Republic of the Philippines vs. Carlos R. Vega, et al.

Original registration of title under Presidential Decree No. 1529 may be granted, pro hac vice, on substantial compliance with the requirement to prove that the land is alienable and disposable public land, even without a CENRO/PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s original classification, where the evidence shows a positive act of government classifying the land as alienable and disposable and there is no effective opposition from the government. The exception applies only to applications pending before the trial court prior to the Decision and not to future applications.

Respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega, and the Heirs of Gloria R. Vega trace their claim to Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baños, Laguna, to their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Respondents-intervenors Buhays assert a claim to an 826-square-meter portion of the same lot based on a 14 January 1951 “Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan” executed by Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega in favor of their predecessors-in-interest, the sisters Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio. Original registration of title is governed by Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 14, which requires proof that the land is alienable and disposable public land and that the applicant and predecessors-in-interest possessed it openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega, and the Heirs of Gloria R. Vega filed an application for original registration of title over Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baños, Laguna, with an area of 6,902 square meters. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92. They alleged that they inherited the land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza; their mother’s siblings, two brothers and a sister, died intestate without leaving any offspring.

On 21 June 1995, the Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition, alleging among other grounds that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation. During the trial, respondents Vegas presented exhibits to comply with jurisdictional requirements and witnesses to prove ownership, occupation, and possession. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna, under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testified that he had inspected the subject land and identified his Report dated 13 January 1997 submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The Report stated that the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone and that no public land application had been filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person.

Respondents-intervenors Buhays entered their appearance and moved to intervene, claiming a portion of the subject land consisting of 826 square meters. They alleged that the portion had been sold by respondents Vegas’ mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, to their predecessors-in-interest, the sisters Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio, by virtue of a “Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan” dated 14 January 1951. They formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest.

The evidence at trial included Gonzales’s Report, which attested under oath that (a) the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925; (b) the land had never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (c) the land was not within a previously patented, decreed, or titled property; (d) there were no public land applications filed by the applicant for the same land; and (e) the land was residential/commercial. Respondents-intervenors Buhays also offered Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, which was approved by Samson G. de Leon, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, and annotated with the proviso: “[T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925.” The Land Registration Authority’s Supplementary Report did not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land; it noted that the subject subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505, but that no decree of registration had been issued therefor, and recommended that if the instant case were given due course, the application in Case No. 1469 with respect to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed. The government did not cross-examine Gonzales and presented no countervailing evidence, aside from the pro forma opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable because Gonzales’s testimony did not contain the date when the land was declared as such. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals treated Gonzales’s testimony and sworn Report, the DENR-annotated subdivision plan, and the LRA’s failure to object as sufficient evidence that the land was alienable and disposable.

• Public Domain: Petitioner Republic opposed the application on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
• Failure to Prove Alienable and Disposable: On appeal, petitioner argued that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner questioned whether the evidence on record was sufficient to support the lower courts’ conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s grant of registration.

• Incomplete Record: Respondents argued that petitioner failed to include pertinent portions of the record that would support its arguments under Rule 45, Section 4(d), specifically the Appellee’s Brief of respondents Vegas, warranting outright dismissal.
• Question of Fact: Respondents argued that petitioner raised questions of fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.

• Procedural Defect — Incomplete Record: Whether petitioner Republic’s failure to attach respondents Vegas’ Appellee’s Brief to the Rule 45 Petition warrants outright dismissal for failure to include material portions of the record under Rule 45, Section 4(d).
• Question of Law or Fact: Whether the Petition raises a question of law, rather than a question of fact, reviewable under Rule 45.
• Alienable and Disposable Land: Whether respondents Vegas sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable public land.
• Substantial Compliance: Whether, despite the absence of a CENRO/PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s original classification, the evidence presented constitutes substantial compliance to support original registration.
• Buhays’ Claim: Whether respondents-intervenors Buhays’ title to the 826-square-meter portion may be affirmed based on the same title of respondents Vegas.

