Republic of the Philippines vs. Alconaba

An applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain must prove by clear and convincing evidence both that the land was classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that the applicant or predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Mere self-serving testimonies of possession and tax declarations of recent dates are insufficient to sustain such a claim.

Respondents are the children and sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr. and Luz Batallones Melendez, who were allegedly the original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, a 2.6-hectare agricultural land situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. The respondents subdivided the property into five lots (Lots 2111-A through 2111-E) after the deaths of their parents in 1967 and 1976, and sought registration of title in their names. The application was opposed by the Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General, which contended that respondents lacked the requisite possession and title under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 and Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

On 14 November 1996, respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an application for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of 5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. They identified themselves as the sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr. and Luz Batallones Melendez, the original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, a 2.6-hectare agricultural land. In their application, they stated that their parents had been in possession of the property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother on 19 February 1967 and their father on 5 May 1976, they partitioned the property among themselves and subdivided it into five lots — Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E — executing an Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition on 24 June 1996. They claimed to have been in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners, publicly and peacefully.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application, contending that neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title or had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since 1945 or prior thereto. The OSG further argued that respondents' tax declarations and receipts — all of recent dates — did not constitute competent evidence of a bona fide right to registration, and that the land formed part of the public domain.

At trial, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr. and Carmencita M. Alconaba testified. Mauricio, aged 60 when he testified in 1997, claimed that their parents had possessed the land since 1949 and had religiously paid taxes thereon. After their parents' death, he and his siblings took possession, paid taxes, and continued planting rice. Carmencita, aged 62, testified that the land had been in their parents' possession since 1940, that she and her siblings immediately took possession after their parents' death and religiously paid taxes, and that the land was being cultivated by their tenant, Julia Garal. She admitted that no improvements had been introduced by their family on the lot and, on cross-examination, that plans to sell the property were at hand.

The trial court found that respondents had established their family's actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from 1940, and that the land was alienable and disposable and not within any reservation or forest zone. It confirmed respondents' title and directed the Register of Deeds to register the parcels in their names. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Republic then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Possession: The OSG argued that both lower courts erred in giving weight to the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the lots in the concept of owners for at least thirty years.
• Insufficiency of Tax Declarations: The OSG maintained that respondents' tax declaration, which was only for the year 1994, and property tax receipts, which were all of recent dates (1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997), did not constitute sufficient proof that respondents and their parents had been in possession of the property for at least thirty years.
• Date of Classification as Alienable and Disposable: The OSG contended that even granting that respondents had been in possession since 1940, their adverse possession should be reckoned only from 28 September 1981, when the property was declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone, relying on a statement in the survey plan marked as Exhibit "Q."

• Date of Classification: Respondents contended that since Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004, of which Lot 2111 forms part, was approved on 31 December 1925 by the then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and alienable as early as that date.
• Meaning of "Certified on September 28, 1981": Respondents argued that the phrase "certified on September 28, 1981" in Exhibit "Q" could not have meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on that date, as the date obviously referred to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 was certified.

• Classification as Alienable and Disposable: Whether respondents proved by clear and convincing evidence that the subject land was classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain as of June 12, 1945 or earlier.
• Possession and Occupation: Whether respondents proved that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

• Classification as Alienable and Disposable: No. Respondents failed to discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain as of June 12, 1945 or earlier, the evidence relied upon being ambiguous and insufficient.
• Possession and Occupation: No. Respondents' self-serving testimonies and tax declarations of recent vintage did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence required; the law requires both possession and occupation, and respondents failed to prove specific acts of ownership or actual occupation of the land.

• Classification as Alienable and Disposable: The Court found no merit in the OSG's claim that the property was classified as alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981, as the phrase "certified on September 28, 1981" in Exhibit "Q" referred to the certification of Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004, not to the classification of Lot 2111 itself. However, the Court likewise rejected respondents' contention that the land must have been alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 because Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 was allegedly approved on that date by the Bureau of Forestry. There was nothing in the record to support the claim that 31 December 1925 was the date of approval of the project or the date of classification of the subject property as disposable and alienable public land. Because a person seeking registration of title must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, respondents' failure to establish the date of classification was fatal to their application.

