Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

A parcel of forest land is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System, and possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A final decision declaring a lot public land is res judicata and bars the reopening of the cadastral proceeding, rendering any subsequent decision null and void ab initio. A certificate of title covering property of the public domain classified as forest or timber land is void, and any title issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

The private respondents, Emilio Bernabe, Sr., Emilio Bernabe, Jr., Luz Bernabe, Amparo Bernabe, and Elisa Bernabe, all Filipinos and residents of Balanga, Bataan, sought to register portions of Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre, which had been declared public land in a pre-war decision in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. The lot was segregated from the forest zone and released as agricultural land on July 6, 1965, under the Public Land Act. The respondents filed a petition to reopen the cadastral case under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, claiming acquisition of ownership and possession for more than 30 years.

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

On April 26, 1967, the respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning portions of Lot No. 622 — designated as Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 — and a portion of Lot No. 324 — Lot Nos. 791 and 799 — as identified in segregation plans approved by the Director of Lands. The respondents alleged that they had acquired ownership and possession of the parcels by purchase from the original owners, whose possession, including that of the respondents, had been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years.

On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and directing that the Republic be notified by furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands, and the Director of Forestry with copies of the Order and petition by registered mail. On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an opposition, but upon verification that the area was already released from the mass of public forests, he withdrew his opposition. On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed an opposition alleging that the land was still public land and could not be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.

The lower court found that the petitioners had complied with all the terms and conditions entitling them to a grant. Its decision dated December 17, 1968 approved the segregation plans and adjudicated the lots in favor of the respondents, directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue the corresponding decrees of registration. Pursuant to the decision, Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818 were issued on May 7, 1969.

On May 7, 1970, the Republic, through the Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the decrees under Section 38 of Act No. 496, as amended, on the grounds that the proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to the Solicitor-General of subsequent hearings; that the parcels were portions of the public domain within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on July 6, 1965; that the respondents did not have a registerable title; that the lower court lacked jurisdiction; and that the respondents employed actual fraud. The respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no fraud, that the Solicitor-General had delegated his appearance to the Provincial Fiscal, that the review was filed out of time, and that the parcels had been transferred to innocent purchasers for value. On November 12, 1970, the Republic filed an amended petition alleging that the respondents executed simulated deeds of sale to third parties who were mere dummies. On August 14, 1971, the lower court denied the amended petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

• Requisite Possession Period: Petitioner argued that the lots claimed by the private respondents became agricultural only on July 6, 1965, when released from the forest zone, and consequently the respondents lacked the requisite thirty years of possession to entitle them to a grant under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141.
• Lack of Notice to the Solicitor-General: Petitioner argued that the government, being a necessary party in the cadastral case as reopened, should have been furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions, and that failure to give such notice deprived the State of its day in court and rendered the decision void.
• Fraud in Transfers: Petitioner argued that the transfer of the lots by private respondents to third parties while their titles were still subject to the one-year period of review constituted fraud schemed by the transferors to frustrate any action aimed at nullifying their titles.

• Lack of Fraud and Jurisdiction: Respondents argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action as there was no fraud to justify setting aside a decree of registration on review, and that if the Solicitor-General was not notified of subsequent hearings, it was because he delegated his appearance to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, and the review was filed out of time.
• No Cause of Action: Respondents argued that the petition stated no cause of action because the parcels of land had already been transferred to innocent purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-General filed the petition for review.
• No Abuse of Discretion: Respondents alleged that the decision of the Court of Appeals and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, and neither was the discretion exercised arbitrary or despotic.

• Jurisdiction to Reopen: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, given that Lot No. 622 had been declared public land in a final decision.
• Qualification for Grant: Whether the private respondents qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, given that the lots were released from the forest zone only on July 6, 1965.
• Notice to the Solicitor-General: Whether the failure to furnish the Solicitor-General with copies of court orders, notices, and decisions rendered the decision void and without binding effect on the government.
• Fraud in Procuring Titles: Whether the private respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over the parcels of land.
• Innocent Purchasers for Value: Whether the transferees of the lots could be considered innocent purchasers for value whose titles could not be cancelled.

• Jurisdiction to Reopen: No. The trial court had no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, because the prior decision declaring Lot No. 622 public land had become final and was res judicata, rendering the subsequent decision null and void ab initio.
• Qualification for Grant: No. Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 applies exclusively to public agricultural land, and forest lands are excluded; possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership, and the respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months, and 20 days of possession counted from July 6, 1965.
• Notice to the Solicitor-General: Yes. The Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases, and representatives such as the Provincial Fiscal had no power to decide whether an appeal should be made; without copies of court orders, notices, and decisions having been provided to the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.
• Fraud in Procuring Titles: No. Actual fraud was not established because the land was opened for disposition only on July 6, 1965, and the matter was threshed out in the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the case could still be reviewed because the decision suffered from lack of jurisdiction.
• Innocent Purchasers for Value: No. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and a certificate of title covering property of the public domain classified as forest or timber land is void, even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value.

• Jurisdiction to Reopen: The Court held that the prior decision declaring Lot No. 622 public land had become final and was res judicata, citing Republic vs. Estenzo. The trial court therefore had no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, and the decision rendered therein was null and void ab initio.

• Qualification for Grant: The Court applied Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942, which requires open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. The Court held that the provision applies exclusively to public agricultural land, and forest lands are excluded, being incapable of registration. Citing Li Seng Giap vs. Director of Lands, Director of Lands vs. Reyes, Vano vs. Government, Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, and Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, the Court ruled that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. The respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months, and 20 days of possession counted from July 6, 1965, the date the land was released from the forest zone.

