Republic of the Philippines vs. Boquiren

A trial court has no jurisdiction in a Rule 108 proceeding to nullify marriages or rule on legitimacy and filiation; the validity of a marriage and the status of legitimated children can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, not through a collateral attack in a petition for correction of entries. Where a marriage was in fact celebrated, the Braza doctrine bars collateral attack on its validity in a Rule 108 proceeding, unlike in Kho where no marriage existed at all.

Respondents Oliver and Roselyn are siblings born out of wedlock to Oscar Boquiren and Rosalinda Macaraeg. After their births, their parents executed Affidavits of Legitimation and caused the annotation of legitimation on the children's certificates of live birth, premised on the parents' subsequent marriage. The legal framework governing correction of entries in the civil registry is Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, while the substantive law on legitimation and its impugnation is found in Articles 177 to 182 of the Family Code. The case implicates the boundary between Rule 108 proceedings and direct actions for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Oliver M. Boquiren and Roselyn M. Boquiren were born out of wedlock on October 8, 1997 and November 20, 1999, respectively, to Oscar D. Boquiren and Rosalinda B. Macaraeg. Their births were belatedly registered with the Local Civil Registry of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, on April 16, 2002. Two days later, on April 18, 2002, Oscar and Rosalinda were married. On May 20, 2002, on the basis of Affidavits of Legitimation executed by the spouses, the LCR recorded annotations on the children's certificates of live birth stating "LATE REGISTRATION, LEGITIMATED BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF PARENTS on 4-18-2002 at Mal. Pang." Thereafter, Oliver and Roselyn began using the surname "Boquiren" in their school records.

Sometime in 2015, while securing copies of the children's COLBs, Rosalinda was advised by the Philippine Statistics Authority that legitimation could not be effected because Oscar had a previous marriage to one Gloria Erese Pangilinan on January 29, 1987. A PSA Certification dated September 21, 2015 confirmed this prior marriage. There was no showing or allegation that the first marriage had been dissolved.

On May 4, 2016, respondents filed with the RTC a verified petition for correction of entries under Rule 108. They averred that their parents' marriage was void for being bigamous, that they were illegitimate children, and that the annotation of legitimation should be cancelled. They prayed that the LCR be directed to annotate instead the Affidavits of Acknowledgment dated March 28, 2016, executed by Oscar, so that they could continue using the surname "Boquiren." The RTC impleaded the Local Civil Registrar and Oscar as parties, issued an order setting the petition for hearing, caused publication in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks, and conducted trial on September 27, 2016, during which the public prosecutor actively participated on behalf of the OSG.

The RTC granted the petition on November 4, 2016, ratiocinating that respondents could not be legitimated because Oscar had a subsisting marriage at the time of their birth. The OSG's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 25, 2017. The CA affirmed on March 29, 2019, finding that the Rule 108 requirements for an adversarial proceeding were satisfied, that Oscar's second marriage was void for being bigamous, and that the RTC could rule on the validity of the marriage as essential to determining the propriety of cancelling the affidavit of legitimation. The OSG elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

• Jurisdiction under Rule 108: Petitioner argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction in a Rule 108 proceeding to nullify marriages and to rule on legitimacy and filiation, and that in ruling the legitimation ineffective, the RTC essentially declared the marriage void ab initio, which is outside the direct proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriages under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
• Improper Collateral Attack: Petitioner maintained that the RTC allowed respondents to impugn their own "legitimated" status and to effectively dissolve their parents' marriage by the mere expedient of changing entries with the LCR, without any interested or prejudiced party initiating a direct action as required under Article 182 of the Family Code.
• Respondents Not Proper Parties: Petitioner argued that respondents cannot claim to be prejudiced parties of their own legitimation, since the legal effect of legitimation is to improve their rights—from those of illegitimate children to those of legitimate children.

• Correction of Erroneous Entries: Respondents averred that the erroneous entry of the marriage of their parents, which is a nullity, should be corrected or cancelled so that their actual status as illegitimate children of their father can be correctly reflected in their birth records.
• No Declaration of Nullity: Respondents argued that in granting the petition, the RTC did not actually declare the marriage void but merely corrected erroneous entries in their COLBs, making petitioner's contention that the grant effectively declared the marriage void incorrect and misleading.
• No Marriage to Protect: Respondents asseverated that the government has no concern in protecting the marriage of their parents because there is actually no marriage in the first place, the same being bigamous in view of Oscar's previous marriage.

