Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

A land registration court has jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for is agricultural, timber, or mineral, and its decree adjudicating the land as agricultural is final and beyond review absent a showing that the land had been previously declared timber or forest land or reserved for public purpose; a complaint for annulment of judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available. The 1930 Court of First Instance thus acted within its jurisdiction when it issued Decree No. 381928, and the Republic's belated challenge failed.

The Republic, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, is the petitioner; the Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan are the private respondents claiming under the original registered owners of Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The dispute concerns the classification of public lands under Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which empowered the Governor-General to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber, and mineral lands, and Section 8 of which opened to disposition only lands officially delimited and classified except those already private or subject to a recognized private claim. The 1935 Constitution declared agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain to belong to the State, subject to existing rights, grants, leases, or concessions at its inauguration.

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, covering Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing 7,047,673 square meters and situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to the decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 in the name of spouses Carag. On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928, and two transfer certificates of title were issued: TCT No. T-1277 in the name of the Province of Cagayan covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters, and TCT No. T-1278 in the name of private respondents covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the DENR in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate an action for annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the decree. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team, which reported that the portion of Lot 2472 covered by LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan was still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the decree and OCT No. 11585, and was only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority on 27 May 1994; the team also reported that Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others had possessed and occupied the portion through their predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for cancellation of OCT No. 11585 and its derivative titles be filed, and the Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation, and declaration of nullity of titles, alleging that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a 2,640,000-square-meter portion of the subject property because that portion was allegedly still classified as timber land and was not alienable or disposable until 22 February 1982. Private respondents moved to dismiss, and the Republic thereafter filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation, and declaration of nullity of titles.

The Republic claimed that in 1930 or 1938 only the Executive Branch had the authority to declassify or reclassify public domain land, and that the trial court therefore lacked power to adjudicate the disputed timberland portion to spouses Carag. The land classification maps attached to the complaint did not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for public purpose, and the NAMRIA certification dated 27 May 1994 contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land. The Republic did not allege that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion timber or mineral land under Section 6 of Act No. 2874, nor that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874 or was not land on which a private right could be claimed.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputed portion because it was still timber land and not alienable or disposable in 1930; only the Executive Branch could declassify or reclassify public domain land.
• Sufficiency of Allegations: Petitioner maintained that the complaint and amended complaint sufficiently alleged lack of jurisdiction as the ground for annulment.
• Rule 47 Compliance: Petitioner argued that it need not allege that ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies were no longer available because the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Authority of the Court of Appeals to Try Facts: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and the motion to dismiss.
• Effect of the Director of Lands as Party: Petitioner raised whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the trial court.

• Rule 47 Non-Compliance: Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 because the real ground was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and petitioner could have availed of ordinary remedies but did not.
• Missing Certified Copy: Private respondents maintained that petitioner did not attach a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled.
• Res Judicata and Law of the Case: Private respondents argued that the complaint was barred by res judicata, the law of the case, and Section 38 of Act No. 496.
• Non-Joinder: Private respondents stated that not all heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals.
• Real Party in Interest: Private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but Alfonso Bassig, who allegedly had an ax to grind against them.

• Rule 47 — Allegation of Lack of Jurisdiction: Whether the complaint and amended complaint sufficiently alleged lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of decree.
• Rule 47 — Unavailability of Ordinary Remedies: Whether petitioner was required to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies were no longer available.
• Authority of the Court of Appeals to Try Factual Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and the motion to dismiss.
• Jurisdiction over the Disputed Portion: Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan.
• Effect of the Director of Lands as Party: Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land.

• Rule 47 — Allegation of Lack of Jurisdiction: Yes. The complaint and amended complaint alleged that the trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputed timberland portion, which sufficiently pleaded lack of jurisdiction under Rule 47.
• Rule 47 — Unavailability of Ordinary Remedies: No. Where annulment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the petitioner need not allege that ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of its own.
• Authority of the Court of Appeals to Try Factual Issues: Yes. Section 6, Rule 47 allows the procedure in ordinary civil cases to be observed and evidence to be received, so the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues.
• Jurisdiction over the Disputed Portion: No. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to determine whether the land was agricultural, timber, or mineral, and the Republic failed to show that the disputed portion had been declared timber or forest land or reserved for public purpose; the 1930 decree is final.
• Effect of the Director of Lands as Party: No. The Director of Lands' participation did not change the nature of the land or confer jurisdiction; the government was a party in the original proceedings and did not appeal the trial court's determination that the land was agricultural.