• Notice to the Solicitor-General: The Court acknowledged that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial hearing but that notice of subsequent hearings and a copy of the decision were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, the duly authorized representative of the Solicitor-General. While earlier jurisprudence applied the principle of agency in Republic vs. Director of Lands, the Court noted that later decisions, particularly Republic vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 161 [1985]), tend to be more strict. The Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases, and he alone may withdraw the Government's appeal with binding effect. Representatives of the Solicitor-General had no power to decide whether an appeal should be made, and without copies of court orders, notices, and decisions having been provided to the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.

• Fraud in Procuring Titles: The Court identified the basic elements for the allowance of reopening or review of a decree: (1) the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (2) he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (4) the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. The Court held that actual fraud was not established because the land was opened for disposition only on July 6, 1965, and the matter was threshed out in the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, citing Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sangbengoo and Republic vs. De Kalintas, the Court held that if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid decision obtained by fraud may be annulled within one year, there is more reason to hold the same true if entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, such as want of due process or lack of jurisdiction. The case could properly be the subject of review because the Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and, more importantly, the lower court had no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding.

• Innocent Purchasers for Value: The Court cited Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. for the rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim good faith. Citing Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumyung, the Court held that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands, and any title issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. The lower court counted the period of possession before the lots were released as forest lands, which was tantamount to qualifying the respondents for a grant while the lands were still non-disposable.

• Res judicata in cadastral proceedings — A final decision declaring a lot public land is res judicata, and the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061. Any decision rendered in the reopened proceeding is null and void ab initio.

• Inalienability of forest lands — Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded and are incapable of registration. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership, and a parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.

• Solicitor-General as sole counsel of the government in land registration cases — The Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases, and he alone may withdraw the Government's appeal with binding effect. Representatives of the Solicitor-General have no power to decide whether an appeal should be made, and the reglementary period for appeal is reckoned from the time the Solicitor-General's Office is apprised of the order, not from the time a special counsel or fiscal was served.

• Elements for reopening or review of a decree — The basic elements for the allowance of reopening or review of a decree are: (1) the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (2) he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (4) the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. The fraud must be extrinsic or collateral, and review demands a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e., actual malice.

• Void titles over public domain — A certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

• Innocent purchaser for value — A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. Without the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in contemplation of law.

• "It must be stressed that said lot was declared public land by virtue of a court decision which has become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata." — This passage establishes the jurisdictional bar to reopening the cadastral proceeding, forming the basis for declaring the lower court's decision null and void ab initio.

• "Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the inalienability of forest lands and the incapability of their registration.

• "Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965." — This passage applies the thirty-year possession requirement to the facts, demonstrating the respondents' failure to qualify for a grant.

• "It is well-settled that a certificate of title is void, when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled." — This passage states the rule that titles over non-disposable public lands are void and may be cancelled even against innocent purchasers for value.

• Republic vs. Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222 (1983) — Cited as controlling for the principle that a final decision declaring a lot public land is res judicata, barring the reopening of the cadastral proceeding.
• Li Seng Giap vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 (1931) — Cited for the rule that forest lands are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title.
• Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 (1975) — Cited for the same proposition that inclusion of forest lands in a title nullifies the title.
• Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 (1920) — Cited for the rule that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
• Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 (1960) — Cited for the same rule on possession of forest lands.
• Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 (1968) — Cited for the same rule on possession of forest lands.
• Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 (1975) — Cited for the same rule on possession of forest lands.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 (1979) — Cited for the rule that a parcel of forest land is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register.
• Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 (1983) — Cited for the same rule on jurisdiction of the cadastral court.
• Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 (1984) — Cited for the same rule on jurisdiction of the cadastral court.
• Republic vs. Director of Lands, 71 SCRA 426 (1976) — Cited for the agency principle that service on the Provincial Fiscal is service on the Solicitor-General, but distinguished by later, stricter decisions.
• Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 (1969) — Cited for the rule that strict observance of service is waived once the party is informed by one means or another.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 (1985) — Cited as a more recent, stricter decision establishing that the Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases and that the reglementary period for appeal is reckoned from when the Solicitor-General's Office is apprised.
• Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 (1972) — Cited for the elements for the allowance of reopening or review of a decree and the requirement of extrinsic or collateral fraud.
• Rubico vs. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 (1969) — Cited for the elements of review and the requirement of actual fraud.
• Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil. 118 (1960) — Cited for the rule that a decree entered in compliance with a decision suffering from want of due process may be annulled.
• Republic vs. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 (1969) — Cited for the rule that a decree entered in compliance with a decision suffering from lack of jurisdiction may be annulled.
• Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 651 (1918) — Cited for the rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard.
• Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 (1979) — Cited for the rule that a certificate of title covering property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands is void.

• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Republic Act 1942 — Provides for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles for those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. The Court held that this provision applies exclusively to public agricultural land and does not cover forest lands.
• Section 38, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as amended — Governs the petition for review of decrees of registration. The Court applied this provision to the Republic's petition for review of the decrees issued in favor of the respondents.
• Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061 — Governs the reopening of cadastral proceedings. The Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under this law because the prior decision was res judicata.
• Section 11, Act 2259 — Cited in the lower court's decision as the basis for adjudicating the lots in favor of the respondents, but the Supreme Court reversed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

• Justice Fernan
• Justice Padilla
• Justice Bidin
• Justice Cortes

N/A — The case text does not provide the content of any dissenting opinion. The text notes that Justice Alampay was on leave and Justice Gutierrez, Jr. took no part, but no dissenting opinion is reproduced.