Republic of the Philippines vs. Caguioa

Judicial clemency may be partially granted to a dismissed judge who demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of remorse, reformation, sufficient lapse of time, reconciliation, and potential for public service, but the Court may decline to restore forfeited benefits or reinstate the judge to the bench where the gravity of the past offense and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary outweigh the movant's entitlement to full relief.

Three administrative complaints were filed against Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74, arising from his issuance of injunctive writs and a writ of execution in separate cases. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the Commissioner of Customs charged him with gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for enjoining the implementation of a tax statute and a customs personnel order. A private complainant, Charles T. Burns, Jr., charged him with grave misconduct for issuing a writ of execution favoring the adverse party in a land recovery case. The Supreme Court consolidated the three cases and, in its June 26, 2009 Decision, found Caguioa guilty, dismissing him from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave credits) in two cases and suspending him for three months in the third. The dismissal carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

Judge Ramon S. Caguioa served as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74. Three administrative complaints were filed against him and consolidated by the Supreme Court. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, charged him with gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that enjoined the implementation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9334, which subjected certain parties in a declaratory relief case to the payment of sin taxes and excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064, the Commissioner of Customs filed similar charges arising from Caguioa's issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that enjoined the implementation of a customs personnel order reassigning the District Collector of the Port of Subic. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066, private complainant Charles T. Burns, Jr. charged Caguioa with grave misconduct for issuing a writ of execution in favor of the adverse party in a land recovery case, placing that party in possession of the subject properties.

On June 26, 2009, the Supreme Court found Caguioa guilty in all three cases. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066, he was found guilty of simple misconduct and suspended for three months without pay. In A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2063 and RTJ-07-2064, he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and was dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits. The dismissal carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. Caguioa's motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on August 18, 2009.

Caguioa first sought judicial clemency through a letter dated July 13, 2010, and later filed an Omnibus Motion on October 10, 2011, seeking to convert that letter into a second motion for reconsideration. On November 25, 2011, Burns filed a Comment stating that he would not object to reinstatement, noting that time had healed his wounds and that the period Caguioa had been out of the Judiciary was enough penalty. The Court denied the Omnibus Motion and second motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2011, while noting Burns's Comment.

After almost twelve years from his dismissal, Caguioa wrote a Letter-Request for Judicial Clemency on February 9, 2021, addressed to then Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta. He expressed remorse for his past misdeeds, acknowledged the folly of improvidently issuing injunctive writs based on a misplaced reliance on two Supreme Court decisions, and stated that he had returned to private practice, serving clients with honesty and competence, including pro bono cases. He prayed for reinstatement as RTC judge, treatment of his dismissal period as suspension without pay, and full restoration of his retirement benefits. Attached to his letter were testimonials from Associate Justice Carlito B. Calpatura of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz of the Sandiganbayan, and Atty. Melencio Sta. Maria, Dean of the Far Eastern University – Institute of Law, all attesting to his humility, professional competence, and ethical conduct since his dismissal.

On March 16, 2021, the Court treated the letter-request as a petition for judicial clemency, finding a prima facie showing of circumstances warranting the grant, and referred it to a Commission composed of the three most senior Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The Commission ordered publication of the petition and notice to offended parties. The notice was published in three newspapers on December 15, 2021. No opposition was received within the prescribed period. On January 10, 2022, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment opposing the petition, arguing that the injury and damage sustained by the State were too substantial to countenance clemency. Caguioa replied that the writs he issued were immediately nullified by the Court and that no finding of manifest partiality, ill-will, bias, or corrupt intent had been made against him. On February 10, 2022, the Commission recommended that the petition be granted, finding deep remorse, reformation, reconciliation, and remaining productive years.

• Remorse and Reformation: Petitioner argued that he was remorseful of his past misdeeds, had realized the folly of his ways, and sincerely regretted his lapse in judgment in issuing the injunctive writs. He maintained that after his dismissal, he returned to private practice and served clients with utmost honesty, good faith, and competence, including pro bono cases for those who could not afford legal services.
• Absence of Bad Faith: Petitioner pointed out that the writs of preliminary injunction he issued were immediately nullified by the Court, thereby negating the claim of injury or damage to the State. He further posited that the Court never made a finding of manifest partiality, ill-will, bias, or corrupt intentions against him, either in the related case or in the June 26, 2009 Decision.
• Productive Years and Potential: Petitioner asserted that he still had six more productive years before reaching the mandatory retirement age of seventy, and that he could still be of service to the Judiciary if given the opportunity to redeem himself.

• Gravity of Offenses: Respondent, through the OSG, argued that the injury and damage allegedly sustained by the State for the serious breaches committed by petitioner were too substantial and should not be countenanced, and thus prayed that the petition for judicial clemency be denied.

• Judicial Clemency: Whether the petition for judicial clemency should be granted in light of the guidelines established in Re: Diaz and expounded in Re: Ong.
• Reinstatement: Whether petitioner should be reinstated to his former position as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 74.
• Conversion of Penalty: Whether the whole period of petitioner's dismissal should be considered and treated as suspension without pay.
• Restoration of Benefits: Whether petitioner's retirement and other relevant benefits as a judge should be fully restored.

