or DENR opposes the application on the ground of inalienability, and that the burden of evidence does not shift to the oppositor if the applicant fails to prove alienability.

• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Authorizes application for registration by those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court held that respondent failed to prove the threshold requisite that the land is alienable and disposable.
• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by P.D. No. 1073 — Authorizes confirmation of imperfect titles for those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership since June 12, 1945. The Court quoted this provision as the statutory basis for Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
• Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution — Embodies the Regalian doctrine: all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The Court applied this provision to presume that the subject properties remain inalienable public land absent proof of reclassification or alienation.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended — Governs petitions for review on certiorari, limiting review to errors of law except when factual findings are devoid of support, based on a misapprehension of facts, or glaringly erroneous. The Court applied this rule in reviewing the lower courts’ factual finding on alienability.
• Section G(1), DENR Administrative Order No. 20 dated May 30, 1988; Section F(1), DENR Administrative Order No. 38 dated April 19, 1990 — Provide that CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for lands with an area below 50 hectares, while PENRO issues them for lands with an area over 50 hectares. These provisions were cited in relation to the documentary proof required to establish alienability.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Arturo D. Brion, and Justice Lucas P. Bersamin concurred. Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. penned the decision.