• Jurisdiction under Rule 108: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction in a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries to determine the validity of the parents' marriage and the legitimacy or filiation of the children.
• Collateral Attack on Legitimation: Whether the legitimated status of children can be collaterally attacked in a Rule 108 proceeding or must be impugned only in a direct proceeding for that purpose.
• Proper Party to Impugn: Whether the respondents, as the legitimated children themselves, are proper parties to impugn their own legitimation under Article 182 of the Family Code.

• Jurisdiction under Rule 108: No. The RTC has no jurisdiction in a Rule 108 proceeding to nullify marriages or rule on legitimacy and filiation; these matters can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
• Collateral Attack on Legitimation: No. The status of legitimated children cannot be collaterally attacked in a Rule 108 proceeding; it can be impugned only in a direct proceeding filed for that purpose, the doctrine on legitimacy applying with equal force to legitimation.
• Proper Party to Impugn: No. Respondents are not proper parties to impugn their own legitimation under Article 182, which limits impugnation to those prejudiced in their rights—i.e., persons who stand to suffer economic or material injury, such as the legal heirs of the parents.

• Jurisdiction under Rule 108: The Court applied the doctrine in Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, which held that a trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages or rule on legitimacy and filiation in a Rule 108 special proceeding. The CA's reliance on De Castro and Cariño was misplaced because neither case involved a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries; De Castro was an action for support and Cariño was a case for collection of sum of money. While the general rule from Niñal vs. Bayadog allows collateral attack on the validity of marriage in suits not directly instituted to question it when essential to the determination of the case, none of the cases permitting such collateral attack involved a Rule 108 proceeding. The Court distinguished Kho, where Rule 108 was allowed to delete the entry "married" because the parents never actually married—there was no marriage to speak of, so no collateral attack was involved. Here, a marriage was in fact celebrated between Oscar and Rosalinda; the Braza doctrine therefore controls. The Court also cited Fujiki vs. Marinay for the principle that a petition for correction of entries cannot substitute for a direct action to invalidate a marriage, as direct actions are necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

• Collateral Attack on Legitimation: The Court reasoned that under Article 178 of the Family Code, legitimation takes place by a subsequent valid marriage between the biological parents who were under no legal impediment to marry at the time of the child's conception. Legitimated children enjoy the same rights as legitimate children, with effects retroacting to the time of birth. Because legitimation equalizes children born out of wedlock with legitimate children, the presumption of legitimacy applies to legitimated children as products of the lawful marriage of their parents. It follows that, similar to legitimate children, the status of legitimated children cannot be collaterally attacked. The CA's reliance on Geronimo vs. Santos was misplaced because in that case, the collateral attack was allowed because the respondent was not a child at all of the persons whose names appeared as her parents—Articles 170, 171, and 166 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a couple. Here, Oscar does not dispute paternity; the correction sought would collaterally attack the already-recorded "legitimated" status, which cannot be done in a Rule 108 proceeding.

• Proper Party to Impugn: Even assuming arguendo that the Rule 108 petition could be treated as a direct action to impugn legitimation, it would still fail because respondents are not proper parties. Article 182 of the Family Code provides that legitimation may be impugned only by those prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. Relying on the commentaries of Sta. Maria and the deliberations of the Civil Code and Family Law committees, the Court explained that "rights" generally refers to successional rights. The persons prejudiced by an improper legitimation are the legal heirs of the parents, because a legitimated child acquires the full legitime of a legitimate child instead of the half-legitime of an illegitimate child. The cause of action accrues only upon the death of the parents, when successional rights vest. Respondents, who benefit from legitimation by acquiring the rights of legitimate children, cannot conceivably suffer economic or material prejudice from their own legitimation. The absurdity of relegating respondents to illegitimacy, when they already enjoy the superior rights of legitimated children, further underscores their lack of standing.

• Braza Doctrine — In a special proceeding for correction of entries under Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages or rule on legitimacy and filiation. The validity of marriages, as well as legitimacy and filiation, can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, not through collateral attack. This doctrine applies with equal force to the impugnation of the status of "legitimated" children, because legitimation places a child on the same footing as a legitimate child and the presumption of legitimacy attaches.

• Kho Exception — A Rule 108 proceeding may be used to correct an annotation on a birth certificate pertaining to the parents' marriage only when it is certain that there really was no marriage in the first place. In such a case, there is no marriage to speak of, and allowing correction does not amount to a collateral attack on the validity of a marriage. Where a marriage was in fact celebrated, the Braza doctrine prevails.