• Rule 47 — Allegation of Lack of Jurisdiction: Rule 47 permits annulment of judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction refers to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. The complaint and amended complaint alleged that the trial court had no power or authority to adjudicate the disputed timberland portion because only the Executive Branch could declassify or reclassify public domain land, and that the decree and title were null and void ab initio. These allegations sufficiently pleaded lack of jurisdiction, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that no ground was alleged.
• Rule 47 — Unavailability of Ordinary Remedies: Under Ancheta vs. Ancheta, when a petition for annulment of judgment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter, the petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of her own. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed anytime unless barred by laches. Since the Republic's complaint was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, it was not required to allege the unavailability of ordinary remedies.
• Authority of the Court of Appeals to Try Factual Issues: Section 6, Rule 47 provides that the procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed and that, should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals therefore may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. Instead of remanding the complaint, however, the Supreme Court decided the case on the merits.
• Jurisdiction over the Disputed Portion: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. In 1930, Act No. 2874 governed. Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law. Act No. 2874, Section 6, empowered the Governor-General to classify public domain lands into alienable or disposable, timber, and mineral lands. Section 8 opened to disposition only lands officially delimited and classified, but excluded lands already private or subject to a recognized private claim. The Republic did not allege that the disputed portion had been declared mineral or forest zone or reserved for public purpose during the Spanish regime or thereafter; the land classification maps did not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for public purpose; and the NAMRIA certification dated 27 May 1994 contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land. The Republic also did not allege that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion timber or mineral land under Section 6 of Act No. 2874, nor that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to Act No. 2874 or was not land on which a private right could be claimed. Under Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the land registration court had jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest, or timber. When the Court of First Instance issued Decree No. 381928 in 1930, it had jurisdiction to determine the classification of the subject property; it determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag were entitled to the decree and certificate of title. The government was a party in the original proceedings and did not appeal. The 1930 decision is therefore final and beyond review. The 1935 Constitution recognized existing rights, grants, leases, or concessions at its inauguration, and spouses Carag already had an existing right under Decree No. 381928.
• Effect of the Director of Lands as Party: The participation of the Director of Lands as a party in the original proceedings did not change the nature of the land or grant jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance. The government was a party in the original proceedings as required by law and did not appeal the trial court's decision declaring the subject land agricultural. The Court of First Instance already had jurisdiction to determine whether the land was agricultural, timber, or mineral, and its final determination is beyond review.

• Jurisdiction over the subject matter — Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. Applied: Act No. 2874 governed when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930, and the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to determine the classification of the land.
• Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 based on lack of jurisdiction — A petition for annulment grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner; a void judgment may be assailed anytime unless barred by laches. Applied: the Republic's complaint sufficiently alleged lack of jurisdiction and was not required to allege the unavailability of ordinary remedies.
• Crown lands per se alienable — Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law. Applied: the Republic failed to show that the disputed portion had been declared timber or forest land or reserved for public purpose.
• Land registration court's jurisdiction to classify — A land registration court has jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for is agricultural, forest, or timber based on the proof or evidence in each case. Applied: the Court of First Instance's 1930 decree determined that the land was agricultural, and that determination became final when the government did not appeal.
• Finality of decrees and existing rights under the 1935 Constitution — A final decree of registration is conclusive, and the 1935 Constitution recognized existing rights, grants, leases, or concessions at its inauguration. Applied: spouses Carag had an existing right under Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930, and the decree was final and beyond review.
• Section 8, Act No. 2874 classification exception — The requirement that only officially delimited and classified lands may be opened to disposition does not cover lands already private or subject to a recognized private claim. Applied: trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate lands excluded from the classification requirement.

• "In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches." — This passage, quoted from Ancheta vs. Ancheta, states the controlling exception to the Rule 47 requirement of alleging unavailability of ordinary remedies when the ground is lack of jurisdiction.
• "When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case." — This passage, quoted from Republic vs. Court of Appeals, defines the land registration court's authority to classify land and supports the finality of the 1930 decree.
• "Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable." — This is the ratio on the default alienability of Crown lands under the Spanish regime, which the Republic failed to rebut.
• "When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court." — This passage applies the 1935 Constitution's recognition of existing rights and reinforces the finality of the 1930 decree.

• Ancheta vs. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004) — Quoted for the rule that a petition for annulment grounded on lack of jurisdiction need not allege that ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
• Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil. 159 (1909) — Cited for the principle that all Crown lands were per se alienable except those within the mineral and timber zone or otherwise reserved by the State.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127245, En Banc Resolution dated 30 January 2001 — Cited for the rule that the land registration court had jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest, or timber.
• Republic vs. "G" Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, 22 November 2005, 475 SCRA 608 — Cited for the definition of lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment, referring to lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter.
• Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC, 326 Phil. 640 (1996) — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.

• Section 2, Rule 47, Rules of Court — Provides that annulment of judgment may be based on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court found that the Republic sufficiently alleged lack of jurisdiction.
• Section 6, Rule 47, Rules of Court — Provides that the procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed and that evidence may be received by a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Applied to allow the Court of Appeals to try factual issues.
• Section 6, Act No. 2874 — Empowered the Governor-General to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber, and mineral lands. The Republic did not allege that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion timber or mineral land under this provision.
• Section 8, Act No. 2874 — Opened to disposition only lands officially delimited and classified, but excluded lands already private or subject to a recognized private claim. Applied to recognize that trial courts had jurisdiction over lands excluded from the classification requirement.
• Section 45(b), Act No. 2874 — Cited in Republic vs. Court of Appeals for the rule that persons in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of agricultural lands under a bona fide claim since July 26, 1894 may apply for confirmation of title with the Court of First Instance.
• Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution — Declared that agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, subject to existing rights, grants, leases, or concessions at the inauguration of the Commonwealth Government. Applied to recognize spouses Carag's existing right under Decree No. 381928.
• Section 101, Public Land Act — Cited by the Court of Appeals as the basis for saying that factual issues should be threshed out in the proper trial court. The Supreme Court instead held that the Court of Appeals could try factual issues under Section 6, Rule 47.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, and Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.