• Procedural Defect — Incomplete Record: No. The failure to attach respondents Vegas’ Appellee’s Brief is not fatal; Rule 45, Section 4(d) leaves the material portions of the record to petitioner’s discretion, and only the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment must perforce accompany the petition.
• Question of Law or Fact: A question of law. The Petition challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the legal conclusion that the land is alienable and disposable, not the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence.
• Alienable and Disposable Land: Yes. Despite the absence of a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s original classification, substantial compliance was established by Gonzales’s testimony and sworn Report, the DENR-annotated subdivision plan, and the absence of effective government opposition.
• Substantial Compliance: Yes, pro hac vice. The Court recognized an exception to the strict T.A.N. Properties rule where a positive act of government shows the land’s alienable and disposable character and there is no effective opposition; the exception applies only to applications pending before the trial court prior to this Decision.
• Buhays’ Claim: Yes. Respondents-intervenors Buhays’ title to the 826-square-meter portion was affirmed because their claim derives from the same title of respondents Vegas, who failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale to the Buhays’ predecessors-in-interest.

• Procedural Defect — Incomplete Record: Rule 45, Section 4(d) requires the petition to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution and such material portions of the record as would support the petition. The Court construed the requirement as leaving the selection of material portions to the petitioner’s discretion; except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, no other records must perforce be attached. Respondents were not prevented from attaching pertinent records, as respondents Vegas did by attaching their Appellee’s Brief to their Comment. The Court ultimately decides whether the attached records are sufficient. Thus, the omission did not warrant dismissal.

• Question of Law or Fact: The Court reiterated the distinction in New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. vs. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan: a question of law exists when the doubt concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for examination of the probative value of the evidence, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted; a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, including credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. Petitioner did not ask for examination of the probative value or truthfulness of Gonzales’s testimony; it questioned whether the evidence on record was sufficient to support the lower courts’ legal conclusion that the land is alienable and disposable. This is a pure question of law.

• Alienable and Disposable Land: Under Section 14 of PD 1529, applicants for original registration must prove (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14(1) requires the property to be alienable and disposable at the time the application is filed. Because possession was not disputed, the Court focused on the first requisite. Unless land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation cannot ripen into ownership; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable remain part of the inalienable domain. Land classification cannot be assumed; it calls for proof. To prove alienability, the applicant must conclusively establish a positive act of government, such as a presidential proclamation or executive order, other administrative actions, investigation reports of a Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute; the applicant may also secure a certification from the government. Previously, a DENR certification was sufficient and enjoyed the presumption of regularity. However, Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. ruled that a CENRO certification alone is not enough; the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, that the land falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO, and must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary certified as a true copy by the legal custodian. Thus, under the strict rule, a CENRO/PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s original classification are required. Respondents Vegas failed to submit these twin certifications. However, T.A.N. Properties was issued after the trial court and Court of Appeals decisions in this case. In Republic vs. Serrano, the Court held that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement; the DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent evidence to the contrary, and no opposition was filed by the LRA or DENR. The Court in Serrano equitably extended the benefit of the certification because no substantive rights stood to be prejudiced. Applying these precedents, the Court found substantial compliance. First, respondents Vegas presented Gonzales of CENRO, who testified that the subject land is alienable and disposable and identified his written Report. The Report attested under oath that the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925; that the land had never been forfeited for non-payment of taxes; that it was not within a previously patented, decreed, or titled property; that no public land applications had been filed for the same land; and that the land was residential/commercial. His appearance and testimony before an open court added to the reliability of the Report. Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered by respondents-intervenors Buhays, expressly indicated that the land is alienable and disposable. It was approved by Samson G. de Leon, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, and annotated with the proviso that the survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925. This annotation coincided with Gonzales’s investigation report. Third, the LRA never raised the issue that the land was not alienable and disposable; its Supplementary Report did not object on the basis of the nature of the land. The government failed to cross-examine Gonzales and presented no countervailing evidence, aside from the pro forma opposition of the OSG. While the onus of proving that the land is alienable and disposable remains with the applicant, and the government need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise, the absence of any effective opposition, coupled with respondents’ evidence, persuaded the Court to rule in their favor. Petitioner also assailed Gonzales’s failure to testify as to when the land was declared alienable and disposable. His testimony was indeed bereft of detail as to when the land was classified and when he conducted the investigation. But these matters could have been dealt with during cross-examination, which petitioner waived because of its repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence. In any event, the Report and the Subdivision Plan revealed that the subject land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was classified as residential and commercial. Thus, the evidence substantially established that the land applied for is alienable and disposable and subject to original registration under the Property Registration Decree. No reversible error was committed by the trial court or the Court of Appeals.