• Proper Parties to Impugn Legitimation (Article 182) — Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. "Rights" generally refers to successional rights; the persons prejudiced are the legal heirs of the parents of the legitimated child, whose legitime would be reduced by the improper legitimation. The cause of action accrues only upon the death of the parents, when successional rights vest. The legitimated child himself or herself is not a proper party, as legitimation improves rather than prejudices his or her rights.

• "the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation" — This is the doctrinal formulation from Braza as adopted by the Court, establishing the jurisdictional boundary of Rule 108 proceedings.

• "a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry." — Quoted from Fujiki vs. Marinay, this passage articulates the rationale for requiring a direct action to invalidate a marriage rather than allowing circumvention through Rule 108, safeguarding the substantive and procedural protections of marriage.

• "Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues." — The text of Article 182 of the Family Code, central to the Court's determination that respondents lacked standing to impugn their own legitimation.

• Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, 622 Phil. 654 (2009) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that a trial court has no jurisdiction in a Rule 108 proceeding to nullify marriages or rule on legitimacy and filiation; these can be questioned only in a direct action. Applied squarely to the present case.

• Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019 — Followed. Reiterated the Braza doctrine in a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries; the Court nullified pronouncements on legitimacy and filiation made in the Rule 108 proceeding, declaring them without prejudice to refiling an appropriate direct action.

• Ordoña vs. The Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370, November 9, 2021 — Followed. Echoed Braza and Miller, dismissing a Rule 108 petition seeking correction of entries relating to paternal information and filiation.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Kho, 553 Phil. 161 (2007) — Distinguished. Allowed correction under Rule 108 to delete the entry "married" where the parents never actually married. Distinguished from the present case because here a marriage was in fact celebrated, so the Braza doctrine applies.

• Fujiki vs. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524 (2013) — Cited for the principle that a Rule 108 petition cannot substitute for a direct action to invalidate a marriage, and that direct actions are necessary to prevent circumvention of marriage safeguards under the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

• Niñal vs. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) — Cited for the general rule that the validity of a marriage can be collaterally attacked in another suit when essential to the determination of the case, but distinguished because none of the cases applying this rule involved a Rule 108 proceeding.

• De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, 568 Phil. 724 (2008) — Distinguished. Involved an action for support, not a Rule 108 proceeding; the CA's reliance was misplaced.

• Nicdao Cariño vs. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001) — Distinguished. Involved a case for collection of sum of money, not a Rule 108 proceeding; the CA's reliance was misplaced.

• Geronimo vs. Santos, 770 Phil. 364 (2015) — Distinguished. Collateral attack on filiation was allowed because the respondent was not a biological child of the persons named as parents. The CA's reliance was a misapplication because here, Oscar does not dispute paternity.

• Anaban vs. Anaban-Alfiler, G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021 — Cited as an example where collateral attack on the validity of marriage was permitted in an action for partition of estate, not in a Rule 108 proceeding.

• Rule 108, Revised Rules of Court — Governs proceedings for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to collaterally attack the validity of a marriage or to impugn legitimated status; it is limited to rectifying facts recorded by the State and cannot substitute for a direct action to invalidate a marriage.

• Article 176, Family Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 9255) — Provides that illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized. The RTC invoked this provision to justify allowing respondents to continue using "Boquiren," but the Supreme Court reversed the grant of the petition.

• Article 177, Family Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 9858) — Defines legitimation as applying to children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. The Court noted that Oscar's prior subsisting marriage constituted a legal impediment.

• Article 178, Family Code — Provides that legitimation takes place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The Court applied this to show that legitimation requires a valid marriage, which was absent here due to the bigamous second marriage.

• Article 179, Family Code — Provides that legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. The Court used this to justify the extension of the presumption of legitimacy to legitimated children.

• Article 180, Family Code — Provides that the effects of legitimation retroact to the time of the child's birth.

• Article 182, Family Code — Provides that legitimation may be impugned only by those prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. The Court held that respondents, who benefit from legitimation, are not prejudiced parties and thus lack standing to impugn their own legitimation.

• Articles 166, 170, and 171, Family Code — Govern the impugnation of a child's legitimacy. The Court noted these provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a couple, distinguishing Geronimo.

• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC — The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. The Court held that declaring a marriage void requires a direct action under this rule, not a Rule 108 proceeding.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred.

• Singh, J. — A dissenting opinion was indicated in the case text, but its substance and reasoning are not provided in the source text.