Primary Holding
A marriage contracted for a limited purpose, such as acquiring foreign citizenship, is valid and subsisting provided all essential and formal requisites are present, as the parties' conscious intention to be bound by the legal tie constitutes genuine consent, distinguishing it from a marriage in jest where there is absolutely no intention to be bound.
Background
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought to overturn the lower courts' declarations of nullity of the marriage between respondent Liberty D. Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. The marriage was allegedly contracted for the sole purpose of enabling Albios to acquire American citizenship in exchange for $2,000.00. The case raises the legal question of whether a "limited purpose" marriage, specifically for immigration benefits, is void ab initio for lack of consent under the Family Code.
History
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RTC, April 25, 2008 — declared the marriage void ab initio, finding that the parties married for convenience and lacked the essential requisite of consent.
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RTC, February 5, 2009 — denied the OSG's motion for reconsideration, reiterating that consent was lacking because the parties had no intention to be legally bound.
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CA, September 29, 2011 — affirmed the RTC ruling, holding that the essential requisite of consent was lacking and characterizing the marriage as similar to a marriage in jest.
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Supreme Court, October 16, 2013 — granted the petition, annulling the CA decision and dismissing the civil case for utter lack of merit.
Facts
On October 22, 2004, Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and respondent Liberty Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer before the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer, but he did not file an answer. During the scheduled investigation for collusion, both parties failed to appear. At the pre-trial and subsequent hearing on the merits, only Albios, her counsel, and the prosecutor appeared, while Fringer did not attend despite due notice.
The RTC gave credence to Albios's testimony, finding that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00. After the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; Fringer returned to the United States and never communicated with her, and she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC and subsequently the CA declared the marriage void ab initio for lack of consent, likening it to a marriage in jest. The OSG, representing the Republic of the Philippines, elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Consent vs. Motive: Petitioner argued that both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, knowingly and willingly entering into it and understanding the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. Consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
- Not a Marriage in Jest: Petitioner maintained that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest because the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage; otherwise, Albios's purpose to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Marriage in Jest: Respondent reiterated her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
Issues
- Validity of Consent: Whether a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00 is void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
- Marriage in Jest: Whether a marriage entered into for a limited purpose qualifies as a marriage in jest.
Ruling
- Validity of Consent: No. The marriage is valid and subsisting. Consent was not lacking because the parties freely, consciously, and intelligently entered into the marriage to achieve their objective, satisfying the essential requisites under the Family Code.
- Marriage in Jest: No. A marriage in jest requires a complete absence of consent, where parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way. Here, the parties intended to be bound by the legal tie to accomplish their goal, distinguishing it from a pretended marriage.
Ruling Rationale
- Validity of Consent: Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent must be freely given, real (not vitiated by any vice), and conscious or intelligent. Albios and Fringer's consent was not vitiated nor rendered defective, and they fully understood the nature and consequences of their marriage. Their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created, as that precise legal tie was necessary to accomplish their goal. Motive for entering into a marriage does not negate the presence of valid consent. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
- Marriage in Jest: A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status and no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, resulting in a complete absence of consent. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow Albios to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective. Therefore, genuine consent was present, and the marriage cannot be considered a marriage in jest. Furthermore, the marriage cannot be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45(3) of the Family Code, as entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under the circumstances listed in Article 46, and there is no injured party since both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Doctrines
- Validity of Limited Purpose Marriages — A marriage may be declared valid even if entered into for a limited purpose, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, or title, provided that all essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. The State cannot dictate the kind of life a couple chooses to lead, and motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex; love is not the only valid cause for marriage.
- Marriage in Jest — A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. It is void ab initio for a complete absence of consent, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent.
Key Excerpts
- "There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that motive does not invalidate a marriage and that the validity of marriage depends strictly on compliance with legal requisites.
- "A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound." — This defines the canonical formulation of a marriage in jest, distinguishing it from a limited purpose marriage where there is a genuine intention to be legally bound.
Precedents Cited
- Bark vs. Immigration and Naturalization Service — Cited as the seminal U.S. case establishing the principal test for determining marriage fraud in immigration cases, which ruled that a marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
- United States vs. Rubenstein — Cited as a notable U.S. case where a marriage entered into solely to allow an alien to stay in the country was ruled not a marriage due to lack of consent, establishing the concept of a marriage in jest. The Supreme Court of the Philippines distinguished this case, holding that in Rubenstein, there was absolutely no intention to be bound, unlike in the present case.
Provisions
- Article 2, Family Code — Provides that consent is an essential requisite of marriage. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given and made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
- Article 4, Family Code — Provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. The Court used this provision to establish that since consent was present, the marriage could not be declared void under this article.
- Articles 45 and 46, Family Code — Article 45(3) provides that fraud is a ground for voidability, while Article 46 enumerates the exclusive circumstances constituting fraud (non-disclosure of previous conviction involving moral turpitude, concealment of pregnancy by another man, concealment of STD, concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality). The Court held that entering a marriage for immigration purposes does not qualify as fraud under these articles.
- Article 47(3), Family Code — Provides that the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. The Court noted there was no injured party as both conspired to enter the sham marriage.
- Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. The Court invoked this to justify safeguarding marriage from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, and Diosdado M. Peralta.