• Possession and Occupation: The lower courts based their finding of fifty-seven years of possession on the testimonies of Carmencita and Mauricio, who were 62 and 60 years old respectively when they testified in 1997. If possession commenced around 1940, Carmencita would have been only 5 years old and Mauricio about 3, making it implausible that they could fully grasp the concept of possession of such a large tract of land before reaching the age of reason and reliably testify thereon nearly six decades later. Their bare assertions of possession since 1940 or 1949 were hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required; proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented, not mere general statements that are conclusions of law rather than factual evidence. The law requires both possession and occupation — the conjunction "and" indicating that the terms are not synonymous, with "occupation" delimiting the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession and requiring that possession not be a mere fiction. No evidence showed that the Melendez Spouses cultivated, controlled, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the 2.6-hectare land. Only one tenant worked on the land, with no evidence as to the size of the portion occupied. There was no competent proof that the Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation purposes or paid its taxes. The respondents declared the property for taxation purposes only for the year 1994 and paid taxes only for the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997 — all of recent dates — undermining their claim of immediate possession after their parents' death. None of the respondents reside on the property, and Carmencita admitted plans to sell, leading the Court to conclude that the registration move may have been a camouflage by land speculators seeking profits.

• Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title — An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title over alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain must prove two requisites: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that the applicant or predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. Both requisites must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to find that respondents failed to satisfy either requisite.

• Possession and Occupation as Distinct Concepts — The words "possession" and "occupation" in Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, are separated by the conjunction "and," indicating that they are not synonymous. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession; the addition of "occupation" delimits the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious," the word "occupation" highlights that the applicant's possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over the land of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

• Evidentiary Value of Tax Declarations and Receipts — While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of property for taxation purposes manifests a sincere desire to obtain title and announces an adverse claim against the State. However, tax declarations and receipts of recent dates are insufficient to establish long-standing possession, and belated declaration does not necessarily negate possession but serves as a good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.

• Exception to Conclusiveness of Appellate Court Findings of Fact — While findings of fact of appellate courts are generally conclusive upon the Supreme Court, an exception exists where the findings are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion. This exception was found to be present in the case.

• "The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession." — This passage articulates the doctrinal distinction between possession and occupation in land registration law, clarifying that actual occupation — not mere constructive possession — is required for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

• "Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945." — This passage states the two-part test for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, which is the controlling standard under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 as amended by P.D. No. 1073 and Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

• "It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their testimonies could not be relied upon to prove the adverse possession of the subject parcel of land by their parents." — This passage illustrates the Court's application of common-sense reasoning to evaluate the credibility of testimonial evidence regarding historical possession, reinforcing the requirement of clear and convincing proof in land registration cases.

• Director of Lands vs. IAC, G.R. No. 68946, 22 May 1992, 209 SCRA 214 — Cited for the principle that land registration courts must exercise extreme caution to prevent the public domain from being raided by unscrupulous land speculators, and for the distinction between possession and occupation.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-62680, 9 November 1988, 167 SCRA 150 — Cited for the rule that proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate a claim of possession, and that general statements are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence.
• Republic vs. IAC, No. L-66069, 28 September 1984, 132 SCRA 395 — Cited for the principle that a person seeking registration of title must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence.
• Director of Lands vs. Reyes, No. L-27594, 28 November 1975, 68 SCRA 177 — Cited for the proposition that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
• Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918) — Cited for the definition of actual possession as the manifestation of acts of dominion over land of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 — Provides that those who by themselves or through predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application may apply for confirmation of title. Applied as the baseline provision governing judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1073 — Amended Section 48(b) and (c) of C.A. No. 141 by substituting the phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945," and requiring that the provisions apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Applied to establish the critical date from which possession must be reckoned.
• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Reiterates that those who by themselves or through predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier may file an application for registration of title. Applied as the governing provision for land registration applications.
• Section 34, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Expands the jurisdiction of MTCs to include cadastral and land registration cases and provides that decisions of MTCs in such capacity are appealable in the same manner as decisions of the RTC. Applied to establish the jurisdiction of the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna over the land registration application.

Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.