• Judicial Clemency: Partially granted. The Court found clear and convincing evidence of petitioner's remorse, reformation, sufficient lapse of time, reconciliation, and potential for public service, satisfying the guidelines in Re: Diaz as expounded in Re: Ong, but declined to grant all reliefs prayed for.
• Reinstatement: Denied. The position was no longer vacant and had been filled by another member of the Bench, making reinstatement inequitable.
• Conversion of Penalty: Denied. Given the gravity of petitioner's offenses and the duty to preserve public confidence in the Judiciary, the Court declined to downgrade the original penalty of dismissal.
• Restoration of Benefits: Denied. Petitioner had not yet reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy, and his petition lacked any allegation of exigent circumstances such as economic difficulties that would necessitate the release of forfeited retirement benefits.

• Judicial Clemency: The Court applied the five-part guidelines from Re: Diaz as expounded in Re: Ong: (1) proof of remorse and reformation; (2) sufficient lapse of time from imposition of penalty; (3) age showing productive years ahead; (4) showing of promise and potential for public service; and (5) other relevant factors and circumstances. The standard of proof is "clear and convincing evidence," as established in Nuñez vs. Ricafort, which is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt but greater than preponderance of evidence. Petitioner presented testimonials from Justice Calpatura of the Court of Appeals, Justice Quiroz of the Sandiganbayan, and Atty. Sta. Maria, Dean of the FEU Institute of Law, attesting to his remorse and ethical conduct after dismissal. The Court found no reason to doubt these attestations, noting that the justices interacted with petitioner only in a professional capacity and would not jeopardize the integrity of the Judiciary merely to accommodate a friend. Almost twelve years had passed since the June 26, 2009 dismissal, exceeding the five-year minimum period for reflection. Petitioner was sixty-five years old with five remaining productive years. The reconciliation requirement was satisfied: for the private offended party (Burns), Burns had expressed forgiveness as early as November 2011; for the public complainants, petitioner published his petition and public apology in three newspapers on December 15, 2021. The OSG's opposition was found lacking in merit because it merely harped on the substantive findings of the 2009 Decision without pointing to any post-dismissal act demonstrating lack of remorse, and because clemency does not revisit a final judgment but focuses on the movant's conduct after the penalty.

• Reinstatement: The Court denied reinstatement because the position of Presiding Judge of the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 74, was no longer vacant and had already been filled by another member of the Bench. Restoring petitioner to his former position would be inequitable to the incumbent.

• Conversion of Penalty: The Court declined to convert the dismissal into suspension without pay. Cognizant of the gravity of petitioner's offenses — gross ignorance of the law in issuing injunctive writs despite basic and elementary requisites — and the attendant duty to preserve public confidence in the Judiciary, the Court exercised its sound discretion not to downgrade the original penalty. The Court emphasized that even when clear and convincing evidence of remorse and reformation exists, it does not ipso facto result in the absolute and complete grant of all reliefs sought; the grant must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.

• Restoration of Benefits: The Court refused to restore forfeited retirement benefits for two reasons. First, petitioner had not yet reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy for the Judiciary; in prior cases where retirement benefits were released, the movants were already at retirement age. Second, petitioner's petition was devoid of any allegation of exigent circumstances, such as economic difficulties, that might necessitate the Court's act of mercy in granting financial aid. The Court noted that in prior cases, partial restoration of benefits was granted based on factors such as advanced age, deteriorating health, or economic destitution, none of which were present here.

• Judicial Clemency — Judicial clemency is "an act of mercy removing any disqualification," which may be granted only upon strong proof that it is warranted. It is neither a right nor a privilege available at any time; its grant must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Clemency should not excuse or remove the fault of the offender's past acts, nor amount to condonation, and should not revisit a decision that has already become final. A plea for clemency is not a legal device to reconsider a judgment and reopen a case.

• Guidelines for Judicial Clemency (Re: Diaz) — The Court laid down five guidelines: (1) proof of remorse and reformation, supported by certifications or testimonials from the IBP, judges' associations, or prominent community members with proven integrity; a subsequent finding of guilt for the same or similar misconduct gives rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation; (2) sufficient time must have lapsed from imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3) the age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead; (4) a showing of promise, such as intellectual aptitude, learning, legal acumen, contribution to legal scholarship, or administrative and other relevant skills, as well as potential for public service; and (5) other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. The burden of proof to establish compliance rests on the movant.

• Reconciliation Requirement (Re: Ong) — There is an element of reconciliation in clemencies. When there is a private offended party, there should be an attempt at reconciliation where the offender offers an apology and, in turn, the wronged gives a full and written forgiveness. Only after this reconciliation can the Court acquire jurisdiction on the plea for clemency. Where there is no private offended party, the plea for clemency must contain a public apology.

• Standard of Proof for Judicial Clemency (Nuñez vs. Ricafort) — The standard of proof regarding reinstatement and a petition for judicial clemency is "clear and convincing evidence," which is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt but greater than preponderance of evidence. The degree of believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case. The Court held this standard equally applicable to petitions for judicial clemency regarding membership in the Bench, not only the Bar.

