Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles

A petition for adoption filed under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which allowed either spouse to file alone, is not subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the Family Code's mandatory joint adoption requirement, because the petitioner's right to file alone and to have the petition proceed to final adjudication under the law in force at the time of filing is a vested right that cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the subsequent enactment of a new law. Substantial compliance with adoption statutes, rather than rigid adherence to formal pleading requirements, suffices to sustain the validity of adoption proceedings where the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration.

Private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles and her husband Dioscoro C. Bobiles were married spouses who had cared for the minor Jason Condat since he was four months old. The husband was residing in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. due to his employment at Saint Francis Hospital there. The applicable law at the time of filing was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which permitted a petition for adoption to be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. While the case was pending on appeal, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988, which made joint adoption by husband and wife mandatory.

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old, who had been living with her family since he was four months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1386. Attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof was an affidavit of consent executed by her husband, Dioscoro C. Bobiles, on October 17, 1987 in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., where he was then residing due to his employment at Saint Francis Hospital. The affidavit was duly authenticated in the Philippine Consulate General in that city.

The trial court, finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies seasonably served on the Solicitor General, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay, Salvador Condat (the child's father), and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of the order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in other places as required. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.

At the hearing, compliance with the jurisdictional requirements was proved, and the testimonies of private respondent, her husband Dioscoro Bobiles, and Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted. Dioscoro Bobiles gave confirmatory testimony in open court. The Department of Social Welfare and Development representative unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition. The trial court dispensed with trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. The petition also carried the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring that the minor child Jason Condat be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, with the child's surname changed to "Bobiles." The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision in toto. The Republic then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assigning as errors: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision granting the adoption in favor of both spouses.

• Retroactive Application of the Family Code: Petitioner contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright because it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. Petitioner argued that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as she did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.

• Modification of the Adoption Decree: Petitioner argued in the alternative that, even assuming the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner.

• Vested Right Under Prior Law: Private respondent maintained that her right to file the petition for adoption alone, without joining her husband, was vested upon the filing of the petition under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and that this right could not be prejudiced or impaired by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code.

• Substantial Compliance: Private respondent argued that her husband's affidavit of consent, attached to the petition and made an integral part thereof, together with his confirmatory testimony in open court, was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner, and that substantial compliance with adoption statutes should suffice to sustain the validity of the proceedings.

• Retroactivity of the Family Code: Whether the Family Code's requirement of joint adoption by spouses under Article 185 should be applied retroactively to a petition for adoption filed on February 2, 1988, when the Child and Youth Welfare Code was the governing law.

• Validity of the Adoption Decree: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision granting the adoption in favor of both spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles, notwithstanding that only the wife was named as petitioner.

• Retroactivity of the Family Code: No. The Family Code's joint adoption requirement cannot be applied retroactively to the petition filed by private respondent, because her right to file the petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication under the Child and Youth Welfare Code was already vested upon the filing of the petition, and Article 246 of the Family Code itself provides that retrospective application shall not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.

• Validity of the Adoption Decree: Yes, the adoption decree was properly affirmed. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, together with his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. The Court rejected the petitioner's alternative argument, holding that the adoption was properly granted in favor of both spouses.

• Retroactivity of the Family Code: The Court observed preliminarily that the petitioner's theory implied that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner was a jurisdictional defect, but noted that non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal of an action or special proceeding under Section 11, Rule 3, in relation to Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. The Court further noted that the objection was raised for the first time on appeal. On the merits, the Court cited Article 246 of the Family Code, which provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband. When she filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law, and upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. The Court further held that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, and once jurisdiction attaches, it cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events. The Court also addressed the petitioner's argument that Article 185 is remedial in nature and thus should be applied retroactively, holding that while procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment. The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time.

• Validity of the Adoption Decree: The Court rejected the petitioner's alternative argument that the adoption should have been granted in favor of private respondent only. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, showed that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The affidavit stated that "we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption" and that the adoption was by his wife "and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES." His subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. The Court held that punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice, and that the future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings. The Court applied American doctrines holding that adoption statutes and matters of procedure leading up to adoption should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution, and that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding. The Court further held that the welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and that in the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of the trial court's discretion in approving the adoption will not be disturbed. The Court noted that the adoption was with the consent of the child's natural parents, the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended approval, and the petition carried the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

• Vested Rights Doctrine — A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. It expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that private respondent's right to file the adoption petition alone, and to have it proceed to final adjudication under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, was vested upon the filing of the petition and could not be prejudiced by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code.

• Doctrine of Jurisdiction Determined by Statute in Force at Commencement of Action — The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the adoption petition under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and that the subsequent enactment of the Family Code could not oust that jurisdiction.

• Doctrine of Substantial Compliance in Adoption Proceedings — Adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. There need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the husband's affidavit of consent and confirmatory testimony were sufficient to make him a co-petitioner, notwithstanding his non-inclusion as a named petitioner.

• Doctrine of Paramount Consideration of the Child's Welfare — The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

• "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine of vested rights that the Court applied to protect private respondent's right to file the adoption petition alone under the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

• "When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the retroactivity issue, holding that the Family Code's joint adoption requirement cannot defeat rights already vested under the prior law.

• "Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of rigid formal requirements in adoption proceedings, emphasizing the paramount consideration of the child's welfare.

• "Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts." — This passage states the Court's policy-based rationale for liberally construing adoption statutes in favor of sustaining the adoption.

• Ayog, et al. vs. Cusi, etc., et al., 118 SCRA 492, 499 (1982) — Cited as authority for the definition of a vested right as a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action.

• People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968); People vs. Mariano, et al., 71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge, etc., et al., 145 SCRA 408 (1986); Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Navarro, etc., et al., 149 SCRA 432 (1987) — Cited collectively as authority for the rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

• Republic vs. Pielago, G.R. No. 72218, Resolution, July 21, 1986 — Cited as authority for the rule that a petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time, and that as long as the petition was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.

• Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565 (1971) — Cited as authority for the rule that jurisdiction of a court, once it attaches, cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events.

• Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, 159 SCRA 369 (1988) — Cited by the Court of Appeals and relied upon by the Supreme Court for the proposition that the decree of adoption would promote the welfare of the child.

• Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986) — Cited as authority for the policy that every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill the noble and compassionate objectives of adoption laws.

• Article 185, Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) — The provision requiring joint adoption by husband and wife. The Court held that this provision could not be applied retroactively to defeat the vested right of private respondent to file the adoption petition alone under the prior law.

• Article 246, Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) — The provision providing for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions of the Family Code, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. The Court applied this provision to protect private respondent's vested right.

• Presidential Decree No. 603, Child and Youth Welfare Code — The law governing adoption at the time the petition was filed, which allowed a petition for adoption to be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. The Court held that private respondent was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under this law when she filed the petition alone.

• Section 11, Rule 3, in relation to Section 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court — Cited by the Court to support its observation that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding.

• Justice Melencio-Herrera
• Justice Paras
• Justice Padilla
• Justice Nocon