Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be established by the totality of evidence as a grave, incurable, and juridically antecedent mental incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations; mere immaturity, infidelity, abandonment, gambling, or refusal or neglect of marital duties does not suffice. Accordingly, the declaration of nullity was set aside and the petition dismissed.

Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were spouses whose marriage was the subject of a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the dissolution of the marriage. The case required application of the guidelines in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina) for psychological incapacity.

Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple had no child because Catalina underwent hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour. Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable; the disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, admitting her psychological incapacity but denying that she left the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and that she flirted with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. The RTC found that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity affecting her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, and treated Dr. Reyes’s neuro-psychiatric evaluation as the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the evaluation showed Catalina had been mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations, and that her incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint, and clearly explained by the trial court.

• No Psychological Incapacity at Marriage Celebration: The State argued that there was no showing that Catalina’s alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration, nor were they of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Infidelity: The State argued that Catalina’s marital unfaithfulness was not shown to be a symptom of psychological incapacity.
• Abandonment: The State argued that abandonment of one’s family is only a ground for legal separation.
• Gambling: The State argued that Catalina’s gambling habit was not established to be a symptom of psychological incapacity.
• Expert Evidence: The State argued that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation and testimony of Dr. Annabelle Reyes failed to establish the cause of Catalina’s incapacity and to prove that it existed at the inception of marriage, was grave, and was incurable.
• Molina Guidelines: The State argued that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and CA did not conform to the guidelines in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina); Catalina’s refusal to do household chores and failure to care for her husband and adopted daughter were not psychological defects but indications of difficulty, refusal, or neglect to perform marital obligations.
• Collusion: The State argued that there appeared to be collusion because Eduardo admitted giving P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance at trial.
• Alternative Causation: The State postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment created strain in the relationship and forced her to seek friends’ emotional support, and that her ambivalent attitude toward their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children.

• Gravity and Severity: Eduardo maintained that the RTC and CA explained the gravity and severity of Catalina’s psychological incapacity and that it existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Nature of Alleged Incapacity: Whether Catalina’s infidelity, abandonment, gambling, and immaturity constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage and grave and incurable.
• Expert Evidence: Whether Dr. Reyes’s neuro-psychiatric evaluation and testimony sufficiently established the root cause, gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence of Catalina’s psychological incapacity.
• Collusion: Whether the payment of P50,000.00 by Eduardo to Catalina established collusion between the spouses.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The totality of evidence did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological incapacity under Article 36, so the CA decision was set aside and the nullity petition dismissed.
• Nature of Alleged Incapacity: No. Infidelity, abandonment, gambling, and immaturity do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity; abandonment is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10), and infidelity requires proof of a disordered personality.
• Expert Evidence: No. Dr. Reyes’s report and testimony did not establish the root cause, gravity, incurability, or juridical antecedence of Catalina’s alleged incapacity.
• Collusion: No. The P50,000.00 payment was Catalina’s share in the conjugal property and did not establish collusion.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, namely, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. Santos vs. Court of Appeals requires that psychological incapacity be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Molina guidelines require, among others, that the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; that the root cause be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; that the incapacity exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage; that it be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; that it be grave enough to bring about the disability to assume essential marital obligations; and that the non-complied marital obligations be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code. The lower courts did not exact compliance with these requirements and were liberal in appreciating the scanty evidence. Catalina’s supposed behavior was not even established, as Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations; his testimony was self-serving. The evidence therefore did not sufficiently prove psychological incapacity, and the doubt had to be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage.

• Nature of Alleged Incapacity: The only fact established, which Catalina admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Abandonment was not a ground for nullity of marriage under the Family Code; it was instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10). Her sexual infidelity was also not a valid ground for nullity under Article 36 unless there was a showing that the infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Eduardo did not adduce such evidence. Catalina’s immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity; to rule that immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to youth or immaturity. Suazo vs. Suazo held that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor—an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated the spouse from complying with essential marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.