• Degrees of Clemency — There are degrees of clemency. Generally, unless for extraordinary reasons, dismissal or disbarment cannot be the subject of any kind of clemency within five years. The Court may partially grant petitions, lifting some disqualifications while declining to restore forfeited benefits, depending on the gravity of the offense, the preservation of public confidence, and the presence of mitigating factors such as advanced age, deteriorating health, or economic difficulties.

• "Clemency is not blind acceptance or tolerance of a wrongful act. Thus, any act of clemency should not revisit a decision that has already become final. A plea for clemency is not a legal device to reconsider a judgment and reopen a case." — This passage defines the boundary between clemency and appellate reconsideration, establishing that clemency focuses on the movant's post-penalty conduct rather than relitigating the original offense.

• "Judicial clemency is 'an act of mercy removing any disqualification,' which may be granted only upon a strong proof that it is warranted. To be granted judicial clemency, a claimant must show evidence of reformation and potential." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine of judicial clemency, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence to define the nature and threshold of the remedy.

• "the grant of judicial clemency must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts." — This passage articulates the limiting principle that constrains the Court's exercise of mercy, explaining why full relief may be denied even when all guidelines are satisfied.

• "humanity calls us to show benevolence and compassion to those deserving, but this Court has a greater duty toward justice and fairness." — This formulation, quoted from Re: Ong, captures the tension between mercy and institutional integrity that governs the Court's discretion in clemency petitions.

• Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021 — Controlling precedent expounding the concepts of forgiveness, clemency, mercy, pardon, and judicial clemency; established the procedural requirement of a prima facie evaluation, creation of a commission, and reception of evidence; clarified the reconciliation requirement and degrees of clemency. The Court partly granted clemency therein, forfeiting two-thirds of retirement benefits as penalty.

• Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, 560 Phil. 1 (2007) — Foundational precedent laying down the five guidelines for resolving requests for judicial clemency: proof of remorse and reformation, sufficient lapse of time, productive age, promise and potential for public service, and other relevant factors.

• Junio vs. Judge Rivera, Jr., 509 Phil. 65 (2005) — Cited for the principle that the Court has been conservative in granting judicial clemency and for the standard that a judge's conduct must withstand the most searching public scrutiny. Judicial clemency was granted therein based on years of service, single administrative offense, sincere repentance, lapse of more than ten years, and regressing physical condition.

• Department of Justice vs. Judge Mislang, A.M. Nos. RTJ-14-2369 & RTJ-14-2372, February 15, 2022 — Cited for the principle that the new parameters set by Re: Ong are prospective in application, and that the five-year period is a reasonable estimation of the minimum period for reflection, not a dispensation from the requirement of proving remorse and rehabilitation. Petition was denied therein for lack of remorse and insufficient evidence of reformation.

• Nuñez vs. Ricafort, A.C. Nos. 5054 & 6484, March 2, 2021 — Established that the standard of proof for judicial clemency is "clear and convincing evidence," and that the procedure for creating an independent commission does not apply to all clemency petitions, particularly those concerning disbarred lawyers rather than members of the Bench.

• Talens-Dabon vs. Judge Arceo (2012 case), 699 Phil. 1 (2012) — Clemency granted to a dismissed judge; the Court lifted the ban on reemployment and released accrued leave credits, but did not restore retirement benefits. Followed in the present case as a model for partial grant of clemency.

• Talens-Dabon vs. Judge Arceo (2020 case), A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, June 2, 2020 — The Court denied the same judge's petition for payment of retirement benefits, illustrating that release of forfeited benefits is not automatic even after clemency is partially granted. Distinguished from the present case on the basis that the movant therein had already reached retirement age.

• Paredes vs. Padua, 471 Phil. 31 (2004) — Clemency granted by restoring accrued leave benefits only, despite findings of sincere repentance and deep remorse, due to the severity of the infraction. Cited as precedent for partial grants.

• Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, 805 Phil. 688 (2017) — Petition for judicial clemency denied because the movant demonstrated impenitence, self-righteousness, and vindictiveness. Cited as a negative example contrasting with the present case.

• Section 17, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC (February 22, 2022) — Provides that dismissal from service for a serious charge carries the accessory penalty of disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all or part of benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, except accrued leave credits. Applied to confirm that Caguioa's dismissal carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from government reemployment, which the Court lifted as part of the partial grant of clemency.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 9334 — Amended Section 131 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, subjecting importation of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors, and wines into the Philippines, even if destined for tax and duty-free shops, to all applicable taxes, duties, and charges, including excise taxes. Caguioa's injunction against the implementation of this provision formed the basis of the administrative charge in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 — Provides that the mandatory age of retirement for justices and judges is seventy years, with eligibility for retirement benefits upon rendering at least fifteen years of service in the Judiciary or government. Applied to deny restoration of retirement benefits, as Caguioa had not yet reached the mandatory retirement age and prior cases releasing benefits involved movants already at retirement age.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concurred. Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., took no part.