• Substantial Compliance: The Court emphasized that its ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not detract from Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. and similar cases imposing a strict requirement to prove that public land is alienable and disposable, especially because the lower court decisions were rendered prior to those rulings. The general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary. As an exception, courts, in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record, may approve the application pro hac vice on the ground of substantial compliance showing a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception applies only to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and is inapplicable to all future applications.

• Buhays’ Claim: Respondents-intervenors Buhays’ title to the portion of the subject land was affirmed. Their joint claim over the land draws its life from the same title of respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that portion of the land to the Buhays’ predecessors-in-interest.

• Substantial Compliance in Original Registration (Pro Hac Vice Exception) — Under Section 14 of PD 1529, the general rule requires an applicant for original registration to prove that the land is alienable and disposable public land through both a CENRO or PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary. As an exception, courts may approve the application pro hac vice, in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence on record, where there is substantial compliance showing a positive act of government as to the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. The exception applies only to applications for registration pending before the trial court prior to the Decision and is inapplicable to future applications. The Court applied the exception because the CENRO investigator’s sworn Report, the DENR-annotated subdivision plan, and the LRA’s failure to object established substantial compliance.

• Alienable and Disposable Public Land — Proof of Classification — Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. Land classification cannot be assumed; it calls for proof. The applicant must conclusively establish a positive act of government, such as a presidential proclamation or executive order, other administrative actions, investigation reports of a Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute; the applicant may also secure a certification from the government. The Court applied this by examining whether the evidence showed such a positive act, ultimately finding substantial compliance.

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The Court applied this distinction by holding that the Petition raised a question of law because it challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the legal conclusion that the land is alienable and disposable, not the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence.

• Rule 45 Material Portions of Record — Under Rule 45, Section 4(d) of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari must be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution and such material portions of the record as would support the petition. The requirement as to material portions is left to the discretion of the party filing the petition; except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, no other records must perforce be attached. The Court applied this by refusing to dismiss the Petition for failure to attach respondents Vegas’ Appellee’s Brief, noting that respondents could attach pertinent records and that the Court ultimately decides whether the attached records are sufficient.

• Presumption of Regularity of DENR Certification — A DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. The Court relied on this principle through Republic vs. Serrano, where a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification annotated on the subdivision plan was treated as substantial compliance, especially where no opposition was filed by the LRA or DENR and no substantive rights stood to be prejudiced.

• "Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable." — This passage, quoted from Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., states the strict rule that a CENRO or PENRO certification alone is insufficient and that the applicant must present a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s original classification.
• "While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925." — This passage, quoted from Republic vs. Serrano, supplies the substantial-compliance doctrine that the Court applied by analogy to the DENR-annotated subdivision plan in this case.
• "To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary." — This passage states the general rule that survives the Decision and frames the exception recognized for pending applications.
• "As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications." — This passage defines the pro hac vice exception and its temporal limitation, which is the core ratio of the Decision.

• Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477 — The Court cited this as the controlling strict rule requiring a CENRO/PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s original classification; it noted that the ruling was issued after the lower court decisions in this case and did not preclude the pro hac vice substantial-compliance exception.
• Republic vs. Serrano, G.R. No. 183063, February 24, 2010 — The Court relied on this precedent for the doctrine that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification annotated on the subdivision plan constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement to prove that the land is alienable and disposable, and that the DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent contrary evidence.
• New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. vs. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan, G.R. No. 161818, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 503 — The Court cited this case for the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact, which it used to reject respondents’ argument that the Petition raised a question of fact.
• Republic vs. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010 — The Court cited this case for the principle that the onus of proving that the land is alienable and disposable remains with the applicant in an original registration proceeding, and the government need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise; it also distinguished Roche because in that case the Laguna Lake Development Authority opposed the application.
• Republic vs. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 51 — The Court cited this case for the rule that public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
• Republic vs. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 585 — The Court cited this case, which in turn cited Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, for the rule that matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed and call for proof.

• Section 14, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides who may apply for original registration of title, including those who by themselves or through predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court applied this by identifying the two requisites for registration and focusing on the first requisite because possession was not disputed.
• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed. The Court applied this by examining whether the evidence sufficiently established the alienable and disposable character of the subject land.
• Rule 45, Section 4(d), Rules of Court — Requires a petition for review on certiorari to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution and such material portions of the record as would support the petition. The Court applied this by holding that the failure to attach the Appellee’s Brief was not fatal and that the selection of material portions is left to the petitioner’s discretion.

Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.