• Expert Evidence: Both lower courts relied heavily on Dr. Reyes’s neuro-psychiatric evaluation despite the paucity of factual foundation for the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity, and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological incapacity. Dr. Reyes rendered only a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder; neither the report nor her court testimony explained the root cause that could have brought about Catalina’s behavior. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age beyond maturity. Expert evidence in nullity cases presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe, and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Lim vs. Sta. Cruz-Lim explained that the expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court; the probative force of expert testimony lies in the assistance the expert can render in showing the facts that serve as basis for the conclusion and the reasons upon which the logic of the conclusion is founded. Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. Her report therefore lacked depth and objectivity, removing the necessary support for the conclusion that Catalina was psychologically incapacitated. There was also no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage.

• Collusion: The assertion of collusion was based on Eduardo’s admission during trial that he had paid Catalina P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part. The payment could not be a manifest sign of collusion. Catalina did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she made it clear that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount as her share in the conjugal asset out of recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high; whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity should not be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Article 36 contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, namely, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The Court applied this definition and found that Catalina’s alleged incapacity was not sufficiently established.
• Molina Guidelines — In Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina), the Court laid down eight guidelines: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) the incapacity must be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) the illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) the essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220, 221, and 225 as regards parents and children, and the non-complied obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision; (7) interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect; and (8) the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. The Court found that the lower courts did not exact compliance with these guidelines.
• Gravity, Juridical Antecedence, and Incurability — Santos vs. Court of Appeals decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code, and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Court applied this requirement and found no sufficient proof that Catalina’s alleged incapacity was grave, incurable, or existing at the time of marriage.
• Totality of Evidence and Burden of Proof — The existence or absence of psychological incapacity is determined strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations. The incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove its existence. The Court found that Eduardo failed to discharge this burden.
• Natal or Supervening Disabling Factor — Suazo vs. Suazo held that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor—an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated the spouse from complying with essential marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. The Court applied this doctrine and found no such proof.
• Abandonment and Infidelity as Grounds — Abandonment is not a ground for nullity of marriage under the Family Code; it is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10). Sexual infidelity is not a valid ground for nullity under Article 36 unless it is shown to be a manifestation of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The Court applied this doctrine to Catalina’s admitted abandonment and alleged infidelity.
• Collusion — The payment of a share in conjugal property to a spouse who does not oppose a nullity petition does not, by itself, establish collusion. The Court found that the P50,000.00 payment was made as Catalina’s share in the conjugal asset and did not amount to collusion.

• "Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." — This passage states the core definition of psychological incapacity and distinguishes it from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will.
• "Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness." — This passage establishes the quantum of proof required under Article 36 and explains why Eduardo’s evidence failed.
• "It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown." — This passage, quoted from Suazo vs. Suazo, states the natal or supervening disabling factor requirement applied by the Court.
• "In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." — This passage is the Court’s concluding ratio, resolving the doubt in favor of the marriage and against nullity.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina), G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198 — Controlling precedent that laid down the eight guidelines for deciding cases involving psychological incapacity under Article 36; the Court found that the lower courts did not comply with these guidelines.
• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20 — Precedent holding that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; applied to reject the finding of incapacity.
• Suazo vs. Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154 — Precedent requiring proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor; quoted and applied to show that mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect is insufficient.
• Lim vs. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 569 — Precedent on the probative force of expert testimony; applied to discredit Dr. Reyes’s report and testimony for lack of depth and objectivity.
• Villalon vs. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572 — Precedent holding that sexual infidelity is not a valid ground for nullity under Article 36 unless shown to be a manifestation of a disordered personality; applied to Catalina’s alleged infidelity.
• Dedel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 461 — Precedent holding that immaturity alone does not constitute psychological incapacity; applied to Catalina’s alleged immaturity.
• Yambao vs. Republic, G.R. No. 184063, January 24, 2011, 640 SCRA 355 — Precedent stating that proving a spouse’s failure to meet marital responsibility is not enough; incapacity due to psychological illness must be shown.

• Article 36, Family Code — Authorizes the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The Court applied this provision and found the evidence insufficient to prove such incapacity.
• Article 55(10), Family Code — Lists abandonment as a ground for legal separation. The Court applied this provision to hold that Catalina’s abandonment of the conjugal home was not a ground for nullity.
• Articles 68 to 71, Family Code — Define the essential marital obligations of husband and wife. The Court applied these provisions through the Molina guidelines, which require the alleged incapacity to refer to these obligations.
• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Define obligations of parents and children. The Court applied these provisions through the Molina guidelines, which require the non-complied marital obligations to be embraced by these articles.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Bienvenido L. Reyes.